



# International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

## Challenges for Peace and Security in Africa

Mr El Ghassim Wane,  
Director for Peace and Security, African Union

### I. Introduction: Africa's Security Threats

1. Of the many challenges facing our continent, the quest for peace and security remains undoubtedly the most pressing. Over the past two decades, Africa has experienced a number of long-term, severe and, in some cases, inter-related crises and violent conflicts. While interstate wars and liberation struggle dominated the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium have been characterized by intra-state violence.

2. Clearly, in the past few years, the number of violent conflicts has been significantly reduced, and important advances, while still fragile, have been made, thanks to the collective determination and efforts of Africa, with the support of its partners. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and the Comoros, amongst others, all bear testimony to this encouraging trend. At the same time, far too many African countries remain trapped in a vicious cycle of conflict and its deadly consequences. In 2006, half of all high intensity conflicts took place in the African continent while, in 2007, 38% of the world's armed conflicts took place on our continent.<sup>1</sup> That Africa is host to 8 United Nations operations and that our continent constitutes over 60% of the agenda of the UN Security Council bear testimony to this reality.

3. Yet, peace and security challenges on the continent are not limited to large scale armed conflicts. Indeed, a considerable proportion of armed violence does not fit neatly into the category of armed violence between the military forces of parties contesting over power, territory or resources. As noted by SIPRI, "other forms of violence, such as massacres, arbitrary killings and terrorist attacks, are inflicted directly and intentionally on civilians. Even though these forms of violence often take place in the context of an armed conflict and the incidence of armed conflict per se has declined since the early 1990s, this 'one-sided' violence against civilians has continued largely unabated."<sup>2</sup>

4. In addition, the significant preponderance of low intensity conflicts (inter-communal, inter ethnic) across many areas of the Continent is also reason for concern. Conflicts between non-state actors, inter-communal and inter-party conflicts caused by disputed presidential elections have resulted in hundreds of casualties and large scale displacement. Human insecurity is therefore not only a consequence of major armed conflicts but also of violence occurring at other levels of society.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See SIPRI 2007 Yearbook, chapter 2 and the work of the Human Security Centre: [www.humansecuritycentre.org](http://www.humansecuritycentre.org)

<sup>2</sup> Ekaterina Stepanova, *Trends in armed conflicts: one-sided violence against civilians*, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008.

<sup>3</sup> World Health Organisation, *World report on violence and health*, Edited by Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi and Rafael Lozano, 2002.

5. The causes of this worrying situation are many. As stressed in the Statement of Commitment to Peace and Security in Africa issued by the Heads of State and Government of the members of the PSC on the occasion of the Solemn Launching of this organ on 25 May 2004, these include ethnic and religious extremism, corruption, exclusionary definitions of citizenship, poverty and disease, the illegal exploitation of Africa's renewable and non-renewable natural resources and mercenarism.<sup>4</sup>

6. To these should be added a host of other factors ranging from competition for land and other resources, misallocation of resources and shortcomings in governance, as well as subversion by outside actors. The situation is aggravated by the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and the scourge of drug trafficking, which poses an ever increasing threat to peace and security in Africa.<sup>5</sup> More generally, it is to be noted that once violence erupts, conflict itself may become the main source of its own continuation and protractedness in a process of attack and retaliation, which lead to self-perpetuating cycles of violence.

7. Equally challenging is the task of sustaining transitions from war to peace, in that:

*“...Experience has indicated that in the early phases of the transition from conflict to peace, peace processes remain fragile and the risk of resumption of violence high. This is because countries emerging from conflicts are characterized by weakened or non-existent capacity at all levels, destroyed institutions and the absence of a democratic culture, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.”*<sup>6</sup>

8. Indeed, while the decline in the number of conflicts in Africa is a welcome development, transitions from war to peace are typically volatile periods with specific challenges of their own. In this regard, the African Development Bank has noted the specific challenges of consolidating the peace, rebuilding state institutions, and re-launching economic activity. In its words:

*“...Post-conflict countries have a low revenue base, high expenditure needs, and weak institutional capacity. The factors that led to the conflict may persist or may even have been aggravated during the conflict, while new risk factors may have emerged. As a result, many post-conflict countries slip back into conflict. Thus, most of the ongoing conflicts in Africa are recurring conflicts. Understanding the problems post-conflict countries face and recommending measures to aid the transition from conflict is therefore an urgent priority.”*<sup>7</sup>

9. It is also important to pay attention to the emerging trend of election-related conflicts and violence. As noted by the AU's Panel of the Wise, while elections have become a core ingredient of popular participation in the governance process, since the new wave of democratization in Africa in the early 1990s, they have also spawned conflicts and violence and scrambled ethnic and regional alliances that sometimes threaten the social order, economic development, and efforts to strengthen regional integration. This situation signals weaknesses in the governance of elections, the rules of orderly political competition, and lack of impartial judiciaries to interpret and adjudicate electoral disputes, as much as it reflects the

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<sup>4</sup> Statement of Commitment to Peace and Security In Africa, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union - PSC/AHG/ST.(X), 25 May 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), adopted by the Executive Council in June 2006.

<sup>7</sup> African Development Bank, *African Development Report 2008/2009: Conflict Resolution, Peace and Reconstruction in Africa*, Oxford University Press, 2008.

transitional teething problems associated with managing elections and building institutions of competition that are widely accepted by winners and losers.<sup>8</sup>

10. On a related point, it is important to emphasize the need of respect by AU Member States of their Constitutions, especially when it comes to introducing constitutional reforms. This is an important component of Africa's efforts to strengthen democratic processes on the continent and, more generally, to promote peace, security and stability.<sup>9</sup> Failure to observe these provisions can lead to situations of tension which could, in turn, precipitate political crisis and undermine the countries concerned, while at the same time sowing the seeds of instability detrimental to their development and even to that of entire regions of the continent.

11. Another source of concern relates to border disputes and conflicts. Since African countries gained independence, the borders – which were drawn during the colonial period – have been a recurrent source of conflicts and disputes in the continent. Nearly half a century after the political liberation of the continent, the delimitation and demarcation of the borders inherited from colonization still face major technical and financial problems. Subject to the completion of the survey being currently carried out by the AU Commission, it is estimated that less than a quarter of African borders have been defined. This situation gives rise to “undefined zones” within which the application of national sovereignty poses problems. In these zones, a local dispute between two communities can rapidly escalate and lead to inter-State tensions. When these zones have natural resources, their management can prove to be difficult and be a source of misunderstanding. Over the past few years, we have noticed a worrying increase in border disputes. Fortunately, thanks to the wisdom of the countries concerned, these did not escalate into open conflicts.

12. As we strive to achieve our objective of a peaceful Africa within a peaceful world, a new threat, relating to climate change is clouding our horizon. Changing weather patterns and rising sea levels will surely bring environmental stress to large parts of our continent. Although Africa has contributed least to global warming, we are, because of our limited resources and capacity, likely to suffer the most from the resulting consequences, whether they relate to scarce water resources, damage to coastal infrastructure and cities, reduced agricultural yields and environmentally-induced migration. While we are yet to deepen our understanding of the interaction between climate change and conflict, it is clear that this phenomenon will impact negatively on our quest for peace and further compound the efforts being made in this respect.

## II. The Devastating Costs of Conflict

*“Africa suffers enormously from conflict and armed violence. As well as the human tragedy, armed conflict costs Africa around \$18bn per year, seriously derailing development.”<sup>10</sup>*

13. While data with regard to conflict related impact and cost is problematic, given the absence of agreed indicators, definitions and reliable national statistics, it is clear that violent conflict has had a devastating impact on the continent. As stressed in the Declaration on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and

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<sup>8</sup> Panel of the Wise, Report on Strengthening the Role of the African Union in the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Election-related Disputes and Violent Conflicts in Africa, submitted to the Ordinary Session of the Assembly, in Sirte, Libya, July 2007.

<sup>9</sup> See in this regard the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

<sup>10</sup> IANSA, OXFAM and SAFERWORLD. *Africa's missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of conflict*, 11 October 2007.

Resolution, adopted by the 39<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 30 June 1993:

*...No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems in the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between our countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families. Conflicts have forced millions of our people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled-up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of our countries to address the many compelling needs of our people.”*

14. Armed conflicts in Africa kill thousands of people every year, not only combatants but, in fact, primarily and overwhelmingly, civilians. In addition to the casualties incurred directly as a result of combat, the humanitarian consequences of armed violence on many millions of Africans are severe.

15. In terms of direct and indirect casualties, although estimates vary considerable<sup>11</sup>, one estimate notes that “across nine African conflicts, indirect deaths were 14 times greater than deaths occurring in combat”.<sup>12</sup>

16. In fact, “violent conflict has exacted a heavy toll in terms of human suffering and lost development opportunities in Africa...in situations of conflict far more people die from disease, starvation, malnutrition, and breakdown of health services than from battle.”<sup>13</sup> More people, especially women and children, die from the consequences of conflict than die from direct conflict-related violence. In addition, many other people are injured as a result of violence, suffering often from permanent disability.

17. Civilian displacement as a result of armed conflict is considerable. Africa has the largest number of victims of forced displacement in the world, with close to 3 million refugees, 20 percent of the global estimate of 10.5 million according to the latest figures available in 2009. With about 11.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 19 countries in Africa, out of the global estimate of 26 million, the African continent is the most affected by the tragic reality of IDPs. From protracted cases of Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf camps, in Southwest Algeria, to cases of multiple internal displacements of civilians in countries like CAR, DRC, Somalia and Sudan, there is an urgent need to find durable solutions for victims of forced displacement and address its root causes.

18. The consequences of armed conflict on our continent’s socio-economic development are becoming clearer as research into the effects of armed conflict, as well as other types of violence, begins to establish the true extent of its impact. Estimates have pointed to a combined economic loss of around \$300bn since 1990 by a number of African countries affected by conflict. With an average annual loss of around \$18bn as a result of wars, civil wars, and insurgencies, armed conflict shrinks a nation’s economy on average by 15 per cent

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<sup>11</sup> Average 17.6% GDP per annum (Lindgren G. (2004) ‘Measuring the Economic Costs of Internal Armed Conflict – A Review of Empirical Estimates’, Uppsala University, Sweden. Paper for the conference Making Peace Work in Helsinki 4–5 June 2004. Note that Lindgren gives an average of 11.3 per cent, but made an error in calculation for results from Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2000); Paul Collier et al estimated that the average civil war reduced GDP by around 2.2% per annum (Collier P. (1999) ‘On the economic consequences of civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 51, No.1, pp.168-183 or Stewart and Fitzgerald studied nine conflicts from 1970 to 1995 with average loss of 10.5% per annum.

<sup>12</sup> Using data from Annex 2 of Muggah R. (2007: forthcoming) ‘A hard pill to swallow: risk factors and impacts of collective violence on population health in Africa’, WHO/AFRO chapter on collective armed violence. IANSA, OXFAM and SAFERWORLD. *Africa’s missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of conflict*, 11 October 2007.

<sup>13</sup> Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, *Appendix 2A. Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1997–2006*, SIPRI Yearbook 2007.

according to an estimate considered conservative as it is based solely on costs of armed conflict (and not other types of violence) and periods of actual combat.<sup>14</sup>

19. Understanding the multitude of ways in which armed conflict and other types of violence affect countries' socio-economic development is critical as these estimates will underlie decisions on resource allocation and priority setting, particularly in terms of placing prevention at the centre of efforts. Estimates of "the cost per case of violent events or episodes can be used in economic evaluations (...) as a first step towards exploring the benefits of potential interventions aimed at preventing violence and ensuring that the most effective and cost-effective interventions are being applied in violence prevention. Measuring the overall cost of violence is also important for the purposes of advocating for prevention."<sup>15</sup>

20. These costs include *direct costs* (medical/rehabilitation costs due to casualties, injuries, disability, military expenditure, care for refugees and displaced people, physical destruction leading to loss/depletion of infrastructure and livelihood assets), which are usually undertaken at the expense of essential services. A reduction in Human Development in countries experiencing conflict has therefore been noted, with estimates pointing to an average 50% more infant deaths<sup>16</sup>, 15% more undernourished people<sup>17</sup>, life expectancy reduced by five years<sup>18</sup>, 20% more adult illiteracy<sup>19</sup>; 2.5 times fewer doctors per patient<sup>20</sup> and 12.4% less food per person. These averages tend to mask however, the fact that conflict does not impact all sector of society in equal ways, with regional, social, religious, or ethnic lines often determining differing effects.

21. In addition to the direct costs of violence, the indirect costs from lost opportunities tend to be even higher as "economic activity falters or grinds to a halt; the country suffers from inflation, debt, and reduced investment, while people suffer from unemployment, lack of public services, and trauma. More people, especially women and children, die from the fall-out of conflict than die in conflict itself."<sup>21</sup> These relate to reduced economic activity due to insecurity, reduced mobility and workforce; capital flight and macroeconomic impacts; loss of developmental aid; ecological degradation with its impact on food security; reduced capacity for structural stability; and wealth transferred to the illicit economy. Furthermore, the disruption of trade and loss of investor confidence as a result of war tend to result in loss of business potential not only for the country in question, but also its neighbours and indeed the entire continent. Spill-over effects of armed conflict and the perceived or real fear of violence spreading may also result in increased military spending by neighbours. Finally, but equally important, there are the *intangible costs* (health-related, livelihoods and quality of life, loss of social capital).<sup>22</sup>

### III. A Peace and Security Architecture for Africa: Building the Requisite Institutional Framework

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<sup>14</sup> IANSA, OXFAM and SAFERWORLD. *Africa's missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of conflict*, 11 October 2007.

<sup>15</sup> World Health Organisation, *World report on violence and health*, Edited by Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi and Rafael Lozano, 2002.

<sup>16</sup> World Bank, 'World Development Indicators 2007', 2008.

<sup>17</sup> See World Bank 'Health, Nutrition and Population Data', <http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats> (last checked by the author May 2007).

<sup>18</sup> World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*, 2008.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> IANSA, OXFAM and SAFERWORLD. *Africa's missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of conflict*, 11 October 2007.

<sup>22</sup> IANSA, OXFAM and SAFERWORLD. *Africa's missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of conflict*, 11 October 2007.

22. Peace and security has always been at the core of the concerns of African leaders, for this is a prerequisite for the development of our continent and its peoples. As a matter of fact, African leaders have constantly endeavoured to strengthen the capacities, particularly the institutional capacities, of the continental Organization to enable it to address the challenge of peace and security.

23. It was against this background that the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in Cairo, in 1993, to provide the Organization with the necessary instruments to deal with the scourge of conflicts. More specifically, the aim was not only to develop an institutional mechanism of collective African action in matters of conflict management in relation to the hitherto *ad hoc* ways of dealing with conflict, but also to effectively take on board the changes that has taken place as far as the crises facing the continent were concerned, with the significant increase in internal conflicts as compared to inter-State conflicts.<sup>23</sup>

24. Nevertheless, the scope and gravity of the conflicts, as well as their complex nature, soon revealed the limitations of the Mechanism, which, among other things, did not provide for the deployment of peacekeeping operations – a responsibility left exclusively to the United Nations – and conferred only very limited powers on the OAU. It was necessary, therefore, to adapt the structures and resources of the continent to the situation then prevailing on the ground and to new challenges resulting from the changes that had taken place in the international system. The efforts deployed in this regard also formed part of the plans to transform the OAU into the African Union.

25. It is in this context that the Heads of State and Government adopted in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which entered into force in December 2003.<sup>24</sup> The adoption of this Protocol marked a turning point, for it substantially strengthened the powers of the AU in matters of conflict prevention and resolution, and introduced new rules of procedure which gave added credibility to the AU. In particular, mention should be made here of the rule that prohibits the participation of any Member State, including members of the PSC, in deliberations and decision-making processes with respect to conflicts in which they are involved.

26. The PSC Protocol provided the basis for the African Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA), whose five main pillars are:

- (i) the PSC, which is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent and for facilitating timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa;
- (ii) the Panel of the Wise, whose role is to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention;
- (iii) the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which is tasked to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and consists of: (a) an observation and monitoring centre located at the AU, known as "the Situation Room", and (b)

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<sup>23</sup> See in this regard Organisation of African Unity, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Operationalization of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* (CM/1805 (LIX), Council of Ministers, 59th Ordinary Session, 31 January – 5 February 1994) (Addis Ababa: OAU 1994).

<sup>24</sup> African Union, *The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (Durban: African Union, 2002).

observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at the regional level and transmit the same to the Situation Room;

- (iv) the African Standby Force (ASF), composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin, ready for rapid deployment; and
- (v) the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. It is important to stress that the PSC Protocol, in Article 16(1), requires the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission to harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability, and to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union.<sup>25</sup>

27. Since the entry into force of the Protocol, significant progress has been made in the operationalization of the APSA. The PSC is now fully operational, and has already met 220 times, addressing most of the conflict and crisis situations facing the continent. In the short period of its existence, the PSC has acquired undeniable credibility, illustrated, amongst other things, by the annual meetings it now holds with the UN Security Council. It has also forged a similar relation with the Political and Security Committee of the European Union (EU). The Panel of the Wise became operational since December 2007, and has met seven times since then. In its work, the Panel has initiated thematic reflections on issues relevant to conflict prevention: election-related conflicts and violence and impunity, justice and reconciliation.<sup>26</sup>

28. Key components of the CEWS and the ASF are in place; every effort is being made to ensure the full operationalization of these two structures by the end of 2009 and 2010, respectively.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the MoU between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms was signed in January 2008, and a number of steps have since been taken towards its implementation, including the establishment of Liaison Offices with the AU to facilitate coordination and collaboration.<sup>28</sup>

29. Clearly, the search for peace in Africa requires the mobilization of all. It was, therefore, logical that Member States, through the PSC Protocol, encouraged NGOs, community-based and other civil society organizations, particular women's organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. In this respect, it is worth noting the many initiatives taken by civil society organisations towards conflict prevention and resolution, assistance to victims and rehabilitation of communities, as well as towards exploring creative ways of building sustainable peace in our continent.

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<sup>25</sup> African Union, *The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (Durban: African Union, 2002). A detailed analysis of each pillar of the architecture can be found in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (Eds), *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalising Solutions*, Ashgate Publishers, March 2010.

<sup>26</sup> African Union, *Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise*, adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its 100<sup>th</sup> Meeting, 12 November. Addis Ababa.

<sup>27</sup> On CEWS see African Union, Conflict Management Division (eds.), *Meeting the Challenge of Conflict Prevention in Africa. Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag), 2008; see also African Union, Conflict Management Division (eds.), *The CEWS Handbook* (Addis Ababa: African Union, mimeo 2008b). For a detailed analysis El-Ghassim Wane *et al* , "The Continental Early Warning System: Methodology and approach", in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (Eds), *op. cit.* pp 91-111. On the ASF see, inter alia, Jakkie Cilliers and Johann Pottgieter, "The African Standby Force", *Ibid.* pp 111-143.

<sup>28</sup> African Union, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, (Addis Ababa: African Union, mimeo, 2008).

30. In order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security, and in line with the provisions of the PSC Protocol, a Peace Fund has been established. It is made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the Union, as well as voluntary contributions from sources within and outside Africa. Since its establishment, the Peace Fund, in addition to the regular transfers from the AU budget and voluntary contributions from some Member States, has received significant support from our partners.

#### IV. Structural Prevention of Conflicts and Peace Building

31. The discussion above makes clear that, although high, the costs of prevention are considerably less than the costs of armed conflict (human, financial, material). Indeed, several authors have statistically analysed different methods of intervention concluding that acting before high levels of conflict intensity are reached have more chances of success.<sup>29</sup> This is exactly the point made by Davies and Gurr, for whom the economic costs of managing conflict once it has erupted (whether in caring for refugees, fielding peacekeeping operations and providing humanitarian relief) as well as the “far higher costs of recovering devastated cities and mined farmlands, rebuilding economic and socio-political systems and the incalculable costs in human suffering and loss of human capital have prompted broad interest among government and UN agencies, international organisations, nongovernmental organisations, researchers and activists, in *the potential for better anticipating such crises and responding with preventive action before they erupt into intense violence*”.<sup>30</sup>

32. In addition, structural prevention is often needed. According to Hampson, ‘structural prevention... involves measures that address the root causes of violence such as discrimination and economic deprivation, societal stress, military threats and sources of insecurity, and various environmental and resource degradation problems that may contribute to political instability and conflict. Many organisations and actors can contribute to structural prevention, including NGOs, development assistance agencies, educational institutions, religious leaders, the scientific community, the business community, and others’.<sup>31</sup>

33. Over the past two decades, the AU has adopted several instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. These instruments relate to human rights; governance and the fight against corruption; on-going democratisation processes on the continent; disarmament; terrorism; and the prevention and reduction of interstate conflicts. They represent a consolidated framework of commonly accepted norms and principles, whose observance would reduce considerably the risk of conflict and violence on the continent and consolidate peace where it has been achieved.

34. In addition to the Constitutive Act, which commits Member States to respect democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, mention should be made of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) and its Protocols relating to the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998) and on the Rights of Women (1995); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), which, among others, commits Member States to take all necessary measures to prevent children from taking direct part in hostilities and to refrain from recruiting them; the NEPAD

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<sup>29</sup> See for example Michael Lund, “Conflict Prevention: Theory in pursuit of policy and practice”, in J Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk and W. Zartman (Eds), *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Transformation*, SAGE publications ltd, 2008.

<sup>30</sup> J Davies, and T Gurr, “Preventive Measures: An Overview”, in J Davies and Ted Gurr (eds), *Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, (Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers), 1998, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> F Hampson, “Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations and Beyond”, in F Osler Hampson and D Malone (eds), *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*, IPA (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), 2002, p. 148.

Declaration on Democracy and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), both adopted in Durban, in July 2002; the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (2003); and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), which builds on earlier OAU/AU documents, including the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government.

35. It should also be noted that efforts are underway to enhance the AU's capacity to prevent and manage unconstitutional changes of Government. In January/February of this year, the Commission submitted a final report on the issue to the Assembly, which adopted a decision strengthening significantly the AU's framework for dealing with unconstitutional changes of Governments. With respect to election-related conflicts and violence, the Panel of the Wise submitted a report on the issue to the Sirte Session of the Assembly, which, in turn, requested the Commission to take all necessary steps to implement the recommendations of the Panel and to report to it regularly on the progress made in this respect.

36. To address the problem of refugees, the African leaders have adopted a number of instruments, in particular the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. In October 2009, the AU convened in Kampala, Uganda, a Special Summit on forced displacement in Africa, which is expected to adopt the AU Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. This Convention is the first of its kind in the world to offer a comprehensive legal framework designed to codify the standards of protection, provide for means and institutions of protection and assistance, and serve as a legal basis for coordinating various regional and international actors and agencies involved in providing protection and assistance to IDPs in the continent.

37. It is also important to recall the 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA), which is a comprehensive response to the multifaceted challenges of defense and security facing the continent, and was launched to provide a framework for coordinating, harmonizing and promoting policies aimed at preventing, containing and eliminating the pernicious internal and inter-state conflicts in Africa, as well as at accelerating regional integration and development on the continent. During the OAU Durban Summit, a Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa was adopted with a view to giving effect to the 2000 CSSDCA Solemn Declaration. The MoU defines clearly how AU member states should pursue the key objectives of security, stability, development, and cooperation. It also outlines a plan for achieving the set objectives and identifies performance indicators with time-frames.

38. The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) of 1996 is another essential tool for the continent's collective security. The Treaty, which has now entered into force, bans the testing, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of nuclear explosives in Africa. It provides for the establishment of an African Commission on Nuclear Energy mandated, *inter alia*, to collate reports and exchange of information on issues relating to nuclear weapons. In the light of the preparations for the holding of the NPT Review Conference, the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty enhances Africa's voice in seeking to further its collective security and development.

39. Equally important are the various decisions and instruments pertaining to landmines, in particular the May 1997 Kempton Park Plan of Action on a Landmine-Free Africa, which committed the continent to the total ban of anti-personnel mines. There are also instruments dealing with the issue of small arms and light weapons. In this respect, I would like to highlight the Declaration on an *African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons* adopted in Bamako in December 2000. The Declaration lays out measures to be implemented at the national,

regional and continental levels to deal with this scourge. A number of steps have since been taken towards the implementation of the Declaration.

40. In June 2006, the Executive Council, meeting at its 9<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, adopted the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy. The AU PCRDR Policy is intended to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that seek to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict. Given the peculiarities of each conflict situation, the Policy is conceived as a flexible template that can be adapted to, and assist, affected regions and countries in their endeavours towards reconstruction, security and growth.

41. While there remains a long way towards the full implementation of the Policy – development of operational guidelines for the adaptation of the Policy at regional and national levels, development of a database of African experts on PCRDR to be placed at the disposal of countries emerging from conflict, and establishment of an AU Standing Multidimensional Committee to provide political support and mobilize all the necessary and available resources for the implementation of the Policy – a number of concrete actions have already been taken, in support of countries such as the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Liberia and Sierra Leone. As part of the PCRDR Policy, and as a follow-up to a decision adopted by the Assembly in January 2008, the Commission is also in the process of developing a comprehensive AU framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

42. In January 2008, the Assembly of the Union adopted an AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). A year later, the Heads of State and Government adopted a decision on the threat of drug trafficking in Africa, which recognizes that this phenomenon was becoming a major challenge to security and governance in Africa, in general, and in West Africa, in particular, and requested the Commission and the RECs to intensify their efforts in the fight against drug trafficking.

43. Mention should also be made of the various instruments adopted towards the prevention and combating of terrorism, including the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted on 14 July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria, and the Protocol thereto; as well as the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. To this end, the AU has embarked on developing an Anti-Terrorism Model Law, which focuses on the suppression of the financing of terrorism that would be a ready-made technical assistance to Member States.

44. With respect to border issues, it is worth mentioning the Declaration on the AU Border Programme (AUBP), adopted by the Executive Council at its June 2007 session in Accra, with the overall objective of preventing conflicts and deepening integration on the continent. The AUBP revolves around two main axes, namely: the delimitation and demarcation of African borders where such an exercise has not yet taken place, and the development of cross-border cooperation. Last March, the Commission convened the 2<sup>nd</sup> Conference of African Ministers in charge of Border Issues, which adopted a Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and the Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of its Implementation.

45. Of particular importance to the maintenance of good neighborliness among AU Member States is the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact of January 2005. The objectives of the Pact are to promote cooperation among the Member States in the areas of non-aggression and common defense; to promote peaceful co-existence in Africa; to prevent conflicts of inter-State or intra-State nature; and to ensure that disputes are resolved by peaceful means.

46. These instruments and similar ones adopted by the Regional Mechanisms form the basis of the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted in Sirte on 28 February 2004. The CADSP is premised on a common African perception of what is required to be done collectively by African states to ensure that Africa's common defense and security interests and goals are safeguarded in the face of common threat to the continent as a whole.

47. Finally, it is important to highlight the numerous decisions adopted by AU policy organs on the issue of climate change. These decisions articulate a common African position to guide Member States in the negotiation process of the new global climate change regime after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. As indicated above, a movement forward on this issue will contribute to the overall efforts to promote sustainable peace, security and stability on the continent.

## V. Building Partnerships in Support of Peace in Africa

48. In their efforts to promote peace and security, African leaders have been mindful of the need for the support of the international community. Consequently, the PSC Protocol states that the PSC shall cooperate with the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and other relevant UN agencies and international organizations.

49. In line with these provisions, the AU has developed close relations with the United Nations. Since 2007, the PSC and the UN Security Council have instituted an annual consultation between the two organs, which is held alternately in Addis Ababa and in New York. The Commission and the UN Secretariat work together on a range of issues relevant to peace and security in Africa. Of particular significance in this respect is the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The two organizations are also cooperating in the area of capacity building, through the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme, signed in 2006.

50. Recently, relations between the AU and the UN have focused on ways to fund African-led peacekeeping operations. A number of steps are being considered in this respect, as a follow-up to the work done by the AU-UN Panel established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1809(2008) of 16 April 2008. In the meantime, it is significant to note that, in the specific case on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the UN has agreed to provide a logistics support package funded from UN assessed contributions, as well as financial support from UN Member States, through a Trust Fund, which allows for funding to be channeled to AMISOM to cover reimbursements and, eventually, to help procure necessary contingent equipment.

51. Strong relations have also been built with the EU, within the Framework of the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan adopted in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 2008. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the steps taken towards strengthening political dialogue and the support being provided towards the operationalization of the APSA. With respect to the funding of African-led peace support operations, mention should be made of the signing of the Financing Agreement for the new APF within the framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF in Addis Ababa on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2009. This second generation APF covers the period 2008 – 2010 and amounts to 300 million Euros, with a possible replenishment of 300 million Euros. The new APF is a major deliverable of the Peace and Security Partnership, notably its priority number 3 (predictable funding for African-led peace support operations). It comprises an early response mechanism that allows for urgent support to the first stages of African-led mediation and preparatory steps of African-led peace support operations.

52. The AU has also developed strong partnerships with the Arab League, the International Organization of La Francophonie and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. On the basis of the Agreements concluded with these Organizations, close cooperation has developed in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in countries and regions of common concern. Regarding more specifically the Arab League, initiatives are underway to create direct working relations between the Peace and Security Councils of the two Organisations. The AU Commission and the Arab League General Secretariat have developed close consultations and coordination on issues relating to situations involving countries which are members of both Organizations. Mention should also be made of the AU/G8 regular consultations undertaken within the framework Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations.

53. It is also encouraging to note the deepening relations with the AU's bilateral partners, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, China, France, UK and Russia) and other Asian, European and Latin American countries. In order to improve their support to the AU peace and security agenda and reduce transaction costs, the partners, through their Embassies in Addis Ababa, have strengthened their coordination and devised a number of practical steps to this end, including joint reporting by the AU on the partners' financial contributions. I would like to seize this opportunity to express AU's deep appreciation to all the partners for their political support, including within the framework of the international contact groups established to support AU's efforts in situations of unconstitutional changes of Government, as well as for their generous financial and logistical contributions to the promotion of peace and security on the continent.

## VI. Addressing Conflict and Crisis Situations on the Ground

54. While endeavouring to establish and implement an effective peace and security architecture, the AU is at the same time actively involved in efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and crisis situations, as well as in post-conflict reconstruction and development activities to buttress those countries emerging from conflict. In this respect, it should be noted at the outset that the situations vary.

55. There is no doubt that in recent years, notable progress has been made in the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Continent, thanks to the efforts deployed in the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture. However, at the same time, it is clear that in a number of countries and regions where peace was restored, the situation is not less precarious. It goes without saying that the post-conflict reconstruction process is complex, and calls for sustained support in order for the countries that have emerged from crises not to relapse back into the vicious circle of violence. Furthermore, some of the peace processes in the Continent – like those between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti and Eritrea, and in Western Sahara - are faced with persistent deadlock, while new hotbeds of tension emerge.

56. Among others, it is worth highlighting some of the situations the AU is seized with. In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and its Supplementary Agreements in March and November 2007, made it possible to revive the peace process. All efforts should be made to ensure that a timeframe for the holding of elections is soon fixed and respected. It is essential to establish the best possible conditions for the completion of the peace and reconciliation process.

57. In the **Democratic Republic of Congo**, the establishment of institutions emanating from the 2006 elections made it possible to restore peace and re-establish State authority in

most of the country's provinces. Progress has been made towards the restoration of peace in the eastern part of the country. Efforts should be pursued to continue to address the issue of the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)* and other negative forces, which constitute a source of serious concern for the DRC and Rwanda. Hence the importance of recent cooperation established between these two countries and that of the continued support of the international community. The AU is actively engaged in supporting the DRC to meet the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and development, as demonstrated by the recent dispatch of an AU multidisciplinary assessment mission to make recommendations on how best the AU and its member States could support the ongoing efforts.

58. In **Burundi**, the AU played a pivotal role in the peace process, deploying several peace support operations in the country. AU's efforts are currently focussed on post-conflict reconstruction and development and on support to the electoral process that will start this May. An AU multidisciplinary mission has just returned from the country -.

59. In **the Sudan**, it is worth recalling the deployment of the AMIS from 2004 to 2007 to support peace efforts in Darfur. In spite of the many challenges faced, the Mission made a tremendous contribution to the search for peace in Darfur, and was later replaced by an AU/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID). The AU and the UN have also appointed a Joint Chief Mediator to facilitate the negotiations between the parties to the conflict in Darfur. The AU is also actively supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, being one of the guarantors of the CPA.

60. It is important to make mention of the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue an arrest warrant against the President of the Sudan. While the AU is committed to fighting impunity and promoting justice as necessary conditions for sustainable peace, nonetheless it is the African Union strong view that the indictment of President Bashir has complicated the search for lasting solutions to the challenges facing the Sudan. In this respect, it is important to highlight the request to the UN Security Council to defer the ICC process in the interest of peace and stability in the Sudan. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council felt to take the action expected of it.

61. On 21 July 2008, the PSC decided to establish the AU High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), with the mandate to make recommendations on how best to address the three interlocking issues of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur. The AUPD submitted its report to the PSC, on 29 October 2009.

62. The central message which the Panel heard and transmitted can be encapsulated in the definition of the crisis as "Sudan's crisis in Darfur". Indeed, while many other factors are at play, it is fundamentally the historical legacy of Sudan's inequitable governance between the centre (Khartoum) and the peripheries, including the South and Darfur, that led to armed uprisings in various parts of the country and the resulting cycle of conflicts. The Panel sees the Darfur crisis as a symptom of the wider crisis of the Sudanese nation, and it is its strong view that the Darfur crisis can only be settled as part of an overall resolution of the Sudanese national crisis. The Panel made a number of recommendations aimed at promoting a just and long-lasting resolution of the crisis in Darfur.

63. At its meeting in Abuja, the PSC Summit endorsed the Report and the Recommendations contained therein, and requested the Chairperson of the Commission to establish an AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), comprising of former Presidents Thabo Mbeki, Pierre Buyoya and Abdulsalami Abubakar, to assist in the implementation of all aspects of the AUPD Recommendations, as well as to assist the Sudanese parties in the

implementation of the CPA and other related processes, as part of the democratic transformation of the whole of the Sudan. Since then the Panel has undertaken a number of activities in support of the ongoing processes in the Sudan, including the just concluded general elections. The Panel has also expended significant efforts to garner the support of the countries of the region and the international community in support of a holistic resolution of Sudan's crisis. In the coming months, the AUHIP will focus its efforts on the implementation of the remaining provisions of the CPA, including the final demarcation and delimitation of the border, the process leading up to the holding of the referendum, the coordination of international support, as well as on the post referendum issues. With regard to the post-referendum issues, it is important that issues such as citizenship, rights of border communities, wealth sharing, in particular oil, economic arrangements including the issue of currency, and others, be addressed, to ensure that, whatever the outcome of the referendum, the two sides understand that they will need to ensure good and harmonious relations.

64. Since the start of the armed conflict in **Somalia** almost two decades ago, the African Union has remained seized with the situation. In particular, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2007 authorized the deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with a mandate to *provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation.*

65. AMISOM has, since its deployment in Somalia in March 2007, been effectively implementing its mandate and has achieved tremendous results. On 8 January 2010, the PSC at its 214<sup>th</sup> meeting renewed the mandate of AMISOM for a further period of 12 months beginning 17 January 2010. AMISOM. As a multi-dimensional peace support operation, AMISOM is made up of the military (force), police and civilian components. In implementing its mandate and tasks, AMISOM has developed three pillars of intervention thus:

(i) Providing security to the Transitional Federal Institutions and key infrastructure in Mogadishu: AMISOM has been instrumental to the continued presence and functioning of the TFG, the Parliament and other institutions of government in the country by providing them with necessary protection. AMISOM also secures vital infrastructure, like the airport and seaport, which guarantees access to Mogadishu for both people and international humanitarian aid. AMISOM also carries out a number of physical protection actions such as demining and clearance of IEDs that ensures that the population is able to move about freely.

(ii) Providing support to the implementation of the Djibouti peace process. The Djibouti peace process provides for the establishment of a government of national unity (in this case, the new TFG including elements from the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia – Djibouti [ARS/D]) to re-establish state institutions, further reconciliation, restore peace, security and the rule of law, deliver basic services including humanitarian assistance, and allow for a transition to an elected democratic government in September 2011. In this regard, AMISOM recently, together with the UN and IGAD, facilitated the signing of an agreement between the TFG and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) which will enable the government expand its area of influence across the country and also increase the numbers of TFG forces through the incorporation of ASWJ forces in the government side. Efforts are also underway to engage all the armed opposition groups with a view to bringing them on board the Djibouti peace process as the government is also being supported in such areas as constitution making and parliamentary support in ensuring that the transitional tasks outlined in the Transitional Federal Charter are implemented. This support is being provided through the direct responsibility of the AU Special Representative for Somalia and Head of Mission supported by a core of civilian support staff.

(iii) Providing capacity building support to the TFG in the military, police and public service sectors, in order for the Government to be able to restore law and order in Mogadishu by providing basic services to the people and to assume primary responsibility for their safety and security. In this regard, AMISOM forces are carrying out the training (orientation and reintegration) of TFG forces and supporting their operationalization. AMISOM's Police component is supporting the reactivation of the SPF into a professional service that will incorporate the principles of democratic policing suited to the political, social, cultural and economic realities of Somalia. In terms of building the capacity of the TFG public service, AMISOM will shortly be starting the training and mentoring of civil servants in areas of public procurement, revenue generation, public finance management, humanitarian and resettlement management and policy implementation and accountability amongst others.

66. The humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role. In implementing this mandate, AMISOM has effectively secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors (seaport, airport and streets) of Mogadishu, thus allowing for humanitarian access to the needy population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu.

67. Beyond the context of winning the hearts and minds of the Somalis as a protection force, AMISOM field hospitals and medical personnel have been rendering medical services to the civilian population although the facilities were designed to provide medical attention to the deployed troops. Given the depth of problems in Somalia, AMISOM medical facilities have now become a major medical point on which the civilian population around Mogadishu has become dependent.

68. While the TFG has demonstrated its commitment to dialogue and reconciliation in line with the Djibouti process, Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam and their foreign supporters continue to reject peace overtures by carrying out acts of terrorism and flagrant abuse of human rights with impunity. It is against this background that the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution imposing targeted sanctions against persons and entities known to be undermining the search for peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia.

69. Finally, it is worth noting that, in its continued effort to reach out to other Somali interlocutors and stakeholders, the TFG signed on April 12 a new agreement with the semi-autonomous state of Puntland. The new accord called for the strengthening of law and order in the mainland and at Sea, the re-establishment and maintenance of the Somali Navy with its Headquarters in Puntland, the creation of employment opportunities, in particular those living along the coastline, the cleaning of toxic waste along Somalia's coastline (especially in Puntland) and the sensitization of the public against the dangers of piracy with the view of ending the menace.

## VII. Challenges

70. Despite the significant progress made, there are still many challenges to be overcome. One of the major constraints the African Union is faced with is related to the lack of financial resources and logistical capacity for its peace support operations, as has been amply shown by the ongoing operation in Somalia. In this respect, it should be stressed that the African Peace Facility established by the European Union at the request of the AU, is now one of the main sources of predictable financing for peace support operations conducted by the African Union. In effect, not less than 440 million Euros have been spent under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. A new package of 300 million Euros has been allocated for the 2008-2010 cycle.

71. However, these instruments and support are not sufficient. That is why, at the request of the African Union, a reflection was initiated at the United Nations to lay the foundations and decide on the modalities for sustainable and predictable financing for peace support operations carried out by the African Union, in so far as in taking such initiatives, the AU is acting on behalf of the international community as a whole. The AU/UN High-Level Panel in charge of this study was established under the chairmanship of Mr. Romano PRODI, and submitted a report on this issue. Since then, the AU has continued to engage the UN in order to effectively address the issue of the funding of AU-led peace support operations.

72. This specific issue leads me to another broader issue, that of the coordination of AU action with that of the UN. Although it is clear that the AU has a very important role to play in the promotion of peace and security, the UN Security Council still has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This responsibility should be fully taken up in Africa through increased readiness to deploy peacekeeping operations, particularly to take over from AU missions or ensure the success of innovative forms of partnership such as the pioneer, but complex formula of hybridity embodied by UNAMID in Darfur. Be that as it may, the promotion of peace in Africa should be an urgent international priority, and this clearly implies that all African and international stakeholders should bear a share of the risk, boldness and sacrifices required to achieve this objective.

73. Finally, it is incumbent upon the Africans through out the continent to take effective preventive measures against the outbreak of conflicts and crises. The old adage is that prevention is better than cure. The AU is not short of instruments in this respect. Undoubtedly, sustained democratisation will bring more opportunities for Africa to prevention conflicts, thereby opening more space for socio-economic development.

## VIII. Conclusions

74. As discussed above, the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts are central to the AU's mission. The ratification of the *PSC Protocol* by AU member states and its entry into force on 26 December 2003 has provided the articulation of the series of new institutions and decision making procedures (also known as *pillars*) that form the new peace and security architecture: the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the Panel of the Wise; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. Furthermore, as we noted above, because the Regional Mechanisms are considered part of the overall security architecture of the Union, they too form an integral pillar of the APSA.

75. Yet, the overall rationale of a peace and security for Africa is that of preventing conflict before it turns violent. We saw above how the costs (humanitarian, political, economic but also to the organization, financial) of acting once conflict escalates mitigate against a purely conflict management approach through, for example, an approach based exclusively on peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. This is the reason why the imperative of conflict prevention is clearly contained in the design of the PSC itself, as its primary functions are to anticipate and prevent conflicts. In this function the PSC is to be supported by several other mechanisms, and in particular the Continental Early Warning System (as regards monitoring and analysis) and the Panel of the Wise (preventive diplomacy and other related activities).

76. It is true that the institutionalization of APSA has evidenced a series of capacity and funding deficits. It is critical that AU Member States meet their financial obligations, so that the organization's dependency on external aid is reduced, and sustainability and ownership guaranteed. It is also true that the implementation of the APSA is taking place at time when

demands on the organization increase exponentially. In a context where capacities are stretched to the limit, and where organizational development, training, and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions on the sustainability of APSA are many.

77. Yet, we must recognize that, ultimately, Africa itself must define, drive and implement the types of institutions and solutions that address the challenges of peace and security on its soil. Although the support (political, financial and technical) of partners to the development and implementation of the APSA are welcomed, the translation of ‘African solutions’ into practical, executable and feasible mechanisms to address the scourge of war on the continent must be done by Africa itself.

78. In this respect, it is worth recalling that, on 31 August 2009, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), meeting in Tripoli, Libya, on the occasion of the Special Session on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, declared 2010 to be the Year of Peace and Security on the continent. The Leaders made the following pledge:

*“...We are determined to deal once and for all with the scourge of conflicts and violence on our continent, acknowledging our shortcomings and errors, committing our resources and our best people, and missing no opportunity to push forward the agenda of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. We, as leaders, simply cannot bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans.”*

79. Clearly, the Year of Peace and Security should be an opportunity for African peoples and leaders, as well as African institutions, in partnership with the international community, to review current efforts towards peace on the Continent, with a view to strengthening them and, where appropriate, launching new initiatives. The AU looks forward to engaging with all stakeholders in order to jointly “**Make Peace Happen**” in Africa in 2010 and beyond.