



Broadening the Base of Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping: Proposals for How the United Nations can Attract and Support New, Expanding and Returning Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries¹

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I. Executive Summary

1. United Nations peacekeeping remains one of the international community's most effective tools to manage threats to international peace and security. The demand for personnel, equipment and enabling assets for UN peacekeeping operations is thus likely to continue, and even grow. Yet, even today, the Organization struggles to find the capabilities it requires. Moreover, although there are currently 116 troop- and police contributing countries, nearly 60% of total military and police contributions to peacekeeping came from the top ten contributors, which are all developing countries.

2. A recent non-paper issued by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) stresses that the UN can no longer rely so heavily on a small number of key contributors, and must strive to ensure a globally representative mix of contributors that would provide both legitimacy and flexibility to peacekeeping. It also warns that meeting today's needs is not enough; dependable and sustainable capacities are also needed to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

3. This study, conducted for the Challenges Forum, examines how DPKO and DFS can expand the base of peacekeeping contributors by targeting and assisting countries that are interested in becoming first-time contributors to UN peacekeeping, expanding their contributions or returning to peacekeeping after a hiatus. The study makes the following recommendations:

4. Need for a Strategy: DPKO and DFS need to understand the motivations and barriers that Member States face when becoming contributors. On this basis, they must develop a proactive, integrated (political/military/police) and properly-resourced strategy for generation of troops, police and other capabilities. The strategy should be tailored to

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different categories of potential contributors and address both current and future needs. It should also look at data collection/analysis and relevant IT tools.

5. Need to Streamline Current Practices and Procedures: DPKO and DFS are currently very responsive to new and emerging T/PCCs. However, some procedures could be further streamlined. These include:

- a. Develop generic introductory reference manuals (in French and English) with mission-specific annexes, to introduce Member States to the requirements of becoming a T/PCC.
- b. Develop a page on the DPKO website dedicated to T/PCCs
- c. Provide basic training to military, police and political advisers at permanent missions to introduce them to the requirements of being a T/PCC.

6. Ensure that Capitals have Easy Access to Information on Peacekeeping Contribution and Standards: DPKO and DFS' most critical interlocutors in contributing countries are not located in New York, but in capitals or in regional organizations. To rally support within the capital and make contributions materialize they need access to immediate information about general or mission-specific peacekeeping issues, contribution requirements and standards. DPKO and DFS also need to build relationships with ministries and other constituencies in capitals. To address this, DPKO/DFS could:

- a. Establish regional centres to serve as a single point of entry for queries from potential contributors, and provide outreach/information on peacekeeping requirements, standards and training. Member States would have to agree to fund these posts, perhaps beginning with pilot centres in one or two key regions or initial short-term deployments to a contributor or regional organization
- b. Establish a dedicated, integrated office at UN Headquarters that would pull together the information a capital requires and implement the DPKO/DFS strategy for expanding troop/police contributions.

7. Assessment Visits Need to be Prioritized and have Clear Guidelines: Assessment visits for military contributions and formed police units are an indispensable step in the process of signing on new contributors or new contributions and can achieve much more than discussions in New York. At present, these visits are carried out in an *ad hoc* fashion, without clear guidelines, and when funding and staff are available.

- a. DPKO/DFS need to budget for assessment visits by HQ as a priority activity, and also consider budgeting visits to the field by prospective T/PCC delegations.
- b. DPKO/DFS need to develop SOPs/guidelines for assessment visits.
- c. Member States need to understand how critical assessment visits are and fund them accordingly.

8. Training and Capacity-building by Bilateral and Regional Donors Needs Coordination: At present, bilateral and regional capacity-building and training initiatives that target new and emerging T/PCCs are largely *ad hoc* and uncoordinated; nor are the peacekeepers being trained and equipped necessarily linked to those slated for deployment to peacekeeping operations. DPKO/DFS should:

- a. Explore (i) whether the UN (or another actor) can/should serve as coordinator of

- bilateral/regional partnerships, to bring about a coordinated and targeted approach to allocation of resources for delivery of capacity-building and training for UN peacekeeping; and (ii) how such a mechanism would be funded.
- b. Ensure that UN standards serve as the basis for training and capacity-building by donors and that a coordination mechanism assists in disseminating these standards.
 - c. Encourage new or emerging T/PCCs to voluntarily partner with a leading T/PCC for guidance on preparation and deployment, or joint training and deployment with a more established T/PCC in their region.
 - d. Leading T/PCCs could organize regional workshops to share experiences with emerging or smaller T/PCCs.
9. Some Existing Policies need Modification. As highlighted in the New Horizon non-paper, some key policies and procedures make peacekeeping less effective and also stand in the way of attracting new contributors. The Secretariat and Member States should pursue, without delay, dialogue on these areas:
- a. Member State involvement in mission planning for robust operations
 - b. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and self-sustainment standards
 - c. Operational standards underlying required capabilities
 - d. A move from a quantitative to a capabilities-driven approach to the generation of peacekeeping capabilities
 - e. Procedures for recruiting and deploying police, especially specialists, on the basis of job descriptions
10. While the Secretariat will engage formally with Member States on these issues, other informal processes that encourage debate and put different perspectives and possible solutions on the table can be useful. The Challenges Partnership and DPKO/DFS can consider some of the proposals made in this study and select any that merit further research and development. The Partnership can also discuss ways in which it might assist DPKO/DFS with development of some of the specific products and initiatives proposed in this study.

II. Introduction

11. United Nations peacekeeping remains one of the international community's most effective tools to manage threats to international peace and security. The demand for personnel, equipment and enabling assets for UN peacekeeping operations is thus likely to continue, and even grow. Yet, even today, the Organization struggles to find the capabilities it requires.

12. In 1993, which was one of the peak periods in UN peacekeeping with large missions deployed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United Nations deployed an estimated 80,000 military, police and other personnel. Today, over 116,000 personnel are deployed across 15 missions. The size and increasing complexity of many of these operations and led to a proliferation of new peacekeeping tasks that require new, and often scarce, military and police capabilities. In the United Nations-African Union

Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) for example, less than 70 per cent of the nearly 20,000 authorized troops have been deployed, more than two years after the Security Council established the mission, and key capabilities such as helicopter support are still missing, impeding the Mission's ability to implement its mandate. Robust mandates, some of which include the protection of civilians, have also raised concern among leading troop contributors, contributing to uncertainty around the resourcing of operations. At the same time, the global economic crisis has placed strains on Member States and further threatens contributions to peacekeeping.

13. This crisis was highlighted earlier this year, in an internal analytical process launched by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS), aimed at identifying challenges and opportunities facing United Nations peacekeeping. A non-paper issued on 17 July 2009, entitled "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping" ("New Horizon"), sets out a broad agenda for peacekeeping reform. One of the points it stresses is that the UN can no longer rely so heavily on a small number of key contributors of police and military personnel and other assets, and must strive to ensure a globally representative mix of contributors that would provide both legitimacy and flexibility to peacekeeping. It also warns that meeting today's needs is not enough; dependable and sustainable capacities are also needed to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

14. This study, conducted for the Challenges Forum, examines how DPKO and DFS can expand the base of peacekeeping contributors by attracting and assisting countries that are interested in becoming first-time contributors to UN peacekeeping, expanding their contributions or returning to peacekeeping after a hiatus. In addition to looking at factors that might increase the base of contributors, it proposes steps the UN can take to provide, or mobilize other actors to provide, more effective support to interested Member States. These include streamlining of procedures, policy changes, increased political outreach and the strengthening of bilateral and regional partnerships. The Challenges Partnership and DPKO/DFS can consider these proposals and select any that merit further research and development. The Partnership can also discuss ways in which it might assist DPKO/DFS with implementation of the proposals made in this study.

15. Interviews for this study were conducted from July – October 2009, with a range of new and emerging troop- and police contributing countries, major contributors and former contributors, as well as officials in DPKO and DFS.

III. Challenge 1: How can DPKO/DFS Broaden the Base of Peacekeeping Contributions?

16. There are no quick and easy responses to the challenge of expanding the base of contributors to UN peacekeeping. At present, there is no set template or strategy for approaching different categories of member state contributors, although there are some established practices. The New Horizon highlights the importance of forward looking analyses of the willingness and readiness of countries to contribute and commits DPKO and DFS to improve strategic planning to identify medium and long-term capability

requirements. DPKO and DFS are already engaged in thinking on this issue and it would, therefore, be premature for this study to propose a specific strategy. However, to the extent that DPKO/DFS thinking is aimed at developing a strategy, the following considerations, which emerged in the course of this study, should be taken into account:

17. Understanding the Problem: Most contributions come from a small pool of developing countries. Nearly 90% of military and police personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations as of August 2009 came from developing countries.² And nearly 60% of total military and police contributions to peacekeeping as of August came from the top ten contributors, which are all developing countries.³

18. These figures reveal two problems: First, that the majority of current UN contributions do not come from a “globally representative” pool of countries – indeed, the developed world is largely physically absent from UN peacekeeping today, although it does pay most of the bills. As indicated in the New Horizon report, this has implications for the international character of peacekeeping and its underlying legitimacy and ability to deploy the right combination of personnel and capabilities.

19. Second, since the UN currently has 116 contributing countries, the fact that nearly 60% of contributions come from the top 10 countries also indicates that there is very heavy reliance on a small pool of top contributors to provide the bulk of contributions. Given the growth in demand, this approach is clearly not sustainable, and the UN must expand both the current pool of contributors and the scale and range of contributions.

20. Analyze Motivations and Barriers. In order to appeal to T/PCCs, DPKO and DFS need to understand the motivations Member States have for becoming contributors, as well as what holds them back. The Secretariat already has some useful data on this issue and much external research exists as well, but it is worth noting some of the factors that surfaced, during discussions with Member States for this study, as common motivations for and barriers to becoming a T/PCC:

Motivations	Barriers
a. Public opinion	a. Public opinion
b. Financial profit (including, Mission Subsistence Allowance, for police)	b. Financial burden
c. National interest	c. Cultural/historical/legal/constitutional reasons
d. Geographic proximity	d. Insufficient understanding of requirements/standards/flexibility of UN support arrangements
e. National profile/prestige	e. Absence of required personnel/equipment
f. Keeping armed forces gainfully occupied and trained	
g. Training/equipping/professionalizing	

² Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Contributions (military observers, police and troops) by Continent, as of 31 August 2009.

³ Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Contributions (military observers, police and troops) by Country, as of 31 August 2009. It should be noted, however, that Italy and France rank 11th and 15th, respectively, due to their contributions to UNIFIL.

<p>armed forces or police</p> <p>h. Armed forces or police gain experience in new areas, e.g. humanitarian activities, human rights, gender, community policing, diversity</p> <p>i. Recovery of prestige/respect for armed forces or police</p>	<p>f. Lack of specialized capabilities</p> <p>g. Lack of training and equipping programmes</p> <p>h. Capabilities tied up in other theatres</p> <p>i. Command and control</p> <p>j. Robust mandates</p> <p>k. Protection of civilians mandates</p> <p>l. Security/troop casualties</p> <p>m. Perceived lack of UN credibility</p>
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21. Strategy Must be Targeted. The list above is based on a limited sampling, but illustrates the wide range of factors that might influence a Member State's decision to contribute to UN peacekeeping. It also underscores the fairly obvious fact that the United Nations cannot have a single strategy aimed at attracting different contributing countries. Rather, it must devise a range of approaches tailored to different categories of Member States, that may have different motivations and interests, different levels of experience with peacekeeping and bring different capabilities to the table.

22. Three categories of contributors have been identified by DPKO⁴:

<p>Three Categories of Member State Contributing Countries</p> <p>a. Current T/PCCs who could be encouraged to contribute more</p> <p>b. New and emerging T/PCCs that have never provided troops/police</p> <p>c. Former contributors who could be persuaded to return to peacekeeping</p>
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23. In addition, the UN may need to target specific countries based on criteria including the following:

<p>Criteria for Targeting Potential T/PCCs</p> <p>a. Military/police capabilities</p> <p>b. Regional/geographical issues</p> <p>c. Political priorities</p> <p>d. Language, culture, familiarity with mission conditions</p> <p>e. Interoperability with other contributors</p>

24. Many current contributors are, in reality, making a very small contribution to peacekeeping, often in the form of a handful of military observers or police.⁵ Indeed, of the top 116 contributors, only the top 24 contribute more than 1,000 troops, police and observers, and only the top 64 contribute more than 100 troops, police and observers. Some of these countries are proceeding slowly, for political or other reasons, and may just be familiarizing themselves with UN peacekeeping for the moment. Others may face

⁴ Another set of categories that could be considered are: (i) countries that might lead an operation; (ii) countries that might provide a critical mass of troops/police; and (iii) countries that might provide niche capabilities.

⁵ Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, as of 31 August 2009.

some of the other barriers listed above, such as a lack of equipment and training that would allow broader integration into complex UN operations. Since they are already participants in the system, however, this pool represents great unrealized potential that could be further tapped into. Thus, many of the proposals below with respect to countries that are not yet contributors would apply equally to those that are currently making small contributions. The obstacles for former contributors are somewhat different, but addressing those could help ease the way for new and emerging T/PCCs as well.

25. Strategy Must be Proactive. If it hopes to broaden the base of peacekeeping contributors, DPKO/DFS need to be proactive in pursuing potential contributors, and not just respond to potential contributors that approach the UN. There is also a need, as recommended in the New Horizon non-paper, to conduct forward-looking analysis to assess the willingness and readiness of countries to contribute in the future. In this connection, it may be useful for DPKO and DFS to review the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), which is currently not used proactively either by Member States, in coming forward with UNSAS-related capacities, or by DPKO, to test whether pledges can actually be converted into offers. The UNSAS database itself, which already contains a great deal of useful data, could also be reviewed in this connection. With regard to police, the current database is not adequate. Both military and police generation and deployment could also benefit from advanced IT tools, databases and programmes, to ensure greater efficiency.

26. Strategy Must be Resourced. DPKO/DFS must ensure that there is adequate preparation before and effective follow up after discussions with Member States, which has sometimes not been possible in the past due to overstretched resources. To implement the strategy properly, DPKO/DFS will need to allocate dedicated resources, or seek new capacity. This will also require reflection on where in DPKO/DFS this capacity would best be located if it is to have the range of expertise required to operate in an integrated manner and have easy access to all necessary information.

27. Strategy Must Include Political Outreach and be Integrated. DPKO/DFS has tended to treat the generation of troops and police as a technical exercise, but force/police generation requires political outreach and an integrated military/police/political strategy. While consultation does take place with the political side of DPKO, responsibility for force/police generation lies almost fully with the Office of Military Affairs Force Generation Service and the Police Division, respectively. The two main ways in which they do this is by sending out Notes Verbale when personnel are required for a mission, or calling meetings with potential T/PCCs. In addition, due to the pressing needs and their limited capacity, the Force Generation Service and the Police Division are focused on current, rather than future, demands. Even so, despite the current demand for police, the Police Division has been able to hold very few meetings with potential PCCs to encourage their participation.

28. One of the main impediments to contribution is the lack of national interest or political will on the part of Member States. For DPKO and DFS to address this, contribution to peacekeeping must be approached as a highly political matter, which is

how it is viewed by Member States. Not only is political buy-in needed at various levels of different ministries in the capital, but legislative approval can also be required. Often, successful engagement must take place over a period of time, and cannot be limited to one particular mission or one specific DPKO need. This demands concerted political engagement and outreach at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General engaging with Heads of State and Heads of Government to obtain political commitments on contribution. Any military or police strategy must also be aligned with an overarching political strategy. It should also be noted that increasing the contributions to UN peacekeeping is not a “Secretariat problem” – indeed, it is the Security Council that issues mandates and authorizes the strength of missions. Accordingly, the DPKO/DFS strategy should also address ways to involve the Security Council, the C-34 and other bodies in dialogue with potential contributors and on the need to increase contributions.

29. With regard to the re-engagement of former TCCs, many of them Western nations that left peacekeeping in the 1990s, there is a new generation of officials who have no first-hand experience of UN peacekeeping and still refer to the problems of the 1990s. Yet peacekeeping has changed in important and commendable ways and DPKO and DFS need to reach out to these countries and explain the new way of doing business. The number of police contributions from Western countries has also decreased dramatically with the closing of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). These countries need to be re-engaged as well, and encouraged to contribute to other missions. If the goal is to have more global representation among contributors, this outreach needs to be considered a UN priority.

30. For police, there is such a pressing need for specialized skills and backgrounds, and for a larger volume than ever before seen in UN peacekeeping, that a targeted police strategy is critical. Many of the police requirements are for “formed police units” (“FPU’s”), which few Member States have; those that do often require equipment and other support before deployment. The Police Division now has, for the first time, a dedicated capacity for recruitment of police, and will be working to develop a police recruitment strategy. Again, to be effective, this work will need to be done in conjunction with a political strategy and outreach.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS need a proactive, integrated and properly-resourced political/military/police strategy for generation of troops, police and other capabilities, which is tailored to different categories of potential contributors and addresses both current and future needs. The strategy should also look at data collection/analysis and IT tools.

IV. Challenge 2: New T/PCCs are Unfamiliar with United Nations Peacekeeping

31. This section sets out the key challenges that Member States and DPKO/DFS face when seeking to provide new or expanded contributions to peacekeeping and proposes ways for DPKO/DFS to assist further in this process. This study did not find any evidence to suggest that the UN is losing potential troop or police contributors because it

has poor procedures and policies. On the contrary, Member States reported that the Force Generation Service (FGS) in the Office of Military Affairs, the Police Division (PD) and the logistics and finance divisions of DFS are extremely responsive and dedicate a great deal of time whenever approached by a Member State. The issue is how current practices and procedures can be further streamlined and targeted.

32. Peacekeeping can be Intimidating. For Member States that have little experience with peacekeeping, the prospect of becoming a T/PCC can be an intimidating one. These countries often have small, under-resourced permanent missions in New York and may lack a military or police adviser, who would normally have familiarity with the technical and military issues involved. Navigating the UN Secretariat, its rules and regulations, and even the jargon, can be challenging.

33. Even established T/PCCs report that they have an ongoing need for information. Because of the high turnover rate (most military or police advisers remain for two years) at permanent missions in New York, and depending on the size of the permanent mission and the background of the military/police adviser or the individual in charge of peacekeeping, many new advisers encounter many of the same problems in navigating the system.

34. Oral Briefings and Lots of Documents can Sometimes Overwhelm.

- a. *Oral briefings.* At present, a Member State that walks into the UN seeking information about becoming a contributor will be referred, in the first instance, to the Force Generation Service for TCCs, or to the Police Division for PCCs. These offices provide an initial oral briefing and then refer the Member State to other parts of DPKO and DFS for further briefings, e.g. on financial and logistic aspects. A number of guidelines, policies and PowerPoint are also made available. Recent and emerging T/PCCs report that they find the briefings to be informative, but those who are not familiar with peacekeeping or, in some cases, with military or technical terminology, have found it difficult to process all the details and convey these accurately to capitals. They would prefer to have the contents of the briefing and any key points in the accompanying documents provided to them in the form of a single, self-contained document, which they could then transmit to capitals. Ideally, this would be a generic document about peacekeeping contribution, with annexes for specific missions; these annexes could draw on existing mission-specific materials, that would be revised and supplemented for this purpose. There is, of course, no substitute for a tailored oral briefing that answers the specific questions that a Member State has, particularly with regard to specific missions, but that should be a second step, and further detailed discussions should ideally, take place in the capital (see section on Assessment Visits, below).
- b. *Accompanying documents.* With regard to the accompanying documents that are currently handed out to Member States, there is no set “packet” that has been vetted by the two departments and deemed appropriate for new or expanding T/PCCs. Thus, FGS and PD hand out the documents they each produce, such as the generic and mission-specific TCC guidelines or policing-related policies, and

DFS does the same. If the Member State does not visit the Integrated Training Service, for example, or the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, they might not be aware of the new peacekeeping training standards and modules, or the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” and other key guidelines/policy documents, elements of which are also relevant for new T/PCCs. (See Annex 1 for partial list of relevant materials for new T/PCCs). Moreover, the materials that are handed out to Member States were created for other purposes and are pitched at different levels; thus, they do not specifically target the concerns of new T/PCCs. Many of these materials assume a certain level of understanding of UN procedures and systems and are written in fairly technical language, which has been difficult for new T/PCCs to understand. Member States report that extracting the key points from this abundance of documents can be confusing and overwhelming.

35. Contributors can Start Small and “Contribution” Does Not Just Mean Troops. One of the key messages that potential contributors need to be aware of is that a Member State need not contribute a battalion or formed police unit in order to be a T/PCC. Indeed, FGS encourages most countries to start by contributing a few military observers. In the case of police, potential contributors are encouraged to begin by contributing a few individual police officers. Second, peacekeeping is not just about contributing troops or personnel, because the UN needs equipment, enabling assets and niche capabilities as well. Finally, a country that wishes to go down the road of contributing to the UN is advised to assign a military or police adviser to New York for 6 – 12 months. These messages need to be provided in writing.

36. Member States Need to Know What’s in it for Them. Potential contributors may be aware of some, but not all, of the benefits that contribution to peacekeeping can bring to them. The UN needs to agree on a message and communicate these benefits to new/emerging T/PCCs at the outset.

37. DPKO/DFS need to streamline current practices and procedures as follows:

PROPOSAL: Develop generic introductory reference manuals (in French and English) with mission-specific annexes, to introduce Member States to the requirements of becoming a T/PCC.

These manuals should

- a. introduce potential contributors to UN peacekeeping*
- b. selectively draw from and supplement relevant existing materials (e.g. on reimbursement, logistics, training, etc) , but not just be a collation of all existing materials*
- c. be written in clear and simple language that is appropriate for newcomers to peacekeeping*
- d. include a flow chart showing the sequence and timelines for required steps*
- e. explain the different forms that contribution can take*
- f. describe the benefits of peacekeeping to Member States*

- g. List related materials, including guidance material, and where they can be accessed*
- h. List key contacts in DPKO/DFS*
- i. Mission-specific annexes could be in the form of a CD-ROM, with footage of the mission, examples of achievements of specific units, etc.*

PROPOSAL: Develop a page on the DPKO website dedicated to T/PCCs

This page should

- a. contain the generic reference manuals and mission-specific annexes*
- b. have links to other materials, policies and standards relevant to T/PCCs*
- c. have a “frequently-asked questions” section*
- d. Include a generic email address to which queries can be submitted and directed to the correct office in DPKO/DFS*

PROPOSAL: Provide basic training to military, police and political advisers at permanent missions to introduce them to peacekeeping and the requirements of being a T/PCC.

This training:

- a. could constitute one module of the annual Military Police Advisers’ Community (MPAC) training*
- b. should have an integrated approach*
- c. should complement more specialized training provided at HQ, such as on COE requirements*

V. Challenge 3: Capitals Do Not Have Easy Access to Information on Peacekeeping Contribution and Standards

38. One of the big challenges DPKO/DFS face is that their most critical interlocutors in contributing countries are located in capitals, or at the headquarters of regional organizations, as are the key decision-makers. Personnel in the permanent missions in New York have a different set of responsibilities and backgrounds, and are not always the appropriate interlocutors for detailed discussions on logistics capabilities, equipment, training, etc. In addition, depending on the information flow between the capital and the permanent mission, DPKO and DFS have sometimes experienced a disconnect between what the permanent mission and the capital are saying.

39. Capitals and regional organizations need access to immediate information about general or mission-specific peacekeeping issues, contribution requirements and standards, to enable them to rally support within the capital and make contributions materialize. As pointed out in the New Horizon, since DPKO and DFS do not have representation in the various regions of the world, there is no opportunity for the Organization to build relationships with ministries and other constituencies in capitals (such as parliaments, citizens’ groups, the media, etc.) or “sell” peacekeeping to them. Nor is there a dedicated

office at UN Headquarters identifying a capital's needs and pulling together the information it requires. (See proposal above about establishing an integrated office within DPKO/DFS for this purpose). Instead, the permanent mission of the T/PCC must make the rounds of the various DPKO/DFS offices, seeking information piecemeal. Finally, T/PCCs that approach the UN are usually more diligent in passing information on to their capitals, while there is less certainty about subsequent information flow when it is the UN that is targeting a potential T/PCC and contacts the permanent mission in New York.

40. If DPKO/DFS could to set up outposts in different regions, many of these objectives could be achieved. Consideration could be given to attaching centres to existing regional UN offices, as appropriate. DPKO/DFS would also have to give thought to how to staff these centres, to ensure the right range and level of skills. In addition, the terms of reference of the centres would have to be very clear to avoid any duplication/overlap with the role of Permanent Missions or DPKO/DFS offices at UN Headquarters. Finally, there would have to be clear reporting and communication lines with Headquarters.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS could establish regional centres that would serve as a single point of entry for queries from potential contributors, and provide outreach/information on peacekeeping requirements, standards and training.

Staff would:

- a. be up-to-date on a range of peacekeeping issues and reach back to NY Headquarters for any technical advice required, or to request an assessment visit from NY.*
- b. Conduct outreach to difference constituencies, including ministries, parliament, the public, etc. , including possibly a public information component*
- c. Advise on peacekeeping standards and training*
- d. Provide quality control of preparedness and training*
- e. Build contacts and long-term relationships with current or potential contributors*
- f. Liaise with HQ and third countries on capacity-building issues*
- g. speak relevant regional language(s).*

Member States would have to agree to funds these posts, perhaps beginning with:

- a. pilot centres in one or two key regions; or*
- b. initial short-term deployments to a contributor or regional organization, to work on capacity-development of UN Missions*

VI. Challenge 4: Assessment Visits are Critical but Little Funding and No Guidance Exists

41. Assessment Visits Need to be Prioritized and have Clear Guidelines. Whenever possible, DPKO/DFS carry out “assessment visits” to prospective military contributors. There is, however, currently no provision for visits to PCCs that are considering contributing formed police units. These visits are different to high-level political visits and are conducted either for assessment of general capabilities or for contribution to a specific mission. They are also distinct from “pre-deployment visits” (PDVs), which are carried out to inspect a particular capability that has is to be deployed to a specific mission.

42. All DPKO/DFS staff and recent T/PCCs interviewed confirmed that assessment visits are the most indispensable step in the process of signing on new contributors or new contributions and can achieve much more than discussions in New York. Because these visits are so important, DPKO/DFS may want to review how they are framed and conducted. At present, assessment visits are carried out in an ad hoc fashion, when funding and staff are available. The assessment visits are aimed at providing expert advice and answering detailed questions the prospective T/PCCs might have, as well as assessing their capabilities (including structure, composition, enabling units, training, etc.) once a strong declaration of interest has been made. With some exceptions, the teams carrying out these visits are composed of military, finance and logistics experts only, with no political or training experts present, which participants have indicated is not always effective.

43. The key issues that prospective T/PCCs want explained to them in detail are not the military tasks per se that they will be asked to carry out, but rather UN procedures, which can be complicated, and specificities of mission mandates. The issues Member States often request detailed information on include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a. Command and control
- b. Rules of engagement/concept of operations
- c. Compatibility/Inter-operability
- d. Contingent owned equipment system and reimbursement arrangements
- e. Logistics system and flexibility of arrangements
- f. Translation of mission SOPs and force orders into tactical level tasks
- g. Local language, customs and conditions of specific missions

44. Because of the complexity of the issues involved, these discussions are more effective if they take place early on in capitals, between UN and Member State experts, rather than with permanent missions in New York. At the same time, DPKO and DFS need to establish the country’s capabilities with regard to training, equipment, personnel, command and control and support, and need clear standards for doing so.

45. Facilitate Visits of Prospective T/PCCs to Missions. In certain case, it might be worthwhile for DPKO/DFS to invite a delegation from a potential T/PCC, or a team of

senior military/police officers from different prospective T/PCCs, to visit one or two missions to which they are considering contributing, to observe the needs and conditions on the ground first-hand. This would require funding and planning, but if the countries are carefully selected it could be quite effective.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS need to budget for assessment visits by HQ as a priority activity, both for military and FPU contributions, and also consider budgeting visits to the field by prospective T/PCC delegations. Member States need to understand how critical assessment visits are and fund them accordingly.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS need to develop SOPs/guidelines for assessment visits.

These should include:

- a. the purpose and outcome of such visits*
- b. link to DPKO/DFS military/police/political strategy*
- c. Who is in the lead*
- d. Who else participates and in what capacity, with a view to having an integrated team*
- e. key topics/areas for briefings*
- f. clear standards against which DPKO/DFS will measure operational capability*
- g. funding*

VII. Challenge 5: How Can DPKO Make Better Use of Bilateral and Regional Partnerships?

46. Training and Capacity-building by Donors Needs Coordination. At present, significant global resources are spent on bilateral and regional capacity-building and training initiatives that target new and emerging T/PCCs. These are largely ad hoc initiatives that are neither coordinated among themselves nor with the UN. Nor is there necessarily a correlation between the peacekeepers being trained and equipped through these initiatives, and those who are slated for deployment to peacekeeping operations and may require support.⁶

47. Because of the UN's limited capacity and resources, these partnerships among Member States, which can serve to provide a global training network, are essential and should be encouraged. They could be more effective, however, if they were coordinated with and reflected the UN's actual and projected needs. Examples abound of expensive and well-intentioned training programmes that are not targeted to personnel who are actually deploying to critical operations like those in Darfur and the Congo. Another specific need relates to countries that are considering the development of FPUs for UN peacekeeping, but require bilateral assistance and currently cannot approach a coordination mechanism to assist them in identifying available support.

⁶ There has, however, been some coordination with regard to support being provided to countries deploying police and FPUs to UNAMID.

48. UN Standards Must Exist and Serve as Basis for Training and Capacity-building by Donors. It is essential that any bilateral or regional assistance programmes that aim to prepare peacekeepers for UN service be based on UN operational and training standards. Clearly, this presupposes that the UN has clear, up-to-date standards in place. Where that is the case, DPKO/DFS must ensure that those running these programmes have access to and fully understand the standards. In other areas, the UN must engage Member States in the development of clear standards that would support pre-deployment preparedness.

49. Coordination Mechanism Could Assist in Dissemination of UN Standards. A coordination mechanism, if developed, could be one means of distributing the latest standards and policies. Too often, assistance is being provided on the basis of outdated UN standards, or based on the donor country's own standards and procedures, which then creates problems down the road. Donor countries should be aware that UN standards are constantly undergoing change. Thus, even their own national personnel or other experts with past peacekeeping experience who are retained to assist with capacity-building and training, may not be fully aware of these changes.

50. Explore Working With or Within Existing Coordination Mechanisms. Another option is for the UN to work within the limited coordination mechanisms that already exist. The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centre, and its African chapter, the African Peace Support Trainers' Association (APSTA), are information-sharing bodies that could potentially be tapped into for coordination and dissemination purposes. They could also be provided access to DPKO/DFS' database of training modules and policy and guidance documents. At present, however, the only existing coordination mechanisms are the annual meeting of the "G-8++ Africa Clearinghouse" and the more recently established Global Clearinghouse, in which the UN, EU, AU, and NATO participate along with G8 members and other member states seeking to develop peacekeeping capacity. Both fora meet annually with the objective of enhancing global information exchange and coordinating activities in order to enhance global peace operations capacity building efforts and avoid overlapping of donor programmes. Despite the intention to develop a website for information exchange and dissemination of relevant information when the Africa Clearinghouse was first established, this still does not exist, although there has been a recent resurgence of support for the idea which could open the door to improving coordination.

51. Another mechanism that has been proposed is the development of an African Union comprehensive plan for long-term capacity-building. This was recommended in the 31 December 2008 Report of the African Union-United Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, and the Secretary-General's Report of 18 September 2009 on Support to AU Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations. The goal is to develop a long-term road map for capacity-building, indicating priorities, structural requirements and benchmarks, and for the UN to facilitate discussions with the AU and other actors on development of a harmonized framework to consolidate funding.

52. The UN and Member States must assess whether the UN's needs can be adequately addressed through these mechanisms, or whether a mechanism specifically targeting UN operations is warranted. Such a discussion should consider whether the existing mechanisms could be improved if they had full-time Secretariats, websites for information exchange, etc.

PROPOSAL: Explore whether the UN (or another actor) can/should serve as coordinator of a bilateral/regional partnerships, to bring about a coordinated and targeted approach to allocation of resources for delivery of capacity-building and training for UN peacekeeping.

- a. Mechanism should be used to communicate UN standards to partners*
- b. Should include an effective information management system to communicate information about upcoming deployment numbers and dates.*
- c. If the UN is in charge of coordination, it would need resources to carry out this function.*

53. Joint Training and Deployment by T/PCCs. Capacity-building and training partnerships are usually between a donor nation and a new or emerging T/PCC. Another model that could be considered is partnerships between T/PCCs in the same region or sub-region, whereby the two countries would train and perhaps even deploy together. For example, for its first foray into peacekeeping, a new TCC might attach several units to the battalion of a more established TCC from the same region. Argentina and Chile, for example, began forming a joint force ("Cruz del Sur") in 2008, for future UN operations. Another example, in 1999, was New Zealand's deployment of a battalion to the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), to which several other countries (Canada, Ireland, Nepal, Fiji and Singapore) attached forces at various times. Finally, this is beginning to happen in the African context with preparations for the African Standby Force (ASF).

PROPOSAL: Explore partnerships in which a new or emerging T/PCC and a more established T/PCC from the same region train and deploy jointly.

54. Experienced T/PCCs Should Share Experiences With New/Emerging Contributors. While DPKO/DFS should serve as the primary source of information for new or potential T/PCCs, current contributors also have a wealth of experience and information they could usefully share. Some emerging T/PCCs stated that, before approaching the UN, they felt more comfortable turning to an existing T/PCC in their region, or to another T/PCC with whom they had strong ties, for advice and guidance on becoming a contributing country. These partnerships can be effective and should be encouraged.

PROPOSAL: The UN should facilitate a mechanism whereby new or emerging T/PCCs would, voluntarily, partner with a leading T/PCC for guidance through the process of preparing for and deploying to a peacekeeping mission.

55. Member-state Run “Training” Workshops. The UN does not have the resources or capacity to organize regular workshops to train Member States on becoming contributors, but these could be useful if run by experienced T/PCCs, with some participation by UN experts. The UN should determine the location and timing of workshops to ensure that the greatest needs are being covered.

PROPOSAL: Leading T/PCCs could organize regional workshops to share experiences with emerging or smaller T/PCCs.

- a. The workshops would be organized and run by Member States.*
- b. UN experts could present on some key issues, but current T/PCCs would share experiences on participation in UN peacekeeping operations, including requirements, deployment preparations, training, etc.*
- c. Workshops would be funded either by the hosting country or a third party donor.*

VIII. Challenge 6: Which Existing Policies should be Modified to Attract Contributors?

56. A number of DPKO/DFS policies, or practices with policy implications, pose obstacles to contribution. These are concerns both for leading troop-contributors and for former contributors to peacekeeping – for the most part Western nations that left peacekeeping in the 1990s. Others were raised in the New Horizon and cannot be removed overnight, but both the Secretariat and Member States need to be committed to pursuing solutions.

57. Mission Planning and Command and Control. European and North American countries have had long-standing concerns with command and control arrangements in UN peacekeeping operations, many of which are now shared by other TCCs as well. Those interviewed cited a range of concerns:

- a. Lack of continuity/consistency in UN senior leadership
- b. Lack of consistency in UN management of missions and military operations
- c. Force commander has only operational control; does not command forces, which are under national command
- d. Military assets and support are under civilian control
- e. Inability of DPKO Headquarters to exercise command and control over peacekeeping operations; only provides guidance and assistance
- f. Concerns about the effectiveness of DPKO and the DPKO - field relationship, leading to concerns that DPKO may not be able to provide the necessary support/back up at critical moments
- g. Despite recent advances, lack of military and planning doctrine, as compared with NATO, etc.
- h. Reluctance to get involved in an operation if the Member State has not been involved in mission planning
- i. Planning processes (especially for new missions) differ from planning doctrine of many countries, whereby Headquarters provides strategic guidance but operational planning is done by Mission Headquarters

- j. Reluctance to participate unless the Member State is given senior command positions, but realization that they will not get these positions unless they contribute troops, which creates a vicious circle
- k. Judgments about command and control are being made based on these countries' involvement in peacekeeping in the 1990s.

58. Addressing concerns about command and control is a real challenge, given the unique structure of UN operations and the need to maintain impartiality in order to preserve the UN's legitimacy. However, the New Horizon acknowledges the need to strengthen contributors' confidence in mission planning and command and control arrangements, and makes some important proposals:

- a. DPKO and DFS will engage with members of the Security Council and contributing countries on strengthening mechanisms for consultation and interaction on mission planning processes within the framework of UN command and control.
- b. With regard to robust concepts of operations, DPKO/DFS will develop, in consultation with Member States, a strategic guidance note and guidance for mission planners.

59. One model that could be further explored is the Strategic Military Cell (SMC), established in 2006 in connection with the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). One of the key conditions of European contributors for participation in the expanded force was that a special cell be set up at New York Headquarters to provide "strategic military guidance" to UNIFIL. The SMC liaises directly with the UNIFIL Force Commander and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It comprises representatives from the various TCCs present in UNIFIL as well as the Permanent Five members of the Security Council.

60. This parallel structure contains many of the elements that leading TCCs have long demanded -- i.e. involvement in headquarters planning or command functions -- which would provide some confidence to their national command. A Secretariat review found, however, that while the temporary reinforcement that the SMC provided for rapid planning was potentially valuable, its large and unwieldy structure and its disconnect from the Office of Military Affairs were problematic, and concluded that any future mechanisms would have to fall under existing command and control structures. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping, or C-34, has also made references to the need to follow established frameworks.

61. Nevertheless, the experience merits further study to determine whether this model, or something approximating it, can be replicated in future operations to partially address concerns about information exchange, command and control and mission planning.

62. Need to Move from Numbers to Capabilities. As highlighted in the New Horizon, to generate more resources, DPKO needs to "move from a quantitative focus to a qualitative approach emphasizing the generation of capabilities." As discussed above, this

requires that clear operational standards exist, and that these are linked to training and to delivery on the ground. Changing the UN's approach would require work, but would offer both short and long-term benefits.

63. This discussion is particularly relevant when it comes to efforts to re-engage former TCCs. These countries can, at least in principle, offer many of the enabling and niche capabilities that the UN requires and are in such short supply. As they point out, however, the quantitative approach of the UN system regarding configuration of requirements may reflect the way in which leading TCCs configure their forces but differs sharply from the practice followed by most Western/NATO countries (e.g. for engineering and mechanical units). Although there have been some improvements in this regard, UN requests to Member States, particularly in subsequent MOU negotiations, still tend to focus on standardized numbers and quantities needed for a particular mission, rather than providing a framework for more diverse capabilities and expected outcomes. This incompatibility can make it difficult for Western countries to respond to UN needs.

64. COE and Self-Sustainment Standards. Troops and police arrive in the mission area with their own equipment (contingent owned equipment) and self sustainment capabilities. UN standards in this regards are reviewed every three years with Member States, but many still find them to be cumbersome, confusing and difficult to meet. The New Horizon laid out some of the problems: Some contributors are unable to rapidly assemble the equipment for modern operations or to cover initial investment in equipment. Others have been unable to sustain the required levels of capability in the field, particularly in difficult environments. Still others argue that reimbursement rates do not reflect today's demands and do not sufficiently recognize the cost to contributors of deploying higher quality equipment or high-end expertise. As such they create further disincentives for the provision of already scarce requests.

65. The new Horizon recommended that Member States and the Secretariat engage in a senior-level dialogue on this issue in order to better define the requirements and make necessary changes in current policies.

66. Job Descriptions for Police. At present, the Police Division recruits most individual police, with a few exceptions, on the basis of a very generic profile, including five years of police service, one year in a peacekeeping or other peace operation. For certain missions, DPKO asks PCCs to identify specialists or experts, with expertise ranging from administrative and budgeting issues to border management and organized crime. Once they arrive in the mission, however, these officers are often used in a generic capacity, such as patrolling. This has made some PCCs, especially Western countries, reluctant to deploy specialists, who are needed in their own countries. This raises questions about DPKO's future ability to fill posts in missions that require specialized police and requires that PD and field missions review their procedures and resources for matching what are now thousands of police officers to specialized tasks.

PROPOSAL: The Secretariat and Member States will need to pursue, without delay, dialogue on changes in some key policy/procedures that would help attract key contributors:

- a. Mission planning for robust operations*
- b. COE and self-sustainment standards*
- c. Operational standards underlying required capabilities*
- d. Move from a quantitative to a capabilities-driven approach to resource generation*
- e. Procedures for recruiting and deploying police, especially specialists, on the basis of job descriptions*

While the Secretariat will engage formally with Member States on these issues, other informal processes that encourage debate and put different perspectives and possible solutions on the table can be useful.

67. Specific Concerns Raised by Former TCCs. Some concerns specifically raised by former contributors, are ones that the UN has little power to affect. These are worth noting, however, as DPKO/DFS develop a strategy for expanding contributions.
- a. Interoperability, and UN vs. NATO/EU cultures and structures. Many Western countries state that one of the barriers to their participation in UN operations is that they bring certain expectations with them based on their EU/NATO experiences, including involvement in command and control and planning processes but also other cultural and structural differences. These expectations cannot be accommodated by the UN, and the adjustment to the “UN way” of doing things poses practical difficulties for these nations. There are also issues related to interoperability. As one country put it “we normally only work with countries we are used to working with. So unless there is a critical mass of European forces in a UN operation, it is difficult for us to participate”.
 - b. Lack of spare capacity. For NATO countries, all spare capacity is currently earmarked for reinforcements to Afghanistan and other non-UN operations, leaving limited resources for contribution to the UN. In addition, in light of NATO and EU expansion in Eastern Europe, many of these countries are prioritizing contributions within a NATO or EU framework over UN peacekeeping.
 - c. Political will. Western countries are unlikely to get involved in high risk operations in distant countries unless there are national interests at stake and a national political will for involvement. This, rather than the availability of suitable military capabilities, is what determines their participation in peacekeeping. Certain countries, such as Western ones, or EU members, may also make their decisions regarding participation in UN peacekeeping based on an analysis of who else is contributing, resulting in a “crowding in” effect.

IX. Conclusion

68. United Nations peacekeeping is stretched to its limits today and there are serious questions about whether it will be able to identify the personnel and other capabilities it needs for future operations. The UN thus has to be proactive in its efforts to broaden the pool and scale of contributions of its T/PCCs.

69. This will require a solid strategy that is focused not just on technical police and military needs, but aligned with political priorities. It will mean streamlining the procedures used to respond to Member States' information needs, and revising some key policies that are holding back contributors. It will mean that the Organization must do more outreach, ideally through DPKO/DFS representatives based outside of New York, who can develop long-term relationships with capitals and regional organizations. And finally, it will require that donors have a more coordinated approach to bilateral and regional training and capacity-building programmes, and really target countries and personnel who are likely to deploy to peacekeeping operations.

70. The New Horizon process provides an opportunity for both Member States and the UN Secretariat to respond to these needs, both through dialogue and concrete action. The Challenges Partnership can also play an important supporting role.

X. How Can The Challenges Partnership Support This Agenda?

71. The New Horizon non-paper calls for "a renewed UN partnership to set a new horizon...to help configure UN peacekeeping to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow". The Challenges Partnership is a key stakeholder in this process, and its unique perspective and support can make a valuable contribution to the pursuit of a strengthened peacekeeping partnership, with a shared vision and unity of purpose, as outlined in the New Horizon agenda. Many of the recommendations made in the New Horizon and discussed in this study require further dialogue and consultation, which the Challenges Partnership can encourage and support. Some examples are:

72. Support/sponsor further research and opportunities for dialogue on:
- a. Modalities for increasing engagement and information sharing with Member States on mission planning processes, especially for robust operations
 - b. The development of clear operational standards for uniformed personnel
 - c. Strengthening bilateral and regional partnerships
 - d. Providing strategic direction to discussions on contingent owned equipment and self-sustainment standards
 - e. A move from a quantitative to a capabilities-driven approach to the generation of peacekeeping capabilities
 - f. Procedures for recruiting and deploying police, especially specialists, on the basis of job descriptions

73. Development of Specific Products or Initiatives: Other proposals in this study call for the development of specific products or initiatives, which the Challenges Partnership

could support. Any of these initiatives would have to be closely coordinated with DPKO/DFS and would require that the Secretariat assign counterparts to work with Challenges. Some examples of specific products or mechanisms that Challenges could support are:

- a. Creation of introductory manuals and CD Roms (in English and French) for new/emerging T/PCCs
- b. Development and piloting of mission-specific annexes/CD Roms (in English and French) for one or two critical missions that need contributors
- c. Development of SOPs/Guidelines for assessment visits
- d. Pilot project deploying DPKO/DFS representative to a key region, or a short-term deployment to a contributor or regional organization

74. Funding: The development of these products/mechanisms will require resources. Challenges Partners could consider covering, or assisting DPKO/DFS in seeking, the general temporary assistance (GTA) needed to carry out some or all of these projects. Any funding requirements would need to be addressed in proposals for moving forward, and aligned with any DPKO/DFS reallocation of resources.

Annex 1

1. Existing DPKO/DFS materials that reference manuals for new T/PCCs could draw from

Existing documents for new TCCs	Existing documents for new PCCs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Capstone doctrine b. Generic TCC guidelines c. UNSAS guidelines d. Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) manual e. Contributing Countries Reconnaissance visits policy and guidelines f. Pre-deployment Visits (PDV) policy and guidelines g. Mission Start-up Guide h. Policy on Support to Military and Police Pre-deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations i. Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) j. Guidelines on Roles and Training Standards for Military Experts on Mission and Military Staff Officers k. Directives on the Use of Force l. Policy on Authority, Command and control m. Directory of key contacts in DPKP/DFS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Capstone doctrine b. Guidelines for UN police officers on assignment c. Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) manual d. Contributing Countries Reconnaissance visits policy and guidelines e. Pre-deployment Visits (PDV) policy and guidelines f. UN Selection Assistance Team (UNSAT) pre-deployment procedures and Standards and Assessment Procedures for Formed Police Units in UN Peacekeeping Operations (SPAT) g. Mission Start-up Guide h. Policy on Support to Military and Police Pre-deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations i. FPU Policy j. Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) k. UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for Police l. Policy on Authority, Command and Control m. Directory of key contacts in DPKP/DFS

2. Existing mission-specific materials that annexes to reference manuals could draw upon

Existing mission-specific documents to draw on for new TCCs	Existing mission-specific documents to draw on for new PCCs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Mission-specific TCC guidelines b. Mission plan c. List of resolutions/SG reports d. Pre-deployment Information Packages (mission-specific) e. Concept of Operations f. Force Requirements documents g. Rules of Engagement h. Mission-specific training requirements i. Footage of mission (for CD Rom) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. List of resolutions/SG reports b. Mission plan c. Pre-deployment Information Packages (mission-specific) d. Mission-specific training requirements e. Footage of mission (for CD Rom)