



International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

Military and Police Requirements for Effective Implementation of Protection of Civilian Mandates

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Introduction

1. General

- a. Thank you Mike Smith and the Challenges Forum for the invitation to participate and to speak at the 3rd Forum. I am happy to see and meet so many old friends and colleagues. I am in particular happy to see my old FC from Cambodia again Gen Sanderson under whose command I served as bat comdr/sector comdr in 1992/93. His example inspired me later when I was FC myself.
- b. I have enjoyed reading the excellent background paper drafted by Willian Durch and Alison Giffen. I also enjoyed listening to the various interventions started yesterday by JMG. Many papers are now available on the subject of POC and Robust PK.
- c. Since 2005/6 the discussion on POC flared up after the violence in MONUC. Since that time DPKO and TCCs and many other actors are struggling to find answers on what the task of POC means, what is needed, and how to do it.
- d. Conceptualizing the role of UN peace keeping operations in the protection of civilians, as we already heard this week, can be seen under three tiers:
 - i. Protection through political process
 - ii. Providing protection from physical violence
 - iii. Establishing a protective environment.
- e. There are strong links between the activities of three. They are mutually reinforcing, mutually accommodating and should be taken forward simultaneously. The protection of civilians is a complex and multi-actor effort involving the host government, local communities, parties to the conflict, humanitarian, human rights, and other partners. As JMG said yesterday there is still confusion with TCC/DPKO on what POC entails.
- f. For the moment I would like to concentrate on tier 2: "Providing protection from physical violence" since I am asked to speak on the military requirements for effective implementation of the mandate, although I will come back on the establishment of a protective environment as well. On this tier there should be in my view no confusion and I will explain why.
- g. As I said on the subject of Robust PK and POC a lot of policy papers/draft papers, have been produced and more to come as requested by the C34. Many seminars (Wilton Park, Shrivenham) etc etc have been organized.

- h. But: “do we have to wait with taking action on the ground till more papers are produced? “ Or are we waiting as Prince Zeid said yesterday, till the next catastrophe occurs before realizing that immediate action is required?
- i. I will say a few words as someone with a pragmatic approach very much influenced by my experience as FC, MILAD and GOC. The last job in DRC was very much focussed on POC and SGBV. There is a lot to say about the subject. However I will concentrate on :
 - i. Leadership
 - ii. Dilemma’s
 - iii. Give some suggestions on what can be done to do better and what is needed..

Question one. What protection tasks should military and police forces undertake?

Question two. What capabilities and training do they require?

2. Leadership. Many words have been said and written on the importance of leadership. I don’t think we have a disagreement on that. Guiding documents for senior leaders are available and this morning we learnt about the considerations document with chapters on leadership. But if leadership is so important what are we doing about it to improve other than providing and writing guidance and doctrine? In my country they say: “the fish start smelling first at the head”. That applies also for the UN. To find, recruit and prepare SMT for a mission is a complex, politically influenced process. Is the UN successful in that? Preparing for a mission the UN has made progress with SML, SLIP courses. Finding and recruiting the answer is no. More should and could be done to make sure the right person is leading the mission and the right persons are leading the mil/pol components. Leading a multi-national org under difficult circumstances in a volatile environment with so many different nationalities, cultural and religious differences and languages is a challenge...Outsourcing to find/recruit the SMt should be considered. New ways have to be discovered and tried because the present practice does not work satisfactory and on several occasions create damage to the credibility of missions and to the UN.
3. Leadership is automatically linked to accountability and evaluation of performance. It is sad to observe that this is hardly applicable for the senior leaders of UN Missions. That has to change if we want to be serious about success in missions. I would like to suggest two things: 1) a 360 degree evaluation by an institute/agency from outside the UN system to evaluate the senior leaders, 2) that DPKO should consider to provide new SRSG and or FC with a mentor a retired former SRSG and retired general or admiral during their start up as is done in NATO with the senior officers mentor programme.
4. Dilemma’s and challenges. Let me start by saying something on the prioritization of protection. I agree with Bill/ Alison that POC is not the overarching priority of a peacekeeping mission. Their objective is to contribute to a secure environment and sustainable peace and development. POC is an operational objective not a set of tasks at the tactical level.
5. But let’s not forget that where UN PKeepers are deployed and the local population is harassed and feel unsafe they will run. They don’t know anything about mandates, robustness, priorities etc. They know one thing: we will flee to the nearest UN compound because the local population have an expectation that the UN will provide protection whatever the priorities given at mission or UNSC level. In 2006 MONUC had the incredible, almost impossible task to support the presidential/parliamentarian elections in DRC. An enormous logistic and security task with limited resources. We struggled in the Eastern Division with priorities of

POC and the important task of protecting electoral personnel and eqpt and making the elections a success. Keeping all the balls in the air and not letting civilian population down in their expectations of protection. So in my view there is no need in a SC Resolution to specifically give the task of PoC a priority. Let the mission leadership decide on that. Let the UNSC not indicate in their mandates “HOW” the missions should implement the mandate or prioritize against other objectives and tasks. Let them say WHAT to do and WHY.

6. I cannot avoid to talk briefly about Robust PK. Certainly not after the C34 report. Lots and lots of talking about definitions and concepts. In my view robust peacekeeping is NOT a concept. During a workshop in Wilton Park 1 ½ years ago we discussed the subject of robust pk. Some of you were present there. We all, mil/civ high ranking officials from the major TCCs were attending, agreed that in any PKO under Chapter VI or VII, armed or unarmed, the mil and police and also our civilian colleagues should be determined, resolute, effective, disciplined and active not being intimidated. That posture is in between the ears. That posture will give confidence to the local population, the int community and host government. It will make spoilers think twice before spitting a PKeeper in the face. The message of that posture is: don't mess around with the UN. The UN will not be intimidated. So lets delete the word robust. But if at the strategic level there is so much discussion and confusion on the definition of robust, what about the operational/tactical level?
7. On POC of physical violence where deployed and within capabilities” the mil component ,to concentrate on them for the moment, are confronted with situations that, as JMG said yesterday, are obvious that peacekeepers will take action or are confronted with events in the grey areas. However, in my experience even the obvious is not always so obvious. For example:
 - a. Kiwanji
 - b. IDP husband knocking on door.
8. Obvious I would say so. But no action was taken which was a very damaging for the mission and the UN. It is not easy to regain the confidence and trust of the local population. But again if there is so much debate on the strategic/operational level as we heard yesterday, what about the orders/instructions/directives on this issue at the tactical level?
9. It is not only the senior commander who should understand POC. Equally or maybe even more important is the junior leader(cpl/sgt/lt of 24 years old) who goes on a patrol during the night. His patrol is confronted with a 13 year old girl being gang raped by 4 FARDC government soldiers. What should he do? How well does the leader understand his responsibilities? How well is he prepared for this situation? I thought I had seen it all but was not prepared for SGBV that I saw in the DRC.
10. Or example of hamlet in S-Kivu 47 killed
11. Or human rights abuses by FARDC soldiers
12. Or events in Kinshasa in 2006/7. Some action might have political consequences at operational/strategic level.
13. Vital in this is the relation between a SRSNG and a FC. Never separate them. Insist that they should be hand a glove. It is the political military bond.
14. But why is it that so many times commanders do not take action in the grey areas or even when it is obvious that they should. Besides the possible negative instructions from a capital it is very much depending on the commanders personality. Remember: “ the mandate is as strong as the will of the commander to implement it”. I had very good commanders who were very successful. Their actions caused ripples in the water. I had weak commanders who

needed a lot of my time to explain, push and check. Some ,even very senior, had to be removed and sent back to their country.

15. My last point is some suggestions on what to do and what is needed.
16. What kind of activities are required to carry out the POC tasks. Of course it all depends on what kind of environment the mission is operating in permissive/non permissive or a combination of the two. Most of the activities are aimed to prevent, deter and to respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence. A starting point is a firm proactive posture by the troops/police, a flexible deployment, and high visibility. This goes simultaneously with communication to the spoilers to warn them to stop their negative activities and with communication to the local elders/tribal leaders/leading females/population to explain what the force is doing, what their limitations are and that they need their help/assistance. Important is in my experience to operate in particular during the dark hours, be highly mobile, operate as much as possible on foot, communicate with the local population and take decisive action when needed using force according to the ROEs.
17. Experience has shown that peace keeping and peace building go hand in hand, that the peace building activities start right at the beginning of an operation as the SSR effort should do. It is not sequential; it is a concurrent process. The mil component should be aware that more activities are needed to support the peace building effort thereby primarily concentrating on providing a secure environment. In that environment peace building activities can flourish. Activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures and institutions. It includes building the capacity of non-governmental organizations for peacemaking and peace building. Secondary to use mil means to carry out urgent peace building activities in dangerous areas or in remote places. So what is needed to be able to do that?
18. First I would like to underline what the background paper presented us. I cannot say it better. But I would like to add: Mr Brahimi wrote in his report: “The troops must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and the determination to defeat them”.
19. I learnt, several times again, in particular during my time as GOC E-Div MONUC that
 - a. 1)The opponent knows the terrain better than anybody else, is highly mobile and most of the time uses weapons not heavier than a 81 mm mortar. Africa is not Afghanistan.
 - b. 2)They show respect for determined, decisive UN troops.
 - c. 3)The PK force is many times too heavy, too static, reluctant to operate by night, ill prepared for Chapter VII ops and lack communication with the local population and with civilian colleagues.
 - d. 4)In order to reach out to the local population and in particular to the females, there is a need to have experts military and/or civilian female personnel. Not a female driver or cook only because she is a female. They should be trained and prepared for the job. We started in MONUC a project to have civilian HR personnel male and female to join the UNMO teams working as joint protection team. More and more females should be added to those teams. The US forces in Afghanistan are trying thios concept out as well calling it female engagement teams.
 - e. 5)The PK Force lacks reliable intelligence and

- f. lastly military effort should go hand in hand with QIP/reconstruction activities and support peace building and military capacity building activities.
20. In order to be able to operate taking these lessons and best practices into account, the force that is generated should be tailor made for every mission. Not a standard frame work. That means:
- a. Need for battle groups with a light foot print with own engineer capacity to do immediate reconstruction and a recce/sniper capacity to respond with minimum collateral damage to aggression against the people that should be protected.
 - b. Need for trained female officers who can deal with SGBV
 - c. Need for logistic sustainability to operate during long range, multiple day patrols in patrol bases.
 - d. Need for units fully equipped night vision capability.
 - e. Need for helicopter capacity to carry out air mobile ops and dedicated medical casevac capability.
 - f. Need for aerial surveillance capability or intelligence arrangements with interested countries (P5)
 - g. Proper Force reserve and a strategic reserve, ready to move if called for, reimbursed by the UN using dedicated strategic lift. Lack of resources can not be an excuse for no action..
21. Above all Need for Troops which are prepared during pre-deployment training:
- a. To be in the right frame of mind for the mission to be deployed in. “Don’t mess around with the UN”.
 - b. That means VII/VI scenario training during pre-deployment training.
 - c. Prepared to work closely with civilian colleagues and understand their role.
 - d. Decisive leadership including junior leadership and starting at the top with the selection/recruiting of HOMC/FC and SRSGs.
22. TCCs and C34 should understand that “ in order to keep the peace one has to enforce it sometimes.

Conclusion

23. There is a need to explain better to military/political leadership and the military commanders what PoC entails. That can be done NOW without waiting for the next serial of policy papers to be drafted and discussed by:
- a. Tasking a small team of experts to draft a number of scenario’s for TCC pre-deployment training.
 - b. a small team of experts to visit capital of the major TCC/PCC and discuss/mentor scenario training starting at the political/military level down to pre-deployment training. Fast action is something that we owe the people on the ground.

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