



Challenges Forum 2009

High-lighted Points of Discussion Session V: United Nations Effective Mission Command and Control

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1. What is it in particular that we need to move forward on?
 - 1.1. Improve Senior Civilian and Military leadership in missions.
 - 1.2. It should be better explained to Member States what complex peacekeeping in sometimes volatile environments with ambitious mandates mean and require from Member States.
 - 1.3. Interact regularly with TCCs about developments in missions without getting bogged down in a bureaucratic process which frustrates rapid decision making.
 - 1.4. Clear guidance and directives on C2 whereby striking the right balance between decentralization of authority and UN HQ control.
 - 1.5. Interaction of military and civilian and police in United Nations operations should be improved at UN HQ and in the field and the roles of various senior mission leaders clearly defined.

2. What is it that could facilitate making progress in a particular area?
 - 2.1. On 1.1 Senior leadership. Improve Senior Mission Leadership by better selecting and preparing (less politizing in the selection, better mentoring and pre-deployment training) and making the Senior Leaders accountable for their performance.
 - 2.2. On 1.2 Explain to Member States
 - 2.2.1. Advisory joint team of experienced personnel at HQ level for education and outreach could visit capitals of major contributing countries to liaise with senior political/military/police leadership plus staff colleges/commanders to explain scenario-training modules on the planning of operations/ the use of force/conduct of operations including robust peacekeeping under Chapter VII.
 - 2.2.2. Explain also that PKO anno 2009/10 mean that there is a greater risk on casualties.
 - 2.2.3. Guidance is needed for the C2 of FPUs.
 - 2.3. On 1.3 Interaction with TCC
 - 2.3.1. Regular Security Council and TCC meetings should be held updating the respective authorities with changes on CONOPS, directives, operational requirements, risk analysis and threat assessment.
 - 2.3.2. Peacekeeping operations depend on strong strategic vision. Politico-military discussions will shape the mandate. Need for strategic decision from Headquarters communicated not only to the field but also to the TCCs.
 - 2.3.3. From the outset the Security Council, Secretariat, T/PCC must have the same understanding about the mandate and the posture of the force. The posture will

be determined by the combination of the ROEs, actual mil capacities and the will of the TCCs.

2.4. On 1.4 Clear guidance and directives on C2

2.4.1. Operational oversight and accountability should be increased by reinstating the external Inspector General.

2.4.2. Accountability by measuring the performance of senior mission leaders and take action if situation dictates.

2.4.3. Political/military interaction in DPKO via for example IOTs providing strategic direction should be improved. Confusion, unclear reporting and evaluation lines exist in DPKO. Avoid that at HQ level in DPKO military role/capabilities and priorities are discussed and decided on by non professional civilian personnel. Get order in own house.

2.5. On 1.5 Interaction of military and civilian and police

2.5.1. Clear directives on C2 and a mission implementation plan at the mission level should be drafted.

3. What do we take away from the session?

3.1. Empowering SRSG and Force Commanders with a high degree of decentralization is appropriate but more strategic guidance is needed. It can only work when SMT provides strong leadership. And there must be a balance in the degree of decentralization and the grip of the UN HQ on missions. The perception gap of TCC and the reality on the ground should be bridged as soon as possible. Internal C2 relations in DPKO should seriously addressed.

3.2. Suggestions:

3.2.1. Improve immediately interaction with the Security Council, TCC, C-34, Military Advisors Community. **Action** DPKO short term

3.2.2. Visit capitals by an advisory team to explain to TCC what robust peacekeeping anno 2009 is all about and what is required. **Action** DPKO/OCHA short term

3.2.3. Design a scenario based pre-deployment training program for SRSG's, DSRSG's, HC's and FC's. **Action** DPKO/OCHA short/medium term

3.2.4. Reinstall an external Inspector General incl. a mechanism to follow up on recommended action points. **Action** DPKO short term

3.2.5. Have a good look at DPKO internally addressing the way how to improve the policy capacities and day-to-day management issues regarding missions. **Action** DPKO short/medium term

3.2.6. Engage Secretary-General in a discussion how to improve the selection of SRSG/DSRSG and Force Commanders and how performance could be measured **Action** DPKO/executive office Secretary-General short/medium term

4. Who should do what, when and how? See paragraph 3

Possible Questions for the discussion:

1. Are the present C2 really inadequate? Or are there other more important causes for the various crisis in UN PKO?
2. Is the relation between IOT, OMA and other functional parts within DPKO and OMA clear?
3. Is there really an overstretch in UN HQ or could a more efficient use of present human resources improve C2 and oversight?

4. Is an increase of seconded officers of TCCs to OMA really a way to improve the interaction of UNHQ and the TCCs?
5. What is the right balance between decentralization of authority to the field and UN HQ control? How far should it go? What are the limitations?
6. Could the internal day-to-day functioning of DPKO (OO-OMA/Police) not be improved so that UN HQ is looking at the bigger strategic picture instead of micro managing the missions in the field? Don't call immediately for more people!!
7. What should be done to improve the leadership in the missions?
8. What should be done to improve the C2 at DPKO level. Role of civilian/military. Military marginalized now?