



International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2010

Trends, Facts and Figures – Overview of Peacekeeping in 2009

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On behalf of the Center on International Cooperation, let me express my sincere thanks to the Challenges Forum and the Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Center of Excellence for the opportunity to present a strategic summary of the 2010 edition of the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*.

Just over a year ago, in the previous *Annual Review*, we cautioned that peacekeeping was entering a period of strategic uncertainty. Military and political breakdowns in the most high-profile theaters, coupled with the global financial crisis, had strongly suggested that a withdrawal of resources from peacekeeping was likely.

Contrary to expectations, peacekeeping levels did not contract in 2009. In fact, deployments of military personnel again surpassed record levels, rising by nearly nine percent over the year, with over 200,000 UN and non-UN military, police, and civilians in the field.

Today, the UN alone fields more than 100,000 uniformed personnel—including over 87,000 troops and military observers and some 13,000 police— as well as 23,000 civilian personnel in 15 peacekeeping operations.

The five largest missions account for 77 percent of total UN troop deployments.

For comparison, the total number of military peacekeepers deployed by the UN in 15 field missions was roughly total to NATO deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan during 2009.

If one excludes the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the UN accounted for 77 percent of all military personnel – and 87 percent of total uniformed and civilian personnel – deployed on peace operations during 2009.

Meanwhile, from 2008 to 2009 military deployments under the command of regional organizations and *ad hoc* arrangements fell by 36 percent relative to UN and NATO deployments. This was primarily due to the re-hatting of EUFOR-TCHAD troops to

MINURCAT, and to the withdrawal of a significant portion of the French troops operating in Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire.

It would be premature to mistake overall growth in deployment numbers for an overall improvement in the state of peace operations, however. Peacekeeping continued to suffer from the same political and operational challenges that hindered operations in 2008 – overstretched resources, weak or non-existent peace agreements, and minimal or absent consent.

In fact, the challenges facing the hardest cases are as acute today as they were one year ago. Violence in these theatres still overwhelmingly targets civilian populations, as well as peacekeepers, while political support for continued deployment wanes.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, violence in the east did not improve during 2009, exposing the limits of the mission to protect civilians and extend the authority of the Congolese government without stronger international engagement.

MONUC's mandate renewal emphasized protection of civilians, but provided little operational clarity on how and when to the mission was to do so. By the end of February 2010, just under half of the additional 2,785 troops authorized in November 2009 had arrived. And the UN's partnership with the abusive FARDC has further undermined security in the east, damaging the mission's credibility. With MONUC into its 10th year, the Congolese government is now pushing for a drawdown of the mission, despite significant ongoing violence.

In Chad, MINURCAT was provided with neither a mandate to impact the political situation, nor has it received sufficient troop levels. Over a year into authorization, its military component remains only 2/3rds deployed – and of those troops on the ground, half were already in theater, re-hatted from EUFOR.

Following a peace agreement between the Justice and Equality Movement and Sudanese government in February, the Chadian government is considerably more stable than it was at year end. And, as a result, MINURCAT is also now under pressure to withdraw.

In Darfur, open conflict has abated, but criminal activity has risen, sharply impacting on the delivery of humanitarian aid and overall civilian security. Yet, only about 65% of UNAMID's mandated police force are on the ground. Some two years since its mandate was authorized, UNAMID's military strength stands at three quarters of that authorized.

In south Sudan, it is not immediately clear what impact President Bashir's victory in the recent elections will have, but next year's referendum is almost certain to result in an independent South, which whether peaceful or violent, will require the support of the UN.

And in Somalia, only 60 percent of the AU's UN-supported force is deployed. But it is questionable if any military force in the country could have a measurable impact, as a

political solution to the conflict seems ever more remote, the transitional government's authority consistently rebuffed, and peacekeepers the target of insurgent violence.

It was not only large-scale operations that faced difficulties in 2009. Division within the Security Council shut down the UN's observer mission in Georgia in July. Stalled reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire delayed elections yet again, further extending the stay of nearly 7,000 UN troops. Nepal entered a new period of political crisis in which the mismatch between the limited mandate of UNMIN and the reality on the ground became increasingly clear. And, the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) saw political constriction of its ability to maneuver as Kosovo further embraced independence.

As many of these cases illustrate, what happens when consent – particularly host country consent – is limited or withdrawn is a growing challenge facing contemporary peace operations – a trend that has obvious operational implications for peacekeepers in the field, and one with broader implications for the very viability and purpose of peacekeeping.

Despite this seemingly gloomy picture, this year's *Annual Review* also noted positive developments in peacekeeping over the past year. Several long-standing missions have achieved interim stability, including in Liberia and Timor. Haiti, too, had shown signs of progress prior to the devastating earthquake – and rapid deployments in its wake have helped maintain order, facilitating urgent humanitarian relief.

These successes have posed a separate challenge: Overstretch has generated increased pressure by some Member States for mission drawdown.

Withdrawal of peacekeepers could help contain rising costs, and make troops available for other missions – provided that the necessary conditions were in place for a responsible and sustainable exit.

This pressure has focused attention on the linkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.

A major, contributing factor to such an exit is the initiation of an effective system to support the rule of law in post-conflict settings.

While establishing the rule of law through the development or reform of the justice and security sectors is often associated with longer-term peacebuilding activities, over the course of the past decade it has emerged as a core peacekeeping task – one with significant bearing on the ability of the UN to ensure the longer-term protection of civilians.

Support to rule of law, including deployment of police, has also taken on a new saliency in contexts like Haiti, West Africa, and Kosovo – where drug trafficking and organized crime threaten to overwhelm state institutions and undermine stability.

Fortunately, broad recognition of the importance of peacekeeping as a means of responding to global insecurity has elicited several reform initiatives over the past year from the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and individual member states. These have included efforts to improve planning, management, and oversight mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, to expand the base of troop, police, and civilian peacekeepers, and to strengthen the capacity of those willing to contribute.

It would be unrealistic to expect reform efforts to improve peacekeeping within a year, but there was progress in the most critical area: the relationship between key stakeholders.

Despite differences in approach, these initiatives rightly recognize that the problems affecting peacekeeping are, at their center, political in nature; and that greater consensus is needed among troop and police providers, financial contributors, the UN Secretariat, and the Security Council to sustain complex and ambitious multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

Thank you.