



A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Initiatives in 2009: Strengthening Consultation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and Troop- and Police Contributing Countries¹

Fatemeh Ziai

I. Executive Summary

1. Both the United Nations Secretariat and Member States launched initiatives this year focused on the future direction of peacekeeping, including the “New Horizon” process launched by the Secretariat and several Security Council thematic debates on peacekeeping. Two central themes emerged in these discussions: First, the quality of the UN’s planning and management of peacekeeping missions was called into question, and Member States began to call for greater oversight. The second issue, which had been bubbling under the surface for many years but now threatened to boil over, was why troop-contributing countries (“TCCs”) and Police-Contributing Countries (“PCCs”) – the countries that provide most of the personnel for peacekeeping – have little or no say in how Security Council mandates are shaped and resourced, and what could be done to address this.

2. Tensions between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs concerning the modalities and quality of consultations had existed since the early 1990s. A progression of presidential statements, the establishment of a working group on peacekeeping operations and two key resolutions on this issue (1327 and 1353), provided a framework for consultations, aimed at ensuring that the views of T/PCCs would be taken into account in the Council’s decision-making. Contributing countries feel, however, that these mechanisms have never been adequately implemented.

3. This past year, the issue was placed squarely on the table again, amid a changing peacekeeping environment. The Organization was struggling as the unprecedented scale, complexity and cost of UN peacekeeping stretched its capacities and led to shortages in personnel and other capabilities. At the same time, crises in the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur had prompted self-examination about the vulnerability of UN forces and the ambitious mandates under which they were being

¹Commissioned Background Study by Ms Fatemeh Ziai, Challenges Forum Research Adviser, for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2009. The overall topic for the Forum is “A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the next steps?”

asked to operate. In this context, there was a sudden urgency to improve the dialogue and exchange of information among T/PCCs, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

4. The ongoing debate has led to important changes in practice and procedure. The Secretariat, for example, has taken a number of steps to improve consultation with Member States in advance of private meetings, and to streamline reporting. It has also undertaken to launch dialogue on critical issues such as robust operations, mission planning and command and control. The Security Council has also committed to early and meaningful dialogue with T/PCCs and revitalized the working group on peacekeeping. Much remains to be done to qualitatively improve consultations but a great deal of good will and positive change has resulted from the steps and commitments made so far, which will need to be built upon in the months ahead.

II. How can the Challenges Partnership Support this Agenda of Change?

5. This study, conducted for the Challenges Forum, puts forward a number of recommendations that pick up on proposals made in the Secretariat non-paper entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”, and commitments already made by Member States. The Challenges Partnership may wish to discuss the questions below and identify ways in which the Partnership can contribute to this ongoing dialogue and support implementation of the recommendations.

- a. The Security Council: What further steps can the Security Council take to ensure “early and meaningful engagement” with T/PCCs over the entire life cycle of a mission, and to systematize the positive changes introduced thus far?
- b. The UN Secretariat: The Secretariat has committed to launch crucial dialogues on robust operations and more consultative mission planning within UN command and control. How can the Secretariat’s impartiality be safeguarded while making planning more inclusive?
- c. Engagement by T/PCCs: What can capitals do to ensure that T/PCCs remain engaged over the entire lifecycle of a mission, and that T/PCC representatives respond on the basis of a consolidated position from the field and the capital, including political, military and policing aspects?
- d. Informal Coalitions: How can Member States and the Secretariat expand the use of informal coalitions/ad hoc groups of interested actors to support specific missions?
- e. Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations: What suggestions could the Partnership make for a more focused Working Group agenda, around a limited set of concrete and achievable objectives?
- f. Committee of 34 (C-34): What can Challenges do to move forward the dialogue between the Council and the C-34?

III. Introduction

6. Both the United Nations Secretariat and Member States launched initiatives in 2009 ear focused on the future direction of peacekeeping. This was not the first time UN peacekeeping had undergone scrutiny or reform. What was different this time was that the scale, complexity and cost of UN peacekeeping had reached unprecedented levels, as the Organization struggled to find the military, police and other capabilities it needed and Member States grappled with a global economic crisis.

7. At the same time, a number of crises in key UN operations had prompted self-examination. A crisis in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2008 exposed the vulnerability of UN forces and the ambitious mandates under which they were being asked to operate, while the difficulties encountered in implementing the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) raised pointed questions about the direction in which peacekeeping was headed.

8. This prompted both Member States and the UN Secretariat to ask some fundamental questions: how could gaps between mandates and implementation be addressed? How could mission planning, management and oversight be improved? How could resource constraints be addressed and delivery of field support enhanced?

9. The various initiatives launched this year sought to tackle these questions, and two central themes emerged. First, the quality of the UN's planning and management of peacekeeping missions was called into question, and Member States began to call for greater oversight. The second issue, which had been bubbling under the surface for many years but now threatened to boil over, was why troop-contributing countries ("TCCs") and Police-Contributing Countries ("PCCs") – the countries that provide the bulk of personnel for peacekeeping – have little or no say in how Security Council mandates are shaped and resourced, and what could be done to address this.

10. Although tensions between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs concerning the modalities and quality of consultations had been present since the early 1990s, the changed environment lent a sudden urgency to the matter. The increased complexity of missions, with moving goal posts in terms of objectives and exit strategies, not to mention more precarious security and operational environments, meant that T/PCC concerns were unlikely to go away. Moreover, the gap between the demand for peacekeeping personnel and supply now threatened the ability to mount and sustain operations. The largest contributors were no longer simply motivated by the financial reimbursements they got from the UN for their contributions to peacekeeping. Nor were they seeking to enter the international stage through troop contributions – they were already on that stage and were now demanding a seat at the table. Clearly, their voices would have to be listened to.

11. This paper outlines the key components of the peacekeeping-related initiatives launched this year, including the Secretariat's "New Horizon" process and several Security Council thematic debates. It then examines the issue of consultation among the

Security Council, T/PCCs and the UN Secretariat, to determine where views and expectations diverge and meet, what progress has been made this year and further steps required. The countries that provide troops for UN peacekeeping, or TCCs, have been at the forefront of the discussions, but most of these countries are also PCCs and many of the issues apply equally to the latter.

12. The ongoing debate this year has shown that a consensus exists on the need to qualitatively improve the dialogue and exchange of information between T/PCCs and the Security Council and has encouraged a healthy and honest dialogue about this longstanding issue. It has already led to important changes in practice and procedure, which have generated a great deal of goodwill. This paper puts forward some additional proposals, for discussion among the Challenges partners, that could build upon what has already been achieved and move UN peacekeeping closer to its goal of more effective operations.

13. A cross-section of Security Council members, T/PCCs and Secretariat officials were interviewed for this paper between July and October 2009, and their views are set forth below. As agreed with those interviewed, quotes or views in this paper have not been attributed to any individual or Member State.

IV. Background – the Development of Consultation Mechanisms

14. The basis for consultation with contributing countries is found in Article 44 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that if a Member State not on the Council provides armed forces, the Council shall invite that member “to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces”.

15. The Security Council and TCCs have been grappling with the issue of consultations and information sharing since at least since the early 1990s, when enormous setbacks to peacekeeping in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia lent urgency to resolution of the problem. From the start, the Council has acknowledged, in a progression of presidential statements and resolutions on this issue, that its decisions have important implications for T/PCCs and that it supports the need for enhanced consultations and information exchange. Indeed, whereas no formal consultation mechanisms existed in the early 1990s, various structures were gradually introduced, beginning with regular and *ad hoc* meetings jointly chaired by the Council President and the Secretariat. Over the next years, a number of meetings were held to discuss this matter and presidential statements issued providing that consultations had to be timely, that there needed to be reporting on the outcome of consultations with T/PCCs, and highlighting the particular need for consultation when the Council was considering new mandates or significant changes to an existing mandate.²

² See, e.g., S/PRST/1994/22 of 3 May 1994, S/PRST/1994/62 of 4 November 1994, S/PRST/1996/13 of 28 March 1996, S/RES/1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000, S/PRST/2001/3 of 31 January 2001, S/RES/1353 (2001) of 13 June 2001, S/2002/56 of 14 January 2002 and S/PRST/2004/16 of 17 May 2004.

16. Yet, T/PCCs continued to raise the inadequacy of consultations, leading to constant reiteration, examination and modification of existing procedures. Two Security Council resolutions eventually set out a framework for consultations. Resolution 1327, adopted on 13 November 2000, underlined the importance of improved consultations and committed the Council to hold private meetings with T/PCCs, “including at their request, for a new or ongoing peacekeeping operation, during the implementation phase of an operation, when considering a change in, or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate, or when a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground threatens the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers”.³

17. On 13 June 2001, resolution 1353 laid out an extensive set of procedures for (i) public and private meetings of the Security Council with the participation of T/PCCs, including at their request; (ii) consultation meetings with T/PCCs, convened and chaired by the president of the Security Council; and (iii) meetings between the Secretariat and T/PCCs, with high-level field participation, where appropriate.⁴

18. A presidential statement of the same day announced the establishment of a “Working Group of the Whole on United Nations peacekeeping operations”, as a complement to private meetings with T/PCCs. The working group would “seek the views of the T/PCCs ... with a view to their views being taken into account by the Council”, in order for “members of the Council, relevant T/PCCs and the Secretariat to engage in a closer and more interactive dialogue”.

19. A presidential statement of 17 May 2004 further observed that TCCs “through their experience and expertise, can greatly contribute to the planning process and can assist the Security Council in taking appropriate, effective and timely decisions on peacekeeping operations”.

20. These resolutions and presidential statements provide more than enough mechanisms and detailed procedures for meaningful consultations between the Council and T/PCCs. The problem, from the point of view of T/PCCs, was that these were never adequately implemented.

V. Review of Recent Peacekeeping Reform Initiatives

21. The New Horizon. The key development related to peacekeeping reform this year has been the “New Horizon” process. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) initiated an internal analytical process aimed at identifying challenges and opportunities facing United Nations peacekeeping. As part of this process, a non-paper was issued on 17 July 2009, entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” (“New Horizon”).

³ S/RES/1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000.

⁴ S/RES/1353 (2001) of 13 June 2001.

22. The New Horizon calls for “a renewed UN peacekeeping partnership to set a new horizon – a set of achievable immediate, medium and long term goals – to help configure UN peacekeeping to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow”. It seeks in-depth engagement with all peacekeeping stakeholders with a view to devising a shared and workable forward agenda for peacekeeping.

23. The paper details the challenges UN peacekeeping faces, with over 116,000 personnel deployed across 15 missions, stretching the UN’s personnel, logistics, finance and administration systems, while costs continue to grow. It highlights the difficulty of identifying the military capabilities the UN requires, coupled with the scarcity of specialized police and civilian skills its operations increasingly need. On the ground, UN mandates call for stabilization and the protection of civilians, although critical capabilities are lacking and underlying peace processes are often troubled or absent, complicating the UN’s transition and exit strategies. And amid continuing global political and security instability, all indications are that the need for peacekeeping will remain or grow.

24. The non-paper makes 20 proposals, some broad and others more detailed, to the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat, aimed at strengthening this global partnership. It outlines a broad reform agenda and includes a number of recommendations aimed at addressing the issue of consultations between the Security Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs. The non-paper’s proposals include the following:

- a. Political Strategy and Direction: Peacekeeping operations should only be deployed if accompanied by an active political strategy. Support should be built through a consultative process, using coalitions of Member States to maintain unity of purpose and sustain support for the mission.
- b. Planning and Managing Missions: Sound mission planning and management require sustained dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States and between the field and Headquarters, while maintaining the impartiality of Secretariat planning and the integrity of command and control.
- c. Rapid Deployment: Rapid deployment is ultimately a function of political will but can be enhanced by focusing on the establishment of a mission Headquarters, a sequenced roll-out and prioritization of tasks.
- d. Clarity and Delivery on Critical Roles: Consensus on policy and requirements for robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians, as well as clarification of critical roles for peacebuilding tasks is required. Recurrent gaps and challenges to transition and exit for peacekeeping missions must also be addressed.

- e. Crisis Management: Peacekeeping missions must be prepared to respond through accurate and detailed security risk assessment, scenario-planning and reliable reserve capacities.
- f. Projecting Future Needs: Critical shortages in peacekeeping resources already exist and will be further constrained by the global financial environment. A new and comprehensive approach to resource generation and incentives is required to deliver results in the field.
- g. A Capability-Driven Approach: UN peacekeeping needs to move from a quantitative focus to a qualitative approach emphasizing the generation of capabilities. This demands the development of standards and their systematic linkage to training, equipment and delivery on the ground.
- h. Expanding the Peacekeeping Partnership. An expanded base of troop- and police-contributing countries is required to enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet the future requirements of UN peacekeeping.
- i. A New Field Support Strategy: The complex, fast-paced nature of UN peacekeeping today requires a new support strategy, already underway, that includes the shared use of assets and the creation of regional service centres; a better use of technology to support lighter, more agile deployment; and improved financial arrangements for greater operational flexibility.

25. During a thematic debate of the Security Council on peacekeeping held on 5 August 2009 during the Presidency of the United Kingdom, the New Horizon non-paper was widely welcomed by Member States. Its key recommendations, including those concerning consultations among the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat, were endorsed in a presidential statement. At the same time, Member States noted the need for DPKO to prioritize and sequence the many proposals contained in the non-paper, and to provide further detail on some of the specific proposals. Since the non-paper was issued, DPKO/DFS have engaged in a number of meetings and briefings with Member States to brief them on the New Horizon and elicit their views.

26. In the New Horizon, the Secretariat has made significant commitments toward a “renewed partnership” among peacekeeping stakeholders. On the issue of consultations, DPKO/DFS have committed to “more systematically fulfill the requests of the Security Council in SCR 1327 and SCR 1353 to strengthen consultations with the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries on proposed tasks affecting their personnel” and “include information on consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries in regular reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on individual operations”.

27. Following the release of the non-paper, a DPKO/DFS strategy set out the immediate, short and medium term steps, as well as longer term issues that would need to be tackled in connection with the New Horizon proposals. It also stressed the need for

continuing consultations with Member States, field missions and UN and regional partners in elaborating the medium and longer term steps.

28. A communication was sent to all field and headquarters staff in October 2009 instructing them to implement a number of immediate “changes in practice” resulting from the New Horizon recommendations and implementation plan. These concern the structure, elements and preparation of formal briefings to T/PCCs and the Security Council; the reflection of T/PCC consultations in SG reports; briefings to Member States on Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) to the field; and the elaboration of mission-specific benchmarks.

29. A number of these changes were immediately put into practice in the process leading up to the consultations on Liberia, Haiti and Lebanon that followed the 5 August Security Council debate. For example, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations instructed staff to check with T/PCCs before the consultations to identify specific issues contributing countries wanted raised in the briefings and to ensure that these were included.

30. In some of the meetings, the advance consultations improved the quality of the dialogue, while in others, there was no discernible difference. It was felt that the Liberia meeting on 3 September, for example, was not qualitatively different to past consultations. This might have been because there were no really divisive issues related to Liberia at the time, or because the procedures were still quite new and it would take time before some T/PCCs grew accustomed to this way of doing business and take full advantage of it. The meeting on the mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), however, which took place the next day, was considered to have been a vast improvement as compared with past consultations between the Security Council and T/PCCs. At least ten T/PCCs participated, some at the Ambassadorial level, and the US Ambassador presiding over the meeting called it an "excellent discussion." Based on conversations with contributing countries, it is clear that the Secretariat's commitment to improving the quality of the debate has created considerable goodwill. The discussions around renewal of the mandate of the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) at the end of this year could serve as a test case for how well both the Secretariat and the Council are translating new commitments on T/PCC consultations into practice.

31. Another significant proposal in the New Horizon commits DPKO and DFS to review, before the end of 2009, current reporting and information exchange procedures, for the benefit of both Member States and the Secretariat. In this regard, the Secretariat will be producing a proposal for updated and streamlined reporting procedures. This will include a survey of Member States to determine their priorities in terms of reporting, and will also go a long way to show T/PCCs the Secretariat's efforts to be responsive to their needs.

32. The UK/France Initiative. The Security Council has held three important thematic debates on peacekeeping this year. France held a debate during its Presidency of the Security Council in January 2009, during which it launched, together with the United Kingdom, a six-month process to review peacekeeping. The review was to focus on three themes:

- a. The need to improve strategic oversight of peacekeeping operations, including planning, benchmarking and information flows between the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat;
- b. Proposals for addressing resource constraints; and
- c. Gaps between mandates and implementation.

33. The UK-France initiative drew increased attention to UN peacekeeping and encouraged a number of other countries to come forward with their own ideas and initiatives. Indeed, in the ensuing six months there was a strengthened dialogue, both in the Security Council and in several informal fora, on ways to monitor and evaluate progress in operations, and sessions with UN senior leadership on the strategic challenges facing peacekeeping operations.

34. With regard to the issue of consultations with contributing countries, however, many T/PCCs have pointed out that the increased focus on T/PCC consultations as part of this initiative was an evolving process. Indeed, the first "concept paper" in January focused on Council oversight and only touched on the subject of consultations. The latter was only incorporated into the review process at the insistence of T/PCCs, other Council members, including Costa Rica and Turkey (see below), and following recognition by Permanent Five members of the Council such as the United Kingdom and the United States of the importance of the issue. In the end, however, the review provided numerous useful opportunities for discussing how to engage meaningfully with T/PCCs.

35. The Turkish Security Council Debate. Building on the UK/France initiative, Turkey convened a thematic debate during its Presidency of the Council in June 2009, focusing on the Council's relationship with T/PCCs and other stakeholders. The debate framed relations between the Council and T/PCCs as a critical one and a "cross-cutting element that touches on almost all aspects of peacekeeping". It sought to address how communication with T/PCCs on tasks and capabilities could be improved and how cooperation could be strengthened on both generic aspects of peacekeeping and technical aspects relevant to specific missions. Contributing countries welcomed the opportunity to weigh in on these issues and made clear, in their statements, the impact of consultations on the success of peacekeeping missions and mandates.

36. The United Kingdom Security Council Debate. During its Presidency of the Council in August 2009, the United Kingdom followed up on the UK-France initiative launched in January, by holding another thematic debate on peacekeeping. The debate was intended to be "forward-looking and focused on practical recommendations".

37. The debate allowed for a valuable stock-taking of the review process over the past

6 months, with statements focusing on the themes that had been prominent the whole year, including the value of better consultation with contributing countries, the need for better planning and clear and achievable mandates, and the importance of benchmarking.

38. The presidential statement of 5 August listed the practices that had been developed over the past six months to improve the Councils' dialogue with the Secretariat and T/PCCs and stressed the need for the following:

- a. Ensuring that mandates are clear, credible, achievable and appropriately resourced;
- b. Reviewing and adjusting mandates and missions;
- c. Better information sharing on military operational challenges, better Council access to military advice and increasing its interaction with the Secretariat; and
- d. Weighing the full range of responses and engage in peacekeeping only as an accompaniment to a political strategy; and
- e. Increased interaction with the Secretariat in the early phase of mandate drafting and throughout mission deployment.

39. In addition to showing its commitment to the issue by hosting three thematic debates on peacekeeping that all touched on or focused on the issue of consultations, the presidential statement of 5 August also demonstrated that the Council intended to take real steps to improve consultations. These would include

[e]arlier and more meaningful engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries before the renewal or modification of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. The Council welcomes practical suggestions to deepen such consultations. It recognizes that through their experience and expertise, troop- and police-contributing countries can greatly contribute to effective planning, decision-making and deployment of peacekeeping operations. In this regard, the Council welcomes the interim report of the Security Council Working Group (S/2009/398) and encourages it to continue to address the issue of cooperation with troop- and police-contributing countries and other stakeholders. The Council commits to making progress on this issue, and to reviewing its progress in 2010.⁵

The Council also indicated that it would conduct a further review of peacekeeping in 2010.

40. When asked about the presidential statement, T/PCCs expressed the view that it seemed to demonstrate that the Council wanted to engage seriously on this issue, but most preferred to reserve judgment for another six months or so, to ensure that concrete changes came about. They pointed out, however, that the new timetable the Council had adopted for consultations (beginning with the discussion of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in August, under the UK Presidency, and continuing into the US

⁵ S/PRST/2009/24.

Presidency in September), according to which T/PCC consultations are held, followed by Council deliberations the following week, and a Council decision the third week, actually allows time for the Council to listen to T/PCCs before its own deliberations and decision. This practice has been met enthusiastically by other Council members and T/PCCs alike, and it is hoped it will continue.

41. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping. Another important development this year was the revitalization, under the chairmanship of Japan, of the Security Council Working Group of the Whole on Peacekeeping (the “Working Group”). The Working Group was established in January 2001, during an earlier effort by the Council to strengthen cooperation with T/PCCs. When Japan resumed chairmanship of the Working Group in January 2009, it held a first meeting at the ambassadorial level to discuss how the group could be revitalized. It was agreed that a series of thematic discussions would be held around specific missions and that the Working Group would seek “first-hand feedback from T/PCCs on conditions on the ground”.

42. The second meeting of the Working Group took place on 29 April 2009, with the participation of T/PCCs, Security Council members and other stakeholders, and addressed the issue of “gaps between mandates and their implementation”, including the presentation of case studies by the Secretariat on MINSUTAH and MONUC. Five other meetings have since followed.

43. One of the key issues raised in these meetings has been how to enhance cooperation with T/PCCs. In the course of the discussions, it has been proposed that more meaningful use be made of existing mechanisms, such as Security Council meetings with contributing countries and the Working Group itself, rather than creating new mechanisms. The need for information-sharing with T/PCCs, the need to advance a common understanding of peacekeeping among the various stakeholders, and to expand the base of T/PCCs to ensure geographical balance have also been raised.

44. By all accounts, the meetings held so far this year have allowed for a high-quality, interactive dialogue among the relevant actors. The important contribution that this dialogue has made to strengthening the consultation process between T/PCCs and the Council was widely cited in the statements of contributing countries in the 5 August thematic debate thematic on peacekeeping, as well as in interviews for this paper. The Working Group planned to begin, in October 2009, an in-depth consideration of how it could further enhance cooperation with T/PCCs and other stakeholders.

45. As pointed out by Costa Rica in its statement at the 5 August debate, “the level of interaction and participation of T/PCCs has been greater and more substantial in the meeting of the Working Group than in private meetings of the Council with T/PCCs. This experience leads us to suggest that greater use be made of the consultation mechanisms and the Working Group”.⁶ Following the changes implemented by the Secretariat based on the New Horizon, the quality of discussion in the private meetings is also likely to improve. Nevertheless, the Working Group offers a forum for in-depth and interactive

⁶ S/PV.6178, Statement of Costa Rica to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

discussion, and its focus on thematic issues allows for a common understanding to be achieved on key peacekeeping issues. The Working Group is also mandated to discuss technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations, which it has done in the past and could usefully continue. In addition, as one Security Council member stated, “informal settings are best for meaningful consultations. The format of the Security Council consultations tends to be very formal and even the set-up of the room can make people reluctant to talk.”

46. At the same time, a few TCCs have remarked that some Security Council members have been reserved in their enthusiasm for the Working Group’s discussions of thematic issues. Although several Council members praised the Working Group at the 5 August debate on peacekeeping, and have thus made a commitment to support the mechanism, T/PCCs have noted that these mechanisms place an additional burden on the Security Council – a necessary burden, in the minds of T/PCCs, but a burden nonetheless – and that the Council might, therefore, soon revert to its old habits of having mechanisms in place that were not really implemented.

47. Moreover, the Working Group risks overlap with the C-34, which sees discussion of the thematic and cross-cutting peacekeeping issues as part of its own mandate; therefore, the Working Group should continue to focus on operational issues. And finally, while the efforts of Japan as chair have been highly appreciated, T/PCCs understand that, as a member of the Security Council, Japan, and future chairs, would not want the Working Group to turn into a divisive body among Council members. This can be avoided if the Security Council is fully engaged in the Working Group’s discussions and proactive in following up on them.

48. The Canadian Initiative. Underlining the importance of a substantive discussion with all stakeholders, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, together with the Center on International Cooperation in New York, launched a series of panel discussions to explore critical issues confronting the future of UN peacekeeping operations. The series draws on expertise from practitioners, NGOs, academics and the UN community. At the first event, which took place on 26 May 2009, the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping and for Mission Support addressed the symptoms and causes of peacekeeping overstretch. A second event took place on 11 September 2009, examining the "Political Dimensions of Peace Operations". A further three or four panel discussions are planned over the next eight months to allow more in-depth discussion of priority peacekeeping challenges. Each event is preceded by a concept note, which is circulated to all Member States, and the discussions are also open to the full membership.

49. These events have presented yet another forum where the Security Council, T/PCCs, the Secretariat and other stakeholders can engage in a more in-depth discussion of common concerns related to peacekeeping. One of the goals has also been to support a higher quality debate in the C-34, especially on peacekeeping policy issues, and ensure that the various actors have a shared view of the challenges being faced, particularly on some of the issues that have proven divisive to date.

50. Changing US Policy. One important sign of a new Council approach is the clear change in policy that the United States has signaled vis-à-vis the UN, and peacekeeping in particular, since the election of President Obama. In a series of speeches, the Permanent Representative of the United States has made clear that the United States is “dramatically changing [its] approach to the United Nations” and entering “a new era of engagement” during which the United States “is willing to listen, respect differences and consider new ideas”.⁷

51. In an important symbolic gesture, President Obama met with leading TCCs at UN Headquarters on 23 September, in the margins of the General Debate of the General Assembly, to “express appreciation for their sacrifice, and to exchange views on how to strengthen our efforts to meet common challenges”. This provided a clear signal that the US’s relationship with other Member States, including T/PCCs, would be very different moving forward.

52. This reinforced the message that the Permanent Representative had been conveying in the Council. During the Turkish debate, she stated that the US would be “open-minded about practical suggestions to deepen consultations among troop and police contributors, the Security Council and the Secretariat.... In these consultations, we should also be clear about what we are asking of troop contributors and what we are willing to do to assist them”. During the 5 August debate she stated that “The T/PCCs bring a wealth of experience to discussions related to adopting new mandates or renewing old ones”. She also noted that mandate renewals for the missions in Haiti, Liberia and the Congo were approaching and promised that the United States would “welcome early dialogue with T/PCCs”.

53. In August, under the United Kingdom Presidency of the Council, the UK Permanent Mission made some important changes in T/PCC consultations. In a departure from past Council practice, consultations on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were scheduled one week before the Council was to renew the mission’s mandate. The Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom opened the meeting by encouraging participation and discussion and speaking highly of the contribution of T/PCCs. For T/PCCs, this represented a clear change of tone with regard to consultations.

54. The US took up the Presidency of the Security Council in September, just after the UK-chaired UNIFL meeting and following the series of changes announced by the Secretariat regarding the conduct of consultations. The US Permanent Mission made a great effort to include the views of T/PCCs in the consultations it was to chair that month, by mobilizing contributors to attend the meetings in large numbers and to speak up. Taking its cue from the United Kingdom, the US Ambassador went to great lengths in her opening remarks at the first consultations of the month, on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to encourage T/PCCs to be vocal, stating that the purpose of the consultations was genuine interactive dialogue with T/PCCs and for them to have an opportunity to

⁷ Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and the Center on International Cooperation, 12 August 2009.

share their experiences and concerns. That meeting, and a subsequent consultation scheduled for that month, also took place one week prior to mandate renewal, following the UK example and making good on commitments in the New Horizon and the 5 August presidential statement.

55. The efforts made by the US Permanent Mission, coupled with the broader policy changes announced, have created a sense of promise that the US will have a positive impact on peacekeeping moving forward. Another positive sign is that the new US direction furthered efforts already begun by the United Kingdom the previous month. The coming months will tell whether the Council as a whole can build on this approach.

VI. Why T/PCC Consultations are Still an Issue

56. Motivations behind T/PCC Calls for Consultations. “In reality”, as one TCC stated, “each T/PCC wants something different when it raises the lack of consultations”. For some, there are political considerations at play – their contribution to peacekeeping is so significant that they feel it is only appropriate to consult them on significant political and policy issues, especially when these will impact on their troops. Others may be seeking a more prominent profile within the UN, or more command positions in the field, based on the scale of their contributions. On the other hand, not all T/PCCs are preoccupied with the issue of consultation. Some are more concerned that the costs and complexity of peacekeeping are growing, while the reimbursement scheme has remained stagnant. Others are more focused on political and policy concerns such as the core principles of peacekeeping and the perceived intrusiveness of modern peacekeeping mandates on national sovereignty. In fact, there is no one T/PCC position on any issue, or even a united approach.

57. The T/PCCs that have been most vocal regarding consultations state that they are not asking to be consulted for the sake of being consulted; rather, their primary concern is that Security Council mandates, instead of being “clear and achievable”, as recommended in the landmark report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”), are increasingly unrealistic and not implementable. Nor do mandates adequately consider the conditions on the ground and the limited pool of resources available for UN peacekeeping.

58. TCCs feel that they are asked to put troops on the ground and in harm’s way, but are then not adequately consulted when mandates for complex missions are developed, changed or extended. Yet, they feel they know the situation on the ground better than the Security Council, which usually includes few, if any, TCCs, and could thus help the Council make more informed decisions. Instead, complex mandates are adopted or changed and large number of troops authorized, with insufficient thought given to the operating environment, the assets those troops will require to carry out their tasks, and how many TCCs will even sign up for that particular job.

59. One Member State agreed that “since TCCs are present on the ground and the Security Council does not always have TCCs as members, a ‘reality check’ from TCCs

would be useful. But what we cannot have is the TCCs vetoing what the Council thinks needs to be done”. Nevertheless, unless discussions about sensitive issues such as robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians take place in an inclusive manner before mandate development, the problems will persist.

60. The Security Council’s Position. These demands point to some fundamental questions that underlie this debate, and complicate its resolution: What constitutes a “major” T/PCC? What are the criteria for having a seat at the table – is it based purely on numbers? Or is it based on the complexity of the mission in which a T/PCC participates and the role its personnel play? And finally, who determines whether a change in mandate or approach will affect all T/PCCs equally and whether and when each one must be consulted?

61. The Security Council has traditionally treaded carefully when it comes to the issue of T/PCC consultations. Its main concern is that as the organ with primary responsibility for international peace and security, it is wary of T/PCCs encroaching on its decision-making prerogative. The Council is generally open to hearing from prospective contributors prior to mandate adoption, when T/PCCs have not yet pledged their personnel or deployed, because it wants to determine what it is likely to end up with in terms of contributions. T/PCCs then decide whether to sign up once the mandate and the mission’s “concept of operations” have been issued, and must then follow those.

62. The issue of post-mandate and post-deployment consultation, however, is a different one: the Council is reluctant to engage T/PCCs at this stage, whereas T/PCCs feel that if there are developments on the ground, the basis on which they deployed could suddenly change, placing their personnel at risk. This is precisely when they feel they should be consulted, and their experience and knowledge of the situation on the ground taken into account by the Council.

63. As one TCC put it, “Everyone knows there is a gap between mandates and resources. Recent events, such as the fact that the Somalia mandate was not approved, show that the Council is beginning to understand that they can’t just authorize a huge number of troops without knowing what they will get and whether those troops will be properly-equipped.” The Council is, of course, keenly aware of the gap between the supply and demand for peacekeeping, and has come to realize that the issue needs to be addressed. As India has made clear, for example, its capacity to contribute to peacekeeping is enormous, but it will not continue to do so unless it sees fundamental changes in this relationship.

64. The possibility that early consultations with T/PCCs will show that there is a lack of support for a mandate poses a clear dilemma for the Council. Equally damaging, however, is when T/PCCs agree to deploy but are then unable to deliver on the ground when the situation gets tough, as has happened in Darfur and the Congo. Thus, the Council’s authority must be balanced with its effectiveness as an actor, because nothing undermines its credibility as much as T/PCCs departing from a Council mandate or refusing to perform in a peacekeeping operation.

65. Thus, the need to keep T/PCCs on board is certainly one of the key factors motivating the Council to engage in this discussion. However, there is also a recognition, in the words of one Council member, that “the credibility of the UN as a whole suffers when mandates are not implemented”, so it is in everyone’s interest to address this issue.

66. Lack of Meaningful Consultations. Although a number of positive changes have recently taken place concerning consultations, which are fully acknowledged by T/PCCs, the longstanding practice is described by T/PCCs as follows. First, although elaborate mechanisms for consultation have long existed, T/PCCs feel that these have generally not been adhered to. As one TCC put it, “The problem has been one of institutional culture. There is a feeling that dealing with TCCs and scheduling meetings just creates more work for the Council and especially for the Secretariat”.

67. As a result, T/PCCs feel that consultations have been pro forma and formulaic, with no opportunity for an interactive discussion. At times, key political developments to which the Council was privy, and which affected its decisions, were not even mentioned at meetings, and T/PCCs learned of these after the fact. Meetings have also tended to be very brief – often as short as 30 minutes – leaving little if any time for Council members to react. As one TCC expressed it “We do not want it to be a one-way street; we also want to hear the reactions of Council members to what we say or what is being decided, but there is never enough time.”

68. Of even greater concern is that consultations have generally taken place just before a mandate is about to be adopted or extended, making it nearly impossible for the Council to take into account T/PCC feedback and input. One TCC described the process as follows: “Typically, we would be invited to a ‘consultation’ at 2 p.m. in which we would basically be briefed on the resolution the Council was going to adopt at 3 p.m. at a closed meeting. This gave us no time to go back to our capital or provide real input. What is the point of speaking at such a meeting or raising any problems?” This frustration echoes the views of all T/PCCs interviewed for this report.

69. Most Security Council members agreed that this format was far from ideal, but explained that meetings were scheduled this way because senior officials from the field were in NY for the Security Council meeting and could conduct the T/PCC briefings as well. One Security Council member, who agreed that the timing was not workable, actually suggested that consultations with contributing countries should really take place 90 days before mandate renewal.

70. Following the Council’s statement in the presidential statement of 5 August and the changes implemented by the Secretariat in New Horizon, it is believed that a genuine effort has been made to address many of these problems. Another positive change, introduced by the United Kingdom in the closed consultations on UNIFL in August, was that a conscious effort was made to refer, in the UK’s national statement, to the issues and concerns that had been raised by TCCs in the UNIFL consultation the prior week. This showed that TCCs were not just being asked to state their views in the consultations,

only to be forgotten when decisions were being taken, and is an important practice for the Council to follow in future.

71. Insufficient Secretariat Engagement. T/PCCs have also been dissatisfied with briefings by the Secretariat. They feel that the Secretariat has not approached meetings and consultations with a view to dialogue, but rather as an obligation that must be carried out as quickly as possible, allowing them to return to their “real work”. This attitude, which some T/PCCs feel is prevalent among Secretariat staff, also applies to requests to Secretariat desk officers for information. Often, T/PCCs complain, DPKO staff members do not return calls and treat requests from T/PCCs as something they will respond to if they have time.

72. T/PCCs recognize that the Secretariat is overstretched but believe that “a change in attitude” is required to build confidence among contributing countries and bring about an effective dialogue. In short, a culture of service is required. Some in the Secretariat point out that the deadlines set by the Council have made meaningful engagement by the Secretariat nearly impossible. The Secretariat is also reliant on the input that it receives from field missions when responding to the queries of permanent missions. When this information is late or not sufficiently detailed, the Secretariat’s hands are tied. This points to a critical need, also highlighted in the New Horizon, for Member States to help strengthen the operational to strategic link in UN command and control, in particular between mission headquarters and DPKO.

73. Another complaint by T/PCCs is that the focus of the meetings is not made clear by the Secretariat. Is it to discuss political issues or operational ones? Is to brief on what has already happened or been decided? Or is it to consult with T/PCCs prior to future decisions? This lack of clarity was acknowledged by one Council member, who added that when the focus of the meeting is not clear, T/PCCs may not know whether it is best to be represented by a political or military/police adviser; as a result, the right people are not always present in the room.

74. Again, the commitments made in the New Horizon, and the changes immediately implemented in the consultations following issuance of the non-paper have convinced T/PCCs that the Secretariat is committed to changing past practice.

75. Repercussions on the Ground. A lack of consultations has obvious repercussions for the operations of national contingents on the ground. As stated by the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations during the 5 August Security Council open debate, “Unrealistic mandates have led to situations in which mission personnel are forced to ask national contingents to undertake tasks and utilize contingent-owned equipment in a manner inconsistent with the legal framework under which they were employed”.⁸

76. He then referred to India’s recent experience in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), where “changes in the

⁸ S/PV.6178, Statement of India to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

rules of engagement and concept of operations were communicated to the TCCs after they had been authorized. I reiterate that being informed is not the same as being consulted". In a later discussion, India stated that although the Secretariat had argued that it had consulted the contingents on the ground, this was not adequate, because it was the Government of India that needed to be consulted.

77. Absence of T/PCC Perspective. Another concern is that the formal consultation structures do not allow for the "T/PCC perspective" to feed into ongoing discussions and decisions on peacekeeping mandates and operations. In its statement during the 5 August open debate, for example, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan stated that what was required was "not only enhanced dialogue and consultation but also adequate representation of the major TCCs at the leadership level in the field and, particularly, at Headquarters". This would feed the perspective of "professional soldiers who have already carried out these tasks on the ground" into the planning and management of missions.⁹

78. Uruguay also stressed, in its statement, the need to increase the level of T/PCC representation, especially at the senior level, at Headquarters and in the field, "because we fully believe that communication in the field and between the field and Headquarters regarding the implementation of mandates would be significantly improved by enhanced feedback between national systems and the Organization".¹⁰

79. The Indian Permanent Representative linked the issue of consultation to the success of the broader goals of peacekeeping, stating that "...the future effectiveness of peacekeeping lies in its ability to harness national governance capacities in affected countries. The challenge lies in applying ... the capacities and knowledge of countries that have undergone successful post-colonial nation-building exercises. The Council therefore needs to expand the ambit of its consultations to include these countries."¹¹

80. Consultations not Effectively Used by T/PCCs. Security Council members concede that consultations with T/PCCs have not taken place early enough and that there has not been enough time for a Council member to change his/her speech or the text of a resolution, no matter what a T/PCC might say during the consultation.

81. However, both Security Council members and the Secretariat believe that T/PCCs have not made effective use of the consultations either. They note that many Military Advisors do not attend consultations; those who do often remain silent or raise minor technical issues instead of strategic or critical operational ones. In short, they are not always prepared to engage on issues that might influence the Council's decision-making, such as flaws in the concept of operations. In some cases, it might reflect the fact that some T/PCC Permanent Missions are modest and under-resourced, and thus lack the capacity to contribute as larger missions might. In other cases, this might be due to a simple lack of preparation.

⁹ S/PV.6178, Statement of Pakistan to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

¹⁰ S/PV.6178, Statement of Uruguay to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

¹¹ S/PV.6178, Statement of India to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

82. At times, however, the lack of participation could indicate that Permanent Missions, and Military Advisers in particular, are not receiving the key messages, often political, from their capitals and need to build better ties with the political and military establishments in their capital. It could also indicate that a proper chain of information from the contingents on the ground to the capital and then on to New York needs to be developed or improved. As one Secretariat official stated, “Capitals need to own a mission for its life – not just each time there is a crisis”. This would require a regular and reliable chain of communication. This problem is certainly not unique to T/PCCs – indeed, the disconnect between permanent missions and capitals, as well as between the same country’s representatives sitting on the Security Council and the General Assembly, or on different committees of the General Assembly, such as the Fifth Committee and the C-34, has long been considered a structural weakness of the system in New York, and has real implications for future consultation mechanisms.

83. Several T/PCCs acknowledged that their fellow T/PCCs often come to meetings unprepared and uninformed, thus forfeiting a valuable opportunity to influence the Council’s decision-making. In part, however, they believe these habits have formed due to a history of *pro forma* consultations, where the opportunity to convey useful input to the Secretariat or the Council has been so limited. Thus, a vicious circle has developed whereby each side assumes the other is not committed to serious dialogue.

84. Another dimension, raised by an SRSG, is that the dialogue in the field between national contingents and the mission actually tends to be quite good, because “everyone in the field sees themselves as part of the UN”. The situation gets more complicated at Headquarters, where the UN’s agenda and national interests are often seen as divergent. Yet “T/PCC representatives at Headquarters prefer to engage with DPKO than with the field, and the only contact they actually have with the field is the perfunctory briefings that SRSGs provide at the consultations. They know when SRSGs and Force Commanders are in town – they should ask for meetings and get briefings. They should also consider travelling to the field to have more first-hand knowledge of what is happening”.

85. There are, of course, other mechanisms for consultation outside of New York permanent missions. TCC commanders and the Embassies of their countries could, for example, be consulted in the field, and the Permanent Five members of the Council could even use their diplomatic presences to conduct bilateral consultations with key T/PCCs in capitals, well in advance of mandate adoption or renewal.

86. Mission Planning and Command and Control. Concerns over DPKO/DFS mission planning and management and whether command and control arrangements between UN Headquarters and the field are robust enough surfaced as a central theme in this year’s peacekeeping debates and led to questions about whether more Member State oversight is warranted.

87. Much of this was brought on by the crisis in the Congo in late 2008, following which the TCCs involved made clear their dissatisfaction over their troops suddenly

being drawn into operations that had not been contemplated when they initially deployed. They expressed dissatisfaction with Secretariat management and planning of the mission and made clear that there were certain lines their troops would not cross in the field. As one TCC put it, “If there is a change in the concept of operations, major TCCs should be consulted first. Because if we do not agree, we are later blamed indirectly for not doing what *they* had decided”. The demand of major T/PCCs was clear: “We want to engage with the Council and the Secretariat from the very inception of the mission, including the initial planning stages and changes in mandate”.

88. The Congo crisis also brought home for the Council how little oversight it actually has over missions, prompting it to demand more involvement in planning. The presidential statement of 5 August states that the Council “intends to increase its interaction with the Secretariat in the early phase of mandate drafting”. While the Council’s growing concerns over Secretariat planning had more to do with the impact of planning on the outcome and success of missions, for T/PCCs, the questions raised about planning reflect concerns about what their personnel will be asked to do on the ground. Thus, while the concerns of the Council and the T/PCCs are different, they have both been framed with the debate about command and control and the strengths and weaknesses of planning.

89. As missions have grown more and more complex, the Secretariat has realized that it is unrealistic to expect T/PCCs to continue to engage in complex and risky activities without consulting them. The New Horizon thus commits DPKO and DFS to “review and strengthen mechanisms for more inclusive planning for robust...operations” and that “[t]his process must include a dialogue with Member States to ensure that troop and police contributors deploying to missions with robust concepts of operation are consulted and understand and accept assigned tasks and rules of engagement...” It also states that when a rapid response is called for due to conditions on the ground or the deployment of significant new capabilities, a greater level of information-sharing with T/PCCs is required. Thus, it commits to “strengthen contributors’ confidence in mission planning and command and control by [engaging] with members of the Security Council and contributing countries on strengthening mechanisms for consultation and interaction on mission planning processes within the framework of UN command and control”. All of this will take time to develop but could represent a significant shift from past practice.

90. With regard to Technical Assessment missions (TAMs), DPKO/DFS has undertaken, in the New Horizon, to consult Member States systematically on the objectives and parameters of a TAM before deploying, and to include T/PCCs in this dialogue once their personnel have deployed. The question is whether and how this process could be further opened up to T/PCCs in the initial stages of planning.

91. Thus far, the Council has agreed that the concept of operations should be presented to T/PCCs and welcomes a discussion of it, but not that contributors be involved in developing or revising it. The Secretariat has also balked at engaging T/PCCs, or the Council, for that matter, in each and every aspect of mission planning, which it feels would impede the Secretariat’s ability to plan and manage missions. A

Secretariat official expressed the concern that “there are only a limited number of people out of the 192 Member States who can be seated at the table before the process becomes completely unwieldy”. One TCC agreed, commenting that, “TCCs have to understand that they have to delegate command of operations to the Secretariat. You cannot have unlimited consultation with 192 Member States. But TCCs need to be able to express their concerns and provide real feedback – the two are not [mutually exclusive]’.

92. The issue that arises, as the non-paper points out, is how to maintain the proper balance between inclusiveness, on the one hand, and the impartiality and efficiency of the Secretariat and the need to preserve unified command and control, on the other. At the same time, in view of the complexity and risks of the tasks being asked of peacekeepers, the Secretariat may have to be less protective than ever before with regard to its own impartiality. Simply put, an impartial mission plan that does not work is a less desirable outcome than a mission plan influenced by key T/PCCs, but which stands a chance of success.

93. Since some T/PCCs have been quite vocal on this issue, they could present involvement in planning as a precondition to participation in peacekeeping. And if DPKO/DFS hope to re-engage those T/PCCs, primarily Western countries, who left peacekeeping in the 1990s, those countries are likely to do the same. In light of the commitments made in the New Horizon and with the threat of under-resourced peacekeeping operations looming large, the key questions are no longer about *whether* T/PCCs should be involved in planning, but *how*: How early should consultations with potential T/PCCs begin before establishment of a new mission or before mandate renewal? Would all T/PCCs be involved and, if not, how would a ceiling be set? Would T/PCCs who have not made a commitment yet be included? Or would only the major T/PCCs participate? And what would be the actual modalities for consultation? Could some initial forms of direct involvement in planning be considered, which could then be extended to other missions if successful? A fallback position has been to call for replication of structures and procedures of other organizations such as the European Union, but this is not a feasible solution for the UN. Instead, the Secretariat and Member States will need to engage in some difficult discussions in the coming months to find a realistic way forward.

94. The Strategic Military Cell for UNIFIL. One example of an effort to address concerns about consultation and planning was the Strategic Military Cell (SMC), established in 2006 in connection with the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Following the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, the Security Council authorized an almost eight-fold increase in the strength of the mission to 15,000 troops. It was expected that a significant number of the new troops would come from European countries, representing the most sizable European deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation since the early 1990s.

95. One of the key conditions of the European contributors for participation in the expanded force was that a special cell be set up at New York Headquarters to provide “strategic military guidance” to UNIFIL. The SMC liaises directly with the UNIFIL

Force Commander and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It comprises representatives from the various TCCs present in UNIFIL as well as one each from the Permanent Five members of the Security Council¹²; the SMC is approximately two-thirds European, as three of the four largest contributors to UNFIL are Italy, France and Spain.

96. The creation of this unprecedented parallel structure initially prompted some leading T/PCCs to ask whether a double standard exists for European contributors, since no structures involving headquarters planning or command functions exist for the missions in which developing countries are deployed; indeed, they have had to struggle even to be consulted on critical changes to mandates. A Secretariat review found that while the temporary reinforcement for rapid planning was potentially valuable, the SMC's large and unwieldy structure and its disconnect from the Office of Military Affairs were problematic. It concluded that any future mechanisms would have to fall under existing command and control structures. The C-34 has also made references to the need to follow established frameworks.

97. The experience raises certain important questions for the future: Could the SMC model or something approximating it be replicated in future operations where non-Western countries are involved, if it can serve the important purpose of providing a degree of confidence to their national command? If so, is the composition – representatives of the P-5, together with the leading TCCs – the right one? What other means can be found to make available to the Office of Military Affairs the guidance, lessons learned and information exchange that the SMC provided?

98. The Military Staff Committee. A suggestion put on the table by Russia, and supported by France, is to revitalize the Security Council's Military Staff Committee ("MSC"), composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five members and which, according to the UN Charter, shall "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security [and] the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal...."¹³ Russia has proposed that the Military Staff Committee be expanded to include all 15 Council members, so that "the work of the Security Council on the military aspects of peacekeeping [is] further systematized".¹⁴

99. There has, so far, not been much movement on this proposal within the Council. The Secretariat feels that better military advice could enable the Security Council to produce a more workable plan for missions, but it is rightly concerned about the feasibility of continually bringing military plans before the Council for an expert opinion. As for T/PCCs, such a mechanism simply reinforces the current imbalance between them and the Council. Thus, proponents of this proposal on the Council need to demonstrate exactly how it would lead to better mandates, which would presumably also be in the interest of T/PCCs.

¹² The United Kingdom has never exercised its option to serve on the SMC.

¹³ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Art. 47 (1).

¹⁴ S/PV.6178, Statement of Russia to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

100. The Charter does provide, however, that Member States not represented on the MSC can be “invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work”.¹⁵ This would allow the Council to invite the ten elected members of the Council, as well as military advisers from major TCCs, to participate in informal meetings, when appropriate. One occasion might be the period leading up to the renewal of MONUC, when TCC military experts could provide the Council with very useful military expertise.

101. Otherwise, the focus will probably remain on a new initiative, welcomed in the 5 August presidential statement, whereby increased use is to be made of meetings between Council Members and the Secretariat at the political-military expert level. While this mechanism, which has been used this year to increase expert-level interaction between the Council and the Secretariat, is not a substitute for consultations with T/PCCs, it could achieve the same objective by assisting the Council in making more informed decisions.

VII. The Role of the C-34

102. The Committee of 34, or the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, is the General Assembly committee that is mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping, and report on these to the General Assembly. The C-34 is comprised of 144 Member States that are mostly past or current contributors to peacekeeping operations.

103. The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly has been difficult at times, with the C-34 feeling that the Council has overstepped its authority in addressing broader peacekeeping issues and policies beyond specific operational mandates. Thus, many T/PCCs, which are members of the C-34 but not the Security Council, as well as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), whose members contribute 87% of troops and police to peacekeeping operations have pushed for a more prominent role for the C-34.¹⁶

104. As Uruguay stated in its statement at the 5 August debate, “...seeking as broad a consensus as possible among all Member States would not only ensure the greater legitimacy of and weaker resistance to such action, but would also generate stronger commitment among all those involved in its implementation. Thus, the role of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping must be re-evaluated, and to that end we must all strive to build confidence among those involved”.¹⁷

105. The NAM has also called for the C-34, the Security Council and the Secretariat to “coordinate all efforts in a coherent and strategic direction for peacekeeping”.¹⁸ In this

¹⁵ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Art. 47 (2).

¹⁶ S/PV.167 (resumption1), Statement of Morocco to the 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

¹⁷ S/PV.6178, Statement of Uruguay to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

¹⁸ S/PV.167 (resumption1), Statement of Morocco to the 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.

context, it has underlined that the C-34 remains “the only United Nations forum mandated to review comprehensively the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects....” and noted that the C-34 is, therefore, the appropriate forum for discussing the ideas and suggestions put forth in the New Horizon non-paper.

106. The 5 August presidential statement recognized that “further debate is required among Member States, including in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, to develop a wider consensus on a range of issues....” This would seem to be a good opportunity for the Council and the C-34 to engage in a dialogue to achieve consensus on key issues and find more effective ways to work together.

VIII. Ad Hoc Groups

107. One mechanism that both Member States and the Secretariat cite as being effective in maintaining unity with regard to a mission are the informal “groups of friends” or *ad hoc* groups that are established in support of a peacekeeping operation or a peace process. The Groups of Friends of Haiti and the Core Group for Timor L’Este are considered to be particularly effective. The Core Group for Timor L’Este, for example, usually meets several weeks before a mandate renewal, providing participants with a real opportunity to affect the direction to be taken. The Haiti group includes all the leading TCCs and, perhaps because of the regional ties of the leading TCCs, has put forth unified TCC positions and contributed to useful discussions about the political direction of the mission. Both the Timor L’Este and Haiti groups have also been involved in drafting and defending resolutions. This model has been pointed to as quite effective in giving TCCs a voice and allowing opinions on a mission’s future direction influence the decisions of the Council. The fact that the September consultations on Haiti were particularly effective has also been attributed to the existence of this mechanism.

108. At present, key missions such as the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan do not have a Groups of Friends, and Member States and Secretariat staff alike agree that the establishment of such groups could be very useful. The Group of Friends for Darfur, meanwhile, does not include T/PCCs, and does not, therefore, provide an opportunity for hearing the T/PCC perspective.

109. The New Horizon non-paper states that such coalitions are “critical to building a purposeful partnership and a clear political strategy behind a peacekeeping mission”. It proposes that the Security Council “consider establishing, with interested Member States, informal mission-specific coalitions of engaged stakeholders to assist the Secretary-General in securing or sustaining the necessary political and operational support”. The Security Council and the Secretariat will need to discuss, in the coming months, how this proposal can be realized.

IX. Conclusions and Recommendations

110. Significant progress has been made this year, in a relatively short period and largely within an environment of consensus, in bridging the gap between the Security

Council and T/PCCs on the issue of consultations. The Security Council has made noteworthy commitments and begun to put these into practice. T/PCCs also believe that there is now very serious engagement on the part of DPKO and DFS. Significantly, it has become clear that participation of T/PCCs in the debate on the challenges facing peacekeeping operations is crucial – not as a concession to T/PCCs, but because a true, high quality debate can qualitatively improve Security Council mandates and a peacekeeping operation’s chances of success. To be sure, the discussions for this report made clear that much remains to be done, but there appears to be real momentum and the environment around the issue has become markedly positive.

111. In the past decade, significant reforms have changed UN peacekeeping in far-reaching ways. And yet, as the New Horizon demonstrates, many of the challenges identified at that time remain unaddressed and require a renewed commitment from Member States and the Secretariat if they are to be properly tackled. In the next three years, the New Horizon process will engage the Secretariat, the Security Council, the C-34 and individual T/PCCs, as proposals are reviewed and decisions taken. As far as the issue of consultation is concerned, the changes and good practices that have already emerged during this year of reflection on peacekeeping should be systematized and further built upon. This should be done with a view to addressing not only the problems being faced today, but also those likely to surface in the coming decade of peacekeeping.

112. The Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat each have a distinct role and set of responsibilities but they need to work in partnership, as advocated by the New Horizon. In supporting this new partnership agenda, the Challenges partnership may wish to discuss the following proposals and what steps Challenges can take to support the Security Council, the Secretariat, the C-34 and capitals on this issue.

113. The Security Council:

- a. The Council has committed to making progress on “early and meaningful engagement” with T/PCCs. This should take place over the entire life of a mission. The Council should continue and step up the efforts made thus far, and systematize any positive changes introduced. It should be supported in the review scheduled for 2010 of its own progress on this issue.
- b. The Permanent Five members should hold informal MSC meetings around key missions such as MONUC and invite military experts from the ten elected Council members and major T/PCCs to participate.
- c. To inject more perspectives in the Council’s decision-making, elected members should ensure that their contributions reflect the views of their regional groups.
- d. The use of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations should be encouraged and expanded, and it should develop a focused agenda around a limited set of concrete and achievable objectives (such as the issue of informal coalitions).

114. Secretariat:

General:

- a. The Secretariat should continue the new measures to improve consultations with T/PCCs and the Security Council, including advance discussions to identify T/PCC priority issues for briefings.
- b. The Secretariat will need to move forward quickly with its proposal to survey Member States for their priority information requirements. This undertaking, which aims to streamline and improve reporting, should not be used by Member States merely to propose additional reporting requirements, but rather to honestly and transparently take stock of existing mechanisms and help build a more effective system for information exchange.
- c. The Secretariat could also take advantage of the presence of senior official (SRSGs, D/SRSGs, FCs, Police Commissioners) in New York to propose or provide additional briefings, including bilateral ones, and ensure a regular exchange of information.

Mission Planning:

Some of the modalities that could be considered to involve T/PCCs at an earlier stage include:

- a. Engage in an internal dialogue on command and control and how to increase inclusiveness in mission planning, with a view to implementing the commitments made in the New Horizon non-paper.
- b. Establish a “Core group” of the largest current and future contributors and engage in a systematic exchange when planning a new mission, or if there is a crisis or potential significant change in mandate, to receive their input and understand limitations and strength of troops. When T/PCCs are deployed, they, together with the Security Council, should be consulted in advance of draft revisions and/or new planning documents.
- c. Consult T/PCCs before TAMs to identify specific questions they would want answered in deciding whether to deploy or not, and report back to T/PCCs on these issues.
- d. Establish a mechanism whereby the findings of T/PCC’s own pre-deployment visits are fed into the Secretariat planning process.
- e. Consider, on a case-by-case basis, secondments of T/PCC personnel to HQ, when appropriate, to assist with planning within existing chains of command.
- f. Revisit HQ-field communication, including IOTs, to ensure timely provision of information and channeling of MS requests to the field.

115. Engagement by T/PCCs:

Capitals should:

- a. Remain engaged and have regular consultations over the entire lifecycle of a mission, not just at times of crisis.
- b. Encourage their permanent missions in New York, if they have serious concerns about a mission, to seek meetings with SRSGs, Deputy SRSGs and Force Commanders when they are at Headquarters to raise these concerns.

- c. Encourage field visits, and include political-military representation on both Security Council and MPAC visits, to gain more first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground. Findings of these visits should be shared with IOTs.
 - d. Ensure that T/PCC representatives attending the consultations:
 - i. are at an adequately senior level (some have suggested Ambassadorial level) supported by staff with experience of complex UN peacekeeping operations;
 - ii. have consulted on both political and military aspects; and
 - iii. have received input from both the field and the capital prior to attending meeting.
 - e. Consider basing one official within their contingents in the field to serve as a liaison with the Permanent Mission in New York.
116. Informal Coalitions:
- a. Member States and the Secretariat should have further discussions on the establishment of informal coalitions of interested actors to support specific missions. This could take place in the Working Group, and include lessons learned by the Secretariat and Member States who have participated in successful groups. A first step could be to establish an informal and inclusive group for a key mission such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), where most actors agree that such a group could be of assistance.
117. Committee of 34 (C-34):
- a. The Council and the C-34 should engage in a dialogue to achieve consensus on key issues and find more effective ways to work together.
 - b. The C-34 should provide “practical suggestions” to the Council, as requested in the PRST of 5 August 2009, to further improve consultations.
 - c. The C-34 should consider a report of its own in 2010, in parallel to the Council’s report, on progress made in consultations. This should include steps taken by T/PCCs.