Challenges of Peace Support:
Into the 21st Century

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ـ خوـن الأميرة الدكتورة وحدان علي
السيدة هناء الأنباري
السيدة يغدة قدور

هاتف: 0934408 فاكس: 0934408 صندوق بريد: 74685 عمّان 11185 الأردن
e-mail: id@id.gov.jo
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The Amman Conference on "Challenges of Peace Support: Into the 21st Century" could not have been organized without the moral and intellectual support of many eminent academics, experts, officers, and defense officials.

Their contributions, which make up the content of this book, shed new light on the inter-related themes of the conference, particularly the future-conscious modalities of peace support. Some of the papers focused on an attempt to understand the shape that conflicts of tomorrow may assume while, a number of papers offered fresh analysis of the relation between the military and changing of the societies.

The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy feels truly indebted to all these distinguished contributors.

Several institutions deserve a special mention for their generous support. Special appreciation goes to the Swedish National Defense College, the Norwegian Embassy in Jordan, the Swedish Embassy in Jordan, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada, who sponsored the publication of the book.

The successful outcome of the conference was the result of close cooperation between several institutions:

The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, the Jordanian Armed Forces, the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center, the Swedish National Defense College, the Russian Public Policy Center and the London School of Economics and political science.

Special thanks and appreciation goes to Ms. Annika Hilding, the Project Coordinator without whose ceaseless and tireless efforts the conference would not have been held. Her patient and meticulous efforts deserve special thanks.

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Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber
President, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
Introduction

Though small in terms of geography and very limited in natural resources, Jordan’s strategic conviction in peace has made it one of the largest contributors to the United Nations Peacekeeping forces (UNPKF), as well as the first country in the Middle East to have a peacekeeping center. The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (JID) has been in the forefront of many regional institutions in organizing peacekeeping training seminars. Furthermore, being the main national institution of graduating future diplomats, including some from the Arab World, the academic programs of JID have been designed to highlight the fact that preventive diplomacy, cultural dialogue, and religious tolerance and acceptance are essential tools of peace support. Accordingly, and upon the initiative of the Swedish National Defense College, the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, in cooperation with the Jordanian Armed Forces, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and with the support of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada, convened the third conference on “Challenges of Peace Support: into the 21st Century”.

The conference series engaged an international group of scholars, experts, officers, and defense officials to explore and analyze more effective, legitimate, and, perhaps, new ways of dealing with regional conflicts, bearing in mind the importance of understanding the relations of the military to changing society. Also, to foster an understanding of the impact of information technology, the factor of limited resources, and the complexities relevant to integrating diverse national approaches to peace support activities. The present volume of the proceedings of the Amman conference, published in English by the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy will be followed by an Arabic version as well.

The original strategy adopted for the project involved holding consecutive conferences in different countries. The first conference was held in Stockholm, September 1997, hosted by the Swedish National Defense College. The second conference took place in Moscow, February 1997, hosted by the Russian Public Policy Center. The third conference in Amman, October 1998, was hosted by the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy. And the fourth conference of the series will be held in November 1999, in Pretoria, and hosted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

The Amman meeting considered various dimensions relevant to peace support, mainly: changing concepts of security, new models, preventive diplomacy, confidence building measures, measures of post conflict peace building, civil-military relations, challenges of peace support and the landmines issues.
During the Amman conference, the views, assumptions, and fresh thinking on actual peacekeeping operations, were discussed and cross-examined. The discussions revealed the need for more creative thinking to deal with present and future challenges of peace support, which involves a wide spectrum from traditional peacekeeping to more "muscular" operations, that is a combination of military and non-military components. Introducing the publication of the proceedings of the Stockholm conference, professor Bo Huld, the Director of the Department of Strategic Studies at the Swedish National Defense College and Ms. Annika Hilding, the Project Coordinator, pointed out that "Peace support has thus become a matter of both organization and mandating ... of doctrine" for how to use armed forces ... in order ... to secure peace and stability ..." In other words, in a complex world, there are times when war itself becomes an instrument needed to prevent a bigger, more terrible war.

However, it is noteworthy that most on-going or potential wars are taking place in the developing regions of the world. The present nation-state system has been witnessing profound changes that may make our present understanding of war and the challenges of peace support dangerously out dated.

The startling fact as some experts point out is that of all the present members of the United Nations roughly a third are now threatened by significant rebel movements, disidence and strives. Former American Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned, prior to taking office, that "if we don't find some way that the different ethnic groups can live together in a country ... we will have 5000 countries rather than the hundred-plus we now have."

Some writers believe that many of today's states may splinter. Such a possibility presents serious challenges to peace support on global levels. With a world already comprised of a rich variety of cultures, religions, and civilizations, such possibilities of further splintering is a challenge to the statesmanship of the world. Should such a state of affair becomes a reality then each situation requires a different set of responses especially designed to meet that particular situation.

Consequently, there is an urgent need for innovative thinking in preventive diplomacy and scenarios before, not after, the eruption of armed conflicts within or between states. At any rate, it is hoped that the conference in Pretoria, South Africa, November 1999, will be able to generate more effective models of peace support, with the involvement of the United Nations and/or with other international and regional organizations, including relevant NGO's.

Professor Kamel S. Abu Jaber
President
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

Hasan A. Anbari
Counselor
of International Affairs
Opening Address

BY: DR KAMEL ABU JABER
President, The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

I am honored to welcome you to Jordan and hope that your stay in our country will be a pleasant and memorable one and that our conference will be of mutual benefit to us all. As I look around this meeting hall, I recognize many friends and colleagues. I am certain the expertise and talent present here, both civil and military, will contribute to enriching our debate and exchange of ideas.

It is above all my honor to welcome you on behalf of HRH Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy and Patron of this Conference.

I also wish to take this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation to the co-sponsors who made it possible for us to convene today. Special thanks to the Norwegian Government and to His Excellency the Norwegian Ambassador to Jordan for their generous support. Special thanks also go out to the Swedish National Defense College, as well as the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center for their support and encouragement.

We are, also, deeply indebted to the Jordanian Armed Forces, the Police, and Public Security, without whose efforts and support we would not have been able to hold this conference. My thanks, also, to the Ministry of Information, the Radio and Television Corporation, the Ministry of Tourism and the Lord Mayor of Amman, whose moral and material support was invaluable.

I, also, hope you will allow me to thank our guests from abroad, presenters and participants, who have taken the time and trouble to be here with us today. For us, here in Jordan and the Middle East at large, peace remains a tantalizing idea; a sweet promise of the future. For Jordan in particular, peace is a strategic goal which hopefully will one day materialize, notwithstanding the fact that as I speak here today, the peace process is facing many complications and difficulties. However, we must keep in mind that, perhaps for the first time in the history of this region, peace is within reach should reason and justice reign. That is why the historical moment must be seized.

It is from this basic premise, that Jordan, though a small country with limited resources, has been a major contributor to peacekeeping operations throughout our troubled world. Our police and armed forces, soldiers and officers have rendered and are currently rendering honorable services in the cause of peace in
Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. And, it is because of their discipline, their training, and leadership, that they have often been singled out for their strong sense of commitment.

The entire region needs to be stabilized and achieve peace internally, within each state, and regionally, among its component states. Ours is a very unique region in that, though of a relatively small area, it contained, until the advent of this century, four distinct major cultures: Arab, Persian, Turkish and Kurd. These four cultures are all enveloped by the great Islamic civilization. Not only are they distinct from each other in language, arts, historical experiences, certain customs and mores, but, also, each has developed within it rich and varied subcultures all adding to the wealth of the magnificent mosaic of the area. Since the 1940s, yet another culture, the Jewish culture, with yet another different background, was added. The dialogue, indeed the dialectic has historically taken several forms: the perpetual cultural osmosis taking place was often interspersed with violent eruptions. Over the past two decades, HRH Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal has been advancing the idea that the area needs a conflict resolution center, a mechanism that can anticipate, contain and, hopefully, resolve problems. The most recent crisis between Syria and Turkey is a case in point.

In anticipation of the possible future establishment of such a regional mechanism, the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy is planning to establish an academic conflict resolution department to participate in the education and training of the necessary human resources.

In his speech to the first Jordanian battalion departing to Croatia, HM King Hussein Bin Talal said, “I am confident that you will always be as I used to know you, ambassadors of a country that never ceased to look forward to peace and stability and members of a family that never quit its grand dream of justice, not injustice, security, not horror, good, not evil, equality, not discrimination and progress, not backwardness”.

Peacekeeping must go hand in hand with peacemaking if it is to achieve its objectives. And, however one may define peace, it must, ultimately, be more than the absence of violence. Historically speaking, and throughout the work peace has been a rare commodity, rarely enjoyed but for very brief periods, fleeting moments that were no more than a lull in which preparations were underway for the next round of violence. Only recently, has the world begun to think in terms of peace preparedness, and peacekeeping efforts are in that line.

I feel particularly humble in addressing you regarding the topic of our conference, for most of you have physically and mentally participated in, or have witnessed, the ravages of violence. Your contribution has the added value of your deep understanding of what a destructive conflict can do.

You know more than I do of the fantastic devastation that can be the aftermath of violence, even when conventional weapons only are being used. Military technology, especially in the production of weapons of mass
destruction, has far outstripped our human capacity to imagine the damage that weapons can cause.

Conceptually and philosophically, there has been little agreement between the major cultures of the world regarding the meaning of peace, or for that matter the meaning of its absence. Samuel Huntington is correct in his thesis regarding the inevitability of the clash of civilizations. His perspective, however, is rather an old one, and it is ironic that in his analysis he prescribes to Marxism. It was Marx who advocated the historical dialectic and historical determinism. It was he who negated reason and spirit and believed that man and society are ruled by immutable historical forces and modes of production which are way beyond his power to control or change.

This need not be so. Humans have something to say about their life and destiny. The League of Nations, the United Nations and, most recently, the efforts to establish the International Criminal Court, in which Jordan played a major role, are efforts to humanize international intercourse. Peacekeeping is in the spirit and the text of international law. It is with this in mind, and in an effort to further bolster, rationalize and humanize international law, that HRH Crown Prince El-Hassan proposed to the United Nations General Assembly, in 1981, the establishment of a ‘New Humanitarian Order’.

It is also with this in mind, that we should view NATO’s threat against Serbia which, though not sanctioned by a United Nations Security Council resolution, remains ethically, morally and in light of an ‘International Humanitarian Order’, a timely and correct one. Nation-states and certain of their leaders must realize that state sovereignty is no longer an automatic blanket protection against the reprehensible action of a state even against its own citizens.

The world has rarely experienced long periods of peace and security. Such a condition is especially traumatic for a small nation like ours. Our country has been in the eye of the storm since the very day of its establishment in 1921. However, we have never abandoned the Islamic premise that peace is the master of all judgments. For eight decades now, we continue our attempts to offer a sense of direction and rationality in a nearly chaotic situation. While at home we attempt to cope with the politics and economics of despair, we continue to expand the frontiers of dialogue with our neighbors and abroad.

Our sustained efforts in supporting peacekeeping operations emanate from our belief that ultimately law should be the final arbiter. Nations who claim for themselves the dubious privilege of being outside the pale of international legality run the risk of paying a very high price in the future. Might can, but only for fleeting moments, make right.

Our conference is focused around certain themes, each designed to go beyond the obvious and explore what true peace and true security mean and then how to attain them. Even after twenty years since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, seven years since Madrid and five and four years respectively
since the Oslo and Jordanian-Israeli peace treaties, our region still enjoys neither peace nor security. Fear of peace seems to be a weightier factor than fear of violence and war. Peace has always been fragile and security, almost always, is principally defined in police and military terms.

That is why one of the major themes of this conference is the changing concept of security to include ‘soft’ security, socio-economic and even cultural development, as well. For, as the world has been witnessing a continuous process of villagization, the need to live and let live, as well as the increase in the interdependency in terms of security, politics, economics and culture, become more obvious. Security considerations now and in the future must go beyond military dimensions. Our coming discussions over civil-military relations, preventive diplomacy and confidence building measures, as well as our visits to the relevant Jordanian peace centers, are all designed to address the needs of peace, not only in our region, but also internationally.

The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy has prepared a working paper regarding the possibility of establishing a ‘Jordan Peacekeeping Program’ to coordinate the efforts of the Institute, of the police and army in peacekeeping training. I very much hope you will take the time to look at the proposal and comment on how you think it might be strengthened.

A final thought to leave with you is Jordan’s concern regarding the Peace Process and the necessity of supporting Palestinian self-determination efforts. We need your support and influence in changing the ideologically entrenched, citadel mentalities, that talk in the absolute and see only in black and white. Jordan’s efforts to infuse a sense of rationality, as well as to resort to international law in problem solving, need your active consideration and support. This overriding question in our region must be squarely addressed, with an eye towards meeting the minimum requirements of all the parties concerned. From our Jordanian desert, the Bedouins have a saying that, ‘while the wolf must be allowed to survive, the sheep must not perish’. Coexistence by definition must mean the end of the clash of symbols, for even here, should reason prevail, a compromise is possible.

We are meeting here, in Amman, in the shadow of Jerusalem, the greatest of all symbols. It is time this city of peace, that never enjoyed peace, be given the chance to do so.
Project Report

BY ANNIKA HILDING
Project Director & Coordinator

It is a great honour and pleasure to be here. Before getting down to the nuts and bolts of the “Challenges of Peace Support Project”. I would like to extend my most sincere appreciation and gratitude to our Jordanian hosts, HRH Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal, Patron of this conference, HE Dr Kamel Abu-Jaber, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, and his friendly and efficient staff. I would also like to thank HE Dr Ahmed Mango, Special Adviser to His Royal Highness, Lieutenant General Tashen Shurdom, Lieutenant General Gazzi Al Tayyeb, Major General Hassan Abaza, Brigadier General Al-Allaf and Major General Mahmoud Al Hadeed, to mention only a few.

1. Objective

The objective of the project as a whole is twofold:

- Firstly, to promote and facilitate increased cooperation and coordination between influential agencies and institutions from a wide variety of nations and cultures focused on seeking creative and proactive solutions to the challenges of peace support operations.

- Secondly, to explore, express and make available ideas for more effective and legitimate ways of dealing with regional conflicts.

The specific focus for each workshop or conference is on issues of particular interest and concern to the host region. Solutions must be comprehensive, legitimate, and made applicable, as well as available, through information.

2. Methodology

The Methodology involves:

- Organization of a series of high level international workshops and conferences;

- Organization of visits to peace support training centres and presentations of programmes;

- Encouragement of exchanges between institutes and individuals to take place around, but also beyond the conclusion of this project;

- Publication of conference papers and a final report in multiple languages to increase the pool of peacekeeping literature in languages other than English.
3. Products and Expected End State

The outcome of our work is aimed at:

- An enhanced understanding of the issues;
- An enhanced international peace support network.

4. What makes this project different from other workshops and conferences addressing peacekeeping and peace support? And what is the value added?

- **Firstly**, the project ‘ownership’ (which is different from mere participation) is multicultural, multinational, multiregional, multidisciplinary and multireligious. The “Challenges of Peace Support” project is made up of a ‘coalition of the willing’. The partners in the project represent a rare and wide combination of high-level participants in organisations from various nations, cultures and disciplines. The Middle East, Eurasia, Europe, Africa, North America and Asia are already engaged and active in the project. During the process of developing the agenda and participation, many regional interested parties, for example, armed forces, general staffs and HQs, peacekeeping training centres, a police academy and governmental representatives have all taken active part in the preparatory meetings prior to the conferences. The partner organisations, which have convened workshops or conferences include the Swedish National Defence College (September 1997), the Russian Public Policy Centre (March 1998) and the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy (October 1998). On demand, future workshops and conferences will be hosted in South Africa, Asia, USA and South America, before concluding at the UN Headquarters. The convening organisations have been reinforced by associate partners, such as the L B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, NATO Information and Liaison Office, the Norwegian, Swedish and Jordanian Governments, and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

The project was conceived without funding. To date we have been able to organise meetings thanks to the great number of different sources and participating organisations mentioned above.

- **Secondly**, the project is to present a concluding report to the United Nations in early 2001. The concluding report will focus on the issues that have been discussed throughout the series, with an emphasis on the recommendations for remedies to the problems of peacekeeping and suggestions for their implementation at international and national levels. The theoretical themes addressed by the project include complexities stemming from civil-military relations, the role of regional arrangements and agencies in peace support missions, the changing concept of security, preventive diplomacy, confidence building measures, post conflict peace building, mine prevention, peace support and international law. We have also addressed doctrinal developments, the use of force and the impact of the media, information technology and technological developments on
peace support operations. The training and education of peacekeepers is also a theme running throughout the series of meetings.

- **Thirdly**, the project combines the theoretical challenges of peacekeeping with the practical problems and possibilities of education and training. Directors of four national peacekeeping institutes and training centres have participated in Amman: (Jordan, Canada, the USA and Sweden). The programmes have included visits to national peacekeeping academies, a police academy and a mine-field.

- **Fourthly**, the project promotes and encourages bilateral and multilateral exchanges between influential organisations and individuals that normally do not interact on a regular basis. The organisation of cultural activities, as part of the programme, encourages cross-cultural and inter-professional relations to emerge and develop. International exchange programmes, an early warning programme, and faculty members exchanges have all been initiated during and around the work of our meetings.

- **Finally**, solutions are to be proactive, emphasising the crucial process of implementation, and to be made available through information exchange. The conference papers and the concluding report are to be published in multiple languages to increase the pool of peacekeeping literature in languages other than English. Extensive media coverage of the project has taken place through television, radio and newspaper coverage, which is important for raising public awareness of the issues discussed.

Though my presentation has been rather practical in nature, I would like to end by quoting Dr Kamil Abu Jaber, who opened our conference by saying that ‘while the wolf should be allowed to live, the sheep must not perish’. As we enter into the 21st century, efforts to increase mutual understand, inter-, as well as intra-national cooperation are of utmost importance. Accepting that, if successful, a project like this may only make a very small contribution to the processes that make our world a more peaceful place to live in, nevertheless, believe that mutual engagement and dialogue is one further step in the right direction and I look forward to the days ahead.

Thank you for your attention.

Please forward any questions, comments or suggestions you may have concerning the project as a whole to myself at the correspondence address below:

Project Secretariat: Ms Annika Hilding, Project Director & Coordinator, Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence College, PO Box 27805, 115 93 Stockholm, Sweden. Tel. +46 8 788 9391; Fax. +46 8 788 9499; e-mail: annika.hilding@fhs.mil.se
Security Concerns in Eurasia

BY: DR DIMITRI TRENIN
Deputy Director, Carnegie Center – Russian Federation

I am not, as you have guessed from my affiliation, a government official although I have spent most of my professional life in my country’s armed forces. But, my view will be a Russian view, and it will not be confined to security policies or the security conceptual thinking of the Russian Federation alone.

There are enormous challenges to peace support, but there are smaller, but still very real challenges, to speaking about peace support and especially doing so within a brief time-frame. Imagine a Russian twenty or one-hundred and twenty years ago, making an analysis on the subject matter of my presentation today. He would probably have provided you with a tour de d’horizon which would be very Russo-centric, and the slogan, if you like, would be ‘We are Eurasian’. Additionally, it would be mostly up-beat, ‘We may not advance on all fronts at the same time, but clearly we are capable of protecting our interest on a wide number of fronts’. A Russian speaking on this subject would be inspecting Imperial defenses and staging areas for new advance. He would be identifying the dangers and looking for opportunities.

Today, needless to say, we have a very different picture in Eurasia. It has become polycentric. Russia is no longer the power that calls most of the shots in Eurasia, although it remains a very important and, I would say, indispensable power in that part of the world. And, most people engaged in thinking about Eurasian security in Russia are more pessimistic than they are optimistic.

Let me offer you my working definition of ‘Eurasia’, so that you know what I am talking about as I proceed to address this issue. For the purposes of this presentation ‘Eurasia’, first of all, means the former Soviet States (the current newly independent states) and some of the nations along Russia’s periphery, which used to be part of what some people term the ‘Empire’, centered in Moscow or St Petersburg for that matter. The principal security concern for Russia was, of course, throughout the centuries ensuring security through the advancement of its borders; the longer, or rather, the further away your borders are from your most vital centres, the more secure you feel. Clearly, at some point in that process Russia faced what many other nations have faced, namely, Imperial over-stretch. If you look at the dynamics today, the movement is, if you like, in reverse order. For something like 500 years, the movement was, by and large, from the Russian center to the Eurasian periphery. Today, it is from the Eurasian periphery all the way to the Russian center. That is a major
development, a sea change which conditions our thinking about security in Eurasia. As for Russia itself, its raison d'être for centuries has been the building of an empire, as so many other nations at that time were doing with more or less success. That period of Russian history is probably drawing to a close. There are no resources, there is no will, and the environment is clearly such that an attempt to start building a new empire by any other name would, in all probability, fail. But, that means that Russia will have to re-think its basic security concept, and more than that, it will have to re-think the very foundation of its state. If it is not an empire then what is it? That is a very difficult question and I think that is the central issue which Russia currently faces. It will take quite some time, I am sure, before the Russians figure out what kind of state structure they would want to have in the early twenty-first century.

But, returning to Eurasia as a whole, including Russia, but being immensely wider than Russia. I think that it would be fair to conclude that the world has arrived somewhere between the end of history, which is a very optimistic view of the world, and the end of the world, which is a very pessimistic view. So, if you like, the situation is so much more complex and does not look like becoming less complicated over time. A lot has been said about the ‘arch of instability’, the ‘arch of crises’, and all sorts of Huntingtonian models, but I do not believe that it would be safe for us to make assumptions based on any one single theory of what the current and future security problems of Eurasia are or will be.

I will address very briefly the sources of conflict in Eurasia, the nature of those conflicts, ways of dealing with crises and, very briefly, security models.

I think that the prime source of conflict in much of Eurasia is the end of the continent’s last and only true empire. I have already referred to that. This has not only liberated the many former provinces of Russia and has given them independence, but it has also taken out of the deep freeze a host of problems which have been held in check for centuries by the Russian Empire. And, it is not only for Russia to figure out what sort of conflicts it may be drawn into along its periphery, but it is also up to the newly independent states to think about the role of Russia in dealing with those problems. I think that it would be too facile to argue, as some people do, that Russia’s role is inherently new imperialistic or unconstructive. I think that no conflict in Russia’s vicinity can safely be managed, not to say resolved, without very positive engagement by Moscow.

Another source of conflict was, of course, the end of the Cold War discipline and the collapse of the ‘Old World Order’, which has not been succeeded by a ‘New World Order’ of the same clarity nor of the same power of imposing itself on the very many players. So, you now have a multiplicity of players who are not held in discipline by the New World Order.

And, clearly there are enormous difficulties related to nation and state building; the apparent ease with which many former Soviet Republics received
independence actually led to more problems as these states proceeded along the path of nation building.

I think that we face a whole number of types of conflict in this part of the world, from out-right secession, as in Chechnya, Abkhazia or Karabakh to name but a few (and clearly those things are not confined to the Russian or former Soviet territory), to the disintegration of portions of the Russian Federation, like Dagestan, which is traversing through an extremely dangerous period in its history, when at times it appears that no one is in real control of the situation, that major regional (in terms of regions of a country) player in the Caspian area. You have the potential for the disintegration of authority (as my colleague from the Carnegie Endowment once very well observed) in that one of the myths of Central Asia is that its leaders are immortal, and a succession in all countries including Russia, will be a very difficult and potentially very dangerous process. Such conflicts clearly will have different natures, not all of them connected with a display of open violence, and (as the Chairman has suggested in his presentation) one will have to deal with the human catastrophes, migration problems, drugs trafficking etc., which undermine security in a very big way.

I think that I am running out of time slightly, so I will condense the last part of my presentation and I would like to take questions on the ways of dealing with conflicts which threaten security in Eurasia. However, I think that a principle to be followed throughout many of these conflicts is that there are different models or operating procedures if you are dealing with a conflict which has reached the level of violence and a conflict which has not yet reached that stage. I think that many conflicts in the Caucasus have not been managed successfully, because the parties in the conflict and the international mediators have been trying to present a solution mechanism which would have worked had there been no bloodshed, as between the Georgians and the Abkhaz.

Lastly, I think that it was very aptly put during the opening remarks by the President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy that security models need not concentrate on ‘hard’ security alone, but that they have to involve more and more ‘soft’ security. I think that is clearly the major conclusion that we have, and made as a result of the conflicts we have seen since the end of the Cold War, since the end of the Soviet Union.

On closing, let me suggest that it is not only Russia’s neighbours who may present problems to their regions and to others further afield, but that it is primarily Russia, which is a major security problem to itself and to its immediate neighbours. I think we will all have a huge stake in seeing to it that in the muddling-through process in which Russia is engaged, the transformation rather than the transition of that huge and still very important country does not result in violence and conflict originated by past schemes and past thinking about security.
Changing Concepts of Security from a Historian’s Point of View

BY: PROFESSOR BO HULD'T
Director, Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS)
Swedish National Defence College

The idea of launching new concepts of security has always run into trouble because of the prevalence and predominance of old and trusted beliefs, which is essentially the established wisdom hammered in cold Roman steel "Si vis pacem, para bellum", if you want peace prepare for war: Putting this in its most extreme form: ‘You can never have enough Dreadnoughts’, which I think the British were saying at the beginning of this century, ‘You can never have enough tanks’, as I understand the Soviets were saying for a long time, or ‘You can never have enough intercontinental missiles’.

The fallacy of this argument became obvious with the First World War, by which one could argue that Germany of the 1880’s, with its relatively limited military capability and above all no navy, was measurably safer than Germany of 1914, with its large navy, highly threatening to the British, and certainly the largest Continental force in Europe available. ‘Over-armament’ creates fears and enemies thereby diminishing the security of all. Examples of this are legion.

Efforts at arms control and disarmament were undertaken after the First World War, through various negotiations between the Great Powers, inter alia, over naval forces. Something was also accomplished: the avoidance of a naval arms race between the Americans and the British. Given the expectations, one would have hoped for something more substantial to come out of it, in the shape of agreements between states that had been enemies rather than allies in the Great War, but we still have to recognize that this Anglo-Saxon understanding was an historical achievement of great importance also for the post-1945 world. Efforts by the League of Nations in the 1920’s and 1930’s to establish a comprehensive disarmament treaty, still today the most ambitious project of all, failed and a second world war was needed to bring home messages, which should already have been clear in 1918.

The new departure in 1945, the United Nations Charter, on the one hand, underlines the right to self-defense, on the other, puts basic faith in the principle of collective security, as did the League of Nations. That is, security through cooperation, solidarity, and ‘one for all, all for one’ - all of this with the aim of defending that elusive concept, ‘eternal peace’, which has been repeated in all
European peace treaties since the ending of the Thirty Years War, the 350th Anniversary of which we celebrated in Europe during 1998.

Still, as we all know, security during the Cold War rested essentially on the largest alliances and the largest arsenals ever seen in history. This continuous armaments process for some 45 years did not lead to war, however, which ran counter to one of the basic theoretical tenants within the peace research tradition: all arms races lead to war. The fact that it did not lead to war was, I believe, due to four advancements that we made during the Cold War:

In the first place, the United Nations - which was essentially constructed on clearly defined principles for how to keep the peace by preventing a reoccurrence of World War Two (with Chapter 7 being the ultima ratio), that had the capacity for adaption with a remarkable resilience and an ability to develop in a totally new direction. A combination of political, social and economic processes, the impact of decolonialization, gave the Organization a new vitality, with a focus on human rights, humanitarian assistance, economic development and, not least, the subject of our own conference here and of this whole series of conferences, that is, peace keeping and peace support operations. That development had not been foreseen by the Fathers of the Charter but was the result of flexibility, innovation and, of course, sheer necessity.

We thus moved, already in the 1950’s, into a wider security agenda, a process we now, after the Cold War, reap the benefits of. One might even say that the UN, instead of failing as we so often say, succeeded even though we ourselves did not plan it or quite understand how it all came about.

The second advancement was in strategic thinking. This was forced upon us under the gallows by the nuclear weapons threat: the gradual understanding that security is not a zero-sum game - the security of one also depends on security of the other. The major nuclear powers were, as the French strategist Raymond Aron put it, ‘les ennemies frères’, enemies and brothers at the same time, and only by gradually and painfully establishing a balance between deterrence and a certain element of confidence building - with both selfconfidence and a measure of confidence in one another - was it possible maintain the overall deterrence system.

Much of this wisdom was summed up - rather than discovered - by the so-called “Palme Commission” in its report published in 1982, ”The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues”, and its program on ”Common Security”. The Palme Commission, however, had the misfortune of publishing its report in the midst of what we refer to as the ‘New Cold War’, after the detente years of the 1970’s and at a moment when interest in arms control disarmament was very low and, instead, there was a predominance of thinking in terms of winning and gaining the upper hand, also in the nuclear sphere. This was the Soviet strategy of the 70’s and became the US counter strategy of the 80’s - which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
However, during the Cold War, we did thus acquire a strategic “library” of sorts – which may now be of use also in the future. With Plato, one would hope that “knowledge is virtue”, i.e., if you know “good”, you can also do it!

The third advancement concerns European integration, weaving the web of a security community through circumventing military problems by staking your money, literally, on co-operative economic enterprises, something which first involved only the “ennemies-frères” of the second order, France and Germany, and then gradually in widening circles came to include all of Western Europe and now also, we hope, most of the rest of the European Continent. This is confidence- and community-building by stealth, by design, by patience, by time, by inventiveness and by “spill-over” from one issue-area to the other. This did not start with a European army; that possibility was discarded in the early 1950’s already. Instead one chose to follow other tracks, essentially based on mutual economic interests. Over time, this would produce a “security community” - with war inconceivable between the members. In this respect, the European Community (now Union) has been a resounding success. Today, at the turn of the century, the European defence option, also for peace-support, is again emerging as a defining factor in the future shaping of a European Union.

The fourth advancement involves another “indirect strategy” by which one sought from 1975 onwards to identify areas for military confidence building, economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation to circumvent the basic military confrontation at the time dividing the European Continent from the High North down to the Mediterranean shore. The Helsinki process (CSCE; today the OSCE) was agreed upon by East and West for very different reasons: Brezhnev’s Soviet Union launched the original idea to secure legitimacy for Moscow’s sovereignty over Eastern and Central Europe; the West, on the contrary, expected the CSCE to produce a new, more open Europe - beyond the Cold War. This is also exactly what did happen. Against this background, it is somewhat ironic that President Brezhnev in the late 70’s tried, rather heavily handedly, to export the idea to Asia - although with no great success. Still, I think that the basic assumptions underlying the CSCE will turn out to be exportable. Before the peace-process began to deteriorate in the Middle East after the death of Prime Minister Rabin some of us thought that this might be a (relatively) fast road for this region.

With the end of the Cold War, we moved into what the IISS (the London Strategic Institute), at its Zurich 1991 Annual Conference, defined as ‘new dimensions of international security’: regional stability, nationalism, ‘fundamentalism’, North-South issues, the new risks of ethnic, religious, social, environmental, economic and an endless number of other possible crises and problems, an avalanche of ”smaller” problems replacing the previous overwhelming risk of a Third World War. None of these dimensions were really new; they were known long before, but during the Cold War we were all under the total tyranny of ‘first things first’ and the first thing was, of course, avoiding the nuclear holocaust. Now, suddenly, a new and enormous agenda opened up and with this came, also, a certain demilitarization of security with economic,
political, social, environmental and many other issues looming larger, while the military ones tended to fade.

Not quite, though. The war in 1990-1991 between the International Community and Iraq brutally reminded us of the wisdom of the Romans and developments in former Yugoslavia again demonstrated military force as the still ultimate argument.

The security debate has now moved in several directions. There seem to me to be three basic agendas:

The first one has to do with concepts (and several of these concepts have been mentioned also by my predecessors here). Is security "common", "comprehensive" or "cooperative" or are there other terms that we should now use?

What is "security" in a globalized world? Is there still room for our old concepts of idealism, realism, balance of power, security communities etc? What new ones will prove useful? What significance may be attributed to "security complexes" as links between the system and state levels (as proposed by Barry Buzan)?

Second, we are now faced with an enormous list of "security" challenges from preserving the rain forests to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Which are the first things? How should we set our order of priorities? Where are, so to speak, the nuclear weapons today? Maybe they are still here? Or something else? Everything cannot be "security" – at least not all the time.

The third issue area, the third direction into which the academic debate and also the debate of the practitioners has moved, is the question of level of analysis. Do we talk about the international system? Do we talk about globalism? What do we mean by regionalism? Is the state the main subject as .. has been since 1648? Whose security are we really discussing? Is it not after all a question of the security of the individual human being that we are after? With this a whole arena of problems opens up connected with human rights, with humanitarian interventions, with the very fundamnet of state sovereignty: the right of the "King" to be "Emperor in his own Kingdom", as it was phrased in the 1500's in Europe, i.e., the right of each territorial ruler to exercise the exclusive jurisdiction over his subjects. Here, we are up against ourselves as United Nations Charter Article 2.7 clearly upholds this sovereign prerogative of the states members by ruling out interference in national, internal affairs - but humanitarian interventions are still justified, from case to case if not across the border.

Allow me to remind you of the fact that there has been a historical development. At the beginning, apartheid as well as the whole issue of decolonialization, constituted territory forbidden to the International Community. I come from a country which, up until 1960, maintained a very
strict interpretation of the Charter: There was no right on the part of the United Nations to order the colonial powers to decolonize. Colonial administration, except for the UN Trusteeship System, belonged to "internal affairs". Sweden was in good company - most European countries, excluding the Soviet Bloc, of course, but including the United States and Canada, held the same view. However, there was a major shift, led by the US, in 1959-1960, when the United Nations became an agent for decolonialization, gradually accepted by all its members. We have thus, already gone through a process of change on this very issue, the narrow interpretation of Article 2.7.

We had a second experience, again connected with the war between the International Community and Iraq in 1990-1991; the so called 'Kurd Resolution' of April 1991, by which the United Nations denied Iraq the right to exercise sovereignty, over its own population (the Kurds in the North, the Shiites in the South). Several delegations present, speaking at the United Nations, were then anxious to underline that this could not be understood as precedent for the future, but was a unique case. The People’s Republic of China was one of the most adamant on this point. Nonetheless, we are now again back to the same dilemma. The defining question today is, of course, Kosovo, the issue of humanitarian intervention and where we should strike the balance between Article 2.7 and how to defend human rights and human individuals against genocide. In front of us lies the need for a new agreement between ourselves with our established notions of state sovereignty and a new definition of Article 2.7.

Mr Chairman, ending my remarks, allow me to go back to the Romans again. You know this old patrician who used to end all his speeches in the Senate by saying, "Furthermore, it is my firm view that Carthage should be destroyed" and with that I would like to state, in a friendly comment to my honorable friend, Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber, that "I do not believe in the inevitability of Professor Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’". But this, of course, is another story.
The Changing Nature of Security

BY: DR CHRISTOPHER COKER
Reader, International Relations Department
London School of Economics and Political Science

What makes us feel insecure? Would it be possible to write a history of anxiety showing how in different eras and in different cultures people felt more or less insecure, or whether they felt in greater danger from the different forces of history? The answer is yes. It was done on Europe in the 20th century. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud distinguished between fright, fear and anxiety, and told us that while in other times people felt more fearful of the supernatural or natural disasters, the Western world has felt more anxious than any other. The poet W H Auden called the twentieth century "the age of anxiety", and what made it most anxious was the threat of war.

Auden’s own generation, in the 1930s, recognized the slow count down to the Second World War. The next generation lived in the perpetual shadow of a nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, war has no longer figured in the imagination of the Western world. Even before its end, George Bush was promising, in reference to the Star Wars initiative, “an exit from history”, a history, that is, in which war had been the accredited theme of modern life.

The perception of security during the Cold War by and large revolved around military concepts or blocs. When the Cold War unraveled, so did our understanding of security itself. Relative ‘stability’ gave way to relative ‘instability’, which comprised of new threats and challenges (though on closer inspection many of them were old concerns): nuclear proliferation, nationalism and irredentism, organized crime, and uncontrolled immigration.

In the West, security policy is no longer threat-based. The public is told there is no threat of a resurgent Russia, or an Islamic Jihad, or an alliance of the ‘dispossessed in search of an’ism’. What we face instead are not threats, so much as challenges, which can be met by instruments other than military power. Threats of interstate violence have been replaced by the “Challenges of Modern Society”, which is the suggestive? title of one of the Committees which make up NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme (1994).

This is perfectly consistent with a marked reduction in the military dimension of security since 1989. The Western world has seen a 25% cut in its forces. In my own country, Britain, the percentage of GDP accounted for by the defense budget is the lowest this century, and the number of armed personnel the lowest in sixty years – a problem, - of course, in the long term for peace-
keeping. Seventy per cent of the forces available for peace-keeping missions in 1994 are no longer available today. Continued manpower cuts will reduce them still further.

This is my first proposition: that our understanding of security has changed since the Cold War.

My second proposition, is that security is being redefined according to different cultural criteria. One has to have a point of departure when defining ‘security’, which is increasingly being culturally determined. One definition is “the pursuit of freedom from threat” (Buzan). Another, is “the absence of threats to acquired values” (Baldwin). The two differ radically. The first definition signifies a process of securing; the second describes the state of being secure. Both raise the questions: security for whom? and security for whose values? These values differ from region to region or, more to the point, with levels of economic development. Typical of the new approaches to international security is this definition by Hirschmann. “Security involves a larger number of areas”, he wrote, in 1995, of the post-Communist societies in transition to a market economy. The security of Europe “cannot be reached without developing stable market economies, building up social safety nets, reducing welfare barriers and integrating those countries into the world economy”. In other words, the West’s security agenda in the post-Cold War environment involves developing more stable societies.

Hirschmann’s list of what the West believes might make the post-Communist world feel secure would not be the same checklist we would devise for a society like Somalia. In the post-modern West, the redefinition of security is in accordance with changes in social values. In a massive study of forty-three societies over a ten-year period, the Princeton sociologist, Ronald Inglehart, finds that our societies, though more secure (especially from the threat of war), are more anxious about taking risks. According to his findings, he argues that distributional conflicts over “goods” (such as property, income and jobs), have given way to distributional conflicts over “bads” (such as risks of environmental damage caused by nuclear energy). It is ironic, he notes, that in societies where human life expectancy has risen by twenty years since the beginning of the century, concerns about risks have become central political issues. It is ironic but it is perfectly logical. It is precisely because the risk of early death has receded that people have been able to redirect their concerns from a pervasive daily uncertainty concerning survival to more remote concerns over factors such as ecological security. Europe has become an ‘entitlement’ society. Increasingly, its people believe they are entitled to live in a risk-free world. They want to live in safe cities and enjoy a healthy environment. Elsewhere in the ‘modern’ world, or the world that has reverted back to being ‘pre-modern’, social values differ dramatically. In the materialist world, as opposed to the post-materialist, people are directed towards survival, not long-term security. They are preoccupied with war and its results, famine and disease, which are ever-present risks or realities.
The idea that the world is dividing into several ‘time zones’ is one that he gained credibility in recent years. In Britain, it has been made familiar by the diplomat, Robert Cooper, whose monograph for the independent think tank Demos, in 1996, was taken up enthusiastically both by The Financial Times and The Economist, though both of them have gained increasing currency... But although Cooper’s analysis is the most sophisticated and convincing of those that have appeared in recent years, it was not the first in the field. The tendency to write off much of the world as zones of anarchy, chaos or turmoil began with a popular book by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (1994). As the title implicitly suggests, their concerns may have been prompted by the almost immediate collapse of President Bush’s dream of a “new world order”.

Cooper’s thesis is convincing because it is supported by so much evidence. But what makes it persuasive in the end is not so much its analysis of the forces of ‘chaos’ and ‘confusion’ in the developing world, as its understanding of the limits of action in the post-modern. Post-modern armies may want to stabilize unstable societies which are at war with themselves, but they are constrained by post-modern realities, ‘zero-tolerance’ of casualties, an increasing unwillingness to inflict high casualties on an opposing side, a growing interest in developing non-lethal weapons and engaging in ‘virtual peace-keeping’ (both still in their infancy). All three are features of what is called in the United States, ‘WBOM’ (‘warfare by other means’).

The concept of a world divided into separate time zones is not new, and only a Western fascination for the topical makes it seem so. The Europeans, indeed, might learn a little more from their own history at the time of the Conference of Versailles (1919). In the beginning, the Great Powers, in attempting to bring peace to Eastern and Central Europe, imagined they were dealing with the same world. They were soon disabused of that belief.

As Bismarck once remarked, “just because you wind a clock three hours fast does not mean that time goes faster for everyone else.” The point was made tellingly by the experience of a British Foreign Office official, Arthur Ransome, who undertook a field trip to Galicia in 1918, to see to which country its people wished to be allocated. On coming across a group of peasants working in a field, he asked them whether they were Ruthenians or Little Russians. They did not know. They had never been encouraged to think of themselves in such terms before. “Are you orthodox?” Ransome asked. They had never thought in such terms before. “What are you, then?” he finally asked in exasperation. “We are local”, they replied. They were whatever it was safe to be at the time.

This story has the singular merit of identifying what is so important in the pre-modern world today - that no definition of security formulated in academic conferences or diplomatic meetings can make ‘locals’ feel secure. That is my third proposition. For, it is the politics of ‘locality’ that has emerged with the collapse of the old world order (such as it was), particularly in Africa, where we have seen a new phenomenon: the failed state. In his recent book, The Warrior’s
Honour, Michael Ignatieff writes of a post-modern Third World, 'war used to be fought by soldiers: it is now fought by irregulars'. That is his own reading of the term, but whatever the semantic confusion that arises from academics identifying different post-modern time zones, he is talking of 'local' soldiers - paramilitaries and militias, war lords and irregulars, bandit chiefs and criminal cartels with their own private guerrilla armies, like the Antioquia rebel movement which was run by the Medelín cartel in the mid-1990s.

Ignatieff is writing about the insecurity which arises when the traditional military code of professional armies, once answerable to the state (and supposedly through the state to the citizen) and which implied the general acceptance of the rules of war, becomes the mark of an earlier era when war between states was the norm. The 'irregulars' who fight today's wars tend to ignore human rights, adhere to no military codes and rarely come under effective discipline. The result is often a descent into excessive violence, barbarism and genocide. The politics of locality are in fact far more dangerous than they were for the peasants Arthur Ransome encountered in Europe in 1918.

When the International Community arrives on the scene, usually later than is desirable, it has to confront what it finds. What makes people feel secure? What makes them 'local'? They are whatever it is safe to be or what others wish them to become.

These tribal loyalties must not be dismissed out of hand. In certain circumstances protection rackets do protect peasant production. In Liberia, one author concludes that large parts of Liberian society had become dependent upon the war economy for their survival. What William René calls 'a shadow state' has emerged in Sierra Leone in place of the former state structure. In Colombia, drug cartels have created a state within a state in the middle of Magdalena valley, where they have reinvested money in the local economy and provided employment on a large scale.

This phenomenon appears to be consistent with other elements of localization or 'privatization', as it tends to be called in the West, whether it is African governments hiring private armies, or their richer citizens hiring private companies to defend them. In South Africa, private guards now outnumber the police. In East Africa, private security companies are growing at a rate of 25% per annum. Both the post-modern and pre-modern worlds are turning increasingly to the private option.

If security on more traditional lines is to be achieved, that is, a security based on the principles of civil society, we need to address the reality that local concerns have to be dealt with directly. Mark Duffield's work on Sierra Leone shows how the civil recolonisation of the war economy has allowed for the supply of basic commodities, and that these and other civilian initiatives in warfare may be the foundations or building blocks of a new civic order. We must start from the bottom, not the top. We must ask what other people think makes them secure and how we can consolidate self-help initiatives.
This leads me to my final proposition. At the end of the century there is a strong feeling in many quarters that we should be in the business of managing insecurity rather than security. This is a continuous process, of course. It also requires pro-active approaches. It requires the International Community to do more.

This was clearly the case in Somalia. The respective experiences of the American forces in Mogadishu and the Australian forces in Baidoa tell their own stories. In Baidoa, which was known as the ‘city of death’ because, after Mogadishu, it was the area most affected by the civil war, the Australians saw disarmament as a crucial, but not exclusive, element, in securing a stable and secure environment. They saw their mission as a wider social reconstruction effort. In restoring the 1962 Somali Penal Code, they effectively drove the pro-Aideed forces from the town. They also worked closely with non-governmental organizations. As a result, they developed what Robert Patman calls a “product mix”, that addressed local security concerns and provided a range of civilian assistance that went far beyond the US preoccupation with escorting relief convoys. They also worked closely with local clan elders and helped restore some of the vestiges of a traditional civil society based on the clan system.

All of this contrasted markedly with the American effort. The Australians showed that a post-modern society can effectively restore peace in pre-modern conditions. Peace enforcement did not fail in Somalia. Its implementation did. To get it right next time will require us to see the whole picture; to develop a security perspective that takes into account, first and foremost, the local people on the ground.
Security Concerns in the Middle East Region

BY: BRIG. GEN. MOHAMMED TAISSER MASADEH
Jordanian Armed Forces

Introduction

It is a pleasure to join you in this international conference on "Challenges of peace support into the 21st Century", and to be given this opportunity to share with you some of the Jordanian views on security concerns in the Middle East region and to set out the Jordanian security concerns and Jordan's role in promoting regional peace and security.

Since early this decade, the Middle East region has witnessed a state of significant dynamic changes. These changes are expected to leave major impacts on shaping the political, social, and economic future of the countries in the region and influence the intellectual structure. These changes are exhibited in the decisive strategic transformation process regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and moving from the state of direct confrontation to the philosophy of peace and peaceful co-existence.

Security and Peace in the Middle East

Security, as one of the basic factors that regulate the rhythm of Arab-Israeli peace process and measures, its successes receives special and increased importance. Security has been the axis of the conflict over the last five decades and it will serve as an acceptable and useful basis for the future of political relations in the area. It will also serve as a basis for the stability, prosperity, and development of societies in the region.

It is necessary to draw a distinction between peace and security, since they are closely related. Peace can be contractually concluded, and it will not succeed unless the concerns of individuals are met, because despite the efforts at government's levels, only individuals have the power to make true peace. Meanwhile, security must be earned by building trust and confidence and, above all, by sharing common interests. Therefore, we in Jordan, believe that efforts of the parties should be directed towards a change from the culture of war to the culture of peace.

The Strategic Security Problem and Concerns in the Middle East

Despite the political successes achieved at the early stages of the peace process, it has not found a comprehensive and integral solution to the security
problem in the Middle East. The peace process, in general, has offered partial and incomplete solutions to some secondary aspects of the security issue, with substantial security questions have been left without treatment, politically or militarily.

The security problem exists in different shapes such as: political and sectarian structures, the nature of the ‘standing force structure’, strategic balance and geopolitical imbalances.

a. The Arab-Israeli conflict has deep impacts on all aspects of political and military thought of the countries involved in the region. The concept that Israel’s existence is apt to collapse has become a concrete fact in the Israeli security and political understanding. Therefore, the only security option to encounter this threat is by establishing a strong and superior military institution. On the other hand, despite the fact that some may not agree, Arab political and security thinking has developed over the years from the outright rejection of the Israeli existence, to attempts to alter the strategic balance. Later, this has led to initial and provisional acceptance of Israel as a political entity, to recent negotiations. Any how, political will is required to make decisive changes in power concepts, military doctrines, defense policies to participate in the region’s cooperative efforts to develop and realize security and prosperity. Otherwise the possibility of establishing real regional security is very small.

b. The standing force structure form the basic aspect of the security problem. Whereas Israel has been able to introduce to the Middle East - nuclear power, strategic delivery means, and space technology for military purposes. Israel also has succeeded in developing an advanced conventional military system; capable of expanding in directions in the region. On the other hand, despite the failure of some Arab attempts to introduce nuclear weapons, Arab states have succeeded in building a huge conventional military power along with launching capabilities that can strike anywhere in Israel. The Turkish and Iranian huge military capabilities should also be considered, an attempt to apply direct reduction upon them will certainly express the regional cooperative state and achieve some of its objectives.

Although the Middle East is currently undergoing a very critical transition period, a comprehensive approach to the issues of peace and security at the global, regional, and national levels is essential in order to enable an integrated approach to the complex multi-dimensional military and non-military challenges to security in the future.

I propose to talk on regional security concerns within two substantial issues: Hard Security Concerns, (which include direct strategic military issues), and Soft Security Concerns, (which include the non-military dimensions):
I Hard Security Concerns:

The threats against regional security are not limited to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but they might extend to include conflicts between other countries in the Middle East. For example, the possibility of an Arab-Arab political difference or conflict caused by border disputes, (in more than twenty places). The restarting of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. The conflict between Iran and the Gulf States. Also, the Syrian-Turkish conflict. There is also a possibility of ethnic as well as religious conflict. In addition, there are potential regional conflicts in peripheral countries which may affect the security of the region such as the conflict between Turkey and Greece, India and Pakistan, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and that between the warring factions in Afghanistan.

- **Strategic Balance and Deterrent Theory:** It is logical that these two issues be taken into consideration. The relationship between national security and regional security for each country. which is connected to the threat perspective of each state in the region, and to the international guarantees offered to any state, or to the entire region. Also, it is needed to change the strategic and military doctrine from the philosophy of running the conflict on the basis of military strategies or offensive doctrines to the philosophy of preventing conflicts through co-operative security strategies to any regional security system.

- **Defense Budgets** and levels of military expenditure in the Middle East is considered one of the highest in the world. The proper way in securing an acceptable satisfactory security status lies in making noticeable reductions in the defence expenditures. In order to achieve the security goal of the region, and match the philosophy of directing the people's potentialities towards development.

- **Arms Control:** It is necessary to reduce the pace of the arms race through diverting arms funds into social and economic development in order to meet the requirements of security in the region. There has been many regional and international initiatives to control the arms race in this region. Unfortunately all these attempts have faltered. Such a failure is due to several reasons, the most of which is the inability to politically address the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- **Terrorism:** Terrorism has transformed from a singular phenomenon into a collective one with regional and international dimensions. Therefore, political and social outcomes (in any country in the region) will greatly affect the current security situation prevailing in the region, especially that some countries in the region have at various times played a destabilizing role through the sponsorship of terrorism.

- **Smuggling Activities:** There is an ever-persistent threat to the sovereignty of some regional states from the smuggling activities of narcotics and weapons, whether intended for the local market or en-route to other countries. Alliend with the threat from infiltrators who
might try to enter other states for economic reasons, or to promote terrorism against bordering countries as in the case of Jordan and Israel.

- **Anti Peace Forces**: A number of political groups have publicly declared their opposition to the peace treaty. To date, they have been unable to generate enough support. However, lack of progress on other tracks, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian track, might gradually convert public indifference into supporting these groups. In the process, acts of sabotage, assassinations, and border infiltrations can be expected, causing, therefore, threats to the security of the region. Furthermore, some countries in the region could be ready to support such groups with money, weapons and ideology.

- **Radicals and Extremists**: Some states in the region complain that Radicals and Extremists who pose threat to their existing government as is the case in Algeria, Egypt, and other countries. While some states have been successful in implementing their policy of inclusion - such as the case in Jordan. Added to this, are the threats posed by Radicals and Extremists to the security of other regional states.

- **Confidence-building measures (CBM’s)**: These measures are considered the cornerstone in developing regional security.

II **Soft Security Concerns**:

Not only does security in its broad sense include the military dimension, it also includes the political, social, and economic dimensions. An expanded security concept is required in the Middle East today, one that Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal has defined as implicating "human resources, natural resources to include - water and land, and economic as well as military face. Security covers a matrix of inter-connected issues such as food, water, energy, technology, finance, transport and communications, and includes questions of domestic structure as well as questions of foreign policy."

- **The Middle-East genuine problem is not the shortage of human resources, but rather is the mechanisms adopted in investment and development. Such mechanisms have not so far been successful in addressing the genuine elements of security; for the countries in the region. Nor have they truly dealt with the principal discrepancies between the peoples of this region. Therefore, the discrepancies between neighboring countries such as Jordan/Israel, Yemen - Saudi Arabia, Libya - Algeria, Morocco – Mauritania, should be seriously taken in consideration.**

- **Population**: It is widely known that no country, regardless of how high its GNP (Gross National Product) is, can achieve high standards of social development alone. Yes, some countries have achieved national breakthroughs. But, this is not considered success a
far as regional security is concerned; rather it is a source of tension -
that might be exported.

- **Human Rights and Freedoms**: The confiscation of freedoms, lack of
democracy, and oppression will create a volatile, tense environment
that might explode at any time. At the regional level, democracy based
on public satisfaction is the best barrier against extremism.

- **Water**: Water has been considered a serious and an ongoing threat to
the countries of the region; that is what makes some writers go far to
predict that the future conflicts in the region will be over water. It is
worth indicating that 67% of the Arab rivers originate from states
outside the Arab-territories.

- **Economic Development**: It is needless to elaborate on the Arab-Israeli
conflict which, over the last five decades, has had a dominant influence
on the structure of the region’s security, and has shattered the
economics of the Middle East. Therefore, instability has stood in the
way of genuine development. The principal aspect of the economic
development in the region lies in the full participation of relevant
countries in joint ventures - in a variety of fields. The economic
conferences held in Casablanca 94, Amman 95, Cairo 96 and Dawha
97 are serious attempts to achieve regional economic development.

- **Cultural Misperception**: Based on different cultural principles such as
religious, ethnic, and historical backgrounds, style of life (western and
eastern styles), the Middle East region is rich of such mixed cultures
which this may cause problems to the security of the region, in case of
misunderstanding. So, developing regional Nations in which all
peoples, regardless of race, or religion, live in an atmosphere of
freedom, tolerance, and mutual respect is required.

- **Social Factors**: The massive waves of migration coupled with
reduction in foreign aid has exerted enormous pressure on affected
states. These combined factors have contributed to the rise in
unemployment levels and created disparities of income. In addition, the
annual growth of the economy in many regional states is insufficient to
provide jobs for all those seeking employment. Therefore, energy
should be directed towards solving problems in this sector to avert
potential security threats.

**Jordan’s Role in Promoting Regional Peace and Security**

- Jordan has always been committed to peaceful means for the
resolution of conflicts. Its policies have been predicated on an
unwavering belief of, dialogue and political options, as best
mechanisms for ensuring lasting security and stability. Jordan believes
that regional and international cooperation is essential for bringing
about and consolidating peace and stability. Accordingly, the King has supported all efforts for achieving peace in the region and beyond. Since 1989, Jordan’s Armed Forces have actively participated in collective security arrangements sponsored by the United Nations.

- As you know, Jordan is a small country in terms of size, population, and resources. Undoubtedly, therefore, it has the least economic, military power compared with neighboring countries. Consequently, Jordan’s security policy has been carefully devised throughout the extensive international friendly network which is based on an alliance strategy, moderation, flexibility, liability, and cooperation.

- Jordan’s geopolitical location enabled it to assume a very significant role in the security and stability of a volatile Middle East.

- Despite serious opposition both inside and outside, Jordan has concluded a historic peace treaty with Israel. We want to stress that the risk to Jordan in taking such a decision far exceeds that of both Egypt and Israel; when they signed the Camp David Accord. However, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty has brought into effect new realities to the region and has given a new momentum to the peace process. In practical terms, the peace treaty with Israel reasserts Jordan’s traditional role as a key player in the Middle East.

- Jordan’s commitment to a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict has at times put the Kingdom on a collision course with an anti-Western coalition of forces. By so doing, Jordan contributes significantly to the stability of the region and to creating a favorable environment that strengthens the willingness of forces in the region to make peace an attainable objective.

- On a broader level, the treaty has also prevented the total collapse of the entire peace process. Indeed, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty has become an anchor of a regional peace, especially when faced with a situation of stagnation on the Syrian-Israeli track and the current upsurge of violence and problems on the Palestinian and Lebanese fronts.

- Jordan pursues its own security interests in conformity with common efforts to strengthen security and stability in the region and beyond, in accordance with international law, responsibilities, and commitments.

- Practically, Jordan looks at security aspects from several angles within an integrated form and believes that national, regional, and global security should be considered as well.

- Jordan has committed to a regional security system, which, we hope, should be comprehensive in scope and incremental in implementation. Our objectives of such a system include: enhancing stability in the region, promoting economic cooperation, reducing the probability of
war, minimizing military roles, regulating the arms race by rules and procedures, reducing military expenditures, and promoting political development, democracy, and respect of human rights and the rule of law in the region.

- Jordan has been actively involved in all working groups of multilateral component in the Middle East, which, as you know provides a broad framework for the future of the region and is intended as a complement to the bilateral component. The multilateral baskets are: arms control and regional security, water, environment, economic, development, and refugees.

- In December 1994, a decision was taken by all parties to establish a Regional Security Center in Amman with related facilities in both Qatar and Tunisia. The concept of establishing a conflict prevention/ regional security center, was first introduced and presented by Jordan. Credit goes to His Royal Highness Crown Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal, who, in fact, has been a long-time advocate of this idea. Indeed, His Royal Highness is extremely aware of the absence of any consultation mechanism (conflict prevention centers) in our region and has called for establishing a centre where regional problems can be addressed in a low key international idiom.

- Unfortunately, the Arms Control and Regional Security process has been suspended, because the co-sponsors of the Peace Process. (the U.S. and Russia), could not get all parties to agree on introducing structural arms control, as the weapon systems, conventional and non-conventional. However, Arms Control and Regional Security plenary session would have to reconvene in order to make a desision that a regional security center could become operational. This would be a small step forward, but nevertheless significant as a cornerstone in building regional security institutions.

Conclusion

Throughout the years, the direct military considerations of security have had superiority over non-military security issues; due to the direct nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But what is becoming increasingly evident is that old concepts of security, based on military power and balance, must be reformulated to include considerations to: environment, demography - including population growth, urbanization, and migration-domestic insurgencies, and obstacles to economic development. Despite the current results of the Middle East peace process, the area remains volatile and unpredictable, full of great uncertainties which are important both at the level of change in the sources of the threat to country’s national security.

Regional security should be based on principles acceptable to the countries concerned and, valid over time. To meet these objectives, the principles should include: refraining from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs
of other states, renouncing threat or use of force against states, taking practical steps, renouncing threat or use of force against states, taking practical steps prevent the proliferation of Nuclear Biological and Chemical weapons as well excessive accumulation of conventional arms, refraining from developing military capacity beyond legitimate defense requirements, pursuing a verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and applying appropriately effective instruments to combat all forms of extremism.
The African Peacekeeping Environment

BY: DR JAKKIE K CILLIERS  
Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies ~ South Africa

In much of Africa, the 1970s were a time of aggressive and assertive economic nationalism, policies which were thoroughly discredited within a matter of years. As a result, by the 1980s, the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ on development policy was making external development assistance conditional on economic liberalisation. The subsequent failure of structural adjustment programmes to bring about early recovery, and the pattern of Soviet disengagement from Africa intensified a mood of crisis. Influential voices, both inside and outside Africa, began to argue that political reform was a necessary concomitant of economic liberalisation. As a result, the African state itself, as historical agent of development, came under challenge. Without a remoralisation of public institutions, plus minimal accountability, economic liberation could never endure. In the words of Professor Crawford Young, “For the citizens of many lands, the state had become a predator. Silent disengagement from the state became increasingly evident”. By the turn of the decade, from the 1980s to the 1990s, Africa watchers had coined the term the ‘collapsed state’, primarily in reaction to events in Liberia and Somalia and more recently, also, in respect to countries such as the former Zaire, where enforcement of the law is more likely to be pursued as a means of extorting income than as a mean of ensuring observance of the law.

To a large extent the conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) exemplify the nature of conflict in Africa, as it became a struggle for control over key diamond and oil resources, mineral concessions and personal power. Angola provides an indication of the extent of the collapse of state authority in many other countries. The potential implosion of the DRC threatens to change the map of the entire region, with dire consequences for Central, Western, Eastern and Southern Africa.

Control over resources was, also, the key to the former Abacha regime’s harshest crackdown in Nigeria (in oil-rich Ogoniland in south-eastern Nigeria, home of some of the country’s richest oil fields), when it perceived Ken Saro-Wiwa’s dissident movement as a secessionist threat. One should bear in mind that Nigeria receives more than US $10 billion annually from oil sales, which accounts for 90% of its foreign export earnings.

African conflicts have often been protracted, but the end of the Cold War means that they have lost their global ideological significance. The result is that wars in Africa do not feature on the global radar screens of the international
community, and are bereft of sophisticated weaponry, but fueled by gangsters, warlords and guerrilla leaders. All share two common features: the struggle is essentially for control over mineral and natural resources, and is conducted by small-arms, rather than larger conventional military weapons. This means, ironically, that business can go on, particularly in mining, provided companies negotiate appropriate deals with the local warlord and are prepared to recruit, train and arm their own security companies, and pay taxes or 'protection money' to these local leaders instead of, or in addition to, a distant, often corrupt, but invariably inefficient, central government. In this manner, businesses, in a manner of speaking, can continue, but only at the price of lubricating the very conflicts of which they are captive. In Liberia, for example, rebels have been financing their seven year war with income received from diamonds and iron ore. Angola’s warring factions have done likewise, with ivory and cobra skins and oil fields playing a similar role, assisted by the fact that UNITA controls an estimated 80% of the border frontier regions of Angola. In regions such as Shaba and Kasai in the DRC, the competition for control over access to gold, diamonds and strategic minerals, implies that conflict in these regions will continue as long as companies and gold-diggers continue to pay up. As a result, governments of countries such as Sierra Leone, have resorted to the use of private security companies, such as Executive Outcomes, to reassert control over the more vital economic areas.

Post-Cold War retrenchment by the major superpowers has left fewer resources (political and financial) for the establishment of order and stability in Africa. At the same time, the method of tying aid with political reform has weakened many African leaders, in some cases leading to instability, as was the case in Sierra Leone. Despite success in Namibia and Mozambique, there have been some resounding United Nations failures in peace keeping on the continent. Thus, African state collapse has often occurred in a vacuum foreign or regional non-intervention, leading to the proliferation of non-state actors assuming the traditional role of states, or global organisations, such as security companies and commercial concerns, desperate to defend their investments.

Developments in south-western Africa are set to influence events for many years, as the United Nations wraps up its mission (MONUA) in Angola, against a background of massive confusion and conflict in the neighbouring DRC. The potential for Angola as a major source of illicit small-arms supply in the region potentially threatens the peace and tranquillity of even a country such as Botswana, which has, thus far, been an exception in the region, enjoying economic prosperity, a large degree of democracy and a generally unarmed population. United Nations estimates indicate that there is a total of about one million small-arms in Angola, distributed amongst a civilian population of some 11 million people.

Within the larger Southern African region, the availability of small-arms is a legacy of several decades of conflict, which coincided and followed upon the decolonisation of countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe,
Namibia and South Africa. Yesterday's political symbols of liberation have become today's economic tools for crime and violence. Years of conflict have transferred the region into a small-arms bazaar, within which state control of small-arms, even in South Africa, is the exception rather than the rule.

This is the environment within which peacekeeping in Africa will occur. This is the challenge that the world faces in bringing peace and stability to the most troubled of our continents. It is in Africa, that traditional peacekeeping will meet its greatest challenge.
Possibilities & Constraints: The European Union & Peace Support

BY: H.E MR. YVES GAZZO

Head of Delegation, The European Commission to Jordan

The European Union is increasingly being called upon to be a political player on the international scene. The need for a common foreign policy for its fifteen Member States is dictated not only by the close international trade relationships which now exist. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new conflicts in Europe and neighboring regions make it vital for the European Union to develop a foreign and security policy identity. The political agenda for Europe, adopted by the Madrid European Council in December 1995, identifies the foreign policy challenges which the Union will face in the years ahead: enlargement negotiations with Cyprus and Malta and the associated countries of the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, a continuing policy of dialogue, cooperation and partnership with the Union’s neighbours, in particular the Mediterranean countries, Russia and Ukraine, and the establishment of a European-wide security system. Other points on the agenda include transatlantic cooperation, cultivation of the Union’s traditional relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, and closer relations with Asia and Latin America.

The transformation of the post-Cold War international scene is marked by a shift in the weight of conventional foreign policy instruments. There is a large degree of internationalisation in areas in which the state was so far the sole actor within its borders.

This transformation of international relations has opened up entirely new prospects for the European Union, new opportunities to influence world events and to assert and promote its values and interests. It is a great opportunity to achieve progress in human rights, to prevent conflicts of all kinds, to advocate a balanced globalisation to the benefit of all, and to promote the inclusion of developing countries in world trade.

At the same time, the transformation is a challenge to Europeans to assume all their responsibilities. The new stage calls for new instruments, and the Union has developed such instruments in the obvious areas of trade and development.

Much of the instruments which matter in foreign policy have become European instruments, particularly in the field of trade and financial relations, and cooperation agreements with third countries in many areas.
This evolution has already given us a particularly strong position on the world stage. Many people are unaware of the fact that the European Community and its Member States already provide:

- 30% of the total aid to the Middle East (twice as much as the US, if military aid to Egypt and Israel is excluded);
- 50% of aid to the Palestinian Territories (compared with 9% from the US);
- 60% of aid to Russia and the countries of the Soviet Union (US providing only 25%);
- 40% of funding for reconstruction in Bosnia (US providing 15%).

However, we see that Europe is not called upon as much as the US to act as an international mediator, peace-maker and guarantor of stability. Although its financial involvement is great, its political impact is not so. This is what must change. Our interests are at stake. Europe has just as much interest as the United States in seeing peace in the Middle East and in the Balkans. The European Union cannot be an island of stability in an ocean of poverty and crises. Moreover, we cannot rely on others, however close their views are to ours. No world power can, by itself, guarantee our security.

The European Union does matter. It can and must do more. European foreign policy cannot be reduced to finding a consensus at the lowest cost. Europe has other ambitions and other duties than to form a ‘coalition of boy scouts’. Whatever the merits of humanitarian aid, we do not want to be merely a large humanitarian agency.

The slow and difficult birth of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has sometimes been misinterpreted as Europe’s reluctance to take part in world affairs, not only by some of our international partners, but also by the peoples of the Union, who believe that we do not carry the political weight we should and who are calling for a strong, confident Union on the international scene. However, putting together a common foreign policy is no small task. One must understand that this area is very different from the areas in which Europe has achieved its greatest successes, where Community action, be it in the movement of goods, services, capital, skills, agriculture, environment, customs or transport, has been based on harmonisation and the gradual elimination of differences.

We cannot deny, of course, that a kind of foreign policy tradition has developed over the years, with shared methods of working and thinking. But, these traditions are not comparable to Community directives, as regards their binding nature, since:

- We are not the only players;
- The outside world will move at its own pace; and,
- Each Member State is in a different position from the other. Portugal clearly plays a bigger role than Finland in certain regions of Africa or Asia; Morocco, obviously, has much closer relations with France or Spain than with Denmark. So, Member States tend to wield a different degree of
influence or interest in foreign policy decision-making, and this can also vary, depending on the subject.

It was thought in the past that this heritage could be safeguarded by working exclusively by intergovernmental methods. The intergovernmental method gives each Member State an equal say when the time comes to take a decision, which requires unanimous agreement. But, intergovernmentalism is not producing the right results. The two things which particularly irritate people are (a) the absence of action, and (b) autonomous action by some Member States.

Now, the Member States of the European Union with the greatest international stature are well aware of this. They sometimes despair of Europe and envisage ‘going it alone’. This is not because they lack faith in Europe, it is simply that if countries have to choose between a policy of good intentions and national action, between a hamstrung Europe and defending by themselves interests which they feel are being collectively ignored, they will not hesitate long.

However, this does not mean that we should overlook the fact that foreign policy is always going to be different from other policies in the Union. What is being sought in reality is a common foreign policy, not a single foreign policy. A common policy magnifies collective influence. A single foreign policy would be the product of a single state, which the Union is not.

A common foreign policy of our own is more than just the simple transposition of national diplomacy. We, in Europe, do believe that collective action is undoubtedly more worthwhile and effective than the sum of what each Member State can do by itself. Take the ‘Stability Pact’, for example, which we put in place in 1996 to contain the risks of crisis in our nearest neighbours, in Central and Eastern Europe. The cooperative spirit of the Stability Pact is, also, found in the ‘Royaumont Process’, designed to foster cooperation between the countries of south-east Europe, a region scarred by the Yugoslav conflict.

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 has introduced some useful improvements in terms of what instruments can be used to channel our common policy. We now have all the tools. It is our determination to act that will be put to the test.

We are changing our working methods in order to go forward. There are four fundamental points to be made:

1. We must make full use of the High Representative for the CFSP created by the Amsterdam Treaty.

This will give our action more visibility. The High Representative will contribute greatly to help international actors identify someone to talk to on behalf of Europe, someone to build lasting confidence with, and someone who will convey information and proposals directly to the decision makers, namely the Council of Ministers.

The policy planning and early warning unit, as provided for by the new Treaty, will ensure that the diplomats of the Member States and the Commission work together more closely with the Unit to help draw up common guidelines both for the long term and for crisis situations, and to ensure that these proposals are compatible with the decisions taken in other fields under Community structures and procedures.

3. The Amsterdam Treaty has provided for a considerably widened scope for decisions by a qualified majority.

In a nutshell, this means that qualified majority voting must no longer be one option among others. It must be the only option.

4. The fourth and, I think, the most interesting point for you here today, is that, compared with our greatest ally, we seem to lack one fundamental component of integration: a European military decision-making capability.

I do not mean that we should create a new army, but now that in the wake of the Cold War the deployment of forces abroad has become just as important as the concept of common defence, Europe is faced with a number of questions. For instance, how, as Europeans, do we take decisions on military intervention outside Europe? Will they be taken by the European Union? By the European allies acting within the structures being established in NATO? Or, in the Western European Union? Will the Union Member States really rule out the idea of ever taking a joint military decision?

What I mean is that, in some conflicts, diplomacy can succeed if only there is a united political front backed up by military means. To quote the French philosopher, Tocqueville, “Reason suggests, and experience proves that there can be no lasting commercial greatness which is not married, where necessary, to military might”.

The Treaty has made a step forward by allowing the Council to take decisions relating to the “Petersberg tasks”, opening up the way for the Union to use the Western European Union to implement decisions on conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations.

But, the sad fact is that it is only those conflicts which can be resolved by the threat of military force alone which are the ones most visible to European and international public opinion.

This is why all our Member States have an interest in bringing their foreign policies closer within the European framework. At the same time, we are well aware that foreign policy and, to an even greater extent security policy, is an area where national sensitivities are most delicate. It is through foreign policy that each country plays its part on the international stage, and for all European Union countries, whether or not they have been actors on the international stage for centuries, foreign policy is a fundamental part of their national identity. It is, therefore, vital that each country feels comfortable in the Community

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framework, in the knowledge that its interests are taken on board and respected. In turn, we work on assuming a fair share of responsibility.

In the Middle East Peace Process, the European Union has played a constructive role. It has accepted a role which is diplomatically and politically complementary to that of the US. Though this arrangement has not worked perfectly so far, it can be improved to boost the effect of international community efforts to put the peace process back on track. A report by the Commission released in early 1998 on the role of the European Union in the Peace Process, states that this role would be much improved if the parties acknowledge the need for the European Union, both at a Ministerial level and through its Special Envoy, to participate alongside the US in all fora set up to assist bilateral negotiations between the parties. The European Union has contributed by itself over half of the financial resources to the Peace Process. Because of this, it has more experience, wider links and a considera political capital. It understands that if the international assistance effort is to be renewed, it must be redefined. It is clear that the basic shareholder should be the key coordinator. Therefore, the international economic effort should be coordinated by the European Union on the basis of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee model: Palestinians, Israelis, the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations and the active participation of key donors.

The position of the European Union has not wavered throughout the eighteen-month stalemate. We firmly believe that full implementation of the agreements already concluded is the key out of the current crisis. Both parties must comply with their respective commitments under the Interim Agreement, otherwise further negotiations would lack credibility. The Council of Ministers has maintained this view in all its public statements, including the conclusion of the Cardiff European Council. Under the UK Presidency, the European Union strengthened its consultations with the US and its support of the latter’s mediation efforts, despite the continuous lack of results. The European Union has also reaffirmed its determination to assist the parties out of the crisis, in its capacity as a major economic partner of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as the largest donor of financial assistance to the latter.

There has been a recent initiative by the European Union Special Envoy, or 29th June, 1998, to unlock the situation. It contemplates a number of initiatives that the European Union should support, among which is the holding of an international summit in the event of an agreement on the basis of the US proposal, so as to restore confidence among the parties necessary for the deal to be implemented. The European Union’s strategic goal remains the urgent relaunching of the MEPP, for which Israel’s acceptance of the US proposal, originally accepted by the Palestinian Authority, still seems the most feasible option. It is clear that the stalemate cannot hold for very much longer. In the event of a declared failure of the US proposal, it would be advisable to start exploring alternative ideas, including those supported by the EUSE and the so-called ‘Franco-Egyptian’ initiative.
Before moving on to the Charter for Peace and Stability, which aims at giving concrete content to the political commitments made in Barcelona, I should like to touch briefly on another instrument of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, that is, the network of foreign policy institutions, or EUROMESCO. The network was established in June 1996 at Sesimbra; two working parties were formed, one on political and security cooperation, and the second on confidence building measures, disarmament, conflict prevention and aspects of preventive diplomacy. After two years of operation, EUROMESCO includes thirty-four member institutes and seven observers all working on the development of the debate on political dialogue. The network has now entered the second phase of its development. The annual conference in London last May decided to diversify the issues for reflection, namely to introduce further consideration of the Charter for Peace and Stability, as well as the political conditions for regional integration. The Working Parties will be maintained and their interaction will be encouraged. In fact, a meeting is expected to take place in Valencia during the end of November 1998. The EUROMESCO network represents, today, a confirmed and recognised confidence-building measure of the political and security partnership. It makes a contribution to the dialogue between civil societies on crucial topics of the partnership and supports the work of the senior officials, as required.

The Charter for Peace and Stability aims to give a concrete content to the political commitments made in Barcelona. It is a medium-term prospect, the establishment of peace in the region remaining the prior condition of the project. Following the second Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Malta (April 1997), senior officials of the twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean partners decided to re-launch the work of developing the Charter, and discussions continue with meetings of senior officials.

The principles of such a text would take as a starting point the Barcelona Declaration, stability being considered in its overall conception. Several other elements will have to be reaffirmed, such as, respect for sovereignty, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and other elements will have to be developed, such as, the common perception of stability.

At a meeting of senior officials on 19th May, 1998, followed by a second on 14th September, benefiting from the ‘positive fall-out’ of the Palermo Ministerial Conference of June 1998, it was decided that a special session on the draft Charter would take place in Brussels on 24th November, 1998. Since then, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union has circulated a preliminary draft to all the Mediterranean partners, including the outline and possible chapter headings to be included within the Charter. Our partners have been invited to comment by 31st October, with a view to preparing an agreed text for the ad hoc meeting next month. A series of preliminary remarks have already been submitted supporting the effort and stressing the indivisible nature of security, with some calling for the inclusion of economic and social aspects in the framework of the Charter, and others requesting the inclusion of
Before moving on to the Charter for Peace and Stability, which aims at giving concrete content to the political commitments made in Barcelona, I would like to touch briefly on another instrument of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, that is, the network of foreign policy institutions, or EUROMESCO. The network was established in June 1996 at Sesimbra; two working parties were formed, one on political and security cooperation, and the second on confidence building measures, disarmament, conflict prevention and aspects of preventive diplomacy. After two years of operation, EUROMESCO includes thirty-four member institutes and seven observers all working on the development of the debate on political dialogue. The network has now entered the second phase of its development. The annual conference in London last May decided to diversify the issues for reflection, namely to introduce further consideration of the Charter for Peace and Stability, as well as the political conditions for regional integration. The Working Parties will be maintained and their interaction will be encouraged. In fact, a meeting is expected to take place in Valencia during the end of November 1998. The EUROMESCO network represents, today, a confirmed and recognised confidence-building measure of the political and security partnership. It makes a contribution to the dialogue between civil societies on crucial topics of the partnership and supports the work of the senior officials, as required.

The Charter for Peace and Stability aims to give a concrete content to the political commitments made in Barcelona. It is a medium-term prospect, the establishment of peace in the region remaining the prior condition of the project. Following the second Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Malta (April 1997), senior officials of the twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean partners decided to re-launch the work of developing the Charter, and discussions continue with meetings of senior officials.

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references on democracy, human rights and third party activities in peacekeeping operations as concepts enhancing stability in the area.

I should like to conclude by saying that we are all too prone to underestimate the progress we have made in the past thirty years, from the beginnings of European political cooperation up to the latest advances of the Maastricht Treaty. We have consolidated peace within our frontiers and we are now doing a great deal to project this stability on to some of our neighbours, for instance, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement of the European Union is undoubtedly the most tangible political act that we will undertake in the years ahead, and the most decisive step for security on our continent up to the farthest eastern reaches, and with our southern non-European Union partners, an ambitious, unprecedented undertaking to shape a trans-Mediterranean future of peace, stability and prosperity.

We are only just beginning to measure what we can do and to demonstrate, in words and deeds, that Europe is for peace and against war, for democracy and against dictatorship, for development and against poverty.

The Western European Union

The Western European Union (WEU) was created by the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 by the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg for a 50-year period (to March 1998), and was amended by the Paris Agreement, which brought in Germany and Italy. Until two weeks after the coming into force of the Treaty in the European Union, on 1 November, 1993, the WEU was based in London, but its headquarters was moved to Brussels and its membership has grown to include Greece, Spain and Portugal. It includes also two observer members, Ireland and Denmark, as well as three associate members, Iceland, Norway and Turkey.

The overriding purpose has been to establish cooperation in the field of security, to assist partners in resisting aggression, to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe, to fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal and political freedom, constitutional institutions and the rule of law and to create a firm basis for Europe's economic recovery.

The WEU structure consists of the WEU Council, the supreme body, which meets at ministerial level (foreign ministers and/or defence ministers), the Assembly, composed of representatives of the national assemblies, and the Secretariat.

The Treaty of Amsterdam (Article J4) describes the WEU as an integral part of the development of the Union, establishing that the Union should foster closer institutional relations with the WEU "with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide". In the meantime, the WEU supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of its CFSP and its operational capability, notably, in humanitarian,
rescue and peacekeeping tasks, and the task of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht)

The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht) lays down the objectives of the CFSP as:

- Safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- Strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States in every way;
- Preserving peace and strengthening international security;
- Promoting international cooperation; and,
- Developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In the Treaty, the Member States of the European Union commit themselves to supporting the Union’s external and security policy, “actively and unreservedly in the spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”, and to refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the European Union, or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Treaty of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam sketches out a new framework for general action in the common foreign and security policy, providing a firmer basis by:

- Improving the preparation of decisions by a permanent political committee;
- Using qualified majority voting as the norm;
- Implementing decisions via the Presidency and the Commission; and,
- Including in the Community budget the costs of the CFSP.

Positive innovations introduced by the Treaty include:

- Firstly, the CFSP must be grounded in the principles of territorial integrity and must be in explicit conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- Member States are to step up cooperation and develop new forms of mutual political solidarity;
- The Union will be able to carry out humanitarian aid and peacekeeping tasks (known as the ‘Petersberg tasks’);
- Innovative decision-making methods;
- Visibility and coherence are to be given to the CFSP;
- Confirming the tasks of the Commission, which is fully associated in the drafting of European foreign policy;
- Member States are to analyse together potential conflict zones and anticipate crisis situations through the policy planning and early warning unit.
An Integrated Approach to the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict

BY: SIR MARRACK GOULDING
St. Anthony’s College - Oxford

I join previous speakers in expressing thanks to the organizers of this Conference and to our Jordanian hosts for their wonderful hospitality. For me personally it is a special pleasure to be here. For it was I who recommended to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in 1989 that Jordan should, for the first time, contribute military personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation, UNAVEM I in Angola. It is a delight to see here so many Jordanian officers who have made such a distinguished contribution since then to UN peacekeeping.

The Project Coordinator told us this morning that the primary objective of this series of conferences is “to promote and facilitate increased cooperation and coordination between influential agencies and institutions from a wide variety of nations and cultures. Focussed on seeking creative and proactive solutions to the challenges of peace support operations”.

That is exactly what my presentation is about. It is unashamedly operational, UN-oriented and focussed on internal conflicts because that is what most conflicts are these days.

The Forbes Book of Business Quotations attributes to Aristotle the following quotation. (I have not been able to find it in Aristotle and it may be a product of Malcolm Forbes’ ever-fertile imagination; but it is so apt to my theme that I quote it nonetheless): “It is more difficult to organize peace than to win a war. But the fruits of victory will be lost if the peace is not well organized.”

Armed conflict is rarely an isolated incident. It is usually part of a repetitive sequence of events in which a long-standing dispute heats up and cools down and heats up again, sometimes to such a heat that the parties take up arms against each other. The sequence cannot be broken unless the root causes of the dispute are addressed. So what happens after a conflict has been extinguished is even more important than the actual extinguishing of the conflict. Post - conflict peace-building is thus a kind of preventive diplomacy. Indeed it is the most effective way to prevent conflict.

But because the causes of internal conflict are complex and often economic and social in nature, conflict can be prevented only if the international community can organize and implement programs that integrate all the different kinds of action required to eradicate the root causes. Preventing conflict is no
longer just a matter for the generals and the diplomats; it requires also expertise in governance and human rights and economic and social development. This gives rise to considerable difficulties. First, there is the problem of sovereignty which we discussed this morning. These internal causes of conflict are of great political sensitivity. Time and again the UN or some other third party is told that its mediation or peacebuilding is not wanted because it would intrude on the country’s sovereignty. Secondly, there is the chronic inability of the international community to coordinate its efforts in the way that is needed if there is to be a truly integrated approach to the resolution and prevention of conflict. Thirdly, Dr Coker was absolutely right this morning when he advocated the “bottom-up” approach to security. Most of the work in peacebuilding must be done by indigenous actors and the longer the program goes on, the more imperative it is that those actors should be seen to be in the lead.

During the ten years since the end of the Cold War the UN has had a dizzy, roller-coaster experience in matters of peace and security. The number of peacekeepers deployed rose from 10,000 in 1988 to almost 80,000 at the end of 1993 and then fell precipitously to about 14,000 today. There were many reasons for this decline: over-confidence bred in the Secretariat and Member States by success in some of the early post-Cold War operations; impracticable mandates, especially the protection of humanitarian operations in the middle of conflict; the US’s loss of confidence in the UN; its unwillingness to pay its share of the costs; and so on.

During that giddy decade, the UN – and again I mean the Member States, as well as the Secretariat – has learnt five hard lessons.

First, we have learnt to be selective. An American professor, William Zartmann has developed a theory about the ripeness of conflicts for third party mediation. He argues that the efforts of aspiring mediators are wasted unless the conflict concerned is ripe for their attention. He defines the moment of ripeness as being “a mutually hurting stalemate between specific parties, with a way out”. The “way out” having been identified in earlier attempts to mediate a settlement (the Dayton agreement on Bosnia was, for instance, based to a large extent on the earlier, unsuccessful Vance / Owen plan). The unfortunate reality, however, is that at any one time very few actual or potential conflicts are ripe for third party treatment. As I have said, sovereignty is often an insuperable obstacle. Remember also that Member States’ political energy and willingness to pay are limited. Like a surgeon in a front line hospital, the UN therefore has to steel itself to attend only to those conflicts which it believes will respond to the treatment it can provide. This creates a tough job for the Secretary-General. He has to have the courage to say No when governments, parliaments and the media are screaming for action-and then the patience to do his best if his No is ignored and he is told to do the impossible with inadequate resources, like setting up “safe areas” in Bosnia.
The second lesson is the need to be rigorous in defining the objectives of a UN intervention and in identifying the means which will be needed if those objectives are to be achieved. The people on the ground, civilians and soldiers, have to be told in very clear terms what their tasks are; and they must also be given the human and material resources they need to do those tasks. Peacemaking and peacekeeping cannot be done on the cheap - but they cost infinitely less than war. The UN (and again I mean the Secretariat and Member States) have been woefully negligent over these issues in some cases, e.g. Somalia, Georgia, Rwanda, Bosnia..., again. And, lest I appear to be ungraciously criticizing my colleagues, let me say that Marrack Goulding is probably more to blame than anyone.

The third lesson, which flows from the first two, is to accept that there are some things the UN cannot do. Above all, it cannot combine coercion with mediation. There is a fundamental difference between activities carried out with the consent of both parties to a conflict and activities which involve the threat or use of force against one or both of them. Mediation and coercion are alternatives: a choice has to be made between them. This applies especially to the protection of humanitarian activities amid continuing conflict, which is a kind of enforcement. After much reflection I have come to the conclusion that it can be done only if three stringent conditions are met. First, the international force must have overwhelming military superiority and an evident will to use it if necessary. Secondly, the force must be completely impartial and not condone acts by one side which it would prevent by force if they were attempted by the other side. Thirdly, it must have no other mandate in relation to the conflict concerned - no peacemaking, no peacekeeping, no nation-building. On the one occasion when those conditions were fulfilled - the US-led UNITAF in Somalia - the operation was a brilliant success; the humanitarian agencies were enabled to do their jobs and the famine was brought under control. It was only later that things went wrong, when the international forces got involved in other activities and decided that General Aidid was their enemy.

The forth lesson is that peacemaking is a long-term business. Armed conflict arises because there is an unresolved dispute. Disputes have deeply rooted causes. One cannot end a conflict simply by negotiating a peace treaty. Deploying a peacekeeping operation to help put it into effect and then withdrawing after 2 or 3 years. There are no quick fixes. A rapid burst of peacemaking and peacekeeping may appear to settle a conflict. But the success will be illusory unless it is accompanied and followed by long-term programs to address the root causes of the underlying dispute. The prevention, management and resolution of conflict cannot therefore be achieved by diplomatic and military action alone. Complementary action is required in the political, economic, and social fields if the root causes of conflict, especially internal conflict, are to be effectively addressed. Inclusive and participatory political systems must be established, governance has to be improved, law and order has to be administered fairly and humanely, human rights must be respected, economic and social development must be fostered. Action to achieve these
objectives requires committed international efforts lasting decades. But, that international effort has to be undertaken in a sensitive and discreet way which fosters and supports long-term efforts by committed forces or capacities for peace that are indigenous to the country concerned.

Evidence that the UN has learnt this fourth lesson is to be found in the peace settlement for Guatemala, which took three long years to negotiate. It provides for the usual military arrangements: cease-fire, cantonment and demobilization of the armed opposition, downsizing of the Army. But it includes a number of more important features: a human rights agreement; a standard-setting agreement on the rights of indigenous peoples, ie the Maya Indians who are the majority in the country but have suffered centuries of discrimination and brutality; and the truth commission. There is also a package of agreements on economic, social and agrarian issues, including commitments by the government to increase the tax base by 50% over three years, to tax unused land, to double spending on health and education in the rural areas and so on. The peace settlement is thus a serious attempt to tackle the underlying causes of a civil war which lasted 35 years and killed about 5% of the population. The Guatemala agreement also reflects the UN’s recognition that the shelf-life of international mediators is short after a peace settlement has been signed. The parties to the conflict often find that they are soon united in their distaste for the Omni - present international agencies preaching to them about how they should run their country. The secret is to get as much as possible of the peacebuilding into the peace agreement itself, in the hope that thereafter national actors, with discreet support from the international community, can take up the running.

The fifth lesson, the one which I claim to be the most important of all, is that you cannot negotiate and implement a comprehensive peace settlement of this kind without an integrated approach by the international community as a whole. Such an approach has to satisfy a number of conditions:

- it must be based on an accurate analysis of the conflict and its causes;
- it must (to repeat a point that cannot be repeated too often) include not only short-term measures to stop the fighting but also long-term measures to address the root causes of the dispute which has caused - or could cause - the parties to take up arms against each other;
- some agency must take the lead in designing it, in coordinating its implementation and in monitoring its political results, always in close consultation with the other governments and agencies concerned and with their consent;
- the integrated approach must also enjoy the consent of the parties to the actual or potential conflict.

These are difficult conditions to fulfil. The most difficult is the last one - the consent of the parties. The world is full of actual or potential conflicts which the international community cannot prevent or resolve because one or other or both
of the parties will not accept third party mediation. The “ripeness” problem again.

These conditions also imply a degree of cooperation which is somewhat rare within the international community. Governments have their own interest to pursue and the greater those interests are the more reluctant they will be to submerge their identities in a joint effort. There are also well-known jealousies and competition between international agencies, each of which has its own inter-governmental policy-making body, its own sources of funding and its own chain of command. And there are often difficulties in binding the humanitarian and human rights agencies and NGO’s into integrated programs whose primary purpose is political and can therefore be seen as contaminating “pure” humanitarian and developmental mandates.

My own view is that the only agency which has the experience and authority to design an integrated approach, coordinate its implementation and monitor its results is the Secretary-General of the UN, with the support of the whole UN system. But the proposition would not at present be accepted by a number of major states nor, I regret to have to say, by all parts of the UN system.

I have stated these difficulties in rather stark terms because it is important to be realistic. One of the problems the UN has always encountered is unrealistic expectation of what it can achieve. When it fails to live up to those expectations, it is the Organization itself which is blamed, not the governments who have chosen not to give it the mandate or the consent or the resources it needs to be able to do what has to be done. The Secretary-General can propose but only the Member States can dispose.
Possibilities and Constraints: The UNDP and Peace Support

BY: TIMOTHY S. ROTHERMEL
Special Representative of the Administrator, United Nations Development Program/Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People

Let me at the outset thank the sponsors of this Conference, in particular the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy and its President, Dr. Kamel Abu-Jaber, for organizing this gathering on such an important matter for all humanity. It is very timely as a new millennium draws closer, and the Institute has brought together a very impressive array of internationally respected experts in the field of peace building, a significant challenge not only for the United Nations, but also for every human being in our global society. It is a personal pleasure again to be in Jordan. One of the many attractive aspects of living in Jerusalem is the opportunity and the ease of visiting this wonderful country.

The United Nations Development Program is increasingly becoming involved in peace building with experience growing daily. Therefore, I hope I can make a modest contribution to your proceeding based on services for longer than I care to think about with UNDP, and in particular, an association of almost twenty years with its work in the Palestinian Territories.

In thinking about peace support and UNDP, its possibilities and constraints, as well as the overall purposes of this gathering, I am reminded of my wife, Joan, who is an attorney in New York City. It may come as a strange analogy, but the dear lady who has practiced law for some twenty-five years simply hates courts, judges, juries and the like. Even entering a courthouse for the signature of a clerk on an official document is an ordeal for her. As a result, she has become somewhat of an expert in negotiations—anything to keep the client and herself away from courts and confrontations. Naturally, there are a variety of techniques that she applies professionally, as well as at home, which have on many occasions spared bloodshed between two teenagers who have spent nearly all of their short lifetimes on the verge of war. In short, and in a microcosm in comparison with what is being discussed at this conference, she sets a personal example of conflict prevention, confidence building and post conflict peace building both in her law firm and at home.

The Secretary-General’s reform program announced in mid-1997 had a profound impact on the United Nation’s role in peace-building, peace-keeping, preventive diplomacy, humanitarian relief and UN field coordination. The reforms included a transfer of responsibilities among Secretariat Departments;
reorganization of the humanitarian sector; and setting up three Executive Committees for Peace and Security, Humanitarian Affairs and Development Activities. The Department of Political Affairs was assigned responsibility for peace-building and UNDP has been especially active, together with the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs and UN specialized agencies, funds and programs in this critical exercise for countries in post-conflict rehabilitation situations. UNDP also plays a critical support role in ongoing crisis and conflict situations, especially in the support provided to Special Representatives and Special Envoys of the Secretary-General, who in most cases, are appointed and report to the Secretary-General (S-G) through the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

UNDP is collaborating with the other UN funds and programs to build greater common understanding, policy coherence and coordination in development operations. As part of the package of reform, the S-G, with the backing of the General Assembly, decided that UNDP will continue to manage and fund the Resident Coordinator system and to this end grouped all funds and programs into the UN Development Group (UNDG). This Group is led by an Executive Committee chaired by the Administrator of UNDP, and supported by the Development Group Office (DGO), an inter-agency unit established and administered by UNDP and staffed by personnel from UNDG members comprising UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, etc. The results through UNDG collaboration, so far, include:

- Stronger measures to reinvigorate the Resident Coordinator system and the positions of Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator as the designated representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian and development operations and leadership of the UN country team. A common agenda for action is producing stronger Resident Coordinator selection procedures, training and country team planning and reporting requirements.
- Preparation of a mechanism and guidelines for the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) as a planning, programming and program resource framework.
- An accelerated drive toward common UN premises and the introduction of common administrative services for greater economy and efficiencies.

The fundamental problems affecting many countries in crisis have to do with governance, and the equitable rights of all national groups, majority or minority. Often, compounding the crises are ongoing conflict, poverty and social and economic dysfunction. Such problems are the root causes for internecine marginalizing, alienation, genocide, and in some cases, the collapse of the state involved. Tackling root causes requires establishing a foundation for better governance.

In April 1997, UN Executive Heads meeting under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General took a landmark decision on strategic frameworks for
cooperation on a limited number of countries in crisis or post-crisis to dove-tail the political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions of assistance. Initially seen as a strategy for post-conflict recovery, the approach was also more widely applied by UNDP in preventing crisis and in promoting emergence from conflict under the rubric of UN assistance strategies. In addition to the pilot strategic framework exercise in Afghanistan, United Nations country teams have embarked on the process of consultation and preparatory work related to assistance strategies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and last but not least, the Palestinian Territories.

The strategic framework process is aimed at the inclusion of all actors, whether national or international, multilateral or bilateral, official or non-governmental – engaged in the humanitarian, political, human rights and development fields. UNDP’s intent is to facilitate and support the process, which by definition involves all stake-holders in the field, under the direction of the UN Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator. In this endeavor, UNDP works very closely with the Department of Political Affairs in its focal-point role for peace-building as well as with the High Commissioner for Human Rights in advocating and providing technical assistance for the critical areas falling under her mandate.

The concept reaffirms the importance of partnerships and alliances in crisis situations, and recommends that the Bretton Woods institutions, multilateral and bilateral donors and both national and international NGOs become involved in the strategies for rebuilding societies after conflict. It responds to the need for new, participatory approaches at the national as well as local levels in order to ensure ownership of the recovery process by the affected population, and the structures and institutions that need to be preserved or rebuilt to reinforce sustainability. In addition to supporting the efforts of national authorities, international partners have an additional responsibility of taking into account the particular problems faced by women and minorities, generally among the most disenfranchised of groups.

A recent study of UNDP’s record, over the past decade, of assistance to countries in crisis, pointed to a need for better linkages between relief and development. It noted that UNDP emergency interventions tended to fall into consistent patterns, such as, helping with the coordination and logistics of aid to disaster victims, organizing disaster management training programs and carrying out post-crisis needs assessments. In 1995, UNDP’s Executive Board approved the allocation of five percent of its core resources, currently amounting to approximately $35 million annually, specifically to assist countries in special development situations. Among the wider initiatives identified for this type of assistance were area rehabilitation for resettlement of uprooted populations, the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, comprehensive landmine clearance programs, disaster mitigation and capacity-building training, organization of national elections, gender and human rights protection
and promotion, governance and the rule of law, and as already described, strategic coordination among international assistance partners.

Let me now turn to more familiar ground, the role of the UNDP in the Palestinian Territories. I would submit that this process is a good example of UNDP and peace support. At the outset, let me say that every conflict prevention and post-conflict situation is inherently different. There may be some common traits, but a cookie cutter approach to each individual situation will not work. There are different cultures, different personalities, different perceptions and different constraints in each setting. Insofar as UNDP in the Palestinian Territories is concerned, its work has been far different from that carried out in Central America which, in turn, is different from Afghanistan or Bosnia. The individual players have their unique personalities, working modalities reflect actual situations, and the nature of the conflicts is rarely alike from one country to another.

In the Palestinian Territories, UNDP’s activities have fallen into three fairly distinct phases which I will call, the first phase - getting started, the second phase - consolidation, and the third phase - new partnerships.

During the first decade, beginning in 1978- the getting started phase - UNDP was embarking on a very modest program of assistance to the Palestinians, with operations based for quite some time in New York. There were some important differences, however, from UNDP’s work in other countries. Differences, which in my judgement, have played an important role in the evolution of its activities. The first was an undertaking by the then Administrator of UNDP, Bradford Morse, that he would personally oversee and approve any initiatives undertaken by UNDP in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This was necessary as an assurance to the Government of Israel that UNDP’s work would be carried out under the direct supervision of a respected and trusted figure of international stature. But this decision had the additional advantage of completely unforeseen at the time - of removing layers of bureaucracy and providing both operational and managerial flexibility.

The second distinctive feature of what came to be called the “Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People” was a decision taken early on by UNDP’s governing body that the Program would be permitted to stray from UNDP’s traditional role of technical co-operation into infrastructure activities. This decision, which was taken years before the Oslo Accords, amounted initially to the authorization for UNDP to embark on the construction of water supply and sewerage facilities in the Jabalya Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip. But it also held considerable implications for the post Oslo period. Finally, and quite properly at the time, the management of UNDP decided that the fledgling new endeavor should be by-in-large self-financing. There were no assurances at that time that it would be permitted to operate at all, or if permitted, for how long. So, for all practical purposes, the Program did not receive funds from UNDP for staff salaries, operating expenses and the like. Rather, somewhat in the manner of a consulting firm, the Program had to meet its own costs from its modest
overhead charges on funds contributed by UNDP or the international donor community.

The second or consolidation phase, roughly corresponding to the years just before and during the Intifada, was for UNDP in the West Bank and Gaza a time of modest expansion, a time of solidifying relations with Israel’s Civil Administration which governed development activities, and most important, a time of developing even closer relationships with Palestinian civil society - its mayors, academicians, industrialists, students, etc. An operating UNDP office came into being in East Jerusalem, and subsequently in Gaza. In addition, other developments took place, with implications for the future that again was unanticipated at the time. Most important was the recruitment of a handful of young and very talented professional Palestinian engineers to provide oversight for a growing number of infrastructure activities which, in addition to water supply and sanitation works, began to include classrooms and complete schools, vocational training centers, hospital expansions, and other economic investments, including a produce market in Nablus, a fish market and a citrus processing factory in Gaza as well as other small scale activities involving bricks and mortar. By the time of the Oslo Accords, the Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People had a small but respectable annual program of some $15 million annually from UNDP’s central resources and five bilateral donors - Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States – which had begun to use the Program as a modality for implementing some of their projects in the area.

All this changed with the Oslo Accords and the inception of the Palestinian Authority. Resources to UNDP almost tripled between 1993 and 1994 when the Program’s third phase began. The range of donors also increased and the staff grew from some 45 to 135 talented Palestinians. Its principle interlocutor became the new Palestinian Authority. In those days, there was a great deal of optimism on the part of all parties. A new alliance was developed between the Palestinian Authority and UNDP, along with the existing and expanding relationships with civil society, which brings me back to the topic at hand: UNDP and peace support. Have the past five years in the tangled web of Middle East politics demonstrated the possibilities for UNDP peace support? I think so, let me explain why,

Let me be clear, however. It is certainly not UNDP during the past five years that has been at the political side of peace building in probably the most longstanding post World War II conflict. That role has been in the capable hands of the Secretary-General, the Government of Norway, the European Union, the United States and other. But as many distinguished commentators on the subject of peace building have pointed out, whether pre or post conflict, it is no longer a process of classic observers or peacekeeping missions that are needed in the new intra-state conflict situations. It is that and much more. Peacebuilding means building confidence within a society. It means delivering interventions so that there is a level playing field. It also means ensuring that
both sides to a conflict are afforded the same information. And here, with a generous amount of flexibility, is where the work of UNDP can shine.

In the Arab/Israeli conflict and, in particular, in the post Oslo Palestinian Authority / Israeli situation, UNDP has been given the opportunity to become a major player in the development field, based on its history and experience, some wise decisions that were taken early on, and its focus on human development. The challenging and exciting activities that have characterized this phase in the Program’s history demonstrate why UNDP has a role in the common search for peace that brings us together today.

In 1993 there were no Palestinian governmental institutions in the Palestinian Territories. There was a paucity of individuals trained in the skills needed for the new task of governance. There was a largely dilapidated public infrastructure. But with the support of the international community, in less than five years it is astonishing what has been achieved on the development agenda.

Thanks to the generosity of the Government of Japan, UNDP was able to provide start-up costs of $7.2 million to the newly established Palestinian Authority Ministers. Training and municipal buildings were provided to almost all municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza. Support was provided to the new Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics from its inception as a one man operation into what is currently a robust Palestinian Authority institution, which, I was told by UN experts dealing with statistics, last year carried out the most professional census in the Palestinian Territories that they had ever observed in any country. UNDP also was able to assist the Palestinian Authority in the creation of its General Control Office – its central auditing authority – which has already earned a worldwide reputation for a Palestinian Authority institution, which has the maturity and respect to be self-critical. With the combination of donor support, the wise decision taken years ago to carry out infrastructure activities, and its talented staff, 53 schools have been constructed by UNDP. 52 villages have water supplies for the first time, many kilometers of water supply and sanitation pipes have been installed. This work is continuing and expanding. Support has been provided to start a new Palestinian Environment Authority, Water Authority, Computing Center, Energy Authority and Ministerial Cabinet Office. Housing for the families of the Palestinian Police, who were forced to sleep in makeshift tents along roadsides in 1993 and 1994, has been constructed. It has also been possible to provide support to Palestinian human rights organizations, to set aside US$ 1.3 million to support local and municipal elections. To develop programs for the employment of female high school dropouts, to generate jobs for thousands of workers in Gaza during periods of closure, and even support a few confidence-building activities involving Israelis, Jordanians, Egyptians and Palestinians. In financial terms, almost US$ 300 - million have been invested by and through UNDP in the Palestinian Territories.

This enumeration of activities can go on and on. But it is not my role to make a sales pitch for UNDP’s work in the Palestinian Territories. Rather, these
examples are cited to give an indication of how UNDP, as a flexible and multisectoral institution operating in a conflict or post conflict situation, has the potential ability to make levels of confidence a bit stronger, the playing field a little more level, and the parties more able to deal with each other as equals—elements essential to peace building. Hopefully some of these efforts in capacity building may even have some influence on the ongoing negotiations at the Wye Plantation.

The demands expected from UNDP assistance in the aftermath of a large number of complex emergencies occurring during the current decade, coupled with the tremendous and unforeseen demands resulting from more recent natural and climatic phenomena have stretched UNDP’s current ability to its very limits. Programmable resources for the period 1997-2000 have virtually been fully allocated from UNDP core resource lines. The resulting resource gap is already being felt and is expected to become acute in the future. Unless new resources are identified, virtually all ongoing activities will be hard pressed to continue at present levels. Paradoxically, with the maturing of a number of crisis and conflict situations, and greater progress towards post-conflict transition, the demands for programs of assistance in governance, contribution drafting and law reform, human rights, ethnic and gender parity are likely to become urgent. Along with those activities currently being supported, such as, reintegreration of internally displaced persons, demobilization of soldiers, the return and settlement of refugees, demeaning and victims assistance, to name but a few.
Jordanian Participation in PKO and Future Outlook

LT. GENERAL GHAZI AL-TAYYEB
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, Jordanian Armed Forces

My presentation will cover the Jordanian experience in the UN peacekeeping missions, and NATO-Led implementation force and stabilization force IFOR/SOFR.

The Jordanian experience in the field of peacekeeping operations is relatively new. However, it signifies the country's political and military presence in the world. It also highlights the importance given by His Majesty the King and the Jordanian authorities to UN and NATO activities, particularly the peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations. Hence, Jordanian participation has been extremely comprehensive and effective in nature.

Geopolitically, Jordan exists in the core of the Middle East and thus inherits a pivotal role to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, Jordan has to coexist with an unstable regional political environment. Jordanian peacekeeping involvement has its roots in our security policy, in which creating and sustaining a state of security and political stability in the Middle-East constitutes one of the main elements.

Regional security is a strategic goal of this policy and had been reflected on many occasions by implementation of a variety of roles crucial to maintaining peace in the region, either on bilateral basis or in conjunction with peace efforts exercised by other states. At the regional level, violence and terrorism of all kinds should be persistently fought. Subsequently, all Jordanian military peacekeeping participation, regionally and internationally contributes in this direction and serve such a purpose. At the international level, and as viewed by Jordan, international peace and security is not an exclusive task of the UN or the security council, but is an international collective responsibility. To achieve this noble goal and to reach new peaceful horizons, all members of the international community have to contribute towards it. Based on this, the Jordanian participation in peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions reflects the political and moral responsibilities that Jordan is committed to fulfill towards the international community by adhering to the goals and principles stated in the UN charter.

The humanitarian dimension enjoys special attention by the Jordanian government, not only through its peace keeping participation, but, in its foreign as well as internal policies shown through its political stand on most
international issues. The Jordanian firm principle commitment to human rights was proved beyond doubt during delicate circumstances of excessive exposure to successive immigration waves that placed a great deal of political, social and economic pressure on the country. Jordan managed to provide successful humanitarian treatment, irrespective of political and ethnic sensitivities and economic implications. It is a basic Jordanian commitment to give absolute priority for human rights.

Being a productive member of the international community, has its implications on the Jordanian leadership, government, and people:

- As the Jordanian participation in the UN peacekeeping/ peace enforcement missions is the practical application of one of the major pillars of the Jordanian defense policy, it professes an organic relationship between the Jordanian national security and regional and international peace and stability.

- It is the assurance of the Jordanian commitment to international norms, through productive involvement in the international efforts, to achieve regional and global peace and security.

- It is not only important to the peace and security but to the people of Jordan who view it as a productive interaction with the international community.

- It also emphasizes the importance of an effective Jordanian political presence in the international arena.

- It improves the Jordanian military expertise through regular contact with other friendly military systems in the fields of deployment of forces abroad, command and control, organizing and equipping troops for field operations, strategic transportation and logistic operations. Of special importance is the opportunity allowed for junior officers to develop their own field leadership qualities.

- It magnifies the political and military openness and transparency as an essential component of our foreign policy.

- It develops and improves the political security and future humanitarian regional role, within the context of the peace process.

- At the personal level, having assumed a major command post as a commander, UNPROFOR in Croatia, it gives me a particular pride to represent Jordan, and to reflect the Jordanian vision on international peace and security in one of the most turbulent regions on the European continent.

The Jordanian Armed Forces have started since 1989 to physically participate in the collective security arrangements sponsored by the UN in different parts of the world:
• On the first of January 1989, Jordan responded to the UN call to launch a peace campaign to bring peace to the long deteriorated African state of Angola. Jordan has participated in United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNAVEM I then II and III. That was our starting point.

• After hostilities broke out in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council’s resolution No 740, issued on 15 February 1992, established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to create conditions of peace and security for negotiating a settlement. As a result, the Jordanian leadership agreed to participate in this mission with a battalion-sized contingent. It was deployed in the area of responsibility (Sector West) on 25 March 92, and was placed under the operational control of the sector commander. Its main tasks were protection of the civilian population and ensuring secure passage to the refugees, and maintaining security in the area of responsibility.

• In October 1993 the second Jordanian battalion (JORBAT) was deployed in Sector West / Croatia, then moved to the Sector North later on. It was placed under the operational control of the sector commander and was assigned the same task as JORBAT ONE.

• In January 1994 the third battalion deployed in Southern Sector/Croatia. It was placed under the operational control of the sector commander with a main task as JOIRBAT I.

• Due to the Jordanian target acquisition equipment compatibility with those used by the UNPROFOR, The UN requested Jordan to send 100 troops from the Royal artillery corps to operate those equipment. After the task force has traveled to Germany, technical training with U.S experts was conducted. Later, the Jordanian contingent was deployed in April 94 in the Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was placed under the control of the UNPROFOR commander.

• Following the agreement between the Serb Republic of Knina and Croatia and the establishment of UNYAES (United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia) Jordan participated in this mission with a battalion size-unit which was deployed in the area of responsibility in March 96.

• Furthermore, Jordanian officers assumed several commanding and staff posts within the UNPROFOR, including:

1. Commander, UNPROFOR Croatia command.
2. Commander, Sector West command.
3. Deputy commander, Sector West command.
4. Sector West assistant chief of staff.
5. Liaison officer at the UN department of peacekeeping operations / New York.
The Jordanian military observers in former Yugoslavia totaled 190. Three JORBATs and one target acquisition company was the largest Jordanian contingent participated at one time in UNPROFOR. In terms of manpower the Jordanian contingent counted 3600 troops and formed the second largest force after the French contingent.

Considering the Jordanian rotation system carried out on a semiannually basis, the total Jordanian troops exposed to the UN experience summed up to 1536 troops. This represents 15% of the total strength of Jordan is armed forces. The Jordanian participation in the UN peace operations has not been restricted to the UNPROFOR but has extended since 1989 to most UN observatory missions in different parts of the world.

Within the framework of UN peacekeeping missions the Jordanian Armed Forces have conducted a variety of humanitarian roles:

- Providing protection and security to civilians in the designated areas.
- Assisting immigrants and furnishing them with humanitarian services.
- Providing help in bringing displaced families together.
- Providing assistance to students in terms of transportation, books and stationary.
- Maintaining road network for public utility and repairing destroyed bridges and key communication elements.
- Restoring basic amenities like water and power supply in the conflict areas.

A different dimension of the Jordanian peacekeeping experience is JAF’s participation with NATO-LED FORCES IFOR/SFOR, which came as a result of the Jordanian membership in the NATO Mediterranean dialogue launched by the Alliance in February 1996. With regards to political and security aspects. This participation came in tune with the Euro-Jordanian association agreement which was negotiated within the framework of the Barcelona Process 1995. The following considerations must be pointed out when bringing out this experience.

- The Jordanian contingent in IFOR was limited to 50 troops from the Royal Special Forces. This participation has been sponsored by the French Ministry of Defense.
- Jordan’s original plan was to participate in IFOR with a battalion-sized force. Yet, the government of Jordan was hesitant to take a final decision in light of the high cost of the participation estimated to be $100 million per year. Thanks to the constructive initiative taken by the French Ministry of Defense, a Memo of Understanding was concluded, arranging the dispatch of a small Jordanian contingent to work alongside the French forces who showed generous willingness to provide the necessary logistical support.
Though the Jordanian participation is relatively small in size it entails an important political significance. It has demonstrated Jordan’s willingness to play a positive role in the success achieved by the first multinational peace-making operation launched by NATO in accordance with the new strategy of crisis management. We wanted to be part of this success.

Operationally the Jordanian Special Forces contingent was placed under the operational control of the French armored reconnaissance company commander, which is an organic unit of the French Multinational Division Southwest.

The (TASK FORCE ONE / SPECIAL FORCES /JORDAN) (The Jordanian Contingent) included a counter-terrorism squad equipped with ad-hoc arms and equipment, and was given the following tasks within the context of the Dayton Peace agreement.

- Establishing deterrent presence in the area of responsibility.
- Maintaining the necessary contact with the different parties to assure implementation of the operational tasks.
- Using force when necessary to assure implementation of the agreement.

Following the end of IFOR’s mandate on December 1996 and the subsequent activating of the stabilization force (SFOR), the Jordanian contingent was reduced to only 10 troops. Here, I would like to highlight some key factors that contributed to the Jordanian effectiveness in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement with both UN PKO and NATO-LED Forces:

- The Jordanian troops acted as peace-messengers, and tried to develop confidence relations with the local people in the mission areas.
- The Jordanian element was completely engaged for the “cause of peace”, it tried to develop a peaceful environment by convincing people of the choice of peace.
- The Jordanian presence in some cases, particularly, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had been mentally and emotionally connected to the humanitarian aid program launched by the Jordanian government aiming at reducing the suffering of the Bosnian people. This, in a way contributed to developing mutual confidence between the Jordanian troops and the local population, and was positively reflected on the operational effectiveness of the Jordanian troops.
- Taking advantage of such a positive atmosphere, the Jordanian contingent maintained neutrality; it managed to defuse tensions and address volatile situation.
- Most cases of negotiations conducted by the Jordanian troops had produced calm and peaceful treatments to the spots of tension, not only because of the high negotiation skills but due to the proper investment of
mutual confidence relations that have developed throughout the years. This has been regarded as a Jordanian advantage in the mission area, some consider it a model of utilizing public relations to the benefit of the overall mission.

JAF HQ is seeking to improve operational conditions for even better performance in a peacekeeping/peace-enforcement environment. In relation to human resources and units training, a peacekeeping institution has been established a few years ago to carry out training aspects brought to light by experiences such as:

- Training to carry out the mission under severe cold weather.
- Training on technical aspects of peace-keeping operations which are not included in the basic military training.
- Training on negotiation-skills, communications, liaison and other special skills required for a UN military observer.
- Briefings and data base concerning political and geopolitical background of the conflict in the mission area.

As for material resources it is generally known that the UN units are sufficiently equipped to provide standard support in an operational environment, however, many times extra and urgent humanitarian requirements demand more resources at hand. The JAF is to analyze the effects of such a situation on the operations of the Jordanian units and accordingly re-equip them. In this regard, the requirement of extra medical services remains one major aspect as invariably it has to be extended to the needy local population. Jordanian HQ may consider the supply of extra medical potential to its deployed units for fulfilling any such unforeseen requirement.

- At times UN operations require working in extreme weather. JAF may reconsider both scale and type of military clothing system for its UN troops to better serve in server weather conditions.
- In certain circumstances availability of engineering vehicles and equipment is vital for the mission's accomplishment. Jordanian units are equipped according to the national operational scale which may be reviewed for even better performance and task accomplishment.
- In the context of general working environment, some difficulty was faced in communicating with other participant forces, a major problem being communicating with the local people in their own native language. JAF has already taken adequate and effective measures to handle this problem.
- As for environment preservation, Jordanian units have demonstrated an advanced level of sense of responsibility in this field, though, there remains a requirement of a general direction being given by the UN in order to streamline the overall procedures and canalize efforts in the field of environment preservation in the mission areas. However, political and
moral responsibilities of the participant governments and troops have to be fulfilled in this regard.

In relation to participation with NATO-LED forces the cost factor has substantially affected the size of our participation, but being part of the international success proved to be cost-worthy. Our political presence in such an international effort is extremely essential. A small contingent may produce considerable political results, - it is better to have a small contingent than be absent.

Operationally, our IFOR/SFOR experience has brought to light a wide variety of lessons learned:

- Transition: Unfamiliar with NATO procedures and crisis management environment, the Jordanian contingent encountered requirement for a systematic transition from peace-time preparedness to peace enforcement operations under war-like conditions, a transition period that requires more extensive training and preparation.

- Adaptation: Adaptation to crisis management environment has been well carried out by a small size contingent, but it may require further consideration at the highest level. This is our first experience with NATO led forces, future participation may require joint training at a battalion level.

- A great deal of literature has been written on planning and the execution of strategic and operational echelons. Our experience falls in the tactical level, though, it has been rich and useful, questions of command and control and interoperability have to be carefully examined and carried out. We had to quickly be with the existing command and control structure.

- As a multinational division, SW progressively used French language to communicate, our unit in the field observed that mastering French would have facilitated their integration, a matter that JAF has to consider in the future.

- Leadership in a civil-military context is one of the most valuable lessons we learned. Military and civilian actions in such an environment are intermingled; instructions predict few conditions, sometimes provide no answers. Political preparation of the contingent is extremely essential and has to go down to the lowest level of command because every single incident in a multi-ethnic / political / military and social environment would generate sensitivities and has the potential to turn into a violent struggle.

- IFOR/SFOR working environment, in terms of leadership at the tactical level is a self-generated learning process, and requires more than the traditional field leadership skills. Initiative, effectiveness, quick response, advanced negotiation skills and political preparation are key elements not
only to accomplish the mission but to control tension and avoid violence eruption.

In conclusion, Jordanian peace keeping experience is relatively new, but has been rewarding and rich in learning. The Jordanian GHQ seeks to accrue maximum benefit from the experience by providing full support and further opportunities to magnify the impact and effectiveness of the Jordanian troops; Jordanian people perceive these operations as an international manifestation of their commitments, decisive willingness and persistent efforts to the cause of peace. Jordan, under the Hashemite Leadership will remain devoted to this goal.
Possibilities and Constraints: The Comprehensive Campaign Plan

BY ARTHUR E. (GENE) DEWEY
U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute
Center for Strategic Leadership
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

The Beginnings

The idea of a civilian master plan for managing post-Cold War complex contingency operations would seem to be a long overdue initiative. Even calling it an initiative puzzled an American high school student whose class had just heard a presentation on a similar idea– the Political Military Plan contained in the U.S. 1997 Presidential Decision Document (PDD) – 56. The student asked, “Haven’t you been doing this all along?”

For a variety of reasons, neither national governments nor the United Nations has, in fact, been doing such comprehensive planning all along. There was a limited U.S. attempt at this with a draft political military planning document for the Haiti intervention. But this plan stopped short of including the main actors in today’s contingencies – the civilian organizations (IOs). And it stopped short of being used in actual implementation.

The first US attempt at a truly comprehensive planning approach occurred during a peacekeeping training exercise for the US Pacific Command in October 1995. Faced with the confusion of multinational agencies training in a complicated political/security/humanitarian environment, I raised the question, “Why not a civilian master plan that includes all the civilian and military players?” I answered my own question by sketching such a plan in the traditional five paragraph military operations order format– producing, in short, “civilized” military operations order.

The outline of such a “civilized” version looks something like this:

Paragraph I. The Situation

- The threat, or enemy situation (today’s threats being human rights violations, hunger, disease – as well as war lords and crime lords who create these threats).
- The “friendly situation”, i.e. the key civilian agencies itemized, together with their internationally mandated responsibilities and accountabilities in field emergencies, reconstruction, and development.
Paragraph II. The Mission — (Setting out the overall purpose and end-state of the political/military/humanitarian effort).

Paragraph III. Execution

- Concept of operation.

- Tasks for participating agencies (flying the tasks for UN, and other IO operational agencies to their legal mandates. Also describes the IO/NGO relationships and systems already in place to cover categories of victims (refugees, internally displaced) and emergency sectors (water, health, food, shelter, etc.)

Paragraph IV. Operational Support — (With civilian agencies constituting the main effort, and military forces the supporting effort, this paragraph sets out the range of support tasks which civilian leaders could call upon military forces to provide. These tasks would be confined to the generic areas of protection and security, strategic logistics, and, exceptionally, in-theatre logistics.

Paragraph V. Command and Control — (This paragraph sets out the control framework to achieve unity of effort, using the principles of coordination, cooperation, and integration.)

Initial Reactions:

U.S. Pacific Command military planners reacted positively to the idea. To them, it was a step forward if civilian policy-makers (who are in charge) could be extruded through the same disciplined analysis and problem-solving process that is routine for military leaders (who are in support). Civilian players were more hesitant. While comfortable with the general principle that military forces must come under civilian control, they were less sure about what it means for civilians to be in charge of overall field operations. As for international organization leaders, the plan’s feature of articulating their legally mandated responsibilities and accountabilities is something some of them would just as soon leave unspecified.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that became aware of this attempt at order in the international system sensed a possible threat to their own status. In general, they would prefer to perpetuate the myth that they, not the IOs, are the main event and the main civilian contact for military forces. Some NGOs, under the guise of asserting their independence, gloss over the reality of their narrow financial accountability, and their lack of any legally mandated operational accountability. The idea of bringing some order to the benign chaos of NGO “cat herding” on the modern humanitarian battlefield would not be seen as an unmixed blessing to many of these independent private players.

But both IOs and NGOs could relate positively to one vital aspect of this new attempt at humanitarian order: the civilian emergency response agencies were clearly the main event. The role of military forces is to support this longer
standing main event – usually when for security and/or human reasons, the main civilian relief effort might be stalled and need re-starting.

Origins of the Name:

Independent consultant Walter Clarke added a valuable political annex to my comprehensive plan of action construct. In 1996, both of us were invited to introduce this holistic approach to Latin American peacekeeping training sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command. It soon became the strategic framework for both the “Fuerzas Unidas” and “Fuerzas Aliadas” command post exercises conducted annually with the U.S. and eight South and Central American countries. U.S. Army South planners engaged both military and civilian Latin American colleagues to help refine and tailor this master-planning concept. The result was an enthusiastic group of North and South American civilian and military representatives, who made constructive inputs to the initiative, took combined ownership of it, and gave it the label it retains today – the “Comprehensive Campaign Plan” of “CCP”.

Assumptions Which Underpin the Comprehensive Approach:

The following assumptions are useful in establishing the imperative for use of comprehensive campaign planning:

1. Post-Cold War Contingency Responses are Multinational in Character: Most sovereign states take for granted that emergency intervention today will take the form of multinational coalitions (UN, regional organization, or Coalitions of the willing). Depiction of the U.S. as the “single dispensable Nation” emerging from the Cold War still must recognize that rarely can Modern America take the political and financial heat of “doing it alone” in today’s high risk, high cost world class contingency operations. (Note the Domestic need for the U.S. to have had at least one other national partner for the nearly launched air campaign against Iraq in the spring of 1998).

2. Today’s Contingency Operations are also Multilateral:
Multinational is more than one country; multilateral is the partnership with international civilian organizations. These international organizations, Especially United Nations agencies, bear the principle accountabilities for operational success or failure. (The “single, indispensable” task for the U.S., for example, is to hold UN and other IOs to their operational Accountabilities, while facilitating behind the scenes the necessary Productivity within the overall UN, and other international, system).

3. The Imperative of Understanding, Supporting Existing Civilian Emergency Systems:
International civilian emergency systems covering both victim categories and emergency humanitarian / human rights sectors already exist. These
Civilian systems need to be respected, made to work, and not undercut unilateral national efforts, however well meaning. (For example, IOs are specifically mandated with accountabilities for the victim categories of Refugees and for internally displaced and affected persons. IO, or IO/NGO Combinations are also given responsibilities for the emergency sectors of: Water; medical; food; legal protection; and self-reliance/rehabilitation Programs). So-called “Service Packages”, wherein UN member states sign up for in-kind implementation for the various vital sectors have been tried as alternatives to the existing systems. With few exceptions, such changes to the existing systems tend to undercut them and cause them to atrophy. In the vital case of water purification/delivery systems, where there must be zero tolerance for breakdowns, dependence on Germany instead of the designated IO/NGO combination resulted in countries waterborne disease deaths among the million Rwandan refugees who fled to Eastern Zaire in July 1994.

4. The Military Intervention Trigger: Because “Early Willing” inevitably lags “Early Warning” in determining when, and whether, to intervene in today’s complex contingencies, military leaders can count on being drawn in very late in the day. After economic sanctions and diplomacy have failed, political leaders typically turn in desperation to military force. And the trigger that usually shocks and shames them into action is unspeakable human suffering and horrific violations of human rights. Unlike the rest of the century, the post-Cold War trigger that puts troops in harm’s way is rarely a vital security, economic, or political interest trigger; it is almost always a humanitarian/human right trigger.

5. Costs: On average, use of military assets costs ten times as much as civilian assets for the same job. These military costs in peace support operations are funded from the relatively more stable regular budget of the UN, as opposed to the less stable, chronically under-funded voluntary UN budget. By which member states attempt to underwrite civilian emergency operations. Therefore, prudent asset allocation dictates that military forces must be reserved for tasks that only they can do. This is largely confined to security and exceptionally, rapid, large scale/size, long haul logistic requirements. We can’t afford their doing the “feel-good” humanitarian tasks. Civilian agencies generally conduct immunizations and deliver food more economically and effectively than military personnel.

6. Civil-Military Synchronization is What Counts – the Military Finishing First Doesn’t Count: Implementation Force commanders in Bosnia asserted that they had achieved the IFOR military objectives in the first 120 days. This statement was both true – and irrelevant. For contingencies of Bosnia’s complexity, military forces can depart the complex contingency battlefield - only when the total civil-military team has finished the job. The typically slower and less resolute civilian components will continue to need military forces to provide security space well after military commanders have achieved their purely military
objectives. (Bosnia- Summer '98) is a dramatic example: Bosnia’s major unfinished task is refugee/ IDP return. German laender are irresponsibly dropping off busloads of forced returnees on the doorstep of The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Tuzla. To arrange temporary settlement, UNHCR needs Multinational Division - North to provide protective space. MND-N refuses, stating that “conditions are not ready for resettlement”. So settlement is postponed, peace is postponed, and military exodus is postponed – until the military is prepared to make its capabilities relevant to civilian support requirements. More than anything else, this grim reality of post-Cold contingencies demands orchestration of all the players and all the tasks undComprehensive campaign plan.

7. Force Protect Must Not Become a Mission: Military commanders have a fundamental responsibility for force protection. When they make it a mission, then they might as well remain in barracks; it's easier to protect themselves there. A legitimate security mission on the modern complex contingency battlefield is total asset protection. This means using military forces to provide security space for the main civilian agencies that are in charge – and not just for the military forces that are in support.

8. Civilians are in Charge; Military Forces are in Support: This is the ultimate challenge – how to forge civil-military productivity out of the asymmetry of disciplined, organized military force that are in support, and often irresolute civilians who are in charge. Training together under the CCP frameworks, in the same way the civil-military team needs to operate together in the field, may offer the best antidote to this asymmetry.

The CCP Value-Added

Each section in the Comprehensive Campaign Plan can add value to operational productivity in the following ways:

1. SITUATION – One of the major illiteracies of military personnel, including civil affairs personnel, is a working familiarity with international civilian architecture, personalities, and procedures. The “friendly assets” portion of the CCP “Situation” paragraph defines both the key agencies and the operational systems within which they act. Most important, it ties the principal international organizations to their legal, internationally mandated responsibilities and accountabilities.

The “Threat, or Enemy Forces” portion of the “Situation” paragraph defines not only the strange new threats that have replaced the former Cold War threats; it also forces a consideration of the implications of these threats. In addition, serious application of this threat analysis reveals the multiple order consequences of friendly forces actions, and inactions, in response to key events on the modern humanitarian battlefield. Unlike many civilian policy-makers, attuned principally to opinion polls, military commanders instinctively surf through these multiple order consequences
of their actions. The CCP offers the value of forging political leaders to think through threat analysis and implications in the same disciplined way. (For example, such a threat analysis could have predicted the downstream horrors associated with Germany's precipitous recognition of Croatia in 1991. It could have put the humanitarian spotlight on the consequences of unreadiness for the callous dislocation of 200,000 innocent victims of the military action encouraged by Germany and the U.S. - the Croatian recovery of the Kraina in 1995).

2. MISSION – Military persons develop a competence early on in drafting mission statements, and in performing analyses of missions assigned them by higher headquarters. The CPC’s “Mission” paragraph can facilitate a similar way of thinking on the part of civilian leaders whose task it is to draft the guidance for military commanders. Clarity in articulating realistic purposes and end-states for a combined civil-military effort is the essence of a good mission statement. The CCP can take the process of mission development out of the isolation - even vacuum - in which missions are too often formulated today.

*How can the CCP be used for this? Probably best by instituting a requirement to access the likely and potential operational support requirements of the key civilian agencies the military is in business to support. For example, in developing the mission for the Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR) in Autumn of 1995, a check with a key civilian client of the military – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – could have revealed that military security would be needed to protect OSCE human rights monitors and forensic experts exhuming mass grave sites. Absent a CCP (the Dayton Accords were by no means a comprehensive campaign plan), the OSCE protection requirement came up by surprise. The IFOR commander refused it, then had to be directed to do it. Rigorous mission development and analysis in the CCP context might have avoided this confusion and miscalculation (along with other mission surprises that continue to surface up to the present in Bosnia).

3. EXECUTION – Use of the “Concept of Operations” part of the execution paragraph forces the civilian planner to think beyond the limits of the initial force deployment. (Senior U.S. military planners briefed President Clinton on a projection of what would happen in the first week of what was expected to be a quick in and out intervention in Haiti. When the President asked, “What happens the second week?” there was an embarrassing scrambling for answers).

The pattern for today’s complex contingency operations resembles a relay race. Each lap of the race has a distance-defined transition state. This defines the “passing lane” where the baton can be passed for the next lap. (In Bosnia, it was passing the baton from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) lap, to the Implementation Force (IFOR) lap, and on to the
various Stabilization Force (SFOR) laps now in progress). Here the “military finishing first” principle comes into play. Visualize the relay team as having two runners – a civilian and a military runner – in each lap. The baton is held between them, but it must be elastic enough to allow for the inevitable lag of the civilian runner. But because of the elastic limit of this tandem system, it doesn’t help the military runner, or the race, to spurt ahead and leave his civilian counterpart too far behind. To finish the distance and arrive at the transition lane, the runners must finish and walk off the field – together.

Using the CCP rigor for operation implementation puts both the military and civilian runners into the same game plan. Because they have to finish together, they must also plan, prepare, and train, as well as run, together. Absent use of the CCP technique, it becomes a near-impossible task.

The “Tasks for Participating Agencies” part of the “Execution” paragraph would have provided a useful format for Richard Holbrooke to have used in the Dayton Accords, and for the first High Representative for Bosnia to have used when he took up his post in Sarajevo. Instead, the civilian task assignments were over-lapping, under-lapping, and often imprecise. Take human rights – arguably one of the most vital sectors for eventual peace in Bosnia. Nearly every civilian agency had a human rights function – but there were no time lines, no accountabilities, no one in charge. Call the role of other high priority sectors for peacekeeping and peace building in Bosnia, and one finds a similar lack of rigor, discipline, and accountability.

4. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT – This is the paragraph that slots the military component into the overall civilian operation. The range of tasks which the military could be called upon to perform should have been resolved in the earlier civil-military deliberations on mission development and analysis. Here the generic military tasks are laid out. These include: security (total asset protection); long-haul logistics; exceptional short-haul logistics; information operations (in support of the UN and other civilian organizations that lack such a capability). Engineer support; and community-based assessments (an extremely useful civil affairs assist to UNHCR, for example, in assessing conditions for refugee and displaced person return).

The cost assumption noted at the outset explains why military forces should almost never be used to deliver food, give immunizations, or conduct sophisticated civic action projects. Civilian relief delivery systems, civilian emergency health care and civilian emergency logistics system all are in existence. The beginning of wisdom for military support is to know this, and occasionally to remind their political masters— that is the job of political leadership—to make these existing UN, and other civilian, systems work.

What about civic action as a force protection measure? The British military in Bosnia, for example, funds community projects and finds it helps win
minds and hearts. U.S. forces in Bosnia are conventional force protection measures instead. At the same time, U.S. forces hold a dual key with USAID for AID funding of community infrastructure reconstruction projects (CIRP). But because U.S. forces avoid going into the communities to find out what infrastructure help is needed (except for the civil affairs assessments controlled from Sarajevo), they handicap themselves in fulfilling their CIRP responsibilities.

The genius of this paragraph is to prioritize military tasks against the top civilian mission priorities. For Bosnia today, the overall top priority is refugee and displaced person return. UNHCR often requires military help in providing security space for return to certain areas. Because risks (however prudent) may be involved, some national commanders advise UNHCR that, “We do not consider the area suitable for resettlement at this time” – and thereby put much of this top priority mission on hold. (To be fair to these national commanders, they rightly fear that their political masters back home might not support them if they took casualties. So it is the political leadership of such national contingents that must face the need to take risks, to get the civilian job done, and get the troops back home).

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL – This paragraph must shout the principle that: “It’s all right to have someone in charge – as long as it’s the right person!” To paraphrase President Harry Truman, “It’s not what the organization boxes look like; it’s who is in the boxes.” The military practice of giving responsibilities only to persons with a proven track record is especially relevant to this civilianized final paragraph of the Comprehensive Campaign Plan.

As our assumptions noted, the overall command and control is civilian. This vital civilian function embodies three central components:

Direction: This comes first from the strategic level- from the UN Secretary-General through the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This is the office that should have the lead in drafting and coordinating the Comprehensive Campaign Plan for each major international intervention. OCHA would be assisted for military matters by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). And for political matters by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). OCHA exercises direction, including tasking authority, to the participating civilian international organizations through the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) which it chairs.

Direction flows from a high political authority, through a theatre level person-in-charge, to the civil and military components on the ground. The high political authority is often the UN Security Council. It may also be the six nation Contact Group for ex-Yugoslavia. The theatre level person-in-charge for Bosnia is a High Representative reporting to the Contact Group. In the more usual case, it is a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSRG) reporting to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. Civilian and
military operations under the SRSG are conducted by a Force Commander and often a UN Emergency Relief Coordinator.

Again, operational productivity and success depend upon placing the right person in each of these key directive slots. Relying on geographic and least common denominator attributes for selecting senior United Nations emergency managers virtually decrees mediocre performance. If only a few key member states would introduce into the international system the radical notion of accountability for success or failure of agency heads and emergency managers, we might start to emerge from these tar pits of mediocrity.

Integration: The concept of integration harks back to our assumption concerning existing civilian emergency response systems, using IO / NGO partnerships. These existing systems must be respected, made to work, and not undercut by gimmicks such as careless use of service packages. Similarly, one must also avoid careless direct funding of the non-operationally accountable NGOs, leaving the accountable IOs badly underfunded. Such funding practices on the part of national and regional development agencies further compound their sins when they ignore the requirement to harmonize NGO programs with the responsible IO plan of action.

Integration means the establishment of civilian task forces with responsibilities and accountabilities for each victim category (refugee, internally displaced, and/or internally affected), and for each emergency response sector (water, food, medicine, shelter, human rights, etc.). Here the CCP can add the value of bringing civilians to structure themselves for unity of effort, in the way that military leaders structure themselves for unity of command.

Coordination: Instruments of coordination include, in descending order: UN headquarters coordinating bodies (Undersecretaries Committee, and the previously mentioned IASC); a Principals Group in theatre, chaired by an SRSG or High Representative; a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOCO at the capitol city level, chaired by a UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. And a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) down at the brigade/battalion level (ideally chaired by a civilian representative of the ERC, and co-chaired by a military line officer).

Again, coordination effectiveness depends far less on structure than on the leaders in the structures. Most important is the technique these good leaders use. The best, was the so-called “Sir Robert Jackson Technique” (Sir Robert, now deceased, was a veteran of many senior international crisis management operations – crowned by the management of the Thai-Cambodia border relief operation in the early Eighties). In sum, Sir Robert coordinated by appealing to agency self-interest; he praised lavishly in public and kept the occasional need for tongue-lashings private. Above all, his vast operational and funding experience, and formidable success record, made him credible. Few donors presumed to question his bottom line concerning what an operation would cost. It was this rare ability to add value to each agency’s efforts, as well as to the
total asset effort, that became Sir Robert Jackson’s hallmark. He remains today as humanity’s greatest captain.

For today’s less gifted leaders - joint/combined training probably offers the best coordinating vehicle. I discovered this when I was managing emergencies as UN Deputy High Commissioner for refugees. I soon learned that the agencies I worked with loathed coordination, but they warmed to training. This because training rightly conducted enhanced their effectiveness and made them look good. So we began training, not just before emergencies, but also in the middle of emergencies. And as the usual lead international organization, UNHCR used that training during emergencies principally as a coordination vehicle. Using a UNHCR facilitator, getting all the key IO, NGO, governmental, and intergovernmental players around the table for an interactive “training” session proved to be the best way to invest them in a culture of working together.

Annexes: The CCP provides the strategic direction, the overall “commander’s guidance” for the key civilian and military agencies involved in the operation. There would be a Political Annex that would set out the strategic/political situation, which needed linking to operations on the ground.

Then each operational UN agency would have its annex, setting out its individual plan of action in harmony with the master plan. These agencies are: UNHCR; UN World Food Program; UNICEF; and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). These annexes would articulate the emergency response systems, the IO/NGO partnerships and task forces they would use to fulfill their international mandates. Other agency annexes could include: UN Development Program; World Bank; International Organization for Migration; World Health Organization; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; International Criminal Tribunal, Yugoslavia; and the international Police Task Force.
Participation of Jordanian Public Security In International Missions

BY: COLONEL MAHMoud AL-HADEED
Royal Police Academy-Jordan

Introduction:

Peace and stability are considered to be the most important parts for development, prosperity and building civilizations. Many regions in the world suffered from wars and thousands of innocent victims were killed. As a matter of fact, Jordan’s King Hussein believes in fair and comprehensive peace all over the world. From this point the Jordanian Armed Forces and Police force participated in several missions: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Haiti. Jordan is currently participating in UN missions in Eastern Slovenia Bosnia and Angola.

Participation in UN Missions:

The first participation by the Jordanian Public Security in UN missions was on 12 March, 1992, when a group of Jordanian policemen were sent to Croatia within the International peacekeeping forces. Till this date, Jordanian troops are still deployed in UNPOL missions.

- On the 14 August, 1992, the total of (85) officers took part in UNCIVPOL, to monitor and observe the Cambodian elections process. Their mission was over on 2 August 1993.

- On the 2 April 1994 the total of (85) officers participated within UNCIVPOL, to observe and monitor the Mozambican elections process. Their mission was over on 1 December 1994.

- On the 25 September 1994 the total of (163) officers participated within UNCIVPOL in Haiti. Their mission was over on 30 November 1995.

- On the 21 October 1994 the total of (5) officers participated within UNCIVPOL in Rwanda. Their mission was over on 20 December 95.

- On the 31 December 1994 the total of (20) officers participated within the International Force for Peacekeeping in Angola. On 3 January 1996 the number was increased to become (26) officers, their mission is still ongoing and rotating annually.

- On the 25 February 1996 the total of (46) officers participated within an International force for peacekeeping in Eastern Slovenia / Croatia. On the
25 June 1996, and according to the UN resolution to decrease the force, they repatriated (38) officers, accordingly there are only (8) officers participating in training the local police and they rotate annually.

The number of Jordanian police officers who participated till this date total (1106) officers, including (188) officers who are still participating as follows:

- 161 officers in Bosnia and Eastern Slovenia.
- 27 officers in Angola.

The Nature of UN Missions:

UN missions differ according to the UN Security Council resolutions, and the current circumstances in the mission area.

A. The main aim of the UN mission in Cambodia and Mozambique was to monitor and observe elections.

B. The aim of Haiti mission was to reconstitute democracy and a legally elected president.

Stages of Training and Rehabilitation of Participants in UNCIVPOL:

A. Selection Stage

1. The Public Security Directorate requires the different units to nominate their participants who meet the UN standards.

2. The unit commanders deliver the names of their nominee officers to the Department of Operation according to the following criteria:

   - Sworn police officer
   - His years of service must be a minimum of five years.
   - Good physical fitness.
   - Language proficiency (reading, writing, talking)
   - A clean professional record, Individuals who have been repatriated for disciplinary reasons are not allowed to participate.

3. The Royal Police Academy holds an English Level exam for selected officers, and chooses those with the highest marks.

4. The officers who pass the exam will attend a training course for (12) weeks at The Royal Police Academy.

5. Professional Criteria for Participants in the UNCIVPOL. The following requirements are essential as they relate to the professional police officers skills:

   - To know the home nation’s laws and penal system.
   - To know how to use communication equipment.
   - To know the basic crime scene skills and how to deal with them.
   - To be familiar with personal weapons.
• To know the basic police skills in investigations, patrols, traffic control, map reading, and writing report.
• To know the basic skills of first aid.
• To have a driving license and motor vehicle operation.

6. General Peacekeeping Training Standards: The general history of peacekeeping forces.

• The history of UNIVPOL in peacekeeping.
• The structure and responsibilities of the UN in general.
• The UN structure and its responsibilities for peacekeeping.
• The role of police in humanitarian operations.
• The police role in Human Rights investigations.
• The relationship between UNIVPOL and all other components in order to know their duties.
• The mission structure and standard operation procedures before embarking on the mission.
• The facilities and support organizations.
• Gathering information about the situation and deployment.
• The mission structure and cities of mines fields.
• To be familiar with religion, culture, and local languages of mission area.
• Good knowledge of history, geography, climate, and demographics of mission area.

B. Participation Stage

The Public Security Directorate follows up on participants in the mission area to keep them in touch with their home country by the following methods:

• The contingent commander should send regular reports about each participant.
• Follow up the causalities in mission area in order to guarantee the participant rights of compensation.
• Coordinate the communication between the group commanders, and the contingent commander in the mission area, in order to keep fact of code of conduct and discipline of participants.

Evaluation of Jordanian Police Participation in UN Missions:

• To exchange experience with other International police participants in the mission area.
• To develop leadership skills, such as decision taking and working as one team with other nationalities.
• To know the main role of the UN in keeping international peace and safeguarding nationalities.
• To develop language skills, especially English, French or other local languages through daily life communications with local people and other nationalities.

• To get acquainted with the traditions, geographical area, societies, and culture of the mission areas.

ANNEX: A

The number of participants of Jordanian police with the UN missions from 1992-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Area</th>
<th>Nature of Mission</th>
<th>Number of Forces</th>
<th>Initial Date</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslav</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>12.3.92</td>
<td>Current mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Slavonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14.8.92</td>
<td>2.8.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.4.94</td>
<td>1.12.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Preparing for Election</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>25.9.94</td>
<td>30.11.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>International Observers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.10.94</td>
<td>20.12.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>31.12.94</td>
<td>Current Mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL                  |                    | 1106             |              |                    |

ANNEX: B

The number of forces which are still participating in mission area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission area</th>
<th>Officers No.</th>
<th>Non-Com</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia &amp; Bosnia</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL NO.              | 141          | 47      | 188   |
Civil-Military Relations

BY: DR. ALEXEIJ SALMIN
President, Russian Public Policy Centre – Russian Federation

Let me first introduce myself to you. My name is Alexeij Salmin, I am the President of the Russian Public Policy Centre, a non-governmental organization and independent foundation in Moscow, which had the honour of hosting the previous conference on “Challenges of Peace Support: Into the 21st Century”, over this year.

I see here many distinguished participants of the Moscow conference, and so for me, and I hope also for you (for those who were in Moscow in March). This Session will be a continuation of discussions at Moscow, and the Vystreł Centre (which is a counterpart for the Zarqa Peace Keeping Institute here in Amman, Jordan).

It is a special privilege for me to open this Session on civil-military relations and to have the Chair of this Session, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to HE Dr. Kamel Abu-Jaber, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, for the invitation to take part in this outstanding conference.

I would also like to thank Ms. Annika Hilding, who proposed the idea of the whole project of the series of conferences in Stockholm, Moscow, Amman and maybe in South Africa (or elsewhere), and I am sure that under your guidance, Annika, the Project will go from one success to another.

The topic of today's Session, 'Civil-Military Relations', has already been discussed during the evening Session, and practically all the participants of the conference have mentioned the issue of Civil-Military Relations (CIMIC); and this Session will be a continuation of our morning discussions. Of course, the problem of civil-military relations is, unfortunately, an older story than our conference or all our conferences put together. I think that the problem emerged long before the idea of peace-keeping operations was proposed in the modern world. I think it goes back to the famous words of Von Klauserwits, that "war is a continuation of politics by different means". This was the period when, for the first time in modern European history, war-making became an integral part of political activities and a continuation of these activities. As well as political activities, some elements of peacemaking became an integral part of military activities in modern Europe.

Since then, many years have passed, of course, and now we have different opinions that go back not so much to Klauserwits, as to George Clemenceau,
who once said that “war is too serious a thing to be entrusted to the military”. Frankly speaking, I usually hear this phrase from the military rather than from civilians, while paradoxically civilians say (and I had a chance to hear this both at Stockholm and at Moscow), that “peacemaking is too serious a thing to be entrusted to the peace speakers [civilians]”. Or, as Dag Hammarskold once said, “peace keeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it”. In any case, of course, this issue, is complex and we have had a lot of opportunities and a lot of time devoted at Stockholm and at Moscow to analyzing it.

At Stockholm, at least four participants gave detailed analyses on the issue of the military-humanitarian interface (or ‘CIMIC’ in military parlance), that was considered a key area for policy development concerning military support for civilian groups in peace keeping, crisis management and peace support operations. These were Dr. Michael C. Williams, Mr. Trevor Findlay, General Johan Hederstedt and Professor Yuri E. Fedorov from the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Both civilian elements, and military involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies were analyzed at Stockholm last year; with special reference to the problem of the clash of cultures (which I should say seemed more serious than the problem of the clash of civilizations that was mentioned by some of us here yesterday).

Several aspects of cultural conflict between the military and civilians have been taken into consideration:

- Firstly, the existence of different values and operating styles: which seem more or less evident, of course, for those who have participated in peace keeping activities or have tried to analyze them;

- Secondly, different identities: which also seems more or less evident, and I know this from my experience at the Russian Public Center, where we have both civilians and military and, of course, sometimes our identities are somehow different;

- Thirdly, different time horizons: which is also not very difficult to identify, since the military usually take into consideration better planned operations, which take less time than traditional political strategic planning; and then,

- The fourth element (which some participants at the conference in Stockholm have spoken about) gender differences: taking into consideration that the proportion of women in the armed forces is still much less than in the population in general, or in the civilian component of peace keeping operations.

According to Mr. Findlay (in his contribution at Stockholm), such factors as the clash of activities, the absence of strategic and operational cooperation, historical deficiencies in the United Nations’ system were considered important in the CIMIC process. Improved coordination between the military and civilians was suggested as a solution to the problem. Several aspects of better coordination were mentioned:
- Better communication within the humanitarian community;
- Better communication within the military community; and finally,
- Better co-ordination in military-civilian cooperation.

My colleague, Professor Fedorov from Moscow, in analyzing the NATO doctrine for Peace Support Operations, outlined three major points in the doctrine which he suggested should be treated as paradigmatic:

- Political control and guidance of an operation;
- Coordination and integration of civilian and military components and missions in the framework of the operation; and thirdly,
- The relationships between the institutions and forces responsible for the operation and, on the other hand, between the local authorities and the civilian population.

General Hederstedt stressed that military leaders who do not want to cooperate with civilians, or civilians who regard the military as the major threat, both pose a major problem for cooperation (for the CIMIC process); and this attitude on both sides blocks the rational use of joint resources (absolutely necessary joint resources) in the operational area. In order to overcome these differences, he stressed three major reference points:

- Firstly, the necessity for better recruitment of personnel in charge; Commanders must be able to think in operational and strategic terms and to have the ability to see the whole picture, as well as their own part in it, (of course, this relates to both military and civilian activities and their initiatives);
- Personnel must be given proper training, which should include knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of different civilian and military organizations, and understanding of their peculiar work situation. Training should be provided before and continue throughout employment; and the third point,
- Specialized liaison groups should be formed to bridge problems between the different organizations, to cooperate with local authorities and organizations, as well as to coordinate aid measures. The CIMIC organizations should be revised.

The Moscow conference, frankly speaking, did not pay too much attention to the problem of civil-military cooperation and relations, since the focus of the conference was somewhat different. But, nevertheless, even at Moscow, a lot of time was devoted to discussions on civil-military cooperation and relations throughout the world. One of the distinguished participants of the Moscow conference, Admiral Claes Tornberg, from the Swedish National Defence College was perhaps not pessimistic but rather sceptical, as it seemed to me. In addressing the audience at the Moscow conference, he stressed that the United Nations of today (or the international system as a whole) cannot be modified to
reflect the realities of today’s peace keeping operations, and that “we are to accept those as they are, and aspire to the deepest understanding of the potentiality and limitations of the system”.

This statement, of course, was a challenge, and there were participants of the Moscow conference (some of them participating here in this conference in Amman) who proposed some ideas that could help to solve several problems that emerged in the process of CIMIC.

One of the participants of the Moscow conference, Professor Richard Cohen (and I am very glad he is here with us in Amman also), proposed organizing a civilian-military center for the coordination of NGOs, as a center for the common planification of operations (which would be very useful for the coordination of actions). Professor Cohen also proposed that military management should be submitted to an official civilian body, to be in charge of reporting on the final political assignment, and even to organize common military-civilian headquarters, which would be able to participate in solutions to the problems of peace keeping operations.

So, these are the results of the two previous conferences, prior to this Amman conference. I think, and I hope, that we can take a step or may be several steps forward now to discussing the problems of civil-military cooperation and the different aspects of the coordination of the activities of civilians and the military.
Application of Peace Support in Tajikistan

BY: NURIDDIN SHAMSOV
Deputy Head, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tajikistan

The example of Tajikistan clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of a close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peacekeeping operations and underlines the necessity of implementing a coordinated strategy of the international community, for supporting actions of the Government, in order to overcome the chain of crises and instability, and stand on the way to achieving a lasting peace, national reconciliation and prosperity. In this regard, the role played by the UN in coordinating multifaceted activities should be especially emphasized.

It is also needed to pay a tribute to the efforts made by our close neighbors and all CIS countries. During five years of their presence in Tajikistan, the CIS Joint Peacekeeping Forces have contributed to a great extent to the stabilization of the situation in our country, supporting Inter-Tajik political dialogue and implementation of the achieved agreements.

Tajikistan has gone through a civil war. Thanks to the peacekeeping efforts of the UN, neighboring countries, and first of all Russia and Iran, it became possible to stop a meaningless fratricidal war. To achieve this aim, there was a need for intensive Inter-Tajik negotiation under the UN auspices which continued for more than three years. Accordingly, a general agreement on establishing peace and national accord was signed on June 27th, 1997.

Due to these efforts it has been already a year since the beginning of the work of the Commission on National Reconciliation in Dushanbe the capital city. The Commission was set up in accordance with the above-mentioned agreement; representatives of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) were included; a general amnesty was announced in the country and refugees and displaced persons began returning to their homes. With the assistance of the UN and other international organizations, life of the returnees is becoming normal, and thereby the foundation is laid for their active participation in economic, social and political processes of the country.

There is progress in implementing the military protocol of the General Agreement. By September 1st, 1998, all 5200 fighters of the UTO have taken an oath of allegiance to the Government. The remaining 200 fighters have returned back home recently from Afghanistan with the help of the United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT).
Going back to the origins of peacekeeping in Tajikistan, it should be noted that the breakdown of a bipolar world at the beginning of the 1990s has naturally facilitated the increase in the role of universal and regional systems of security. Political vacuums left in the whole area of the CIS have been primarily filled out by new systems.

Due to diversity of political forces, national mentality, geopolitical situation and a number of other factors at the time, Tajikistan did not manage to have an easy transition. Total lack of experience in a multi-party system pushed various parties and movements, who suddenly found themselves in the center of political events, - into a clash of interests.

At the extraordinary summit meeting of the CIS Heads of State, that took place in the fall of 1992. Primary attention was given to the necessity of ensuring collective actions of the CIS countries in order to stop the bloodshed in the country, secure conditions for extending international assistance and provide a foundation for national reconciliation and restoring the constitutional order.

The beginning of the real peacekeeping process in Tajikistan was an agreement signed by the Heads of State of the CIS on September 24th, 1993, in Moscow. According to this document a military contingent was stationed in the republic. It consisted of limited military units from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with full, military equipment. The basis of the military grouping was the 201st motor-rifle division, as well as a group of Russian border guards stationed in Tajikistan.

In order to carry out an operative management of the troops, a joint command was formed that consisted of the Defense Ministers and Committees of all states-signatories to the agreement. The agreement provided for maintaining the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF) with contributions from the participating states, distributed as follows:

- Russian Federation – 50%
- Republic of Kazakhstan – 15%
- Republic of Uzbekistan – 15%
- Republic of Kyrgyzstan – 10%
- Republic of Tajikistan – 10%

It should be noted that the main burden was put on the Russian Federation, and soon participants to the Agreement, with the exception of Russia and Tajikistan, partially ceased to implement the commitments taken by them. The creation of a multinational peacekeeping force was carried out strictly following the norms of international law. According to Article 52 of the UN Charter, regional organizations (such as the CIS) have the right to carry out peacekeeping operations. Right from the beginning, the CIS Council of Heads of State determined the following tasks for the peacekeeping force:

- Promoting stabilization of the situation of the Tajik-Afghan border that aimed to normalize the situation in the country and create conditions for a
dialogue between all parties in order to reach a political solution to the conflict;

- Providing delivery, protection and distribution of emergency and other humanitarian aid;
- Providing conditions for the safe return of refugees to the places of their permanent residence;
- Protecting identified objects of infrastructure, economy and other important institutions;

While carrying out the task of delivering humanitarian aid during the past years, the JPF have arranged more than 200 auto-caravans transporting food, medicine and tens of thousand tons of cargo.

Actions and efforts undertaken on the regional level were supplemented by measures implemented in the frameworks of a universal system – the United Nations. If in the spring of 1992 it seemed that the UN was following a hopeless path towards resolving the political events taking place in Tajikistan, by the end of summer and the beginning of fall of the same year, the situation changed drastically.

In September 1992, the first UN fact-finding mission headed by the Director of the Department of Political Issues of the UN Secretariat, Ambassador Raymond Sommerains, was sent to Tajikistan.

Beginning January 1993 a group of UN representatives came to Tajikistan in order to monitor the situation on site. Later, on February 1st 1993 this group consisting of 40 military observers, was transformed into United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT).

Inauguration of the UNMOT office in Dushanbe on February 1st 1993 was a significant event in the history of relations between Tajikistan and the UN. Initially the Mission was sent for 3 months, however its mandate was extended by the Secretary General of the UN a few times with the approval of the Security Council. The Mandate of the Mission included:

1. Monitoring the situation on spot and providing the Secretary General with information about any conflict situation.
2. Determining position of each of the conflicting parties on various aspects of the conflict. And encouraging the efforts for achieving peace, undertaken on the regional level, and in case of the lack of such efforts to urge the countries of the region or a group of states to take similar efforts.
3. Evaluation of the military situation in Tajikistan.
4. Providing services on communication and coordination that could facilitate rendering emergency humanitarian assistance by the international community.
On December 16th, 1994, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution N 968, an UNMOT in its present composition was set up. The mandate of UNMOT consisting of 44 military observers provides the following:

1. To extend assistance to the Joint Commission in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on cease-fire signed on September 17, 1994.

2. To investigate information on violation of the cease-fire and send reports on such incidents to the UN and the Joint Commission.

3. To provide good offices as it is stipulated in the Agreement.

4. To maintain close contacts with the parties to the conflict; the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan, the CIS Joint Peacekeeping Forces and border guards.

5. To support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General regarding Tajikistan.

6. To extend political services on communication and coordination that could promote urgent provision of humanitarian aid by the international community.

With the support of UNMOT and personal participation of its former Head and Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Gerd Dittrich Merrem, a number of Inter-Tajik meetings were held between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmonov, and the leader of the UTO, Said Abdullo Nuri, that laid the ground for the peace process and became an important factor of strengthening mutual trust among the different parties.

The successful completion of the Inter-Tajik talks and the signing in Moscow on June 27th, 1997 of the General Agreement on establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan was one of the main results of the UNMOT activity in Tajikistan. Currently, UNMOT has the task of playing a major role in monitoring and extending political and military evaluation and in the implementation of the General Agreement. In order to enable UNMOT carry out additional tasks, the Security Council adopted the Resolution N 1138 on November 14th, 1993 on the recommendation of the Secretary General, giving the Mission the following mandate:

- To extend good offices and expert consultative assistance;
- To cooperate with the Commission on National Reconciliation and its sub-commissions on organizing elections and referendum;
- To participate in the work of the Contact Group of the states-guarantors and international organizations and coordinate their activities;
- To investigate the cases of violation of the cease-fire and report them to the UN and CNR;
To monitor the process of assembling the UTO fighters, their reintegration, disarmament and demobilization;

To provide help in reintegration of the former fighters to the governmental law enforcement structures;

To coordinate the UN assistance to Tajikistan in the transition period;

To maintain close contacts with both parties as well as cooperation and links with the CIS peacekeeping forces, Russian border guards and the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan;

At the moment, there are 62 military observers, 32 international civil officers and 90 local employees in UNMOT. The Department of Political Relations of UNMOT provides assistance to the work of the political and legal Sub-commissions of the CNR by extending legal and consultative services. The Public Information Service of the Mission assists in disseminating information among the population about the activity of the CNR and the development of the peace process.

The role of the UN in the peace process in Tajikistan, which during the last five years has been concentrated basically in establishing and supporting peace in Tajikistan and extending humanitarian assistance, has also been changing towards coordinated post-conflict activity and helping in post-conflict reconstruction. In other words, the UN agencies and institutions have begun to focus more on the programs targeted to development and rebuilding the economic, social and political infrastructure of the country.

Implementation of the General Agreement by the Tajik parties will create the necessary political and legal conditions, as well as ensure security, for conducting new parliamentary elections. This is a transition period from the state of armed conflict to national reconciliation and further democratization of society. The main mechanism for implementing the Agreement is the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) that has an equal number of representatives from the Government and the UTO (13 persons from each side). The CNR is composed of the following sub-commissions: political, legal, refugee and military issues.

It should be noted that the Government of Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are serving as political and moral guarantors of the implementation of the General Agreement by the Tajik parties. In order to monitor the implementation of this document, a 'Contact Group' of state-guarantors and international organizations has been set up in addition to the above-mentioned participants, includes a 'Special Representative' of the UN Secretary General for Tajikistan, head of the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan and representative from the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The states participating in the Contact Group are represented by ambassadors and special representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs. According to its mandate, the 'Contact Group' provides the Tajik parties with
expert evaluations, consultations and other good offices. The ‘Contact Group’ is the principle body for monitoring the implementation of the General Agreement.

Thus, if on the one hand there has been a traditional UN peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan through sending a group of military observers and representatives of various departments of the UN Secretariat. On the other hand, one of the key factors of this operation has been the presence of the CIS Joint Peacekeeping Forces in the country. Although there were attempts to grant these forces the status of UN peacekeeping operations, they did not find any support. Apparently, this could be explained by financial reasons related to reforming the UN rather than any other serious considerations.
Civil-Military Relations – The Jordanian Model

BY: BRIGADIER – GENERAL MOHAMMED FAHED AL-ALLAF
Head, Information Department, Jordanian armed Forces

The relationship between the Jordanian military institution and the civil society entails two different dimensions: First: The historical, traditional and cultural dimensions by which the deep military interaction with society and other civil elements has given the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) its particular character. Second: The normal cooperative dimension under a crisis environment where JAF constitutes an essential part of the Civil-military relations.

Historically, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) has been one of the most important institutional components of the state. Widely known as the Arab Army, JAF came into being prior to the establishment of the state in the year 1921. It was established as a response to the famous national call by the late King Abdullah upon his arrival from Mecca leading a Hashemite force of the Great Arab-revolt in 1916. Therefore, the history of the country is very much connected to the history of the armed forces. As a result, JAF turned to be the most vital institution of the newly born state. Its primary mission was: The establishment of the central government’s authority through the maintenance of public order, and the preservation of internal security.

By early 1956, the National civil police element (public security force) of about 6000 troops was separated from the military establishment and assigned civil duties under the responsibility of the ministry of interior.

Throughout the years, and among the various social, economic, and political institutions affecting Jordanian national life, none, has been more influential in its achievements than the armed forces. By virtue of its status, organization, equipment, and deep expansion within the society, the Jordanian Armed Forces have been capable of efficiently contributing to the overall development of the country. His Majesty King Hussein stated in 1953 “wherever I go in Jordan I find the Arab Legion doing everything”. Although it was initially charged with both external and internal security, JAF has physically taken a central part in building civil society. Its capability to reach all points of the country has enabled it to deal with most classes of population, in a variety of civic action programs designed to promote the country’s development efforts in crucial fields like: health, education, public medi-care, road construction, water resource development, transportation, communication, and many other areas. Civic assistance actions were received by the people with interest and acceptance and promoted JAF’s public image. It became a respectable
professional force of trained regulars not only in effective security response, but also for discipline, justice in dealing with the civilian population and successful interaction with the society.

None of these accomplishments is done in isolation from a democratic control over the armed forces. Constitutionally, under article 32 “the king is the supreme commander of the army, naval, and air force. The armed force has the usual primary mission of defending the country against armed attack. The armed force is also responsible for supporting the public security force in maintaining public order, particularly, in situations where the requirements exceed the capabilities of the civil police force. The constitution stipulates that “the duties of the army shall be restricted to defend the realm and its safety” and specifies that the rights and duties of its members shall be defined by law. Decisions in relation to the use of the armed forces lays in the hand of the highest political authorities.

Throughout its history JAF has neither aligned itself with any group or party other than those stipulated in the constitution, nor performed any duties beyond its constitutional tasks, thus is regarded as the prominent stabilizing factor internally and regionally. The use of the Jordanian forces beyond the sphere of military threat is carried out through certain constitutional and legal conditions: First, in an internal security situation, second, in the role of military assistance to civil authorities, third, in a peacekeeping / peace enforcement environment.

Internal security is a constitutional complementary function given to the armed force, subordinate to the minister of interior. The Jordanian civil police is charged with the primary task of internal security, in which civil authorities are responsible for law and order, only bringing the military into action in exceptional situations judged by the highest political authorities when national security is at risk. Size, volume, and time-frame of intervention are decided by the civil authorities, in coordination with JAF HQ., with the primary task of safeguarding the society. JAF may carry out a wide range of internal security missions including managing the flow of people, protection of institutions and private priorities, safeguarding roads and intersections, providing transportation, communication, and humanitarian relief services. Within the field of internal security, in which state-citizen relationship is extremely important. JAF normally finds itself in the most delicate situation. Where it has to carry out responsibilities entrusted to it, preserving, at the same time, its historical and cultural image as an essential component of society and the state. Jordanian history proves that internal security situations where JAF had to interfere were very limited in number and scope. Minimum use of force has been exercised, and most population has shown unlimited support to the leadership, thus facilitating the execution of JAF’s missions.

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities:

The military establishment is one of the most capable elements within the governmental body, in terms of manpower, equipment and material resources,
and to some extent, in technical know-how. Therefore, it is fully qualified to provide assistance to civil authorities on the basis of civil control within the armed forces. Minimum use of force has been exercised, and most importantly the Jordanian population has shown unlimited support to the leadership, thus facilitating the execution of JAF's missions. Jordanian Armed Forces assistance to civil authorities takes two forms. First: Regular Assistance, in which the Jordanian Civil Defense Corps provides regular services of civil protection such as fire-fighting and other specialized functions in a disaster situation. Or, under war conditions like earthquake, flood, soil erosion, industrial hazards and environmental accidents.

The Civil Defense Corps is a purely civilian body subordinate to the Minister of Interior, yet, it maintains its military status and structure. Organized and trained on military basis, thus, regarded as the military component of the internal security system. Second: Exceptional assistance, upon which response to urgent conditions occurring in a crisis environment whether natural or man-made, for which existing means of civil police and civil defense are insufficient. This form of assistance relates to three functions:

- **Protection** of population, installations, properties, and traffic control. This function aims at damage control, ensuring the continuity of normal life, and laying the basis for efficient performance by other functions.

- **Public safety**, where the armed forces provide assistance of a specialized nature, to include air and land rescue operations, first-aid services, evacuation work, engineering work, transportation and communication. This function aims at facilitating follow-up relief work by other governmental bodies and NGOs. Followed by assistance, in providing relief and humanitarian aid such as shelter, food, water supplies, and advanced level of media-care. The general rule governing the deployment of troops for exceptional assistance rests in the hand of the highest political authorities, through governmental analytical assessment of the crisis.

The Jordanian model for both functions of internal security and military assistance to civil authorities provides no intermediary force between the civil police / civil defense and the armed forces. In this sense, the Jordanian model provides some similarities to the British model where there is no specialized intermediary force between civil police and the armed forces, leaving the civil authorities with the only choice to resort to the regular armed forces for both functions. This is unlike the French and the German, where the Gendarmerie in France, and Bundesgrenzschuts in Germany are paramilitary units, equipped, trained, and employed to act as a back-up. Following deployment of local civil forces, thus, limiting the scope and conditions for complete military intervention in an internal security situation or in a situation where military assistance to civil authorities is required.

Indeed, military assistance is usually exceptional as far as the daily exercise of civil authorities is concerned. There are few examples where JAF provided
such assistance. All have one thing in common, namely, that military assistance was sought and provided to counter an extraordinary danger to public life, or to national security. Where military capabilities and key technical skills were of a particular significance either to save lives, or to save time or resources.

A crisis environment is a situation where multinational and multidimensional efforts are exerted to overcome grave subequences. Cooperation between military and civilian organs is a key element. A decisive, clear cut division of duties and responsibilities in such an environment is a prerequisite.

Even though military intervention proved to be indispensable in most cases. And despite the fact that military measures may dominate at a particular stage of an operation, yet, JAF has exercised the role of the leading agency in a few cases, when means were available only to the military establishment e.g. aircraft and air strips. In many other circumstances, governmental agencies, or NGOs were capable of doing the job as good as the military. Two cases in hand serve as models of the concept of the leading agency in a civil-military context. In the event of heavy snowfall and severe weather conditions that occurred in 1992, the military took the lead. Launching a large-scale campaign, JAF supplied rescue equipment’s and specialized vehicles as well as military personnel and provided medivac, food deliveries, shelter construction, and medical supplies. Isolated regions were reached by air force helicopters. Specialized construction and engineer units were assigned to carry out tasks, such as road clearance and reconstruction. These tasks were conducted in full coordination with local authorities, and in cooperation with other governmental agencies.

However, the massive immigration wave Jordan was exposed to during the second Gulf-war in 1991, remains a typical example where a crisis environment posed a serious threat to national security in which close and coordinated civil-military efforts were of particular significance. Being geographically approximate, an influx of about 1.5 million refugees and displaced persons took place along the Jordanian eastern borders, most of which were of a third nationality. National economy was not prepared for such a situation, the infrastructure came under server pressure, resources were insufficient to contain such a phenomena, the normal composition of the Jordanian society was threatened, political considerations presented itself, therefore, urgent measures had to be introduced with immediate effect.

A wide mix of UN agencies, international bodies, intergovernmental organizations and NGO’s, literally jumped into the situation and became part of the crisis environment. All this combined with the typical national defense requirements in a war condition, and the economic and social implications, made the 1991 refugees influx a typical model of crisis management. Where the Jordanian civil authorities resorting to the military institution, NGOs, and international society the effective harmonized civil-military efforts constituted a key factor to handle the situation.

One simple factor took primacy over other considerations, and that was, the Jordanian firm commitment to the humanitarian dimension. The Hashemite
leadership of Jordan has always stressed a particular focus on the need to provide humanitarian treatment of the crisis irrespective of political or economic implications, and to some extent strategic considerations.

The Jordanian approach to manage such a crisis called for an ad hoc committee, to run an inter-agency task force were the ministry of interior took the leading role with the armed forces exercising a complementary part. In addition to its national defensive role in a war condition, the armed forces was charged with the following tasks:

- Provide general security to the geographical scope of the crisis.
- Secure lines of communications and traffic control.
- Provide air force facilities for transit air lift.
- Air force medical facilities to be placed under operational control of the national relief committee.
- Assist in material and manpower to establish refugee camp sites.
- Provide / assist in providing immediate humanitarian needs, namely, food and water supplies for refugees.
- Provide protection for refugees, preserve law and order, and ensure basic human rights.

While a satisfactory level of coordination between JAF and civil authorities had developed throughout the crisis, it was evident that inter-agency, overlapped responsibilities is required to undergo further analytical work for better performance. Ensuring effective coordination between national organs and international organizations with decisive code of conduct, shared objectives, clear guidelines and the avoidance of overlapped responsibilities are the most important lessons brought to light by experience, which subsequent plans have to take into account. The establishment of even more effective committee structure has been seriously reviewed and was modified.

The third area where JAF carries out tasks beyond its traditional defense function is the field peacekeeping/ peace-enforcement. JAF can be deployed beyond the Jordanian territories only upon approval by his Majesty the King through a royal decree. JAF has been engaged in PKO since 1989. As peacekeepers we have to shift attention to humanitarian and internal security tasks, we have to be able to respond to a variety of situations related to the basic security and social needs of civil societies beyond the Jordanian borders. This represents a very considerable change. Taking into account the traditional role assigned to JAF, its structure, equipment, and training are mainly oriented towards the primary function of National Defense. Presently, peacekeeping/peace-enforcement evolves crossing national borders, interaction with foreign societies which requires harmonized efforts of the political, military, and civil sectors.
The Jordanian military experience with humanitarian interaction in foreign societies is well expressed by numerous relief programs launched by the “Hashemite Jordanian Committee for Relief” in coordination with the Jordanian military institution to include the land force, air force, and the Jordanian civil police. Aimed to assist a number of states hit by disasters, Jordan responded to a variety of external situations to which combined civil-military efforts were necessary to carry out humanitarian campaigns. Jordanian aid to Bangladesh, Somalia, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Chechnia, Iran and some other states are examples of such efforts. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the humanitarian program entailed a series of rebuilding/rehabilitation projects, that included schools, cultural centers, health centers, orphanages, and mosques. In addition to a 6-year humanitarian aid campaign that resulted in hundreds of tons of food, medicine, medical equipment, clothes, and construction materials contributed to developing confidence between the Jordanian troops and the Bosnians, and positively reflected on the operational enforcement environment.

Performing combined civilian/military functions in a peace-keeping environment is presently a primary concern of the ministry of interior and the general staff at JAF HQ. Joint efforts of both, military units and civilian organs in the planning and execution of humanitarian aid are being placed under serious consideration in order to integrate mutual activities in JAF policies on peacekeeping, peace-support, and military assistance to civil authorities.

In conclusion, civil-military relations, as perceived by Jordan diverges from its traditional context of using civil resources for military purposes, to imply utilizing military potential in order to create improved security conditions in its broad sense. The traditional concept of the military doing everything no longer exists. Concepts of more-capable civil organs are growing, civil relief organizations and governmental agencies are often equally prepared to respond to the urgent needs of society, and the criterion must continue to be that JAF perform only those activities in which unique and specific capabilities and technologies are required. However, non-combat activities performed by the Jordanian military institution will remain as the practical application of the Hashemite leadership, vision and firm commitment to the principles of human rights.
Civil Military Relations: A NATO Perspective

BY: GENERAL SIR MICHEL ROSE

Former Commander UNPROFOR/Bosnia
United Kingdom

Introduction

The history of the post Cold War years has generally been one of political disintegration and conflict...a far remove from the high hopes for a new world order announced by President Bush at the start of the decade. Deep rooted ancient rivalries, based mainly on national ethnic and religious difference, have been rekindled as political structures breakdown or disappear altogether, with catastrophic human consequences. Today there are over 30 major conflicts in the world, all of them taking place in regions where nation states have ceased to exist. As Edmund Burke said, “Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of people. They vitiate politics, they corrupt morals, they pervert even the natural taste and relish of equity and justice.” To escape from the horrors of these civil wars, and the famines that inevitably follow, some 30m people have become refugees, of whom nearly 12m in Europe alone. In the last three years we have experienced the greatest mass movements of populations that has ever occurred in the history of mankind, notably in the Great Lakes area of Africa. All this is happening in a world which currently has a population of some 4.6 bn. Before the middle of the next century, there will be some 10bn people in the world. Yet already the West has largely proved itself incapable of developing any sort of coherent response to human disaster of this scale. Nor can we afford to stand aside and hope that things will resolve themselves without our involvement for in the words of John Donne “No man is an island.....any man’s death diminishes me because I am involved in mankind”. In the same way, no nation can isolate itself from the global village, which this planet has become.

Whole regions of the world which, only 10 years ago offered great prospect of orderly trade, have now descended into conditions of anarchy, chaos and brutality. Even in the heart of Europe, in former Yugoslavia we have witnessed a scale of devastation and slaughter in a civil war that has not been seen for over 500 years, – since the time of the Hundred Years War.

When I traveled just 1500 miles from the quiet peace of my home in England to Sarajevo in Jan. 94, I went to live in a modern twentieth century city but one which was now existing in a condition of medieval siege. 1200 shells a day were falling on the city, and people just like you and me were living like rats in their cellars, - only coming out to scavenge for food and water at night.
There was no electricity or fuel and the temperature often fell to bellow 27 degrees. The all-pervasive fear of the sniper affected everyone. I saw one of the snipers one day leaving his position carrying a high powered rifle with telescopic sight. He was a good-looking young man in his late teens. But when he looked at me, his eyes were as dead as the small child that he had almost certainly been responsible for killing that day. In a way he represented the elemental forces which are threatening our very survival on this planet.

Nor will the solutions to such cataclysmic events necessarily come from the belly of an aircraft or the barrel of a gun. Dealing with complex emergencies, giving hope to the oppressed and dispossessed needs rather demands a greater understanding of what it takes to sustain the condition of mankind. The solution are therefor more likely to be found in the preservation of human values in a civilized society, notably through the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness.

Background

I therefore welcome the opportunity to speak about a subject, which concerns us all as human beings, not just soldiers. It is a basic human responsibility to help those less fortunate than ourselves. It is also clear that peace support and humanitarian operations are operations which lies at the tougher end of the spectrum of military activity, and is one which certainly deserves to get a better hearing than it currently does. The soldier’s plea that he joined the Corps of an Army not a Peace Corps is no longer appropriate. As Dag Hammerskjold said in an earlier, simpler era of peacekeeping that “it is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it”. As we come to the end of the twentieth century, armies everywhere need to review their defense strategies if they are going to be able to respond appropriately to the changing nature of conflict which will occur in the next century. It is, I believe particularly important that NATO has come finally to understand that well into the next century its major role will concern peacekeeping. It has now been involved in Bosnia, a state well beyond the borders of its member states, in peacekeeping for the past three years. This is a long way from 1991 when its New Strategic Guidelines designed to take the alliance into the next century failed to mention the word peacekeeping even once. Having said all that, I am firmly of the opinion that our armies should remain primarily able to fight at the intense, hitech end of the spectrum of conflict, and then downshift for operations short of war. Too much peacekeeping is surely bad for your military health!

The international approach to peacekeeping has of course been anyway evolving since UN peacekeeping operations first started in 1948 with UNTSO, and since the end of the Cold War. Although the opportunities for peacekeeping have become wider, the means by which these complex operations can be mounted have not yet been sufficiently developed, neither materially nor conceptually. This imbalance between the aspirations and limitations of the international community has undoubtedly discredited the concept of peacekeeping. Perceptions of failure in Bosnia and Somalia and the Great Lakes area of Africa have also greatly damaged the reputation of the United Nations.
Yet I believe that if we collectively or individually lose faith in either the concept or the undertaking of peacekeeping operations, then the world will become a considerably more dangerous place than it is at present. We must not betray the ideals of those people who signed the UN Charter in San Francisco in 1945, people who had themselves lived through two world wars and were determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Before we analyze the changed operational circumstances, which now face peacekeepers, and try to set new doctrines and concepts for civil military cooperation in peacekeeping operations. It is important that we all understand the basis on which nations have the right to intervene in one another’s affairs from a legal and moral aspect. The principle of non-intervention under article (24) of the UN Charter is of course central to international law. Yet today the international community finds itself increasingly doing just that under article (7), Ch. VII), on the grounds that where nation states no longer exist, or where there are gross violations of human rights, the UN has a duty to intervene.

What is more difficult to answer, is the moral question posed by such interventions. To which crisis should we, the international community, respond, and which ones should we ignore? We cannot act as a world policeman everywhere, nor is it appropriate to intervene in all crises. I do not suppose that the British would have been particularly pleased to see blue helmets of the UN deployed in the streets of Belfast in 1969. Nor must we allow the media to determine our policy. BBC once referred to their being 16 members of the Security Council, the 15 national representatives, and CNN. Can the international community develop a more reasoned, morally based decision making process beyond that of national self interest? The emotional response of we must do something is not a sufficient mission statement for a commander in the field, or should we work towards preventing such a situation in the first place? And finally, if we do decide to act, how far should we allow peacekeepers to get involved in peace enforcement operations?

1998 is the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and we have recently seen growing in importance the added imperative of a need to uphold the law of international human rights in the context of peacekeeping operations. The role of organizations such as Amnesty International and the lessons that they teach regarding the international law of human rights simply can no longer be ignored by any country or Army today. As the Secretary General wrote to the Security Council in 1993 about Angola, “respect for human rights constitutes a vital, indeed a critical component, among measures to resolve, on a long-term basis, conflicts of this nature, including efforts to promote enduring conditions of peace, national reconciliation and democracy”. Sadly, human rights for millions have came to mean having 6’ of earth piled on them, - if there was time.

Military only Act in Support of the Civil Power: In any humanitarian based peacekeeping operation, there is always going to be a need for close coordination between the three aspects of mission that will always be present,
the aid delivery program, political action and the security operation. A
campaign plan based on a common strategy and chain of command is vital if
such coordination is to be achieved, and the civil / military chains of command
must be co-located at all levels of command. Even the NGOs see the advantages
and will become involved. Furthermore a close relationship between the three
elements will obviously make it easier to deliver aid, rehabilitate health
services, make assessments of needs, and facilitate the work of the aid agencies
by creating a benign security environment rather than one in which fierce battles
rage. Thus, if the peacekeeping mission through its presence and powers of
persuasion can get the parties to cease hostilities, or at least to reduce the
intensity of the fighting to a level where aid can flow freely, then clearly this
will improve the delivery of humanitarian aid. Without proper coordination
between political action, the humanitarian mission and the supporting security
operation there can be no real progress. In Bosnia, it was the separation of the
political action from the two other elements, which has been the main cause of
difficulty for the NATO mission in Bosnia.

The principle of coordination and co-location was not properly understood
when the Dayton Peace Agreement was drawn up. In the agreement, the
military objectives were separate from the civilian ones and muddle ensued.
Under IFOR, there were two command structures with SACEUR concerning
themselves only with the military mechanics regarding the separation of forces,
whilst the Office of the High Representative remained for the political program
and civil reconstruction.

Specific Mandate

Another obvious point is that peacekeepers must have a clear, unequivocal
mandate, which identifies the limitations of a mission as well as describes its
objectives. This is something that all military men will ask for but is rarely
forthcoming, even less so in an organization such as the UN in which there are
185 different nations each with their own political agendas. However, just do
something is not a mission statement that is very helpful to military people.

In the Dayton Peace Agreement there was a confusion in the mandate
regarding the arrest of war criminals. Which arose as a result of loose wording
in the drafting of the agreement, the division of responsibility in this area was
not properly described and this ultimately led to the undermining of the
credibility of NATO.

Use of Force

In order to achieve a successful outcome of a peacekeeping mission in the
conditions of the new world disorder. Any peacekeeping force has to be
extremely robust in its use of force, especially where the level of consent on the
part of the warring factions may be patchy at best. The difficult question to
answer is how much can a peacekeeping force even one as militarily robust as
NATO, use force in peacekeeping operations in conditions of civil war without
crossing the line into war fighting. It will certainly be using a great deal of peace enforcement under Ch. VII of the UN Charter.

When ever force is used, it must clearly obey the basic principles governing the use of force in a peacekeeping mission. The force use must be specific to the aim of the mission, only a minimum level of force should be used to achieve that aim, and the use of force should be even-handed and impartial. Force cannot be used to punish an aggressor, or to obtain a political solution. Indeed it is wrong to suppose that any peacekeeping mission can solve the underlying political problems of a country by its presence. It can merely create the conditions for political action.

What is vital is that war fighting goals are never pursued by peacekeeping forces as happened in Somalia, and also as people tried to do it in Bosnia in an attempt to impose the political goal of a just peace by use of air power.

However, even within the limitations of a peacekeeping mission I firmly believe that in all circumstances a military peacekeeping force must be organized, and equipped as a war fighting force. Able to conduct peace enforcement operations from its very first moment of deployment, commensurate with the highest point of the spectrum to which one might reasonably expect to have to escalate in a “worst case scenario”. This includes command and control arrangements, training and equipment, and logistic support.

Affect of the Media on Policy Making & Peacekeeping

The war in Bosnia has been described as a war of information and misinformation, a war for the sympathy of the world in which the media itself all too often became manipulated by the propaganda machines of the protagonists. The influence of the media on a peacekeeping mission is critical, as what is reported and seen on TV inevitably and directly effects policies being developed abroad as well as attitudes within the country where the peacekeeping force is deployed.

Quote “Conventional wisdom over what is happening in Bosnia is stunted by limited understanding of current events as well as a tragic ignorance or disregard of history” Gen Boyd, Foreign Affairs.

If the media falsely shows images of war, exaggerates facts or distorts opinions, there is a very real danger that international policy will be based on propaganda, not on the realities in theatre and the advice provided by commanders on the ground.

Leadership

In the dangerous chaotic situations, which prevail in Bosnia, the peacekeeping mission simply could not have continued with outstanding leadership particularly at the junior levels of command. All leaders however, from the top to the lowest levels, need to believe in, and understand, the
essential humanitarian elements of the mission. They need to understand that it is they, the peacekeepers, who stand on the moral high ground. Men and women who face danger and death need inspiration not insult. They need to know that their sacrifices will not be in vain. Being accused of being accomplices of genocide, or adding to the suffering of the people, being told that you are so bad as the enemy by the protagonists in the war can lead to disillusionment with the mission.

The Way Ahead for NATO

Today NATO has developed new doctrine regarding civil military relations. The Military Committee has now accepted that civil military cooperation may well be a central part of the mission in the case of humanitarian and peace support operations. This reflects NATO’s new broad approach to security. The purpose of CIMIC is to secure the full cooperation of the civilian population, authorities and organizations in commander’s area of operations. Even in hostile Ch. VII circumstances of peacekeeping, CIMIC will still play an important role in reducing the level of conflict and ensuring freedom of movement for humanitarian aid convoys and peacekeepers.

The US already has a fully developed capability in the form of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, consisting of 3 reserve CA brigades. It also has responsibility for coordinating activities of one regular company of the 96th CA battalion.

A full training cycle in NATO is being developed to ensure that the lessons learnt by the UN and NATO in Bosnia are taught to units and commanders involved in peacekeeping. As US Gen. Nash in Bosnia “I have been trained for 30 years to read a battlefield..., now you are asking me to read a peace field. It doesn’t come easy. It isn’t natural. It isn’t intuitive. They don’t teach this stuff at Leavenworth. Only through the development of a dynamic doctrine will the international community be able to create a common international understanding of the new challenges facing peacekeeping. NATO has already defined the training standards relating to the new operational circumstances which will be required and have also established an inspectorate for peacekeepers so that those who are offered up by nations for peacekeeping duties are proved capable of performing the tasks given.

Technology

Military technologies also need to be further developed in the area of surveillance, precision guided weapons, and communications need improving, not least if we want to ensure that we can if not compete with, at least keep up with the communications developments of the media. We must make better use of the recent developments in mine detection and clearance techniques, as well as in our ability to transfer large amounts of equipment and supplies by air to even the remotest corners of the globe.
Training

Ideally, we could tie into this inspectorate an arm which would determine the equipment required by contributing nations, especially those who normally arrive in theater minus even the most essential personal equipment.

Conclusion

It is clear that "The road to peace is indeed long and difficult" but as President Truman once said, "if you do not wish to pay the price of peace, then you had better be prepared to pay the price of war".

We continue to strive to make the international community particularly the UN and NATO effective in its principle role of peacekeeping and to support initiatives of regional organizations who are trying to avoid the descent into civil war as we saw it in Bosnia. For in whatever organization peacekeepers find themselves, they are in the words of Dag Hammerskjold, "The front-line of a moral force which extends around the world ....their successes can have a profound effect for good in building a New World order".
Multinational Force and Observers’ Experience in Implementing Confidence-Building Measures and Post-Conflict Peace Keeping

BY: MAJOR GENERAL TRYGGOVE TELLEFSEN
Force Commander, Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai.

I am pleased to address this conference and wish to express my thanks to the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, the Jordanian Armed Forces, and his Royal Highness Crown Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal for including me and the Multinational Force and Observers in their program. I commend the participation of so many diverse groups such as the Swedish National Defense College, the Russian Public Policy Centre, and the London Scholl of Economics and the support of the Norwegian government and the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. The diversity of the specialties and the nationalities represented by the participants in this conference. This underscores the fact that peacekeeping in the 21st Century will involve not just military aspects but will also be will also be characterized by civilian, diplomatic, and economic components acting in concert with international and multinational support and resources.

In many ways, I believe that the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) has already begun to put some of those precepts into practice and I would like to share with you the MFO experience in implementing confidence building measures and in post-conflict peacekeeping.

For over 16 years, the Multinational Force and Observers – the MFO- has performed a unique peacekeeping role under the terms, as outlined in the Camp David Accords. For a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, which was signed in 1979 and a subsequent Protocol to that treaty signed in 1981. Following several decades of belligerency between Egypt and Israel, the Treaty of Peace was negotiated under which the Sinai Peninsula, under Israeli control since the 1967 War, was returned to Egypt. The MFO was specifically created by the Protocol to that Treaty to oversee compliance by both signatory countries to the terms of the treaty. Since the interest of the MFO is in the monitoring and preservation of the Treaty as the executive agent of the parties, the role of the MFO is one of partnership rather than that of a foreign military force. The MFO sits on the same side of the table as the parties and its purpose is to assist these two nations in maintaining the peace.

The MFO has its own independent legat status, with headquarters in Rome under the direction of the MFO Director General. Throughout its history the
MFO has been the vehicle through which various confidence building measures have been possible. The major accomplishment of the Force has been its contribution in creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two parties following many years of conflict and discord.

The MFO experience serves as a potential model for other peace keeping operations both in the region and throughout the world. The lessons learned by the Force could be value to architects of new peace treaties and conflict solution models. The success of the MFO’s mission has come about primarily because, formerly warring parties, Egypt and Israel, have shown an abiding commitment to the peace treaty and compliance with its principles. The MFO strengthens their commitment to peace by acting as a symbolic presence, and when necessary, as an actual and psychological buffer and facilitator between the parties.

Unlike other peacekeeping missions, which are often seen as being imposed by outside forces on an unwilling set of combatants, the nations of Egypt and Israel recognize that the success of the MFO’s mission is to their benefit. They are intimately involved in its operation and organization. The MFO is funded by the Treaty Parties themselves. With an annual budget today of $51 million provided in equal measure by Egypt, Israel and the United Stated. With smaller financial donations by Germany, Japan and Switzerland, and the troop contributions from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay and the United States. The Force consists of 1,900 military personnel and 600 civilian employees.

In addition to cooperative funding, the Treaty parties are intimately involved with the operation of the MFO through a Liaison system which fosters cooperation with the MFO and each individual Treaty country and between the two countries. This Liaison arrangement acts as a channel for communication and a forum for problem solving.

The MFO has a constant contact with both Treaty States, at several levels. At the top levels, the Director General in Rome, I as the Force Commander in the Sinai, and the two Director General’s Representative, located respectively in Cairo and Tel Aviv, maintain close cooperation with the Government of Egypt and Israel. Through their ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. As well as through the Chief of the Liaison Agency, with International Organization (CLAWIO) of the Ministry of Defense of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces Liaison Unit (CIDFLU), of the Ministry of Defense of the Government of Israel. On daily operational levels the Chief of Liaison of the Force in the Sinai works closely with the deputy liaison chiefs in both the Egyptian and Israeli Liaison systems, and through his liaison officers with other Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

According to the terms of the Treaty. The Sinai and the adjoining international border area are divided into four zones. In Zone A, the area of the
Western Sinai bordered by the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, Egypt is authorized to maintain a set number of military personnel, equipment and early warning devices. In Zone B, cared through the rugged central sector of the peninsula, the treaty authorized Egyptian border guard units, but forbids other military activity and army presence. Zone C, on the Egyptian side of the International border with Israel and along the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba down to Sharm El-Sheik, is the primary area for the MFO combined arms force of infantry, air and naval units. Only the Egyptian civil police are authorized to operate in Zone C.

Operating in one of the nature's harshest environments, the Force operates two main camps, Force Headquarters in the North at El Gorah and another smaller camp at the southern most tip of the Sinai at Sham El-Sheik. Operationally, Zone C is divided into three infantry battalion sectors, the northernmost consisting of a battalion of soldiers from Fiji, the central sector manned by a battalion from Colombia, and the southern sector manned by a U.S. battalion. The three infantry battalions peace a total of 30 remote sites, supplemented by mobile patrols, and temporary observation posts. In addition, a Coastal Patrol Unit consisting of three vessels provided by Italy patrols the Gulf of Aqaba, ensuring the freedom of navigation through the strategic Strait of Tiran.

Zone D is a narrow strip running the length of the international border on the Israeli side in which the Israelis are limited to a fixed number of personnel and weaponry and early warning systems.

One of the primary missions of the MFO along the international border and in all four of the Treaty Zones, is to see and be seen. It is worth noting that at the time the treaty was negotiated there were fifteen separate disputes just over the border area. Conflict was the normal state of affairs. Over time and with sensible negotiations, often via the MFO, these disputes have gradually been resolved. Peace is now the norm throughout this once heavily fought over region.

CIVILIAN OBSERVER UNIT

Along with the MFO’s military presence, the MFO structure features a unique Civilian Observer Unit (COU). This singular component of the MFO structure is a specialized arm of the force whose 15 members regularly travel throughout all four of the zones. The unit, which conducts both aerial reconnaissance and ground verification missions, functions beyond the area of the MFO military presence to ensure that Treaty terms are being met throughout the entire area covered by the Treaty. The Civilian Observer Unit, all U.S. citizens, is composed of half of diplomatic personnel on short term loan from the U.S. Department of State and half of retired U.S. military veterans hired on contract by the MFO. The Civilian Observer Unit is accompanied on every mission by host country liaison officers, Israelis in Zone D and Egyptian in the other zones, who are an integral part of the verification and compliance process.
The Civilian Observer's duties are to observe and report in a totally non-confrontational and transparent fashion. Both Treaty parties support their presence and their efforts as vital confidence building measures designed to provide open and credible verification of compliance with the precepts and principles of the Treaty of Peace. Their civilian character underscores the concept that the ultimate goal in the Sinai is not to establish a permanent foreign military presence in the region, but rather to foster an atmosphere in which the area well return to normal and peaceful civilian conditions.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION

We in the MFO's are lucky. Our peacekeeping operation is conducted in an atmosphere in which both Egypt and Israel are also committed to the spirit and letter of the Treaty. Our job throughout the years has been to lay the groundwork for mutual trust between the two parties - to allow that atmosphere to grow. It is my sincere belief that this atmosphere of trust could not have been possible by monitoring compliance with the Treaty with sophisticated listening and monitoring devices instead of soldiers and civilian peacekeepers. The MFO presence, both as a physical barrier and a psychological buffer, has been vital in keeping small problems from being large ones and keeping a neutral line of communication open for resolution of differences and misunderstanding.

Although every peacekeeping operation will be slightly different in tone and circumstance, there are lessons to be learned from the MFO experiences:

1. It is important to tailor peacekeeping or peace support operations to the conflict that proceeded it. Conflicts differ and it is vital to take into consideration the specific situation - to create a peacekeeping operation suited to the task.

2. The starting point of a peacekeeping activity, if it is to be successful, is to identify the main parties. These parties must be interested in peace and must want the peacekeeping force to be there. It is important that the peacekeeping force is not seen as another "enemy". Keep in mind that the absence of war is not necessarily peace.

3. It is also important that the peacekeeping force be seen as non-partisan and impartial. It must have a chance of lasting for a reasonable length of time. The type of force and whether it will include both military and civilian components will determine the modus operandi. For instance, a military combat force that has been in action in the area would find it very difficult to take on the role of peacekeeping as it is very difficult to move from peace enforcing to peacekeeping.

4. All parties to a peacekeeping operation, especially including former belligerents, must feel that it is to their advantage to keep the peace. The more input and coordination they can have in the operations and nature of the peacekeeping mission the more they will feel that the international peacekeeping operation is for their benefit and not imposed by outside forces against their will.
5. The peacekeeping operation can be vital in supporting and encouraging confidence building measures which in turn foster an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual benefit. For instance, active and continuous monitoring of mutual compliance, such as we undertake in the MFO, contributes significantly to confidence building. While taking care to remain scrupulously neutral, a successful peacekeeping operation can be pro-active in facilitating communication and negotiation between formerly hostile entities.

6. Inclusion of a civilian element in a peacekeeping operation can add an extra dimension to the operation and soften the military aspects of the mission, creating an atmosphere of civilian and military working hand in hand to encourage the eventual return to normality and civilian activity.

CONCLUSION

In the world today there are many areas in which land disputes, ethnic hatred, religious rivalry, or political instability threaten the peace and bring about suffering and bloodshed. While these situations may differ, the MFO model can contribute valuable lessons to the world community's attempts to resolve them. Just as the MFO was tailored to meet the specific needs of the parties and the peculiarities of the conflict between Egypt and Israel. Other peacekeeping operations should be structured to fit the particular conflict rather than using a "one size fits all" approach which is not well suited to achieving a long-lasting and stable peace.

The MFO experience is an excellent example of what can be accomplished when there is commitment and concern for maintaining the peace and a willingness to commit resources to a neutral, just and peaceful monitoring of international agreements. There is no question that both Egypt and Israel have benefited from the state of peace that has existed between them for the past decade and a half. The fruits of this peace can be seen in the steady development and dynamic economic growth underway in both the North and South Sinai. Perhaps then the most important accomplishment of both nations and the multinational Force and Observers is to serve as an example, both regionally and worldwide, that peace can be achieved despite the odds against it and that it is to everyone's benefit.

We of the MFO do not look for a "military victory". The real victory will come when the Israelis and the Egyptians can wave good-bye to us and we leave them to maintain the peace themselves. In the long run, the Israelis and the Egyptians are the peacemakers; we are the peacewatchers.
Challenges of Peace Support and Landmines Issues

BY: MAJOR KNUT-AGE GREVE
Norway

The Oslo Diplomatic Conference, in September 1997, produced a historic result, “The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and on their Destruction”. The Convention was signed in Ottawa on 3rd and 4th December, 1997, by 122 countries. The number of Signatories and Ratifications rose rapidly. On 16th September of this year, Burkina Faso became the 40th country to ratify the Convention. This sets the 1st March, 1999, as the date for the formal entry into force of the Convention. On that day, the clock starts ticking for states and parties to comply with the obligations of the Convention, in particular, clearing anti-personnel landmines from their land and destroying stockpiles. In addition, the Convention provides a comprehensive framework for international cooperation and assistance to mine affected countries.

The rapid ratification process is a clear expression of the determination of the International Community to overcome the humanitarian challenge posed by anti-personnel landmines.

The Convention sets out a total ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines without exceptions, rights of reservation, or transitional periods. The Convention recognises, also, the enormous challenges faced by mine-affected countries in meeting their commitments under the Convention, by providing a political framework for international assistance and technical cooperation in the field of mine clearance. The need for special attention to be paid to the victims of anti-personnel landmines has been recognised explicitly in the Convention. The needs are enormous. By allocating resources to mine action, within the framework of the Convention, this will strengthen its status and promote its universalisation.

In this context, we consider the agenda for mine action as part of the wider agenda for peace and sustainable development. Resources for mine action are instrumental in creating an environment of human security that is essential for social and economic development in a post conflict situation. It is, furthermore, important to involve to the greatest extent possible both sides of a former conflict in the design and implementation of mine action programmes.

Mine action is also essential in support of the realisation of human rights, and in promoting the principles of non-discrimination and equal rights of the victims, with regards to education, health and participation in society. Norway
supports the view of having an integrated approach to mine action and, thus, to be a part of a comprehensive strategy for reconstruction and development. We also recognise that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) has a key role to play in the coordination of international mine action efforts. Norway has pledged US$ 120 million over a five year period for mine action, from which approximately US$ 22 million have already been disbursed this year. We are channeling our support through the United Nations, non-governmental and international organisations. In this context, I would also mention plans now under way to support Jordan, which has signed the Convention in efforts to resolve the problem of emplaced anti-personnel landmines.

The three major elements of the Convention, i.e. a total ban on anti-personnel landmines, ii. destruction of in-placed mines, and iii. assistance to mine victims, are interrelated. To effectively rid the world of these weapons and to help the victims, it is necessary to eliminate the source of the problem.

The Norwegian Government considers anti-personnel landmines to be inhumane, outdated and inappropriate weapons for use in war or conflict situations. The use of these weapons causes far greater human suffering than can be justified from a military point of view. Norway, therefore, adopted a total national ban on anti-personnel landmines in June 1995. The programme for phasing out and destroying all anti-personnel landmines in the Norwegian defence force was concluded on 1st October, 1996.

The Convention represents a great humanitarian success and a significant step forward in the disarmament process. The challenge facing all of us now will be to make this Convention universal, as well as to translate the provisions of the Convention into reality. At the same time, we must work to gain wider acceptance that the human suffering caused by these weapons far outweighs any military benefits they may be claimed to have.

The Norwegian military forces are trained to carry out military mine clearing and mine breaching operations. These types of mine clearing differ from humanitarian de-mining operations in that the aim of mine breaching is to clear a sufficient number of routes for troops or vehicles through a minefield to allow military forces to complete their mission. It may, thus, be carried out in the heat of battle, with the time factor playing a decisive role. Mine clearing, such as road clearance, is a military task outside of battle contact. Breaching can be done with a calculated ‘acceptable’ percentage of missed mines and ordinance, whereas humanitarian de-mining operations require the methodical removal of all mines in an area.

However, the skills required for these types of operations are sufficiently similar such that military personnel may be able to carry out or assist in humanitarian de-mining operations as well.

Military authorities in several countries have, during the last years, established training centers for mine detection and mine clearing. Our Engineer
Chief Inspector has the responsibility for the adequate mine clearing and mine awareness training of all Norwegian officers and soldiers going to NATO and United Nations forces.

Norway's engagement in peace keeping and peace support operations requires increased intensity in mine detection and mine clearing training. In order to carry out a proper performance of this task, the Norwegian Army is establishing a training center for detection and clearing, which also includes detection training in cooperation with dogs.

In most missions, the condition of refugees and displaced persons, though not an accepted responsibility, inevitably becomes a peace support operation concern in the course of time. The limit of involvement should be that of the reporting of facts and assessments, thus, drawing the attention of the authorities of the country and organizations to their needs.

It is rare that a military operation embraces a para-civilian role of economic aid and assistance. However, it is rarer for the military organization to be involved in an economic operational commitment, organized and directed by military staff.

Humanitarian relief, on the other hand, is not such a rarity and is something that soldiers understand as a recognized contribution in support of civilian relief operations. Nevertheless, in peace support operations both have their place.

A basic need after the end of active hostilities would be to reestablish the infrastructure. It is of great importance that the population gain access to their existential/extensional areas for water supplies, food production and electric power. In addition to this, restoration of roads and communication is a great necessity. Our experience over decades has shown the need for mine clearing and -mining as a priority for the repatriation of displaced peoples. Included in this is the issue of mine awareness, which is very important to the civilian population.

One of the challenges of peace support into the 21st century would be to establish an element of leadership, which requires coordinating contributions from United Nations, national authorities, peace support operation staff and non-governmental organizations.

BY: PETER ISSACS


Introduction: There is growing awareness within the international community that what has come to be known as the “global landmine crisis” has far-reaching consequences and requires a multi-faceted and integrated response. There is also recognition that the United Nations has a key role to play in articulating a systematic, coherent and effective response and in providing the necessary support and coordination mechanisms. Accordingly, in March 1998, the UN circulated for comments a draft policy document entitled "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy" in order to encapsulate the key principles on which UN mine action is based, and to clarify the roles and responsibilities within the UN system. The aim of this document is to build upon these principles by clearly describing the United Nations Mine Action Process, as an integrated response to the global mine problem.

The Nature of Mine Action: As described in the policy document, ‘Mine Action’ refers to all those activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by populations as a result of landmine contamination. It is not so much about mines as it is about people and their interaction with a mine-infested environment. Its aim is not only technical to - survey, mark and eradicate landmines - but also humanitarian and developmental - to recreate an environment in which people can live safely. In which economic, health and social development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which victims needs are addressed.

A distinction has sometime been made between operational mine action (i.e. mine action in support of operations mandated by the UN Security Council), humanitarian mine action and mine action in support of reconstruction and development. The UN does not adhere to this distinction. Since it does not reflect the fact that there is considerable overlap between the various aspects of a country’s recovery (peacekeeping and peace-building, reintegration of refugees

1. Throughout this document, the term “landmine” is used to describe both landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
and IDPs, revival of communities, reconstruction and development). And that what really matters is the establishment of clear priorities in relation to the needs of the affected populations.

Given the importance of an integrated and holistic response to the issue landmine contamination, and the need to bring real and lasting support to those who are at risk, UN mine action encompasses four complementary core components:

- Mine awareness and risk reduction education;
- Minefield survey, mapping, marking and clearance;
- Victim assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration;
- Advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support to a total ban on antipersonnel landmines.

In conjunction with these core components, other integral enabling activities will be key to the success of mine action and mine action programs. These include, but are not limited to:

- resource mobilization,
- capacity building and institutional support,
- information management (including the conduct of assessment missions, surveys and more general data gathering),
- training of personnel (in all mine-related responsibilities, including management), and
- quality management (including setting of standards and program monitoring and evaluation).

Integrated Mine Action: The integrated approach to mine action requires appropriate attention to be given to the issues of ownership, sustainability and capacity building. In countries with long term needs, mine action programs must be sustainable and should include as a key component the development of an indigenous capacity. An indigenous capacity (formed most often under the auspices of a government or local authorities) is characterized by its ability to develop and articulate overall policy and direction, and to coordinate, manage, and sustain a program that is accountable, cost-effective. And able to address the humanitarian and socio-economic implications of landmine contamination. Mine action initiatives must also be an integral component of strategies designed to rehabilitate health care, education infrastructures, agriculture and marketing systems, to name but a few of the requirements of societies recovering from violent conflicts.

The United Nations Strategy for Mine Action: General - The combined implementation of core components and enabling activities in a systematic, logical manner, results in what can generically be described as the mine action

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2. This incorporates a wide range of activities, including manual and mechanical clearance, mine-detection dogs (MDD) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
process. However, this process is not dependent upon all of the core components being undertaken together. Circumstances within some countries may necessitate a phased approach to solving the problem, starting for example with mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives, prior to other activities commencing. Similarly, situations in other countries may allow for the full range of mine action activities to be undertaken, but on a limited geographical basis within that country. Therefore the process is designed to be flexible and dynamic, with applicability to the wide range of scenarios in which mine action programs are required.

It is UN policy that the primary responsibility for taking action against the presence of landmines lies with the concerned State. Thus, in principle the Government of the affected country should assume overall responsibility for the coordination and management of a national mine action program. When required, UNDP, in consultation with all stakeholders, including United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), other UN entities, relevant local partners, NGOs and donors should assist in creating sustainable national capacities and in preparing and implementing the mine action plan.

In circumstances where the United Nations has to initiate a program under its auspices, either because of the need to meet urgent humanitarian and operational needs, or because of the absence of recognized national authorities. UNMAS will develop the initial program plan in consultation with all stakeholders, including relevant local partners, UN entities, donors, and NGOs. This plan should clearly define objectives, priorities, institutional arrangements and other requirements including technical and financial support and modalities needed to undertake specific activities. It should be designed to meet critical urgent needs as well as the long-term requirements essential for the development of a sustainable, indigenous capacity.

The Determination of International Mine Action Requirements:

Country Assessment Phase - The "global landmine crisis" is a sum of the landmine-related problems facing the 68 countries which are believed to be afflicted by these weapons. However, the scope, nature and degree of affliction varies markedly between individual countries. At this point in time this information has yet to be measured with any degree of accuracy or confidence. Until this occurs, international mine action requirements cannot be clearly defined - and assistance programs articulated. In addition, the measurement system must be able to cope with constantly changing political and security situations within these countries, as this will directly influence the ability to implement mine action initiatives. Therefore an important component of the UN Mine Action Process is the 'Country Assessment Phase', the principal aim of which is to identify the extent of the problem within each mine-affected country. This is achieved through the analysis of information obtained from a number of sources, including NGO and UN agencies working within the
country, the United Nations 1998 Questionnaire on Mine Action, publications such as “Hidden Killers” and ICRC reports, and multi-disciplinary assessment missions to the country itself.

**UN Assessment Missions:** It is imperative that all available information is gathered, appraised, analyzed and presented in a consistent and transparent manner, to enable an accurate assessment of the situation to be made. Whilst a real challenge of information can be obtained through different sources, a key element of this process is the conduct of an assessment mission to the affected country. The UN has initiated a process of multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral assessments in order to gather all relevant information required for the United Nations to make an informed decision with regard to the launching of mine action activities within a country.

Assessment missions will examine the requirements associated with each component of a comprehensive and integrated mine action plan. Information will be collected on the impact of mines on the population from humanitarian, health, socio-economic and developmental perspectives. Local capacities for mine action, the security situation and the willingness of all parties to support a mine action program. Assessment missions will be conducted in cooperation with UN coordinator in the country. The assessment team will consult with local civilian and military authorities with UN agencies - in particular UNDP, INICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO, with NGOs and ICRC, and with diplomatic missions and representatives as required.

The information gathered and analyzed during the Country Assessment phase is used to determine the requirement and framework for a UN assisted mine action program or project to be implemented. Negative determinations must preclude the decision being revised at a later time, should either the situation change or subsequent additional information be obtained. Additionally, the affected nation may use information obtained during the assessment process to obtain support for mine action activities on a bi-lateral basis. Alternatively, if it is decided that further action is required, a draft proposal will be prepared for inclusion in the ‘Portfolio of Mine-related Projects’.

**The Portfolio of Mine-related Projects:** The purpose of the Portfolio of Mine-related Projects is to present a global picture of UN mine-related
projects\(^5\), their objectives, implementing partners, financial needs, and financing mechanisms. The portfolio takes into consideration those projects which are already included in country-specific consolidated appeals, as well as those for which similar resource mobilization mechanisms do not exist. It complements the policy articulated jointly in the policy document by the various UN partners concerned with mine action, and it is meant to be a living document whose object is to facilitate a transparent exchange of information with the international community. It will be regularly updated by UNMAS as new projects are identified or as situations change within existing project proposals. This will occur as required, and according to a procedure yet to be defined by the Mine Action Steering Committee (MASC) or Inter-Agency Coordination Group (IACG)\(^6\).

**Feasibility Review:** Once a draft project proposal has been prepared, a decision will be taken as to the feasibility of launching the program at that point in time. This decision is likely to require input from a large number of concerned parties, with involvement from one or more UN agencies, donors and most importantly, the host nation. Should it be determined that it is not possible to initiate the program, (reasons may include a lack of donor support, an inability to reach an agreement with the host nation or unacceptable security conditions). The proposal will remain in the Portfolio, where it will continue to be updated and/or assessed against situation. Once again, a negative determination does not preclude the affected nation from attempting to enter into a bi-lateral agreement in order to execute the proposal.

A position determination will result in an ongoing collaborative process amongst concerned parties and the host nation - to clarify and agree to the actual requirement, limitations and end-state of the mine action activities to be implemented. As previously detailed in this paper, limitations may include the range of mine action activities to be undertaken at that time, or access restrictions which may confine activities to particular geographic regions within the country. The Portfolio will also be updated at this point to reflect any changes to the scope and status of the original proposals as a result of the review process.

**Program Development Phase:** Once agreement has been reached on the requirement, limitations and end-state of the mine action activities to be undertaken, - the complementary processes of developing a National Mine Action Programme\(^7\) and Launching a National (Level 1) Survey can commence.

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5. This document may also in the future include non-UN projects such as implemented directly by Non-Governmental Organizations.
6. The composition and function of these groups is detailed in the policy document.
7. The UNMAS paper, “A Functional Analysis of Mine Action” dated 2 march 1998, states that a National Mine Action Program should address a combination of the following objective:
   - Conduct limited and focussed mine clearance operations to enable the provision of essential humanitarian assistance.
   - Reduce ongoing human suffering caused directly by landmines.
The timing of the commencement of actives relative to each other, and the scale of these activities will depend upon specific situations and the nature of the mine problem within individual countries. In many cases, sufficient information may be available at this time to enable an outline plan for the National Mine Action Program to be developed, however it will be the information gathered and analyzed during the National Survey that will provide the basis for detailed planning to occur. Therefore, the UN Mine Action Process advocates that a National Survey be launched as soon as possible during this phase, with outcomes used to facilitate the development process on an ongoing basis, as the information becomes available.

**National Survey:** National Survey has been referred to in the past as level 1 or General Survey, using definitions as stated in the international standards for Humanitarian Mine clearance. This narrow approach was developed at a time when mine clearance was regarded - mine clearance as the principal component of mine action. Experience and a greater understanding of the nature of the problem have led to an expansion of the definition of mine action to incorporate other important components, all of which must be evaluated in order to determine the overall national requirement. A National Survey is required in order to measure the impact of the mine problem throughout the country, and the determination of priorities as a result of this process will allow activities and resources to be focused on areas of greatest need. The data collected during the survey can also be used to assist with ongoing resource mobilization requirements, and to provide valuable information to donors as to the overall indicative cost to solve the mine-related problems. Additionally, the results of the survey can be used to review the previously determined requirements, limitations and end-state as appropriate in order to assist with the planning, development and refinement of a National mine Action Program.

National Survey's require information and data to be gathered processed and analyzed in an effective manner. The recognized method used in National Surveys to data has been a computer database, incorporating a Geographic Information System (GIS). These systems should be developed on a compatible basis, thereby allowing the strategic comparison and analysis of information to be undertaken by all parties concerned with mine action. In most situations throughout the world where National Mine Action Programs are in operation, mine action activities have generally commenced prior to National Survey starting. This has often occurred when there is a clear indication of the urgent priority needs within the affected country, particularly during a post-conflict situation. However this does not mean that a national Survey is not required or cannot be still be implemented, as was illustrated by the Afghanistan program. Where a National Survey was instigated five years after the program started. A

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- Enable the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes to pursue lives without risk from landmines.
- Establish an effective (indigenous) mine action capacity which will enable the implementation of long term reconstruction and redevelopment programs.
similar situation has also occurred in Cambodia and Mozambique, where for a variety of reasons, both programs have identified the need for a National Survey to be undertaken after a number of years of operation.

The lessons learned in these cases have resulted in the development of the UN Mine Action Process. Previous program implementation has tended to focus on the known mine problem by searching for and removing the mines, rather than determining the impact and scope of the problem throughout the country, prior to developing a plan. This approach was particularly evident on occasions where programs were implemented because of emergency requirements. However the current approach to mine action demands a more holistic approach to solving the program and this will be applied even during future emergency situations. Under certain circumstances it may be possible to complete a National Survey prior to starting the development phase of the National program. This may occur when the agreed mine action requirements, in terms of the scope and \ or the geographical location of activities are extremely limited. Even in these cases however, a certain amount of concurrent activity with regard to program development and preparatory work can and should be undertaken where possible. This is an important consideration in respect to gaining and maintaining support from the local population. And is closely linked to a key principle of the UN Mine Action process - in that National Surveys should not be undertaken unless the appropriate follow up mine action is able to be implemented in a timely manner.

Enabling Activities: Implementing the mine action program in a timely manner will generally require early or concurrent execution of a number of enabling activities. Forward planning will be particularly important when considering procurement lead times and the training requirements for indigenous personnel, prior to mine action activities commencing. Early consideration must also be given to the requirement for any additional information which must be collected and collated as a pre-cursor to the implementation phase. This may include projected refugee movement data, updated mapping or satellite information, or confirmation/monitoring tasks within critical areas.

Implementation Phase: the implementation of a Mine Action program will require the collection and analysis of information on an ongoing basis. As an example, Technical (Level 2) surveys will be required in order to determine the perimeter of a mined area prior to marking or clearance. The International Standards for mine Clearance Operations provide the detailed requirements for the conduct of this activity and this document is used to develop country specific technical standard and standard operating procedures (SOPs). The International standards also detail the requirements for completion (level 3) survey reports, which are required to be submitted at the completion of clearance activities. This process is critical in order to maintain accurate
records of the activities which have been undertaken, and in particular, form an important part of the overall Quality Assurance process.

The value of the International standards during the implementation of mine clearance activities cannot be understated. For this reason, similar documents which detail the procedures, processes and standards for other components of mine action which are implemented in the field, also need to be developed. In the case of mine awareness, UNICEF has already started work on this requirement by producing the first draft of “Guidelines for Mine Awareness Education”. Programs will also incorporate clearly defined accountability mechanisms to ensure that priority needs are met and that there is cost effective use of available resources. This will involve periodic review exercises in order to determine overall effectiveness, in approach, orientation and implementation, and to identify what changes - if any need to be introduced. This process of ongoing action, information collection and review, will continue until it has been determined by those responsible, that the mine problem within the country has been solved.

Summary: The UN Mine Action process is an integrated response to the global mines problem, advocating a flexible, dynamic, and transparent approach to implementation. It uses a multi-faceted assessment phase in order to determine international and national requirements, a National Survey to plan and define National mine action programs, and the implementation of appropriate mine action activities focussed in the areas of greatest need. The mechanism which is used to link the international community with the specific needs of a particular country is the Portfolio of mine related projects. This living document is designed to cope with constantly changing situations in many of the mine-affected countries, thereby enabling a more effective and timely UN response.

The Way Ahead: The framework for the process has been outlined in this paper, however a significant amount of work is still required both in terms of the implementation of this process and the ongoing refinement and development of the detailed mechanisms and processes. The UN has recognized that the Assessment Phase must be accorded high priority in order to determine international and national mine action requirements. Funding support for a number of multi-disciplinary assessment missions has been pledged by the Government of Canada, and is now up to UNMAS and other UN agencies to put this initiative into effect. Assistance and input will also be required from all concerned organizations and parties able to provide relevant information, to allow informed decision making to occur.

The Portfolio of Mine-related Projects will continue to be updated by UNMAS as new projects are identified and existing proposals are amended. It is also essential that UNMAS continue to develop donor confidence in the Portfolio, by promoting its use and ensuring that it remains a valid, living document.
A recent initiative led by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) and Handicap International (HI), resulted in a meeting in Brussels over the period 7-11 May 1998. The aim of the meeting was to determine guidelines and standards for the conduct of a National (Level 1) Survey, and was attended by representatives from seven NGOs, the UN, and donor nations. The meeting was very successful in identifying principles, guidelines for quality management, and a standardized methodology and survey instrument format (data collection, collation and storage requirements). The UN will continue to support and contribute to this important process, in order to define and develop the standards and guidelines for National (Level 1) Survey. The requirement to develop and further refine standards and guidelines also applies to mine action activities undertaken in the field. The International Standards for Mine clearance Operations will continue to be reviewed and updated by the UN. In addition, appropriate attention will also be given to the development and/or refinement of similar documents, which detail the guidelines and standards for both Mine Awareness and Victim Assistance activities.

The UN will continue to ensure that the Mine Action Process is implemented within mine-affected countries, as an integrated response to the global mine problem. It is essential that programs are appropriate, effective, timely and are focussed on the areas of greatest need.
International Law and Landmines

BY: MU’IN L. KASSIS
Assistant to the Head of Delegation
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - Jordan

Ladies and gentlemen, stories of a landmine survivors who, despite their physical loss and psychological pain, are lucky to live and tell how a footstep on a blind landmine has changed the rest of their life. Many others were not fortunate enough to tell their stories. Dervisa Covic is only one of an estimated 24,000 men, women, and children who fall victim every year to the millions of anti-personnel landmines polluting more than 70 countries. These indiscriminate weapons render huge swathes of potentially fertile agricultural land unusable, overburden medical services, cut off access to villages and towns, impede the return of the displaced to their homes, and endanger the lives of humanitarian personnel. In simple words, anti-personnel landmines remain a central obstacle to the return of ‘real peace’ and stability even long after guns fall is silent making it more difficult for countries to negotiate the hazardous transition form conflict to peace and recovery.

Efforts by the international community to find peaceful solutions to the word’s conflicts have so far failed to eliminate the scourge of war. Although total eradication of war must remain our ultimate aim, the harsh reality in today’s world compels us to work towards limiting the horrors of today’s armed conflicts. This failure did not prevent the human quest to devise certain rules of conduct to minimize the suffering of wars. Such efforts were eventually to lead to the codification of laws and treaties trying to attach restrictions to the indiscriminate use of certain weapons and reduce the suffering caused by armed conflicts to the minimum – necessary for the achievement of legitimate military objectives.

International Humanitarian Law, formerly known as the law of war, has been codified since the late nineteenth century through numerous diplomatic conferences that addressed certain methods and means of war which were considered to violate the conscience of humanity. This branch of international law (whose predominant body is contained in the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, in the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two additional Protocols of 1977) introduces humanitarian imperatives that restrict the choice of means and methods of warfare — including anti-personnel landmines. Thus, the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg stipulated that nations should not employ arms, cause more suffering than needed to take a soldier out of action. When the “Dum – Dum” (or fragmenting) bullet was invented a few years later, it was
considered contrary to the 1868 Declaration. The Hague Conference in 1899 therefore banned its use. The 1899 and 1907 Conferences at The Hague adopted conventions, which also restricted the use of submarine contact mines and prohibited the use of poison or poisoned weapons as well as the use of projectiles diffusing poisonous gases.

Consequently, one could trace two main sources of international law that currently regulate the use of anti-personnel landmines: The first is customary international law. Two basic rules of which apply directly to anti-personnel landmines. The most recent expression of these two basic rules can be found in Article 51 of 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva conventions, the content of which states that parties to a conflict must always distinguish between civilians and combatants. Civilians may not be directly attacked and indiscriminate attacks and the use of indiscriminate weapons are prohibited. The Protocol further states that it is prohibited to use weapons, which cause unnecessary suffering. Therefore, the use of weapons whose damaging effects are disproportionate to their military purpose is prohibited. As these rules are part of customary international law, they apply to all States irrespective of the specific obligations of treaties to which they are party. The second source is 'treaty law', which applies only to States party to specific treaties. The most relevant text is the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted in 1980. Protocol II of this treaty is entitled Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices. This Protocol specifically regulates the use and transfer of all landmines, including anti-personnel mines, and also regulates or prohibits three other types of weapons. (It is noteworthy that by 3 June 1998, 20 States have notified the United Nations of their Protocol will enter into force on 3 December 1998).

Regrettfully, the 1980 Convention, as originally adopted, contained major weaknesses such as the fact that it did not apply to internal armed conflicts, where most mine use occurs; and it assigned no clear responsibility for the removal of mines nor did it prohibit the use of non-detectable mines. Furthermore, it does not include any control or supervisory mechanisms. However, this 1980 Convention provides for the possibility of convening periodic review conferences to change or update its provisions. Consequently, as a result of public pressure to respond to the crisis caused by landmines, the French government took the initiative in 1993 to ask for a Review Conference. This was endorsed by the States Parties, which at the 1993 UN General Assembly agreed to establish a “Group of Governmental Experts” to prepare revisions to the Convention and make the necessary arrangements for a Review Conference. This Group met three times in 1994 and held a final meeting in January 1995. It’s recommendations were sent to all State Parties and to the Review Conference held in Vienna and Geneva in three sessions between 25 September 1995 and 3 May 1996. Through this process the Convention was amended and its provisions were extended to apply to internal armed conflicts.
The responsibility for mine clearance was clearly assigned to those who use mines. The location of all mines are to be mapped and recorded. All anti-personnel mines. The location of all mines is to be mapped and recorded. All anti-personnel mines are to be made detectable. However, due to the need to adopt decisions by consensus, the provisions limiting the use of anti-personnel landmines were, in the view of the ICRC, too weak and too complex. In addition, States have the option of delaying implementation of some key provisions until the year 2000.

Though the ICRC encourages States to adhere to the amended version of the 1980 Convention, in order to improve the absolute minimum norms applicable to States which continue to use mines, it was not convinced that those modest improvements will end the humanitarian crisis caused by land mines. Fortunately, a growing number of States have reached the same conclusion. By the end of the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention in May 1996, nearly half of the States Parties to this Convention had supported a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. In calling for the urgent negotiation of a new treaty comprehensively banning the production, stockpiling, international transfer and use of anti-personnel mines. No State voted against, although ten abstained.

An unprecedented international effort was launched by fifty pro-ban States in Ottawa, Canada in October 1996 to develop a comprehensive global response to the landmines crisis. States of the "Ottawa Group" including countries from all regions of the world committed themselves to working together for a global ban, ending new deployments of anti-personnel mines, promoting regional efforts, and supporting a massive increase in resources for mine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance. The Organization of African Unity has been a leading force in efforts to end the scourge of landmines. As early as June 1995 the Council of Ministers of the OAU called for the global prohibition of anti-personnel mines and increased international assistance for mine clearance and assistance to victims. Likewise, similar initiatives, conferences, expert meetings took place worldwide with the participation and support of organizations such as the Organization of American States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Parliament, UNESCO, UNICEF, and other UN agencies, the ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and many other NGOs, particularly the ICBL.

States in the "Ottawa Process" realized that they did not need to await an international consensus before taking measures to protect their own territory and populations from the devastating effects of landmines. By the end of 1996 thirty States had renounced for themselves the use of anti-personnel landmines. Around sixteen other States were in the process of destroying their stockpiles. Prohibitions on international transfers of anti-personnel mines had now been adopted by a large majority of mine-producing States. Parliaments of five States had adopted legislation making the production, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel mines illegal on the national level.
The "Ottawa process" led to an intensification of efforts at the global and regional levels to address the problems of mines clearance, the needs of victims and promoted the establishment of zones free of anti-personnel mines. The "Ottawa process" also accelerated efforts to achieve a legally binding international treaty banning anti-personnel mines. At the October 1996 conference to launch the Ottawa Process Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy challenged all States to come back to Ottawa in December 1997 to sign such a treaty. After nearly a year of consultations and negotiations the treaty text was concluded in Oslo, Norway, 17 September 1997.

In accordance with Article 15, the Treaty was open for signature from 3 to 4 December 1997 at a specially convened conference in Ottawa, Canada, and thereafter at the UN headquarters in New York (where it can still be signed until entry into force). As of this month an impressive total of 130 States have signed the treaty. A State becomes party to the treaty six months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification. In an extraordinary achievement 40 States have already ratified the treaty which will now enter into force on 1 March 1999. States party to the Ottawa treaty undertake never under any circumstances to use, develop, produce, stockpile AP mines within 4 years and clearing those in the ground within 10 years, as well as to the provision of assistance for mine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance.

The Middle East region has not been spared the agony caused by anti-personnel mines. Several countries are reported to have serious problems with mines, many of them left behind after the Second World War. Subsequent conflicts have dramatically increased the scale of the problem, and while two thirds of the countries of the world have now signed the Ottawa Treaty only three – Jordan, Qatar and Yemen, are in the Middle East region.

Now that a legally binding framework is in place at the global level to ban the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, much is still needed to be done on other levels, particularly in terms of rehabilitation and improved care for the victims and mine clearing assistance. The ICRC believes that rehabilitation must go further than the provision of artificial limbs. Job training, gainful employment and counseling are essential features of the solution of the problem. The ICRC has learned that mine amputees can be valuable workers, including in our own limb-fitting centers. Employing them to help fellow survivors not only benefits the workers themselves but also has a positive impact on patients who are trying to come to terms with the accident which has befallen them. As it is likely to be many years before some communities can hope to live free from the threat of mines (even after signing the Ottawa Treaty), teaching people how to avoid injury is another important activity. The ICRC is currently running mine-awareness programs in several countries and need assessments are being conducted in many others such as in Sudan, Georgia and Uganda.

Over the last year and a half much attention has been focused on bringing a treaty prohibiting anti-personnel landmines to fruition and developing new
technologies to remove mines that are already in the ground. Throughout this process it was the voices of the victims and survivors that rang out the loudest. It was their plight and their contributions that led most of the world to reject anti-personnel mines as weapons of war. Assistance to victims and prevention of mine accidents remain major challenges for the international community. We encourage States that have not yet signed the Ottawa Treaty and those that still have not ratified it must do so without reluctance or any further delay. They must join the rest of the world in rejecting anti-personnel landmines abhorrent. By that time that has been accomplished, we will all be able to say that the end of landmine crisis is in view.

An African proverb says “the world was not left to us by parents, it was lent us by our children.” Let us return the world to our children free of anti-personnel landmines.
Challenges of Peace Support In A New Security Context

BY: H.E. MR. ANDERS BJURNER
Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Sweden

Let me start by expressing my Government’s sincere appreciation for this seminar series and for the preparatory work that has been carried out by a number of people. In particular, I would like to thank the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy and Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber, its President, for being our generous hosts here, in Amman, and also Ms Annika Hilding for her efforts to keep this important project together.

We started out in Stockholm a little more than a year ago. The seminars in Stockholm, Moscow and now here, in Amman, have shown that the mix of practitioners, diplomats, military officers, researchers and representatives of major actors in this field has sparked a vivid dialogue. It is of vital importance that we continue to create opportunities for people with different backgrounds and experiences to gather together and exchange views on this topic, and also allow both global and regional perspectives to interact. Stating that conflict management is a complex issue may be the understatement of the day. Therefore, the Swedish Government has decided to support this project.

The end of the Cold War opened up greater and new opportunities for peace support, but also created new types of threats and risks to peace and security. We have learnt many lessons about peace support over the last ten years, but I would strongly argue that we have not learned enough and certainly, in practice, we have not applied our lessons sufficiently. We cannot claim success when we have on our agenda Kosovo, Bosnia, Georgia, Congo, Sudan, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to mention but a few unresolved so called ‘internal’ conflicts.

If we add to these examples a new resurgence of inter-state tensions, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iran, Turkey and Syria, and India and Pakistan, we have enough concrete evidence that there is a great and urgent need for improved instruments of peace support, more research on conflicts, improved training, additional norms and, not least, a re-allocation of resources to peace support efforts.
I think we need to take a much broader and deeper approach in order to address the shortcomings of our international peace support system. This critical view should not hide the fact that many improvements have been made in the international system, both at the global and regional levels.

I will say a few words on a subject discussed during our first day here, in Amman: the new security context and its implications for international peace support. In doing so, I will address six key areas for a global response to this change of context and the importance of conflict prevention and peace building measures.

The security context has changed fundamentally over the last decade, from the threats of the Cold War to the challenges of globalization. We have gradually realized that the notion of ‘security’ cannot be limited to the military security of states. Individual human security and the security of the planet must be given as much recognition as the security of states. To mention one example, scarce resources will probably be a source of disputes and conflicts more often than in the past. Water supply is already a source of conflict in the Middle East and in several other places.

Globalization means that political, economic, social and environmental aspects, considered to be domestic concerns from the outset, may have considerable regional and international impact from a security point of view. At the same time, the possibilities of globalization, that is, integration and economic progress, offer the best opportunities we have ever known for achieving peace, democracy and development. But, when trade, economy and financial markets do not recognize any borders, it is also important that politics goes global.

I would like to briefly point out what I consider to be six key areas for a global response, international cooperation and common action required to support sustainable peace:

1. To eradicate poverty;
2. To promote human rights;
3. To deepen democracy;
4. To bring about disarmament;
5. To prevent armed conflict (which is, of course, part of the other five areas as well); and,
6. To support regional cooperation.

1. Putting an end to poverty is imperative. Large economic inequalities and the lack of civic infrastructure create friction between individuals, between groups, and between countries. Marginalization spurs violent conflicts. Development and economic integration play a much greater role in the long-term prevention of violent conflicts.

Another example is that the trade policies of industrial countries should also facilitate regional cooperation among developing countries. The debt
crisis creates vicious circles for weak economies. The international financial system has proven to be insufficiently adapted to political and social realities, as demonstrated recently in the debate about the IMF’s role in Asia.

2. Societies which respect human rights are more stable and more peaceful. Repression spurs rebellion and violence breeds violence. Primitive expressions of public vengeance have no place in a civilized legal system.

Economic, social and cultural rights create the basis for a sustainable society, with strong democratic participation. The rights laid down in the Universal Declaration apply to all. The principle of non-discrimination is of particular and critical importance for individuals who belong to ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities or to indigenous peoples. This principle should be complemented with national mechanisms to ensure effective participation in society, that is, a policy of inclusion. Few measures would be more important to prevent conflicts, both within and between states.

Another important example of conflict prevention is the recent adoption of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, which is a milestone in the struggle against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is imperative to close the gap of impunity.

3. The International Community should increasingly support world-wide efforts to strengthen and deepen democratic cultures. It is essential to develop civil, open and pluralistic societies, to promote the equal participation of all women and men in political life, to ensure an independent media, freedom of speech and the rule of law. Non-governmental organisations could, and should, play an important role in this context.

Democracies seek security in cooperation with one another, rather than through deterrence, that is, in openness rather than in secrecy. Democracies, also, have a proven record in dealing with internal tension and strife without resorting to violence. Strengthening democracy helps to prevent violent conflict by handling differing views and interests. A democratic culture provides the groundwork for reconciliation.

4. Disarmament is prevention. A specific field of great importance is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This is a serious threat to peace, security and development. Such weapons have been the primary cause of casualties in almost every recent conflict. There are estimates that up to 90% of casualties in today’s conflicts are caused by small arms. Practical and concrete measures, such as, collection, safe storage and destruction in the context of peace-keeping operations, should be the focus in dealing with small arms and light weapons.

5. Stable peace does not suddenly turn into military conflict. War normally breaks out after a period of gradual deterioration. Prevention has the best
prospects of success at the earliest possible stage of such a process. The need for early action is obvious. Nevertheless, decisions are taken at a late stage, often too late. There are strong forces at work which obstruct early action, such as, forces hiding behind arguments about sovereignty, public opinion and national interest, or forces defining security as stability and order, rather than dealing with the underlying causes of conflicts.

After almost two years on the Security Council, we are more convinced than ever of the urgent need to build a political commitment for preventive measures and to develop, hone and refine preventive instruments. It is a question of political will. It is a matter of allocating resources. It is about looking for solutions which are sustainable in the long term, even when strong forces want to focus on short term needs alone.

Several regional organisations have identified conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes as key tasks. The growing network of European security organisations is one example, cooperation between African states another. Cooperation with regional actors is crucial, but complex, in today's growing grey zone of conflicts, which are domestic in origin but international in impact. They often involve neighbouring countries as recipients of refugees, weapons suppliers, or even participants. In such situations, the United Nations must be faithful to its global principles and Chapter VIII of the Charter, and find a way of engaging regional actors in peaceful solutions which guarantee the legitimate security interests of all. When regional leadership is available, the role of the United Nations should be one of providing support and, when international military peace operations are needed, to authorize and monitor.

However, when regional leadership is lacking, or sometimes inappropriate, the United Nations must be ready to lead. The United Nations (and its Security Council) has a primary responsibility for upholding international peace and security. The uniqueness and strength of the United Nations lies not in any single field of activity, but in the totality of them all. Peace, security, democracy, human rights, social justice, humanitarian relief and sustainable development are inseparable.

Now, I will turn to some reflections on what governments, international, regional, and other actors can do to assist a state moving from war to peace.

First, I would, however, like to underline that the main responsibility rests with the parties to a dispute and the national leaders. International law makes every state responsible for its international behaviour. States should, also, be expected to account for their internal actions. They often have major external consequences. Sovereignty should stand for responsibility and accountability. National responsibility for conflict prevention and for creating a stable environment where citizens can prosper, regardless of gender, religious beliefs
and ethnic identity, cannot be negotiated away. Lasting peace cannot be imposed. Reconciliation must grow from within.

South Africa demonstrates that deep rooted conflicts can be settled successfully. Work is going on with extensive international assistance in Bosnia. The case of Northern Ireland looks promising. People in post-conflict societies must be given the prospects of earning a living and building a future for themselves and their children. They must be given a governance system where their voice can be heard and possible differences of view settled if peace shall prosper.

But, conflict prevention is also an international responsibility. The United Nations and regional organisations possess a wide array of instruments for preventive action. Lessons have, also, been learned from a wide range of peacekeeping operations. Assistance from external actors can take many forms, for example, helping with demilitarization and demining, ensuring public order, safeguarding respect for human rights, providing electoral assistance, and creating conditions for political participation and good governance. Support for rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as for the reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, is often much needed. The reintegration and re-education of soldiers may require special resources.

Part of making peace work is to ensure public order. One innovative element in today's multifunctional peace operations is the civilian police. Police functions of various kinds are today a prominent feature of many United Nations operations, with over 3000 officers deployed in ten missions. Civilian policing involves a role of assistance and service, and not one of control and coercion. They must work closely with the people. Civilian police are one component with the potential for an extended role in future peace support activities. The initiative taken by Sweden, during its Presidency of the United Nations Security Council last July, led to a Presidential statement in which the Council recognized an increasingly important role for the civilian police in contributing to the building of confidence and security in order to prevent conflict, to contain conflict, or to build peace in the aftermath of conflict.

Peace-building often includes investigating past violations of human rights and imposing a measure of accountability. As I mentioned earlier, closing the impunity gap is central to the credibility of international peace support. Human rights and peace are closely connected.

Electoral assistance has become much in demand from Governments. Many Governments seek the legitimacy which the United Nations offers. As the Secretary-General said in his report on Africa last year, "elections must...be part of a long-term undertaking that will lead to a strengthening of national institutions and democratic processes".

One important part of addressing the root-causes of conflicts is to improve weak and unstable government structures. Sound institutions, interfacing with an organised civil society, are critical for the necessary capacity of a state to
skillfully manage change. And changes are part of the development of any society.

To develop civil, open and pluralistic societies, to promote equal participation of all women and men in political life, to ensure an independent media, freedom of speech and the rule of law, are all part of building a sustainable peace. The capacity of a state to mediate, arbitrate and negotiate between different interest groups is as important as establishing a sound judicial process. These capacities are not only useful in a post-conflict context, but are also long-term conflict prevention instruments. Successful cases of international intervention help to reinforce a climate of positive norms. Post-conflict reconstruction and economic rehabilitation require a balancing act between the long-term needs of development and the more short-term demands of shoring up a fragile peace process. It is a delicate task to judge when it is safe for the external actors to withdraw without risking the country sliding back into war.

However, we should not try to build one universal model applicable to each and every conflict. It is rather about finding a way to design a tool-box from which to create the right blend on a case-by-case basis. It is about finding the right division of responsibility between global, regional and local actors, with respect to their different comparative advantages. We need to stimulate new and creative ways of establishing mechanisms for an international response when peace and security is threatened.

At this conference, certainly a number of important areas for future action have been identified. In conclusion, I would, from a Swedish perspective, briefly mention eight imperatives for operational improvement, which need to be further developed. These are areas where, in our view, much more could be done to improve the international peace support system. In other words, these are eight challenges which are still to be met, based on our experiences over the last five to ten years:

- Early warnings must be transformed into rapid and early coordinated action;
- Prevention and conflict management must, firstly, attend to the root causes and origins of tensions or crises. So called ‘structural prevention’ must be applied more often and ways of cooperating with NGOs improved;
- When so called ‘direct prevention’ is needed, it should be applied gradually. A ‘ladder of measures’, from fact-finding, good offices, arbitration, etc., should be tested before reaching deterrence and enforcement measures, as defined by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
- Conflict management should be comprehensive and integrated, that is, ‘multidimensional’. A whole spectrum of military, police, economic, humanitarian and political instruments should be possible to use, blended in a way which reflects the needs of each specific conflict;
• If peace enforcement is needed, it should be targeted and balanced with other ‘positive’ measures and take a forward-looking approach, that is, include a strategy of next and next-to-next steps;
• The mechanisms leading from deterrence to cooperation and from separation to confidence-building are crucial if peace enforcement is to lead to peace settlement;
• In order to achieve sustainable peace, post-conflict measures must be long-term oriented and include a large tool-box of instruments pertaining to the conflict resolution perspective; and,
• Peace agreements should always include clear verification instruments and be explicit on specific implementation measures.

How should we meet these shortcomings? Certainly, there is no easy answer, no quick-fix solution to these complex issues. However, beyond advocating greater ‘political will’ let me, very briefly, suggest some general tasks:
• More effectively disseminate lessons learned??;
• Improved research, not least on the ‘cause-effect’ of peace support measures;
• Improved training, both of the various actors, as well as integrated training;
• Further elaboration of United Nations instruments, but, also, not least on a regional level, in cooperation with, and support from, the United Nations;
• Further develop an international normative system to cope with the new types of so called ‘internal’ conflicts; and,
• More resources for peace support measures, in particular, for conflict prevention.

The challenges are evidently enormous. But, the potential for change is great. We owe it to the Founding Fathers of the United Nations, as well as to next generations of the 21st century, to further improve our peace support capacity.
United Nations Peace Keeping Support in the Region: Visions for the Future

BY: MAJOR GENERAL T. R. FORD,
Chief of Staff UNTSO, 20 October 1998

United Nations Peace Keeping Operations

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations peace-keeping, and the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations Supervision Organisation. UNTSO has earned its place in history as the first example of what has come to be known as “peace-keeping”. Since 1948, there have been forty-nine UN peacekeeping operations. Thirty-six of those were created since 1988, the year in which United Nations peacekeeping was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Well over 50,000 military and civilian police personnel, and thousands of other civilians, from 118 different countries, have served in the United Nations peace-keeping operations. No figures, however, can do justice to the ultimate sacrifice that more than 1,500 peacekeepers have made over this half century and gave their lives in the cause of peace.

Over the past year, the international community has begun to overcome its recent reluctance to make use of the United Nations peacekeeping capacity, and in this period the Security Council has authorised two new operations; one in the Central African Republic and the second in Sierra Leone.

United Nations peace-keeping clearly offers certain important advantages, including the legitimacy through endorsement by the UN Security Council, and the breadth of its experience of over 50 years in different regions and with different types of peacekeeping operations. Recently, this has been extended by UN experience in incorporating in the peacekeeping operation a substantive civilian component. A significant development over the past year has been the increase in civilian police operations, particularly following the withdrawal of military personnel, which has proved to be very useful in post-conflict situations. This development reflects a growing interest in the role that peacekeeping operations can play in helping to build human rights, law-enforcement and other institutions, and thus to strengthen the foundations of lasting peace.

At the same time, peace keeping continues to adapt to changing needs. The cooperation with regional organisations is growing and is now an important aspect, evident by the relationship established with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO in Europe, and with the Organisation of...
African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, where this year the UN established a liaison office. Since the causes of conflict are usually regional or local, regional organisations are particularly well suited to play an important role in early warning and preventive diplomacy. Therefore the UN is seeking, in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter, to create a real partnership, with a more rational and cost-effective division of labour, between those organizations and the United Nations. In July this year the Secretary-General invited the heads of regional organizations to a meeting in New York to discuss concrete steps to improve co-operation in preventing conflict.

The past year has seen some progress in the development of the UN stand-by arrangement system, which now includes 77 member states, with over 100,000 personnel pledged in the framework of the system. The headquarters of the United Nations stand-by forces High Readiness Brigade was inaugurated in Copenhagen in September 1997. It is also interesting to note that while the total number of peacekeepers in the field has declined since the early 90s, as a consequence of the winding down of several major operations, the actual number of UN peacekeeping operations has risen in the past year. Today there are some 14,500 military and police personnel deployed in 16 missions around the globe.

**Peace Keeping in the Middle East**

Three UN Peace Keeping Missions are now involved in the Middle East and have been in the region for some time. These are UNTSO, UNDOF and UNIFIL, involving military from some 27 Troop Contributing Nations plus international staff representing most of the 185 UN member states.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), established in 1948, is composed of unarmed military officer observers, deployed in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt (they were also deployed in Jordan until 1995), with the mandate to observe and maintain the cease-fire ordered by the UN Security Council in 1948 and to assist in the implementation of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and four neighboring Arab countries of 1949.

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), consists of some 1000 plus troops, established after the 1973 Middle East War to maintain a cease-fire between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation, as provided on Agreement on Disengagement of 31 May 1974.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), is composed of some 4500 troops, established to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. UNIFIL has been prevented from fully implementing its mandate. Israel has maintained its occupation of parts of south Lebanon, where the Israeli forces and their local auxiliary continue to be targets of attacks by groups that proclaim their resistance to the occupation. UNIFIL does its best to limit the conflict and protect the
Inhabitants of the area from the fighting. In doing so, it contributes to stability in the

JNTSO, UNDOF and UNIFIL have many common interests, hence the military officers of UNTSO deployed in the Golan Heights and South Lebanon, although under command of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, have been put under operational control of the Force Commanders of UNDOF and UNIFIL respectively. Whilst UNTSO continues to work closely with both UNIFIL and UNDOF and assist in the implementation of their mandates, it also shares wherever possible, common logistic and administrative support services in an effort to improve efficiency and cost savings.

The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) which the Force Commander Major General Tellefsen spoke about yesterday, also contributes to the stability in the region.

Let us expand a little on Peace keeping in the Region by using UNTSO as an example. UNTSO was the first peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations. The first group of UN military observers arrived in June 1948, and were deployed in Palestine and some areas of the neighbouring Arab countries, with the mandate to assist the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, in the supervision of the truce between Israel and Arab forces. With the conclusion of four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, in 1968, UNTSO's function was extended to assist the parties in supervising the implementation and observance of those Agreements.

What can be said about UNTSO's achievements? Could a peace keeping operation be considered successful if its mandate is still the same and the main goal still unfulfilled after fifty years? To answer these questions we have to look at UNTSO's accomplishments during this time.

The region has experienced a number of wars since 1948, which changed the cease-fire lines, and therefore affected the way UNTSO has functioned and deployed its military observers. UNTSO has moved with the cease-fire lines and has adapted to developments in bilateral relations and agreements, but its military servers remained in the area, acting as go-between for the hostile parties and as a bridge by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts. The military observers have operated with the consent of the parties, and are dependent on the cooperation of the parties for their effectiveness. There is no element of enforcement in their functioning, although their very presence is something of a deterrent to violations of the truce and, acting on the basis of United Nations resolutions, they exercise a degree of moral suasion.

Between 1949 and 1967 UNTSO observers continued to conduct patrols along the Armistice Demarkation Lines, and to supervise a neutral zone in Jerusalem and demilitarised zones in the Sinai and near Lake Tiberias. Following the 1967 war, UNTSO observers demarcated the cease-fire lines and established two cease-fire observation operations, in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. 1972, a similar operation was set up in southern Lebanon, but without the specific agreement of Israel.
UNTSO’s main responsibilities were also related to the work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), set up by the Armistice Agreements between Israel and four Arab countries. The main task of the Commission was the investigation and examination of the claims or complaints presented by the parties relating to the application and observance of the Armistice Agreements. UNTSO observers assigned to each Commission carried out the investigations of complaints submitted to the Commission.

Fifty years later, UNTSO has 152 military observers, supported by UN international and local civilian staff, still deployed throughout the region and their mandate has not been changed. At present, UNTSO maintains a Headquarters in Jerusalem, offices in Beirut and Damascus, and operates Observer Groups in the areas of Southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights and Sinai. Observer Group Golan works closely with UNDOF, manning 11 Observation Posts on both sides of the Area of Separation and assisting in Inspections in the Area of Limitation. Observer Group Lebanon mans 5 OPs on the Lebanese side of the Armistice line and works closely with UNIFIL. Observer Group Egypt maintains a UN presence in the Sinai behind the MFO. The Chief of Staff as Head of Mission reports on activities in the mission area through the DPKO to the Secretary General and is responsible to him.

From this brief account of UNTSO’s main activities and accomplishments, it is clear that UNTSO has played, and continues to play a very important and positive role in the turbulent Middle East developments.

Nevertheless, the achievement of the mandate cannot occur purely on the resolve and the effort of the peace keeping mission, but in concurrence with the commitment and the support of the parties to the dispute. UNTSO’s mandate is linked to the accomplishment of the final peaceful settlement, which is still an unfulfilled aim. Peace agreements have been concluded between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan, and peace talks on all other tracks were launched in the beginning of 1990s with high hopes and expectations. Unfortunately the process, initiated at the Madrid conference, is stalled at present. Israeli - Palestinian negotiations have been deadlocked for the last nineteen months, and talks between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon have been frozen since 1996. Multilateral economic regional cooperation and joint projects are also facing enormous difficulties.

Recent Developments

The role of diplomacy, especially preventive diplomacy, is central to virtually all United Nations efforts. In accordance with Article 1 of the UN Charter, which calls for effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, the UN Secretariat is trying to move the emphasis from curing the conflicts to preventing potential crisis.

Conflict prevention, therefore, should be one of the United Nations’ deepest commitments, yet there is still too little emphasis on preventive action. Preventing potential conflicts from crossing the threshold of violence requires early warning
of situations with the potential for crisis, proper analysis, an integrated preventive strategy, and the political will and resources to implement such a strategy. During the past year, often in difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions, the United Nations has been engaged in the sensitive diplomacy of peacemaking, where success in preventing conflict often goes unremarked. The mission of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan to Baghdad in February was undoubtedly an exercise in preventive diplomacy. He has also appointed prominent and skilled diplomats, from the international community as well as the United Nations, to serve his personal representatives in situations of actual or potential conflict. Their tasks have ranged from information-gathering to mediation.

Perhaps the most delicate kind of preventive diplomacy is that which seeks to bring about reconciliation between antagonistic political forces within a country, in the hope of preventing or resolving conflicts which, if left to escalate, might in time become a direct threat to international peace and security. This was the purpose of the Secretary-General’s mission to Nigeria at the end of June. Another sensitive mission was the information-gathering panel of eminent personalities that visited Algeria in July and August. In such cases, an invitation from the Government of the Member State concerned is an essential prerequisite for involvement.

Both peace keeping and disarmament can also contribute significantly to conflict prevention. Peacekeeping can be a valuable tool for conflict prevention. Peacekeeping forces are generally deployed only after, or during, a conflict, usually under the terms of a cease-fire agreement, but their main task is to prevent violence from flaring up again.

Unfortunately, preventive deployment of peace-keeping forces confronts many political obstacles. In general, only the spectacle of actual violence, with all its tragic consequences, convinces the parties to the conflict, potential coop-contributing countries and the Security Council of the utility or necessity of deploying a peacekeeping force. Late in 1992, the Security Council did, however, take the unprecedented decision to establish a presence of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as a preventive measure. The force deployed, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), remains the sole example of a purely preventive United Nations force.

Post-conflict peace-building involves integrated and co-ordinated actions aimed at addressing the root causes of violence and in laying the foundations for a durable peace. Post-conflict peace-building may be seen as a long-term conflict prevention strategy. There has been a growing recognition of the need to link all aspects of external support for countries afflicted by conflict, whether political, humanitarian, developmental or human rights. The participation of donor Governments, host Governments and non-governmental organizations to meet this need is essential.
Future Relevance

The international community and the UN will remain committed to the peaceful resolution of the Middle East problems, and the UN peace-keeping operations will continue to execute their functions and responsibilities, but as in all conflict, it is up to the parties to overcome current difficulties, and to pursue the path of peace. The parties are already engaged in a process which will either move forward or backwards, but can not for long remain stalled. It is therefore essential that all parties commit themselves to a comprehensive peace based on the principles enshrined in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and reflected in the documents of the Madrid conference and the Oslo accords.

The current stalemate is primarily a crisis of confidence and trust. The parties are sceptical of each other’s good faith and willingness to carry out their side of the bargain. Nevertheless, the political map of the Middle East has changed profoundly in this decade, and the parties have begun to treat one another as partners, not as enemies. There is no viable alternative to this; the status quo is untenable; and potentially grave consequences loom, should the process fail. Of course, many problems remain and forging a lasting peace is not easy, but the parties must persevere on the path of co-operation and search for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East. The United Nations Peace Keeping Missions (plus the MFO) by their presence and actions will continue to provide support in many ways, including confidence building, to the total process.

The UN peace-keeping role and ongoing operations in the Middle East are ever more important in preserving the cease-fire between the parties. At the same time, the UN should continue to be engaged in the quiet diplomacy in the Middle East, as it has been during the past year, and to support all ongoing efforts to revive and advance the peace process.

Experience has shown that keeping the peace (in the sense of avoiding a relapse into armed conflict) and providing humanitarian assistance (as UNRWA has been doing for 3.4 million refugees) are essential, but not sufficient conditions for establishing the foundation for an enduring peace. Peace-keeping must be supplemented by peace building. Regional economic and social development, as well as support to a civil society, are important dimensions of the peace process, which must be pursued simultaneously with the ongoing peace negotiations.

In conclusion, the United Nations has demonstrated in recent years that it will continue to develop its overall peace keeping capacity. There will be an emphasis on preventative diplomacy, including progress on international agreements that assist in the building of a peaceful environment around the world, supported by cooperation with regional security organisations, and the ability for timely response by UN peace keeping missions that are appropriately structured, integrated, well trained and supported.
Peace is an irreversible strategic option for Jordan, which seeks by all means to make it just, comprehensive, durable and everlasting. The success and continuity of the Peace Process requires bilateral, regional and international cooperation. Jordan’s concept of a comprehensive peace is based not only on ending the state of war, or signing a peace treaty, rather on establishing peaceful relations and full cooperation among the peoples of the region, to include economic, cultural, security, political, scientific and social cooperation.

Since the conclusion of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Jordan took practical measures to ensure the success and continuity of the Peace Process. This was done through direct and effective contacts, that HM King Hussein and HRH Crown Prince Hassan, the Regent, made with the concerned regional and international parties. This helped the advancement of the Peace Process.

It should be noted here, that although some procedures have already been implemented to support the Peace Process, other procedures still have to be implemented in order to enhance, develop, and give credibility to peace, in order to make it durable and acceptable to the generations to come.

I Implemented Procedures:

- Jordan has committed itself to the full implementation of the Peace Treaty with Israel. It has established normal relations with Israel in various fields, such as the economic and cultural fields. Jordan is still participating in the bilateral committees with Israel for cooperation and coordination in the environmental, energy and water fields.

- Jordan made intensive contacts, under the supervision of His Majesty the King and Crown Prince Hassan, with all parties concerned in the Peace Process, in order to urge them to protect the process and its achievements, and maintain its continuity, in order to eventually achieve comprehensive peace. It should be noted here, that whenever the Peace Process faced serious obstacles and difficulties, Jordan’s role has been effective in reconciling different views of the parties involved. For example, the Hebron Agreement, and the Crown Prince’s role in bringing the Palestinians and the Israelis back to the negotiating table on the US’s initiative.
• Jordan has established security cooperation against all forms of terrorism, especially terrorism directed against the Peace Process, with all parties and at all levels.

• Jordan supports the Palestinian Authority as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. And continue providing the Palestinian Authority with all technical, and administrative assistance, in order to help it in establishing its social and civic institutions.

• Jordan has opened dialogue with the deferent political parties in Israel, and with Jewish communities all over the world, in order to enhance understanding between our peoples and religions, which could be a helping factor in promoting peace and trust between the peoples of the region.

• The Jordanian government has encouraged all sectors of Jordanian society to initiate economic, cultural, and tourism exchanges with Israel, in order to overcome the psychological barrier that has existed over the years. To exploit the opportunities of peace, Jordan has also received popular delegations representing different sectors of Israeli society, and has offered them all necessary co-operation. We have also encouraged contact between all parties which support the Peace Process.

• Jordan has played a positive and effective role in the multilateral talks, in order to achieve comprehensive peace in the region. It has also participated in the MENA economic conferences in Casablanca, Amman, Cairo and Doha.

• Jordan has rejected and resisted all internal and external pressures exerted against it by certain regional countries, in order to force it to freeze its peace treaty and normalization process with Israel.

• Jordan has called for dialogue to resolve political disputes between the different parties. Especially between Israelis and Palestinians, in order to reach mutual understanding and avoid any escalation that might affect the building of trust, which is essential for the continuity of the Peace Process, such as, the expansion of Israeli settlements, the AL-Aqsa Mosque tunnel,... various security incident.

• Jordan has taken a firm stand on certain policies and incidents that threatened the Peace Process, such as, the attempt on the life of Khalid Meshali, the expansion of the municipality of Jerusalem, and the delay by Israel in implementing certain Articles of the Israeli-Palestinian Accord.

• The openness of the Jordanian mass media, television channels in particular, that conduct direct dialogue and debate with various Jordanian and Israeli political figures. In order to engage public opinion on ways to enhance the Peace Process and provide an opportunity for the public to understand views of the different parties.
- Jordan has called, and still calls upon Arab states and Israel to revive the stalled talks, on the Syrian-Israeli track and on the Lebanese-Israeli track, in order to achieve a comprehensive peace. Jordan is ready to make the necessary efforts for the success of these talks, in coordination with Egypt, the USA, Europe and all parties concerned.

II. The Promotion, Continuity And Success Of Peace: Measures and Applications.

Despite the achievements made on the Jordanian-Israeli track, the Peace Process is still faltering on the main Palestinian – Israeli track, and has reached a stalemate on the Syrian – Lebanese – Israeli tracks. Threatening the continuity of the peace process and the stability of the entire region. In order to ensure the success of the Peace Process, the following should be considered:

- All parties should respect and should commit themselves to the accords signed by them, and should fulfil all the obligations of these accords in order to give credibility to Peace Process regionally and internationally.

- All parties should intensify their efforts in order to achieve tangible progress on the Palestinian-Israeli track, such as, the implementation of the Second Phase of the Re-deployment, and the fulfillment of the remaining obligations of the Interim Phase, according to the signed accords, in order to build mutual trust before passing to the final stages of the negotiations.

- No party should undertake unilateral actions regarding the issues of the final stage, such as, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, water, etc. All parties should encourage a positive atmosphere, avoid any provocative actions, such as, collective punishment, the destruction of homes, violations of Holy sites, refrain from action that could undermine the Peace Process, and do their utmost efforts in the security field.

Economic support for Jordan and the Peace Camp countries from foreign donors will enable these countries to tackle their economic problems. To support peace economies, with the aim of making the peace dividend felt by ordinary people. Jordan is facing most serious economic difficulties, which have a negative affect on popular support for the Peace Process.

- Israeli obstacles and measures which impede trade movement between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority should be removed.

- Regional economic projects should be promoted by the International Community to enhance economic cooperation and improve the standard of living.

- Building peace require the enhancement of the spirit of openness, coexistence and cooperation, rather than hiding behind the fort mentality, and replace the security obsession by trust and security building measures for all.
• Developing bilateral and regional security co-operation to fight terrorism, drugs, crime, smuggling, etc... in order to address the factors and reasons behind terrorism and curb the activities of various radical and terrorist groups in all countries.

• To prevent the expansion, and then to eliminate, weapons of mass destruction and arms race in the region, and promote social and economic development.

• Regional co-operation, to tackle the water problem in the region, and to make it a factor of cooperation and development, and provide material, technical and scientific assistance in this regard.

• The success of the Peace Process requires the co-operation of all parties concerned, especially the USA and Europe. In order to encourage all parties to ensure the success of a comprehensive and lasting peace, that will reflect positively on international peace and security, also guarantee international interests in the region.
Peacekeeping Operations

BY: TERRY JOHNSON & PATRICK DOYLE
Monterey Naval Postgraduate School, department of National Security Affairs - USA

(NOT AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT)
Data provided by the United Nations, the United States Mission to the United Nations, and the U.S. Department of Defense (Dat

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**GRAND TOTAL 56**

* 1 ECOMOG Peacekeeping force consists of troops from Western Africa and numbers between 7,000 - 10,000. Nigeria has contributed up to 80% of the troop strength.
# MINURSO
**United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara**

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## United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

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TOTAL: 26   35   655

GRAND TOTAL: 726

*1 Nordic Battalion (+)
UNOMIG
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

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UNDOF
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force-Golan Heights

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**GRAND TOTAL: 1099**
### UNIFIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

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### UNTSO
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

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# MFO

**Multinational Force and Observers - Sinai**

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* Civilian support contractor: Holmes and Narver Service Inc: 450 personnel*
The Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations in the ME: Lessons for the Future

BY: MOHAMMAD K. SHIYYAB  
Director, Department for Security Studies-Hordan

Introduction

Throughout its history, the United Nation's aim has been to prevent a dangerous situation from escalating into war, to persuade opposing parties to solve their problems peacefully, to help restore peace or at least halt the fighting, and more recently, to render humanitarian aid and supervise elections. To achieve this, the United Nations has acted through peacekeeping forces, observer or fact-finding missions (dispatched by: the Security Council or the General Assembly) good offices missions, mediators and special representatives. Since its early days, the United Nations has been concerned with the problems of the Middle East. That was in response to hostilities which have broken out at various times in the course of five decades. The involvement of UN peacekeeping forces in our region has been such a varied, Intensive and a changing one. The aim of my talk today is, to highlight some aspects of the UN forces involvement and effectiveness in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, with the view of learning and emphasizing some lessons that might be useful for future application in our region.

Some Important Lessons

Since no two/peacekeeping operations are exactly the same, there can be no standard form of fixed rules governing their interpretation and implementation. Each operation requires to be planned and mounted in order to meet the circumstances of the dispute and the nature of the environment in which the force will be operating. Therefore, UN peacekeeping operations have been most successful in cases of interstate hostilities, where belligerents have consented to the deployment of international forces after achieving a diplomatic agreement. Good examples of such forces are: the United-Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai (UNEF I from 1956-1967 and UNEF II from 1973-1982) as well as the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (from 1974 until the present). Similarly, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) deployed in Sinai under American initiative since 1982 has followed the traditional UN model and performed its mission unchallenged.
More problematic, however, are cases where peacekeeping forces are interposed in the midst of a civil conflict. In an environment of ongoing confrontation between civil actors, it becomes very difficult to adhere to norms of neutrality and restrictive rules of engagement. As a result, to fulfil their mandate, the UN peacekeeping forces may easily be drawn into enforcement actions better labelled as "collective intervention". Such was the case in Beirut, where hostilities intensified and the contingents of the Multi-national Force became embroiled in the fighting from 1982-84. Another instance of UN ineffectiveness was in May 1967 when the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. U-Thant hastened the advent of a deadly war by instructing the UNEF to evacuate Sinai without consulting the Security Council or the General Assembly which resulted in the 1967 War.

Past and present experiences of peacekeeping operations have helped the UN adopt a flexible approach which should be developed further to formulate an accurate definition of what peacekeeping functions might be. The original role of standing between hostile forces has been expanded to encompass, among other functions, the maintenance of security or stability within a given area, the monitoring of elections, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the disarmament of insurgents.

This flexibility greatly enhances the value of peacekeeping forces as an instrument of the Security Council in dealing with potential or existing conflicts.

Furthermore, the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations would be highly influenced by two main considerations/limitations: first, peacekeeping has to be undertaken without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned, peacekeepers must be viewed as neutral, and are not there to conduct combat operations. Their combat role is non-existent, and their weapons serve only for immediate self-defense should the situation deteriorate. Recourse to force may signal the failure of the mission. Second, peacekeeping operations have been successfully undertaken only with the consent of all the parties in the conflict as means of ensuring that peace has a chance of growing through a continuing political dialogue.

Possible Future UN Roles in the Region

Israel’s acute security concerns may inhibit any third-party’s role as a serious factor in a settlement. Despite deep differences among the political parties on defence policy and security issues, with positive developments of the peace process which might culminate in the signing of new agreements, peacekeepers, as in many previous cases, are likely to be summoned to the West Bank and Gaza for lack of acceptable alternative options. It would therefore be important to think creatively about a compromise solution that might meet the minimal requirements of the Palestinians and the Israelis. For each of the contemplated stages of the ongoing peace process, one might
compare the positions advocated by both the Palestinians and Israelis, demonstrating where the introduction of peacekeepers might help bridge some of the existing gaps.

If a peace treaty is reached between Syria and Israel, it would involve, inter alia, Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights coupled with security arrangements in the vacated territory. This in turn could involve a demilitarized buffer, with limited-forces zones on both Israeli and Syrian sides, to be monitored by peacekeeping forces and an early-warning system. Given the successful experience of the MFO in the Sinai, it is reasonable to expect that the Syrians and Israelis might prefer a third-party MFO-type force (possibly involving U.S. troops) to assure aerial monitoring which would reinforce the verification of compliance to the provisions of any peace treaty between both parties.

Conclusion

In 1945, as a part of the preparatory planning leading to the setting up of the United Nations, a number of meetings were held at Hunter College, New York, Among them was a meeting of the Military Chiefs of Staff of the Western Alliance nations, which had successfully prosecuted the war against Germany and Japan. The aim of their meeting was to formulate a strategy and role for the armed forces for the maintenance of international security in the Post-World War II era. Today, the world is faced with ever increasing violence, largely of an intrastate nature which poses threats to national and regional security, some of which have the potential to threaten international peace and security. It, therefore, seems appropriate to the members of this distinguished audience that a complete reappraisal is necessary of the existing structures, mechanisms and procedures required in the operational planning and conduct of the United Nation's peacekeeping and peace support operations. Also required, is a definitive study of the role which the armed forces can play in the prevention of conflict and post-conflict rehabilitation phases.

Further, I submit to you that it might be appropriate for a repeat meeting to be held, at which the military chiefs from countries whose armed forces have participated in UN peacekeeping operations since 1956 would consider and define new perspectives for the role of armed forces and to update their thinking on strategy and concepts in the maintenance of global security. Such a meeting could lead to the establishment of some form of a security structure which would study, analyse and consider all implications of global security up to and into the 21st Century.

To conclude, please allow me to emphasize that wars are serious and costly business. We can do much better in utilizing available resources to meeting peoples expectations of a better life. The role of war in human affairs has changed over the years. In the past, wars were limited in space and effect on civilians. The human cost of wars has become too high to afford. Since the
Second World War, at least 50 million civilian casualties including 20 million deaths, were caused by wars and conflicts, mostly in developing countries. Regional and multilateral bodies are multiplying. With all its imperfections, the United Nations is still the main incarnation of the global spirit. It alone seeks to present a vision of humankind in organic unit and larger units of international cooperation. We must, therefore, do our utmost to support the UN in all its future endeavours.
Cooperation and Coordination: 
Civilians, Civil Police and the Military

BY: LT. GEN. JOHAN HEDERSTEDT
Military Advisor, Ministry of Defense - Stockholm
Department for International and Security Affairs

I. Civil-military Cooperation

In civil and military terms, peace support and humanitarian operations can be divided into the following main categories:

- civil and humanitarian operations with civil resources,
- civil and humanitarian operations with the help of military resources,
- multifunctional operations with both civil and military resources, military operations.

The new generation of peace support operations directed at other types of conflict than the traditional ones between nations have called for new responses by the UN, regional organizations and other actors with respect to planning, structuring and implementation. The broadened security concept, which focuses not only on the security of nations but also that of the individual, requires a broader perspective. This means that right from the planning stage, an operation should be related to the overall political concerns, and civil humanitarian considerations taken into account. Thus coordination of the various components of a peace support operation is necessary from the outset and continuously thereafter. Civil, humanitarian and military efforts must be better coordinated, not only in the field but also at the analysis and planning stages. The normative work at gradually establishing a common international perspective on the different aspects of peace support operations has to include experience from earlier and ongoing missions.

II. What is civil-military cooperation and coordination?

In this presentation civil-military cooperation and coordination means primarily cooperation between international civil, police and military operations. Only to a limited extent does the concept include cooperation between military operations and local authorities, businesses and individuals — and then chiefly only when it affects the likelihood of completing civil operations in the area, or when it concerns carrying out such operations together with local authorities or businesses.

With respect to military operations, two principle types of military-civil cooperation can be distinguished: firstly, planning and implementing the
military unit's own civil projects. This can be done either by providing equipment, personnel and materials, or by planning and monitoring projects that are then carried out by local groups. The first method is the one used by the Swedish contingent in Bosnia and, to some extent, the Finnish – whereas the Norwegians, Danes and, increasingly, the British prefer the latter. The second type of military-civil cooperation is support of the operations of other civil organizations. For example - by providing logistics support, security information, protection, information on relief requirements, etc. From the point of view of the mission as a whole, the principle purpose of civil-military cooperation and coordination according to the above reasoning is to get all the bodies in a region working together towards a common goal. For the different civil and military organizations active in the area, however, the principle purpose, naturally enough, is to more efficiently achieve their own immediate objectives of their presence. This is illustrated by the goal of the civil-military cooperation and coordination chosen by the Nordic-Polish brigade in Bosnia: “The aim is to establish and maintain cooperation to achieve synergetic effects to support the military unit’s operations.”

III. Reasons for the military to engage in civil projects or civil-military cooperation/support

At least six different specific reasons are usually given why military contingents should carry out civil operations:

1) Situations can arise in which the military units the only ones that can perform a particular task.. For example, the security situation in an area may make it impossible for a civil organization to distribute food.

2) It may be necessary to take measures in order to secure essential resources for the military unit, such as water, electricity and usable roads. Such resources can also be useful to a certain extent for the local civilian population.

3) Civil operations can be a means of entering an area that otherwise be difficult to gain access to, in order to gather information and intelligence.

4) Civil operations can create good relations with the local population and “Force Protection”. This contact can contribute to early warning of any threat to the contingent that may be impending, and the contact itself can also reduce the risk of the contingent being subject to attack or threat.

5) Civil operations can be a means of preparing the ground to make it easier to carry out the principle military tasks, for example by achieving better communication with local leaders.

6) Soldiers feel better if they can do something concrete for the local population –not least as a break in the monotonous routine of surveillance and patrolling, the point of which can be difficult for average infantryman to see.
The first reason hardly needs any further explanation or clarification. The second, third, fourth and fifth may facilitate for the contingent to carry out its primary objective, while the benefit to the local population are secondary. The four reasons are ranked in descending order with respect to the need for direction from the military contingent. The sixth and last reason means that the civil tasks are performed in order to improve the situation for the contingent without having the same direct significance as reasons 2-5 for the success of the primary task. What is clear from the above is that we can, somewhat provocatively, call reasons 2-6 “selfish” reasons, from a military point of view.

The fact that operations are carried out first and foremost to benefit the military contingent and not to meet local needs, does not necessarily mean that they are misdirected or of no use. However, there is a distinct risk that the operations are primarily steered by other criteria than local needs, with respect to content as well as implementation. There is also a risk that operations are not pursued with sufficient tenacity if the contingent is given other, higher priority tasks within the framework of the primary task. For example, the primary task of the contingent in Bosnia is still the military one. Several unit commanders in Bosnia have pointed out that, if they were forced to interrupt civil projects because they were superseded by the military task, it would be a considerable blow to local trust and appreciation.

IV. Reasons for civil organizations to engage in civil–military cooperation and coordination

NGOs and international organizations are normally short-staffed. An international organization often has its limited personnel spread out throughout the area, whereas an NGO typically has its operations in one or a few geographically limited areas. The civil organizations can thus benefit from the military contingents’ contract networks and local knowledge. An example of this is the use of an RRTF as the “ears and eyes” of a civil operation.

For the national relief organizations, the main motive for greater coordination is - according to several NGOs, cost efficiency. The military personnel, who are already being paid, are used to identify, plan and lead/monitor projects. If NGOs were to be used instead, their administrative, transport, wage costs, etc, would have to be paid out of the relief allocation. The military unit is also able to establish a broad network of contacts in the area and has good local knowledge. This is of benefit to varying degrees - both with respect to civil projects led by the military - and when contingents support the operations of the civil organizations.

V. Differences Between Civil and Military Organizations

There are differences in working methods, conditions and attitudes between civil and military organizations, which could create problems in cooperation between the two. Military operations are carried out at the instruction of governments and are conducted under their auspices within the framework of a supra-or international body. Only a few civil operations are organized in this
way. Instead, there are often a number of smaller NGOs operating at local level and under local agreements. This means that any national control of operations is much weaker, which is often exacerbated by the fact that civil operations receive their funds from a wide spectrum of donors, including private individuals, organizations, states and supranational bodies.

Another difference is the time frame. While civil reconstruction projects assume a presence for several years – sometimes decades – military units are often in an area for relatively short periods. This affects how different operations are carried out, how quickly they must be completed, and what their supplementary purposes are. It can also affect the way the local population regards the operations.

A further difference, which is linked to the foregoing, is that between “doing for” and “doing with”. While civil operations are largely carried out by local manpower -- one of the purposes could actually be to stimulate local employment activities- the military often carry out the civil projects themselves with their own soldiers providing the manpower. This could also mean – apart from lost job opportunities – that the local population does not take on responsibility for the maintenance and continuation of the project once it has been carried out.

Finally, civil organizations tend to be less hierarchical, their senior management younger (which can also mean less experienced) than their military counterparts, they are small, have quicker decision-making processes, etc. This can lead to misunderstanding and mistrust. It is not uncommon for civil organizations to regard the military as “militaristic Rambos” and the military side to view the civil actors as “woolly”.

VI. Police in Peace Support Operations: The Security Gap

Approximately 25% of the personnel involved in UN-led operations are police. More than 1,600 Swedish police officers have participated in 15 UN missions and today some 100 Swedes are serving in different operations around the world, primarily under the auspices of the UN and the OSCE, but also in the WEU project in Albania. Sweden estimates that the police can play an increasingly both in the UN Security Council and nationally to develop this capacity.

During Sweden’s presidency of the Security Council in July 1997 an initiative was launched aimed at highlighting the potential of the police component for peace support operations. The Security Council urged Member States to seek to improve national police training and develop their capacity to put further police personnel at the UN’s disposal at short notice. Perhaps the most important experience gained from operations organized by the UN – is that the police must be seen as a separate component also in the early planning phases of a new mission, not just as a supplement to the military contingent. Emphasis was also given to the need for geographically balanced recruitment and the need to recruit female police officers. The importance of close
coordination between police, military, humanitarian and other civil components of UN operations was also stressed. Police aspects should be reflected more than at present in all parts of an operation, from working out the mandate, through planning, implementation and monitoring to "lessons learned". Sweden, on its part, has decided to appoint a special police adviser to the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations.

The UN, OSCE, and other organizations should be encouraged to develop their thinking in the area, not least with regard to guidelines and "doctrine" for the use of police in peace support operations. Practical questions should also be looked at, such as the police "rules of engagement" in an operation, their equipment, civil-military cooperation, decision-making processes in an operation, the use of weapons, and the role of the police with respect to the judicial and political systems in the host country.

VII. Maintaining Order and Security for the Population

In a situation characterized by open conflict and the breakdown of the national judicial system. The first and essential task for a peace support operation is the creation of basic stability and security by separating the warring parties and then monitoring a cease-fire. This is a task that can be solved by a military contingent that is part of an international peace support command. It is now quite usual for a police unit to be included in this type of command. In order to achieve sustainable peace, a peace support operation should aim also at institution building, e.g. through assistance in establishing a judicial system based on respect for human rights. The work is done initially by monitoring the national police, for example on joint patrols and regular visits to police stations. Any violations of national legislation or of human rights are automatically reported to higher levels of the UN system. The work is later extended to include national police training. Important elements in this activity are establishing principles for how a police force operates in a state under the rule of law and disseminating human rights information.

Between the task of creating security by using a military unit to separate or disarm warring parties and the task of helping to establish a judicial system – which is the task of the international police component. There is also what is called Grey area – who is to be responsible for creating security for the population in the conflict area in question. In the areas where peace support units are operating, a situation often exists in which the national forces of law and order and the judicial apparatus have not yet begun to function. At the same time there are individuals or groups who use extreme political violence. They represent a threat to the population at the same time as they seriously obstruct the success of international efforts. In situations like this, international peace support operations are needed in order to maintain order and security for the local population. There is a tendency for this task to fall between the mandates of the military contingents and the police component – that is, in a grey area. In some peace support operations it has been laid down in the mandate that the peace support unit is to be responsible for law and order (UNIFIL in Lebanon).
VII. Conclusion

The societies that are affected by conflict need the help of the international community in a number of areas simultaneously – conflict resolution, security enhancement, humanitarian measures, and institution-building also economic development assistance. It has become clear that the number of actors present in a conflict area will soon be too large to be monitored. Local institutions, foreign military and/or police contingents, international organizations - within and outside the UN system, regional intergovernmental organizations, bilateral assistance organizations and a large number of NGOs of varying sizes and types.

All in all, the indication is that there is a need for better understanding and mutual respect between civil and military organizations with regard to each other’s working methods and comparative advantages.