THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF PEACE OPERATIONS
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Edited By

Amos G. Adedeji and Istifanus S. Zabadi
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and
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THE REGIONAL DIMENSION
OF PEACE OPERATIONS
IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
Arrangements, Relationships, and the
United Nations Responsibility for
International Peace and Security

Proceedings of the Abuja International Seminar of
the Project on Challenges of Peace Operations: Into
the 21st Century
31 May – 4 June 2004

Edited by

AMOS G. ADEDEJI
and
ISTIFANUS S. ZABADI

National War College
Abuja, Nigeria
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FOREWORD

Regional peace operations have been a growing feature of peace operations generally, since the 1990s. Such operations have been mounted by regional organizations in Africa and Europe, mostly by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau, and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Considering the prominent role which Nigeria played in pioneering this process in the West Africa sub-region and the military, political, diplomatic and humanitarian issues which she has had to deal with in initiating and sustaining these operations, it was a fitting honour for our country to host the 14th edition of the Challenges of Peace Operations Seminar and, thereby, formally join the multilateral network of partner countries that are involved in the Challenges Project.

This book is a compilation of edited versions of the papers that were presented at the Abuja Seminar, which was held from 31st May to 4th June 2004. As the organizers of the Seminar had intended from the onset, this compilation covers a wide range of the issues that have been encountered repeatedly, not only in the management of regional peace operations in general, but particularly in the relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations in the conduct of such operations.

I am delighted to note that this book is a further addition to the already considerable but yet growing body of literature that has been generated by the Challenges Project since its inception in 1997. We hope that the richness, depth, diversity and relevance of its contents will add both to academic discourse on peace operations and to practical knowledge towards achieving improvements in the field in the 21st century. We also hope that the issues that have been raised and addressed in this volume will enrich the Phase II Concluding Report of the Challenges Project which is due for publication in 2005.

Furthermore, I am pleased to note that with this publication, the National War College, Nigeria, is continuing to honour its obligations as a strong Partner Organization of the Challenges Project and as the contact institution between the Nigerian peace operations community and other partner organizations worldwide. Our partners can be assured that we will always fulfill our obligations as a responsible member.
country and that we shall apply the outcome of the Project scrupulously, towards enhancing our nation’s performance in the peace operations of the 21st century.

Finally, I congratulate the many experts – diplomats, soldiers and scholars – who, from their various fields of endeavour, contributed to this important work. In pursuit of our goal of achieving greater success in peace operations, and more fundamentally in preventing the eruption of violent conflicts in the first place, I am sure that this book will prove a very valuable material for all those involved in this global enterprise.

Lt Gen Martin L. Agwai
Chief of Army Staff
Headquarters, Nigerian Army
Abuja, Nigeria.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The National War College, Nigeria, located in Abuja had the privilege of hosting the 14th International Seminar of the Challenges of Peace Operations Project, which took place from 31 May to 4 June 2004. In keeping with the tradition that has evolved along with the Project over the years, the College has compiled the proceedings of that august gathering in book form. I consider it a further privilege to be afforded this opportunity to make a few remarks about this publication and to also acknowledge all those who contributed to its timely completion.

In terms of structure, this book is divided into 3 main parts. Part 1 contains the 21 speeches and papers that were presented by distinguished guests, project coordinators and lead presenters at the Abuja Seminar. These papers are published under the five main sessions of the seminar during which they were presented. This was done in order to retain the thematic foci of the sessions under which they were presented. Thus, apart from the speeches during the Opening Ceremony, the rest of the papers in Part 1 are grouped under the following sections: a) Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations; b) Regional Organizations and the Challenges of Initiating and Sustaining Peace Operations; c) International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations; and d) Coordination and Cooperation between organizations in building capacity for effective peace operations.

Part 2 of the compilation opens with an Executive Summary of the entire seminar. Also in this Part are the Rappourteurs’ reports of the presentations as well as the discussions that followed at each session. Part 3 is a compilation of 9 appendices which, by providing information that enables us to appreciate the Abuja Seminar in its full and proper perspective, lends greater value to the entire work.

In reading the papers published under the five main sessions indicated above, the reader may need to bear in mind that the views expressed by their presenters do not necessarily reflect the views held by either Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, the National War College, Nigeria, or even the organizations and institutions from which such presenters came to participate in the Seminar. This is because the purpose of the Seminar was not to assemble officially-held positions on issues, but to encourage original and independent insights into the subject of the Seminar. It must also be mentioned that in most cases, minor editorial changes have
made with a view to ensuring factual accuracy and clarity of language, have not in any way detracted from the very high and impressive quality of the presentations.

The making of a book necessarily involves the efforts and inputs of several individuals and even organizations. I would therefore like to express my sincere appreciation to all those who contributed in diverse ways to the completion of this endeavour.

First, I am most grateful to those who helped us in organizing the Abuja Seminar, at which the speeches and papers in this volume were presented. In this regard, we are particularly indebted to Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden led by Ambassador Michael Sahlin and his able staff, Mr Jonas Alberoth, Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg and Ms Charlotte Svenson, along with all the other Swedish partners of the Challenges Project. We are also very grateful to Lt Gen Martin L. Agwai, Chief of Army Staff, Nigeria, for his immense contribution to the success of the Seminar.

Our sincere gratitude also goes to all those whose speeches and presentations provided the materials for this compilation. In this regard, I am profoundly grateful to our Honourable Minister for Defence, Alhaji Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso and our Honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, whose Welcome and Keynote Addresses respectively, set the high tone that was followed by subsequent speakers. I am also grateful to the many distinguished diplomats, scholars and senior military officers whose presentations constitute the core of this publication.

Among these, I must mention the following: Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS; Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director, Peace and Security at the African Union headquarters; Ambassador Souren Serayderian, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General at the United Nations Mission in Liberia; Dr Glyn Berry, Minister Counselor of the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN and also Chair of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations Working Group; Ambassador Murat Bilhan, Director, Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey; Mr Mannuel Bessler, Senior Adviser at the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance; Prof Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, Chairman of the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Turkey; Ms Sebnem Udum, also of the same institution; Ms Vivienne O’Connor of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland; Prof Erling Dessau of the United Nations University of Peace in Costa Rica; Lt Gen Martin Agwai, Chief of Staff
of the Nigerian Army; Brig Sten Edholm, Commander, Standing High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations based in Copenhagen; Col Festus Aboagye (rtd), Head of Training for Peace Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa; Gp Capt Garry Dunbar, Director, United Nations and Peace Operations, International Policy Division, Australian Defence Headquarters; Mr Lars Forste, Assistant Commissioner, National Criminal Investigation Division of the Swedish National Police; and Ms Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, member of the Executive Board, Femmes Africa Solidarite. Each of these persons whose papers are contained in this volume can be assured of our continual appreciation and gratitude.

My special thanks further go to all staff of the National War College, Nigeria, who worked diligently during the Seminar and in the processes of compiling, editing and producing this book. In particular, I would like to commend, Dr Istifanus S. Zabadi, Director of Research and Publications, and Mr Nnamdi K. Obasi, Research Fellow, for their untiring exertions throughout all the stages of the Seminar and also for their diligent efforts in seeing to the production of this book along with Ms Julie G. Sanda, Research Fellow, and Dr Joses G. Yoroms, Research Fellow, for their very valuable contributions. My appreciation further goes to Mr Danladi Bot, Mr Moses Owolabi, Mr Francis Nwaoha, Mr Musa Dangrem, Mr Woyengikuro Kosuowei and Mr Chukwuma Ezekwe who provided the secretarial and graphic services without which this book would remain incomplete.

To all these persons, and indeed to many others too numerous to mention, I thank you very much and hope that this final product has done justice to your endeavours.

Rear Admiral Amos Adeleji
Commandant
National War College
Abuja, Nigeria.
GLOBAL NETWORK OF PARTNER ORGANISATIONS OF THE CHALLENGES PROJECT
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Dr Istifanus S. Zabadi
Dr. Joses G. Yoroms
Ms Julie G. Sanda
Mr Nnamdi K. Obasi
DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to victims of conflicts in Africa and to all those who have committed themselves to prevent, manage and stop such conflicts.
PART 1

FULL TEXT OF ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT OPENING CEREMONY AND MAIN SESSIONS
OPENING SESSION
WELCOME ADDRESS

by

Alhaji Rabiu Kwankwaso


I particularly wish to extend our warm Nigerian welcome to our partners from other countries and organizations. The Project Coordinators of the Challenges Project, the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, have done well and I have the pleasure of welcoming participants from all the regions of the world here today. I welcome our friends from the United Nations(UN), African Union(AU), the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) and other organizations represented at this conference. I welcome all participants; you are distinguished to us and we want you to feel at home.

This seminar is crucial to Nigeria because our country attaches great importance to the maintenance of regional and global peace. That is why the promotion of international peace and security is one of the cardinal foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. She therefore values and respects the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as enshrined in the Charter of the UN, the Constitutive Act of the AU and the ECOWAS Treaty. In pursuance of our foreign policy objectives, the Nigerian military over the years, has garnered considerable capacity and capability for regional and global peacekeeping, and has also made enormous sacrifices in human and material terms for peace and security in the world.

The contribution of troops to take part in regional and global peacekeeping efforts is therefore seen in Nigeria as one of our obligations towards the maintenance of world peace and security. As a result of this, the Nigerian military has participated in over 23
peacekeeping operations in different countries of the world and has produced 11 Force Commanders at the global, regional and sub-regional levels. Some of these gentlemen are here with us as participants in this seminar. We look forward to drinking from their rich fountains of knowledge and from their varied experiences.

The Nigerian government is indeed looking forward to gaining from this seminar which addresses the regional dimension of peace operations in the 21st century. This has become important as the number of intra-state conflicts and complex emergencies, in circumstances of failed states or involving the total breakdown of government institutions, has increased in recent years. Thus, the UN has inevitably found itself engaged in the maintenance of internal security in such states. In implementing the Security Council’s mandates, the UN has taken on highly complicated peace operations, often with insufficient local knowledge and resources in terms of personnel, materials and finance. Therein lies the imperative for coordination and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations.

As the UN reviews and reassesses its role in peace operations, conflict management mechanisms in regional organizations and other arrangements offer new opportunities. Different regions and sub-regions are evolving in different ways and their respective capabilities to deal with their problems vary. Regional action can have both advantages and disadvantages. States in the region concerned have national interests in the stability of their local environment and are more likely to be willing to take part in peace operations that are closer to the homeland. Moreover, they will often be more familiar with regional cultures and attitudes than outsiders. On the other hand, sometimes states in the region may be too close to the issues and may have their own agenda, as different from that of the international peace mission. Conflicting interests and lack of mutual trust may undermine the peace process. There may also be inadequate military and other resources available for peace operations. We have had ample experiences of both situations in West Africa, and even elsewhere in Africa. I hope that this seminar will examine these issues at length and generate practical solutions that are applicable in the African regional context and elsewhere around the world.

With the on-going efforts at improving the capabilities of regional organizations and their arrangements for peace operations, there is now greater opportunity for the UN to effectively partner these organizations. The UN will need to recognize what it should retain, what it should pass on to regional organizations and arrangements when practicable, and how to best develop effective cooperation to make the
most effective use of the resources available. In essence, the challenge is that of how best to involve regional organizations without regionalizing peacekeeping.

As you brainstorm over these and many other issues during these few days of the Seminar, I challenge you to come up with more practical and workable ideas and recommendations that will indeed provide the pivot of regional peace operations in the 21st century.

Once again, I welcome you all, especially our partners in this project and the resource persons for this particular seminar. I hope that you have an enjoyable stay in Nigeria and fruitful deliberations that will enhance our capacity in regional and global peace operations.

Have a wonderful seminar. Thank you and God bless.
OPENING REMARKS

by

Ambassador Michael Sahlin

On behalf of the Partners of the Challenges Project, it gives me very great pleasure to welcome you to yet another of our seminars. We are honoured to be hosted here in Abuja by our new friends and Partners, the Nigerian National War College, and I wish to place on record our deep appreciation to Nigeria and to Rear Admiral Amos Adedeji and his staff for hosting and organizing this important event.

There are many people to thank but I would particularly like to mention the consistent and excellent support given by Ambassador Arthur Mbanefo, until recently Nigeria’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations, and Lt General Martin Agwai, current Chief of Army Staff of Nigeria.

This Seminar is one of a series of seminars in the project that we call the Challenges Project, the full title of which is, ‘Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century’. As some participants present today are new to the project, I shall ask my colleague who is infact the Project Leader, Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg, to follow my remarks by describing the project in more detail. But first, it might be useful to pose the question: why is there a need for this endeavour at all?

I need not tell this knowledgeable and experienced audience how far peacekeeping has changed in the past 15 or so years since the end of the Cold War. It has changed for a number of reasons, among which has been the fact that the nature of the conflicts changed – largely they became internal, intrastate rather than between countries, although more recently there has been a resurgence of interstate conflict.

Another change has been that when the international community decides to put a peace operation into the field, it has to be able to address not just military issues, but a wide range of humanitarian, social, political, legal, economic and other issues as well. In recent years, human rights issues have also gained greater importance, and of course
in this modern electronic and digital age, the civilian and military leaders of a peace operation find that they have to be more responsive to the media than was the case 10 or 15 years ago.

All these factors present challenges of their own, but of course they are not the only challenges. There is the matter of resources: which countries are willing to contribute troops to peace operations? Or provide civilian personnel with the necessary skills? Or equipment? Or logistical and communications assistance? Or money? How can these scarce resources be put to best use? How can cooperation and coordination be improved? How can the education and training of peacekeepers be improved?

Fifteen years ago, the United Nations had a virtual monopoly of peacekeeping. With rare exceptions, the UN was the only organization with the experience and capability to put a peacekeeping force into the field, but that too has changed. More recently, we have seen what are known as ‘hybrid operations’, composed of a multinational force formed of troops from willing states and authorized by the UN Security Council but not under UN command, and working closely with a civilian UN mission under a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) answering to the Secretary-General and through him to the Security Council. Separately, we have also seen coalition operations, composed of forces again from willing states but not accompanied by any authorization by the Security Council.

This week gives us an opportunity to look more closely at yet a further development, namely the relationship between the UN and regional arrangements. Here again, we have been seeing changes as various regional and sub-regional organizations have sought to develop their own capabilities. We have already seen improvements in areas such as setting standards for training, and capacity-building. Different regions have developed different approaches, according to the nature of the conflict situation and to their respective capabilities. We need to ask ourselves a number of questions, such as: how can we improve the response to regional conflict by closer cooperation between the UN and regional organizations? What challenges are regional organizations encountering in initiating and sustaining regional peace operations? In the evolution of regional arrangements, how can the UN and Member States best assist? Africa has encountered all these and other questions and I am sure that during this week, we shall be able to learn much from our African colleagues about how they see these challenges. I am sure that many of us would like to hear more about the newly
announced African Union Peace and Security Council, its responsibilities and how it will work.

Another shift that has been observed is a marked reduction in troop contributions from developed states. Perhaps, more accurately, I should say a marked reduction in troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, but an increase by some of those states to multinational forces. It is interesting to note the current statistics. As at 30 April 2004, there were 14 UN peacekeeping operations involving 53,406 military personnel and civilian police from 96 contributing countries. Of that number, all the 13 countries providing more than 1,000 troops were either from the developing world or from countries with weak economies. Of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the largest troop commitment is coming from China. There are, of course, other important preoccupations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we must not overlook the fact that a significant amount of UN peacekeeping costs are borne by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, this shift in troop support on the part of developed states in general is worthy of comment. Moreover, another aspect of this situation has been the feeling among some troop contributing nations that they are asked to provide the manpower but have insufficient say in the design and approval of the mandates that emerge from the Security Council.

As the Brahimi Report pointed out, the spectrum of modern peace operations also covers conflict prevention and peace-building. Africa is witness to several of these efforts which have met with varying degrees of success. Conflict prevention and peace-building are themselves challenging concepts and I hope that we shall hear more of these initiatives this week.

In this brief introduction, I have touched upon only some of the aspects of peace operations. I am confident that the statements, discussions and exchanges that will take place this week will do much to broaden and deepen our knowledge and understanding of this complex subject. They will also provide a valuable and informative source of material for the Partners to draw upon selectively in the preparation of the Concluding Report of Phase II of the Challenges Project. And to describe that part of our work, I shall now yield the floor to someone well known to many in this room as a driving force behind the whole Challenges Project from its inception, my colleague and Project Leader, Annika Hilding-Norberg.
THE CHALLENGES PROJECT:
COORDINATION AND UPDATE REPORT
by
Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg

Introduction
As Ambassador Michael Sahlin, Director General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden has indicated, peace operations have become increasingly complex in the past few years. The challenges that we all have to face have become more numerous rather than fewer. The Challenges of Peace Operations Project is an effort to identify some of the problems and offer recommendations for action to find solutions. In the next few minutes, I shall give you a brief background of the project and some details of current and future activities.

Objective
By fostering and encouraging a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership, the primary objective of the Project is to make practical recommendations that will benefit the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations.

Partner Organizations and Major Contributors
The Challenges Project is a joint effort by many Partner Organizations around the world. The list of the current Partners that form the steering group of the Project is as follows:

- Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden (in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces, National Defence College, National Police Board),
- Russian Public Policy Centre,
- Jordan Institute of Diplomacy,
- Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa
• United States Institute of Peace (in cooperation with the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute),
• United Service Institution of India,
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
• Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada,
• Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
• Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law (in cooperation with the Australian Defence Organization),
• Turkey Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in cooperation with the National Police Directorate and the University of Bilkent),
• National War College of Nigeria (in cooperation with the Armed Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence); and
• China Institute for International Strategic Studies (in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence).

The overall project is coordinated by the Folke Bernadotte Academy in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces, the National Police Board and the National Defence College of Sweden.

Valuable contributions to the project have also been made by colleagues from international institutions and associations, such as the United Nations (UN), International Peace Academy (IPA), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI) and the International Peacekeeping Yearbook. Discussions on the practice and theory of peace operations are combined with issues of education and training.

Contribution Training Organizations
Some 14 peacekeeping training centres have contributed to the Project with their perspectives on the issues, and some also by hosting parts of a seminar. These institutions and organisations are as follows:

• CENCAMEX Gendarmerie Peacekeeping Training Centre, Argentina,
• Commonwealth of Independent States HQ for Military Cooperation & Coordination,
• PfP Training Centre of Turkey,
• Royal Police Academy of Jordan,
South African Army War College,
Swedish International Centre,
United Service Institution of India Centre for UN Peacekeeping,
UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations Training and Evaluation Service,
UN Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence,
United States Army Peacekeeping Institute,
Vystrel Peacekeeping Academy, Russian Federation, and
Zarqa Peacekeeping Centre, Jordan.

Sponsors
The many countries involved in the overall project illustrate the truly multinational character of the effort. These countries are as follows:
- Argentina
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- India
- Japan
- Jordan
- Nigeria
- Norway
- Russian Federation
- South Africa
- Sweden
- Turkey
- United States.

Moreover, important contributions have also been made by the following organizations:
- AusAID of Australia;
- Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure, Australia;
- Hanns Seidel Foundation;
- Jordan Radio & Television Corporation;
- Kluwer Law International;
- London School of Economics and Political Science;
- Jordan Ministry of Tourism & Antiquities;
- NATO Information & Liaison Office;
- Royal Court of Jordan;
Finally, the project coordination is financed by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, National Police Force and is coordinated by the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Progress on the Project

The Challenges Project began with a seminar in Stockholm in 1997.

Phase 1 Report

The first phase of the Project (from 1997 to 2002) was brought to a close with a Concluding Report, which was presented by the Foreign Minister of Sweden, the late Anna Lindh, on behalf of all the Partners of the Project, to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 25 April 2002. The presentation session was chaired by His Excellency, Chief Arthur Mbanefo, then Chair of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The Concluding Report was the product of a series of seminars held during the previous five years in nine countries around the world and attended by a wide range of highly experienced civilian and military peacekeepers and academics from some 230 organizations and 50 countries. Subsequently, Partners agreed to a second phase of the Project, to address some of the specific challenges that had been identified in the Phase 1 Concluding Report, and to report again in 2005.

Building on Results and Products

Building on results and products, the Challenges Project contributes to the international debate on peace operations through:

- **Challenges Seminar Reports**, as may be seen on the Project website www.peacechallenges.net
- Input to the United Nations through a Secretary-General Report, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations and to the G8 Industrialised Countries;
- Contributions to international journals relevant to peace operations;
- Increasing knowledge about peace operations in the official languages of the UN: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish;
Concrete exchanges and cooperation between organizations and countries (in particular, between participating training and educational centres); and

Contributions to the establishment of an early warning centre for Africa, the establishment of the International Network for the Promotion of the Rule of Law, and the Untied Service Institution of India Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping.

**Phase II**

In Phase II of the Project, we are addressing the following questions:

- How do we most effectively improve multidisciplinary and multicultural cooperation and coordination at strategic, operational and tactical levels?
- What should be the respective roles of the United Nations and of regional organizations and arrangements?

At the end of the discussions and exchanges on these questions, recommendations will be developed to address:

- How can governments, with differing resources and capabilities, best respond?
- What might be some of the most helpful ways in which Member States could support UN peace operations?

Under this second phase of the Project, three seminars have already been hosted:

- Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, Australia hosted a conference on “The Rule of Law on Peace Operations”;
- Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, hosted a seminar on “Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism”;
- Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey, hosted a seminar focused on “The Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and the Continuing Need for Reform”.

Following this seminar in Abuja, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) will host the 15th Challenges Seminar in Beijing in early November 2004. The topic will be on “Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations.” The Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Event in 2005 will be held with the aim of presenting the findings and recommendations to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Member States.
Primary Target Audience – Member States

Peace operations cannot be successful without the commitment and support of Member States. Thus the primary target audience of the Challenges Project consists of the Member States. The aim of Partners involved in the Project is to influence policy at the national level and stimulate follow-up action at regional, national and sub-national levels and in multinational fora.

High Level Panel

On 4 November 2003, the Secretary General of the UN established a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to consider the wide range of security issues currently facing the world. That Panel is expected to produce its report by the end of 2004. If that report contains issues relating to peace operations, it is intended that the Challenges Project will take them into account in preparing its Concluding Report.

Conclusion

Finally, we all owe a warm tribute to our new Partner, Nigeria, for your very valuable contributions to peacekeeping and peace operations over the years. We look forward to this Seminar and also to your input to and involvement in the Challenges Project!
It is my great honour today, to address such an admixture of important audience of universal peace seekers. As a practitioner of the art of peacekeeping, I feel very much at home amidst this group. That feeling is deeper simply because of my current role as the Foreign Affairs Minister of Nigeria, a country which, by universal acknowledgement, has adopted regional peacekeeping in Africa and particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-region as an important foreign policy vocation. Having had the privilege of heading two United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, the second of which was in the West African nation of Sierra Leone, I have a personal appreciation of the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping operations, whether regional or established by the United Nations (UN).

Holding a seminar at this time in Abuja, on the theme: “The Regional Dimension of Peace Operations - Arrangements, Relationships, and the United Nations Responsibility for International Peace and Security,” could not have been more timely. Exactly a week ago, on 25 May 2004, the African Union (AU) launched its new and potentially more effective organ on peacekeeping, known as the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The statement of commitment to peace and security in Africa issued by Heads of State and Government of member states of the Peace and Security Council stated inter alia:

The establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union marks a historic watershed in Africa’s progress towards resolving its conflicts and the building of a durable peace and security order. The new framework of governmental architecture for regional peace and security that we are painstakingly putting in place needs to be nurtured and strengthened to enable
our Union meet the aspirations of our people for sustainable development…. We however realize that this endeavour must be backed by the resources and commitment of our member states with the full and active support of our international partners.

Underlying African leaders’ determination to make maximum use of the new organ, is the realization, on the one hand, that no meaningful development can take place in an environment of conflict and insecurity; and the necessity, on the other hand, for the international community to demonstrate greater commitment to “collective responsibility” in dealing with African conflicts.

**Origin of UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Though the UN Charter did not make provision for peacekeeping operations, such operations were “invented” not long after the creation of the organisation because of the perceptible need for them. Three years after the Charter was adopted, the principle of collective security on which was hinged the discharge of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security became impossible to implement. Peacekeeping was therefore born, out of the necessity to ensure that the Council was not totally incapable of action in the face of a conflict which portended such risk as the one in Palestine. However, being conceived for intervention in interstate conflict, by deployment of troops to monitor and ensure maintenance of ceasefire, the role of regional organisations was hardly considered.

**Modification of the Concept**

The end of the Cold War forced a substantial modification of the concept of peacekeeping in its area of intervention as well as the depth of intervention. While the post-Cold War era facilitated the settlement of some long-standing internal conflicts, it also saw the outbreak of several other internal conflicts which threatened the existence of several sovereign states and risked engulfing whole regions. It become necessary, therefore, not only to broaden the concept of peacekeeping to include intervention in intra-state conflicts but also to broaden such intervention to include resolution of the causes of the conflicts. Peace making and peace building had therefore become essential parts of peacekeeping. Simultaneously, the role of regional organisations became an indispensable element in the efforts at resolution of the conflicts, particularly in reaction to the perceived over-burdening of the United
Nations in dealing with the epidemic of internal conflicts in the immediate years following the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

The relationship between the United Nations Security Council and Regional Organisations has since been undergoing changes in the efforts to discharge the joint responsibility for dealing with this type of conflicts. Africa has been the main arena for testing and refining the new relationship, which still needs to be better developed and better understood. The relationship gradually evolved from the days the first internal conflicts in Liberia began in December 1989. The Economic Community of West African States deployed its ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) into Liberia to arrest the carnage in the country at a time when the United Nations Security Council was preoccupied with the Gulf crisis. Whereas the Security Council did not authorise a UN peace operation as such in Liberia (only a UN Observer Mission was established long after the deployment of a UN peace operation in Sierra Leone and in Cote d’Ivoire), the current UN peace operation in Liberia, officially designated United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), was virtually considered as a quick follow up to the forward deployment of ECOWAS troops into that country in August 2003.

Notwithstanding, several issues still persist that require to be explored and further clarified regarding the regional dimension of peace operations and the role the UN Security Council. For instance:

i. If, as is being encouraged by the United Nations, a regional organisation were to agree on the necessity of a peacekeeping mission, how can the United Nations be involved from the beginning and at what stage should such a mission become a full ‘United Nations’ mission?

ii. After a regional peacekeeping operation has been taken up by the United Nations, what role, if any, should the regional organisation continue to play?

iii. How can co-ordination between the United Nations Security Council and the regional organisation concerned be institutionalised and operated?

iv. What should be the contribution of the international community generally to a regionally-authorised peacekeeping operation?

After years of regional initiatives on peace operations within Africa and particularly within the West African sub-region by ECOWAS, a number of deductions from which actions need to be taken, can be identified. One is the issue of the impediments to the sustenance of regional peace operations. The experience of ECOWAS has shown that the greatest drawback is the lack of capacity for sustaining such
operations once launched. Given the weaknesses of the states of West Africa, both militarily as well as in financial resources, it is often difficult, even when decisions are taken on the establishment of a mission, to put that decision into operation. Even the African continental organisation, being itself in a similarly weak resource position, is incapable of offering any succour and is often obliged to give mandate to a regional organisation such as ECOWAS to take action on its behalf. Thus, the issue of capacity becomes an area on which to focus primary attention.

In this connection, it is necessary to note the action being taken by the African Union (AU) which, at its extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, in February 2004, adopted the decision on the setting up of an African Standby Force (ASF) which will facilitate rapid assembly of troops for a peacekeeping mission agreed upon by the Union. This followed an earlier ECOWAS decision for a Regional Standby Force of troops earmarked by countries in the West African sub-region.

It is also pertinent, in this connection, to refer to a range of initiatives by extra-African states and organisations aimed at the development of the African regional capacity in the area of troop training, including the French-sponsored Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la paix (RECAMP) exercises and the American-sponsored training assistance. However, developing African troops and technical capacity represents only an aspect, albeit an important one. A complementary aspect, equally important, is the provision of equipment and logistics for quick and efficient deployment, as well as effective operation on the ground. Experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone showed that even where West African countries were able to assemble troops and to deploy them in the theatre needed, they were often ill-equipped for the tasks they were assigned. I should remark that some steps have been taken, such as the American logistic support to ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as similar support by the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom to the ECOWAS forward deployment in Liberia. Such initiatives need to be broadened to address ever-growing needs.

Several instances now abound in which a regional organisation initially authorised and deployed an operation which was later authorised and taken up by the UN Security Council. However, there are still considerable uncertainties as to whether and when the UN Security Council would agree to take up such operations.

It is necessary, therefore, for a more practicable system to be explored, which will not overtask and overstretch regional capacity,
before the appropriate Security Council take-over is decided upon. In this connection, even at the initial stage of authorisation of such a mission by the regional organisation concerned, collaboration by a major power is desirable as has been the case in Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic.

The relationship between the Security Council and the regional organisation after the take-over of a peace operation also still needs to be further studied. It cannot be a case of who pays the piper dictating the tune exclusively. An internal conflict has both military and political aspects, which have to be addressed almost simultaneously. While the UN may be more capable of taking care of the military aspect, the political aspect may well be better handled collaboratively between the two organisations. The geographical position of the regional organisation often provides it with a better understanding of the political initiatives that can facilitate military intervention and thus accelerate the implementation of the peace process. Thus continued political engagement by the appropriate regional organisation should be seen as an indispensable element in the conduct of peace operations.

Among the plethora of subjects for which collaboration between the UN Security Council and regional organisations is desirable, is also the determination of the nature and timing of transitional justice instruments. It is obvious that desirable as such instruments are for lasting solution of internal conflicts, they should not be invoked in a manner that may hinder early resolution of the overall conflict.

Finally, it is necessary to further consider the extent of UN involvement in key areas of any peace process. It is now recognised that an indispensable first step for the resolution of any national conflict is the disarmament process. For any such process to be effective, it will have to address the three key elements of disarmament of combatants, their demobilisation and their re-integration. The three have to be carried out in quick succession, rather than the last of the three being consigned to an uncertain implementation as seems to be the current tendency. This situation arises from the fact that while the Security Council is willing to provide resources for disarmament and sometimes for demobilisation, it is reluctant to provide for re-integration, which is made subject to the generosity or otherwise of voluntary donors. It is important that this tendency be reversed so as to ensure the thoroughness and irreversibility of the disarmament policy not only for the peace and stability of the country concerned, but also for that of its
neighbours into which ex-combatants who are not equipped for life without weapons, are likely to migrate to offer guerrilla services.

I hope you will find some of the thoughts I have offered useful in the course of your work.
SECTION 1

MAJOR ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS
INTERFACE BETWEEN THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS: PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

by

Mr. Souren Seraydarian

Thanks to National War College, Nigeria, for inviting the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno to this seminar. Mr. Guéhenno expresses his regrets that he is not able to be here this week, but he fully intends to attend the next seminar in Beijing, China. I am honored to speak in his place on behalf of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. I will address the regionalization of peacekeeping and other consent-based efforts to manage conflicts, particularly in Africa.

“African solutions for African problems”. Statements such as this have been the quintessential call to order in favour of the regionalization of solutions to intractable conflicts. But this must not become what Olonisakin and Ero have called “a convenient slogan for limiting the role of the United Nations on the continent”. Perhaps what we are really looking for are “globally-supported African solutions for African problems”. Not very snappy, perhaps, but it captures the basic point, which is that for all the ink that has flowed in favour of or against the regionalization of peacekeeping, the reality is that both global and regional efforts are required to help bring conflicts to an end and begin the process of building peace.

Staying on Africa for a bit, it can be said that indeed, African responses to long-standing conflicts have proliferated recently and this very positive trend – which may represent but a short opportunity in time to help make them work – this trend has led to important if fragile peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), at the heart of a very troubled sub-region. Elsewhere on the continent, in Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi and in Sudan, on-going peace efforts
may be bearing fruit. These commendable efforts – the efforts of individual African countries, the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – indicate clearly the increasing regionalization of conflict management and resolution in Africa.

However, once the peace processes produce agreements, the region generally turns back to the UN to assist in their implementation. Neither the regional nor the sub-regional agencies in Africa have yet fully the logistical or the financial capacity to mount and sustain peacekeeping operations that provide security and the capabilities to implement the often-complex peace agreements that result from their peacemaking efforts. Significant steps are being taken in this direction. The restructuring by the African Union and the work to establish both an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee (MSC), as called for in the AU Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, will provide an important capacity to address the conflict prevention, management and resolution needs of the continent. However, as the Standby Force brigades are expected to be established by 2010, this is a somewhat long-term vision.

So, the United Nations continues to assume a vital and major role in leading the assistance to implementation of these often regionally-driven peace processes. But this dynamic – regional involvement at the peacemaking phase to be handed over to the UN for the peacekeeping/peacebuilding phases – can create problems of its own if the UN, at the very least, is not also involved in the peace negotiations that lead to the agreements they are then to implement. By way of example, in the Arusha process for Rwanda, it has been shown that the limited military resources that were eventually brought to bear by the United Nations were not in fact a priori compatible with the regionally-driven negotiating strategy in Arusha that sought to exclude the extremist parties.

Here, we again see the same danger that stalks much of peacekeeping’s history, particularly its most recent experiences. That is the danger of not providing the United Nations with the means necessary to implement the mandates that have been given to it. This danger is exacerbated if we do not heed the other very important lesson, namely that peacekeeping cannot be a substitute for the lack of a coherent policy on how to address conflict situations. If there was no agreement on how to address the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the tool used should not have been a peacekeeping
operation. In such circumstances, the UN is set up to fail. Peace in the Balkans can be attributed to the subsequent regionalization of efforts, but did it not also result principally from the fact that the international community finally agreed on what to do and how to do it?

I delve very, very briefly into this matter only to stress that regardless of whether global or regional multilateral mechanisms are utilized, or a combination of the two, the success of these efforts ultimately relies on a famously difficult currency to define – that of political will – the will of the international community, as expressed through the Security Council:

- first, to identify clearly when a United Nations mission should be deployed and when it should not, and
- second, to provide the necessary political, military, financial and other resources to get the job done.

These are very well-known, well-rehearsed, well-aired principles. They remain, however, as challenging as ever to implement.

The Renewed Surge of UN Peacekeeping

Contrary, perhaps, to popular belief, we are experiencing yet another surge in the demand for UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa. In 2003, new missions were established in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, while the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC) in the DRC was significantly expanded and its mandate strengthened. We shall soon see another expansion, with new missions in Haiti and Burundi, and a possible mission in Sudan. This is certain to represent a considerable increase in relation to what obtained a year ago. In the face of this surge, the challenges for the United Nations are significant.

Challenges of New Peacekeeping Upsurge

The three most important challenges posed by the new upsurge in UN peacekeeping are as follows:

- First, to find enough of the well-equipped and trained troops and other personnel needed to implement the mandates of today’s complex missions;
- Second, to have them deploy rapidly into theatres, capitalizing on the short window of opportunity afforded by the peace negotiations to get the post-conflict process on the right track; and
- Third, to deploy robustly, leaving no doubt as to the credibility of the UN force.

Let me go briefly into each one of these challenges.
To find enough troops, police and other contributions, and to do so at a time when a number of current and forthcoming peacekeeping operations may have simultaneous needs, will certainly not be easy. Getting sheer numbers is not generally a problem. Greater difficulties are being experienced and will continue to be experienced in getting what these missions actually need to function – the enabling units. An infantry battalion will provide an important military presence for a peacekeeping operation. But a handful of airfield controllers will keep an entire mission functioning.

In today’s strategic landscape, in which attention is generally very much elsewhere – Iraq, the Middle East and Afghanistan – it has been increasingly difficult to compete for the capable militaries of the world. Furthermore, as regional peacekeeping capacities are being significantly developed, particularly in Europe, they are drawing further on the already very limited pool of military and other resources for peacekeeping missions. Even long-standing, traditional contributors to UN peacekeeping are now largely absent from UN missions.

Second, this decreased participation in UN missions has also had another negative effect, namely on the ability of the mission to deploy rapidly, within the timelines set down by the Brahimi Report. The fact is that those countries that do contribute to UN peacekeeping operations today are often severely challenged, financially and logistically, to get well-equipped troops on the ground quickly.

The third challenge is the precarious security environments in which we operate. Particularly in the case of internal wars, we may find armed elements only partially under the control of those who consented to the UN’s deployment. And there may be spoilers – those who would exploit the mission’s weakness to derail a peace process. For a peacekeeping mission to succeed in these environments, there must be a shared understanding of the need for a robust force, deployed and configured not only to be able to use force but to keep the initiative and, if challenged, to defend itself and
the mandate. Such an escalation capability is essential to project credibility.

The Search for a Collective Response: Strategic Partnerships

With a view to meeting these challenges, the United Nations, over the past year, has continued to develop its cooperation with a number of regional organizations in support of UN peacekeeping. The focus of that cooperation has been, on the one hand, seeking direct support by getting regional arrangements to deploy before, alongside or after a UN operation, and, on the other hand, strengthening the long-term capacity for peacekeeping of regional and sub-regional organizations, particularly in Africa.

The UN has identified several specific areas in which it could provide support to the AU, sub-regional organizations and individual African member states. Information sharing, training, technical assistance to AU Headquarters and enhanced coordination between the UN and AU are just a few examples. Cooperation in the field of logistics would be mutually beneficial and could come in several forms, ranging from providing full logistics support to an AU-led peacekeeping mission, to sharing lists of standard equipment, to facilitating technical training in the Brindisi Logistics Base. Cooperation in the areas of civilian police, corrections and rule of law, as well as the exchange of best practices, have the potential to strengthen the continent’s peacekeeping capacity.

Elsewhere, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) continues to work closely with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force to monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire and separation of forces agreement, and also with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia. In Kosovo, the United Nations, the EU and the OSCE continue to coordinate their activities in an integrated manner, cooperating effectively with the NATO-led international security force (KFOR). In Afghanistan, the UN mission continues to cooperate with the coalition forces as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to allow for the extension of the Government’s authority throughout the country and the pursuit of the Bonn process.

In fact, the positive developments of this past year, in continued cooperation on the ground between the UN and regional organizations, point towards the creation of strategic partnerships to meet today’s peacekeeping challenges. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation can now be
seen as part of combined efforts that take advantage of the comparative strengths of different organizations, be they global, regional or sub-regional. Member states also continue to play a key role in this dynamic. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the rapid reaction capabilities of the French Operation ‘Licorne’ strengthen the effectiveness of the force deployed by ECOWAS and the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI). In turn, the United Nations and donors provide support to the ECOWAS force.

In Liberia, in order to bridge the gap to the incoming UN mission, the United Nations and ECOWAS worked to ensure the transportation and interoperability of the ECOWAS force, which was deployed relatively quickly to establish a presence before the UN force. The subsequent re-hatting of the ECOWAS force as blue helmets reflects the importance of force continuity. When a robust force is used to bridge the gap before the deployment of a UN operation, the preferred model is the one employed in then East Timor in 1999, when core elements of the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) remained in-theatre and re-hatted as “blue helmets”. This enabled a smooth transition to a robust and credible UN force and ensured the continuity of the mission.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an EU-led force – Operation Artemis – was deployed in Bunia for 90 days, reducing ethnic fighting in that town and allowing time for the mandate and the force of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to be restructured to address the security needs of the UN-supported peace process. This was a very effective deployment that saved lives and addressed a critical need for robust force at a time before the MONUC mandate was strengthened. Artemis did not re-hat and, therefore, it was critical that the MONUC force that did take over in Bunia did so with immediate credibility in order to be able to withstand the tests to its authority that were to surely, and did in fact, come.

By acting regionally, i.e. by involving the European Union and getting it to lead the operation, France may, in fact, have addressed a common concern regarding the involvement of European powers in Africa. The continent, in fact, welcomed the deployment of the UN-authorized Operation Artemis.

Artemis also represents, as an EU-led operation, another very important development. It was a case of regionalization in peacekeeping, to be sure. But it was certainly unusual in that it was a regional deployment from
another region entirely. This development points in the right direction in trying to address the challenges I have already outlined.

In fact, the Artemis operation is a model worthy of replication. The development of a coherent and robust over-the-horizon rapid response capability is required in a number of situations. The rapid response capabilities for peacekeeping operations that are being established by the EU could contribute significantly to UN peace and security objectives, particularly if they could remain in areas of operation for the length of time needed for the United Nations to deploy or as the situation requires.

Additionally, while it must not replace direct involvement in and/or around the UN’s missions, there is a need to support regionally-led peacekeeping. In February 2003, the AU deployed the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to facilitate the continuing implementation of the ceasefire agreements, although financial constraints left that mission short of full strength. The AU is making considerable efforts to enhance its peacekeeping capacities, and missions such as the one in Burundi must receive adequate and sustained international assistance.

The need to help the African regional and sub-regional capacities to deploy and sustain operations can also be addressed in the African Peace Facility being developed by the EU to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations conducted by African regional organizations. This kind of initiative is important to enhance the capability of the AU and African regional organizations to address conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.

Conclusion

It seems clear that there is not a single dimension to the question of regionalization in peacekeeping. If, on the one hand, regions are increasingly involved in peacemaking within their own regions, and in some cases peacekeeping beyond their own regions, it is also true, on the other hand, that the UN continues to play a central role in the implementation of peace efforts, particularly in Africa. Additionally, in playing that role, the UN will work with regional organizations towards implementation, particularly in meeting the challenges it now faces in the current surge of activities.

There is a clear need, and the building blocks are there, for the further development of strategic partnerships that cut across regions to take on the
challenges today to the maintenance of peace and security. In the case of Africa, for example, where it has by far its greatest workload, the UN can deliver through its own mechanisms, the will and the resources of the international community, if these are forthcoming, to assist conflict resolution. It can also work with Europe and other regions to deliver this will and these resources in other forms. There must be flexibility, and perhaps some creativity, to make the most effective use of limited global resources.

There is also a need to address conflicts that have regional dimensions with a regional perspective. For example, in the Great Lakes region, the Security Council, over the last few years, has addressed the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. But there are clear links between these conflicts and what happens in these countries and others in the region, such as Uganda. Similarly, in West Africa, the military, political and economic linkages that tie together the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire are not bound by borders.

It follows, therefore, that successful attempts to resolve these conflicts must similarly take a regional view and seek to focus on those linkages in a strategic manner. A more regional approach is being adopted. The simultaneous presence of UN peacekeeping operations in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone has enhanced the chances of a successful regional approach in the efforts to resolve the conflicts in the three countries. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and MINUCI, along with the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA) and the mission in Guinea-Bissau, have established a coordination mechanism through regular meetings of Heads of Mission and Force Commanders to address cross-cutting issues, such as “freelance” combatants, cross border flow of small arms and the exploitation of natural resources to fuel conflict. Furthermore, there is a logic of regional support for missions, whereby capacities would be pooled in a region to serve multiple missions.

In conclusion, Dag Hammarskjold (the UN Secretary General from 1953 to 1961) once wrote that “War anywhere becomes the concern of all”. It is precisely in marshalling our collective resources, both through the UN and through regional agencies, and finding ways to make them work together effectively, that we will deliver the international assistance and support needed to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and build peace.
The differing strengths and mandates of regional agencies cannot but provide unequal capacities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in their respective regions. Furthermore, we should never lose sight of the unique role of the UN in providing legitimacy and legal sanction to international peacekeeping activities. What the UN delivers, however, is a reflection of the will of the international community. If the will is there, the UN will deliver effectively. If the will is not, the UN can, at best, muddle through. At worst, it will fail the hopes of those most in need.
I should like, at the outset of this presentation, to express appreciation to the organizers of this Seminar, the National War College of Nigeria, the Nigerian Army, the Ministry of Defence of Nigeria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, for putting together this Seminar and particularly for involving the African Union (AU) in the initiative. We believe that this Seminar could not have been better timed, coming as it were, at a time that Africa is being preoccupied with the efforts to establish the African Standby Force (ASF) and other related initiatives. I am particularly gratified to see many old friends and senior military officers who have been very intimately involved in peacekeeping initiatives and deployments in Africa and elsewhere in the world. I am certain that our deliberations will be greatly enriched by the full participation of these distinguished professionals, which is why I will try to limit myself to highlighting some of the major and critical issues as well as the opportunities that continue to impact on the interface between the UN and regional organizations.

The African Union is beginning to accumulate a lot of experience in the deployment of peacekeeping missions in different parts of Africa. However, if the AU is not always mentioned in different fora where peacekeeping deployments are discussed, it is hardly surprising. Until recently, we had maintained the primary role of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security. Within that context, peacekeeping has remained within the purview of the UN Security Council.
However, it is well known that two major developments have occurred within the last two decades, that have made it imperative for others, apart from the UN, to be involved in peacekeeping deployment in Africa. These are the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of conflicts in Africa that were hitherto suppressed. The other development was the unfortunate experience of the United States in Somalia, which ramifications were widely felt all over the world, but moreso in Africa, particularly during the tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994. All of these developments contributed to making Africa address the imperative of being involved in peacekeeping.

Around 1990 and 1991, during the annual summits of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU), when the proposal to establish the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was first tabled to OAU Member States, the initiative almost suffered a still birth. At the time, it was the position of many member states that the OAU had no business deploying peacekeeping missions because the UN Security Council had that responsibility. Moreover, it was the view of many OAU Member States that all 53 Members of the OAU contribute to the mandatory budget of the UN for peacekeeping, and it would amount to a double assessment if they had to again be assessed and forced to pay for OAU peacekeeping deployments.

Additionally, it was also acknowledged that peacekeeping remains a very expensive undertaking and, given that the OAU was not particularly well-endowed to engage in such initiatives, it was best that the issue of peacekeeping deployments be left within the purview of the United Nations. However, all these arguments were thrown to the wind in 1994. After the genocide in Rwanda, the reality dawned on Africans and African organizations that the continent could no longer afford to be indifferent, especially when there are grave threats to peace and security in Africa with potentials for massive loss of lives, destruction of infrastructure, internal displacements, massive outflow of refugees and other related outcomes.

Before highlighting the major issues and opportunities in the interface between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations, I should like to first of all highlight, for the benefit of the participants, the nature of the peace and security architecture that the African Union is trying to establish on the continent. In any case, it is the case that if you have to interface, you need to know what structures will enhance and sustain such an interface.
At the level of the African Union, I am happy to confirm to the participants, that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is now fully operationalized. This means that the Council is now fully empowered to execute its mandate in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution. In the area of prevention, new institutions are being established under the ambit of the Peace and Security Council. These include the establishment of the Panel of the Wise, as well as a continent-wide Early Warning System, coordination with regional organizations through the elaboration of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) etc, and the institutionalization of comprehensive research into the root causes of conflicts in Africa. At the level of management, the Protocol establishing the PSC provides for the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) among others.

We have envisaged a structure that derives inspiration from the idea of a pyramid. At the base of the pyramid, you have the sub-regional organizations. By virtue of their proximity to the source of conflict or the conflict theatres, these organizations have intimate knowledge of conflicts and are more sensitive to the prevailing local conditions. Under normal circumstances, the sub-regional bodies are supposed to have comparative advantage in dealing with the problems of their sub-regions. This explains why, when there are problems, the sub-regional organizations are supposed to be the first to move in, while the AU and UN are supposed to help and complement the sub-regional initiatives instead of competing or duplicating those efforts.

Having made this point, it is important to add also, that there could be times when such proximity may actually complicate the efforts to resolve the problem because, as countries of the sub-region, there will be interests, either national or regional. This problem was most pronounced in Liberia when it took ECOWAS about seven years to resolve the problem as against a shorter period. A further aspect of this problem relates to the lack of means that confronts the regional organizations. In West Africa, for instance, what would be ECOWAS, if it was not for the sacrifices of Nigeria and some other countries in the sub-region? Definitely, ECOWAS is not just the Secretariat with its very limited number of technocrats, but the leaders and countries of the sub-region who are very easily mobilized for action whenever there are problems.

The second level of the pyramid is occupied by the AU - the continental organization. It is not too close to, and definitely not too far from, the theatre of conflicts. It is uniquely positioned to bring a
continental perspective to bear on efforts to resolve conflicts. This is why it is envisaged that the African Standby Force, with its Regional Brigades, can be deployed in sub-regions other than their own.

The third level and the apex of the pyramid is the United Nations. The UN has global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Currently, the UN has most of its peacekeeping deployments in Africa. The UN seems overstretched. Instead of insisting to go it alone, it should be able to get regional organizations to act on its behalf as provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In effect, we envisage, under this architecture, that when there is a conflict, the regional bodies should make the first move, before going to the AU Peace and Security Council for an endorsement of the mandate and, thereafter, the two -- the regional (or sub-regional) organization and the AU -- should jointly approach the UN for the ultimate mandate and decision on the deployment.

Having gone through this architecture, I should like to state that peacekeeping is a very expensive undertaking. It is capital intensive, time consuming and human resources driven. At the level of the AU, we envisage that the ASF may be constrained to have adequate numbers and resources to deploy many personnel for an extended period of time. What is increasingly emerging is an arrangement whereby the AU or the regional/sub-regional organizations undertake peacekeeping deployments, like ECOWAS had done in Liberia and the AU in Burundi. Under such arrangements, the AU or the sub-regional organisations start with a deployment of a Mission, and eventually, have such a mission blue-helmeted by the UN. Such an arrangement would also demand that, right from the outset of the Mission, the AU and the sub-regional organisations must work very closely with each other, and also with the UN, in terms of planning, outfitting and operationalisation of the mission.

I believe that it would not be appropriate or indeed prudent, for regional organizations to ignore the UN at the planning stages of missions only to turn around to invite the UN to come and take over such a Mission. It simply does not work out that way. The benefits of involving the UN at every stage of planning for a mission, are always self-evident and far outweigh the disadvantages.

Along with the UN, we must also add the other partners and stakeholders who will be involved in supporting the Mission either with financial resources or logistics. I do not believe that we loose anything in involving and consulting closely with our partners at every stage of the preparations for a mission. If anything, such an interface
helps us to overcome suspicions, enhances transparency and builds confidence between the donors and recipient organizations.

Beyond the planning support, which is where the UN has an excellent track record especially with the AU, we must now address the two critical aspects or requirements for peacekeeping operations, as identified by African Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Ministers of Defence and Security of Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Sirte, Libya, respectively. These issues which continue to constrain peacekeeping initiatives in Africa are the critical issues of logistics and financial sustainability for peace support operations.

Often, I have wondered why many, if not all, external initiatives have studiously ignored African pleas to address these issues. Instead, most if not all of such initiatives have focused agendas based on the interest of the donors. Such assistance have addressed issues related to training -- and this is true for the American sponsored African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) as it is for the French sponsored Reinforcement des Capacities Africaines de Maintien de la paix (RECAMP) and the British Peace Support Training (BPST) – as well as issues relating to governance, democracy, human rights, humanitarian assistance etc. Without in any way trying to downplay the significance of these important issues in peace support operations and deployment, I wish to strongly appeal to Africa’s external partners to try to listen more attentively to Africans and their requirements for enhancing the African capacity for peacekeeping deployments.

I should like to conclude this brief presentation on an optimistic note by acknowledging that there are many opportunities to expand the interface between regional organizations and the United Nations for peace operations. We must be one side of the same coin and, if we work together, we shall maximize the advantages. The African Union, as clearly spelt out in the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council, is determined to work very closely with the United Nations and to derive maximum benefits from such a coordinated approach and interface.
Introduction

It is my pleasure to join the previous speakers in commending the organizers and sponsors of the series of Seminars on the ‘Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century.’ Before I commence my discussion on the “major issues and opportunities in the interface between the UN and Regional Organizations” which I have been mandated to speak on, I need to make a few remarks. The Challenges Project, since its inception in Sweden in 1997, has consistently maintained a very high quality of attendees at its seminars; it is therefore not surprising that the output from the seminars held in different parts of the world are very informative and add to the body of knowledge available to researchers and practitioners on peacekeeping operations.

The UN must be commended for its dynamic response to an ever evolving global security situation. In this respect, I wish to recall that after a brief period of hyperactivity, the UN Security Council became increasingly unwilling to authorize large multi-faceted UN peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa during the 1990s, following the Somalia debacle. It was felt, in some quarters, that the end of the superpower competition for ideological and political support on the African continent also had some influence on these trends. Let us, however, be charitable to note that internal factors complicated the conflict situations that faced Africa in general and the West African sub-region in particular, and so presented an unappealing doctrine was that more suited to intervention in inter-state instead of intrastate conflicts which were the norm in our sub-region.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was thus compelled to evolve its own means of responding to and resolving the armed conflicts and potential humanitarian catastrophes in the sub-region, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. These examples, though imperfect, were worthy precedents that subsequently served as a model for other regional organizations to initiate peacekeeping operations. Regional organizations, however, still need to seek the endorsement of the UN Security Council in any endeavour that involves military intervention, especially those that require peace enforcement actions.

The situation, today, is however different because out of the six current UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, three are in West Africa; the latest being in Cote d'Ivoire where the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) military operation was absorbed into the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) on 5 April, 2004, by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1528. Apart from these missions, ECOWAS has had quite substantive cooperation with the UN at the level of mediation, verification and election monitoring missions. From the foregoing, it is clear that ECOWAS and the UN have kept faith with the spirit of the key aspects of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. Indeed, over the past two days, ECOWAS and the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA) have been holding consultations on how to deepen our cooperation and fashion out a sub-regional approach to the many challenges facing peace and security.

The key issues relevant to our discussion today are namely: the responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, and the use of armed force in the common interests as key elements of peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS is desirous to strengthen its interface with the UN in these areas by exploring the opportunities that are available or could be initiated to facilitate our cooperation in ensuring peace and security in our sub-region and the world at large.

Based on these assumptions, I shall discuss ECOWAS’ efforts from its military intervention actions propelled by Nigeria as a lead nation in the sub-region and the evolution of the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. I shall also touch on the conduct of peace operations under regional authority and the cooperation between ECOWAS and the UN in these efforts. Most
importantly, I look forward to an interactive session at the end of my presentation to exchange views and clear grey areas.

ECOWAS Military Interventions and Evolution of its Conflict Resolution Mechanism

The major challenge ECOWAS faced from 1990 was the spate of conflicts in the sub-region. These conflicts weakened already fragile state institutions, degraded human capacity and caused the erosion of previous developmental gains which gravely contrasted with the purpose for which ECOWAS was established. A notable common denominator of these conflicts was their effect on the more vulnerable segments of the populace notably women, children and large parts of the population comprising predominantly uneducated and unemployed youths – who then became readily available for recruitment by unscrupulous warlords. This gave rise to the phenomenon of child soldiers.

ECOWAS’ response to the spate of conflicts, prior to the ratification and implementation of its Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (known as the Mechanism) in 1999, was initially through two major legal instruments namely: the Protocol on Non-aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (1981) which existed to promote peace within the sub-region. These Protocols had gross limitations because they were mainly suited to address interstate conflicts while what was required was an instrument to deal with intrastate conflicts.

Thus, when civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989, ECOWAS was in a dilemma of either intervening or allowing the situation to degenerate into a humanitarian catastrophe. Thousands of people were trapped in the theatre of war while those who could flee caused serious refugee problems in the sub-region. Following this development, some ECOWAS leaders, under the aegis of the Group of 9, decided that they could not stand idly by while carnage took place in a member state. Thus on 7 August 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee established a military observer group, officially designated ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to help resolve the armed internal conflict in Liberia.

ECOMOG was launched into an extremely hostile environment and so a force that was designed as a peace monitoring force was quickly transformed into one that had to establish a bridgehead to facilitate the evacuation of thousands of distressed people and the
enforcement of peace. The operation was funded largely from the resources of Member States, while some logistical support was later received from external partners, principally the United States. ECOWAS was later to intervene in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau with various levels of success.

The operations were criticized because the existing legal instruments were at variance with the conflicts and there was no unanimity on how to resolve the conflicts, operationally. Moreover, the force operated without political leadership on the ground and so the Force Commanders had to combine the functions of political and military leadership. Other serious limitations were the lack of Joint Operational Doctrine; thus there were serious command, control and coordination problems. The ECOWAS Secretariat, however, managed a highwire act with a small staff, to provide the political platform for bringing all parties and shades of opinion on the conflicts together, through very trying negotiations that eventually culminated in elections in Liberia and paved the way for UN intervention in Sierra Leone. The civilian staff of ECOWAS from Member states and the troops that participated, in one form or the other, in the resolution of these conflicts, deserve commendations for their perseverance and faithfulness to the cause of peace.

As a result of this experience, the Mechanism was adopted in 1999 and drew largely from the principles provided in the United Nations Charter, the AU Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. It reaffirmed the commitments that had been made in the Protocol on Non-aggression (signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978), the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (signed in Freetown on 29 May 1981) and the provisions of the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS (adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991) relating to Freedom of People’s Rights and Democratization.

The framework for its implementation includes the following institutions: The Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Mediation and Security Council and the Executive Secretariat. It provides for 3 organs to assist the Mediation and Security Council which are namely: The Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

For the purposes of conflict prevention, the Mechanism possesses a sub-regional peace and security observation system known
as the Early Warning System or “The System”, consisting of an Observation and Monitoring Centre located at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, and Observation and Monitoring Zones within the sub-region. The establishment of the System is based on the conviction that conflicts are avoidable if preventive action is taken early enough. ECOWAS has subsequently instituted additional protocols such as those on Democracy and Good Governance and relevant instruments designed to enhance the promotion of human security issues.

Furthermore, the Protocol provides guidelines for the implementation of the Mechanism, managing conflicts, financing and consolidating peace and security within the sub-region. Since the adoption of the Protocol, the institutions of the Mechanism have been established and the Executive Secretary is assisted in its implementation by a Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security who is now managing all issues relating to peace and security in the sub-region. Under this Deputy Executive Secretary are four departments namely: Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Defence/Security and Early Warning, whose directors started work in September 2003. With this team in place, crises are examined regularly by the relevant structures of the Mechanism in order to maintain peace and security in the sub-region.

Thus, subsequent interventions in Cote d’Ivoire where the sub-regional body deployed the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) and Liberia where the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was deployed, were devoid of the acrimony or feelings of hegemony of the past. To further improve peacekeeping capacity, a Mission Planning and Management Cell would soon be established to make contingency plans and provide ECOWAS Secretariat with the staff needed to manage field operations. A Small Arms Unit would also be established to take care of all issues related to the proliferation of small arms in the sub-region.

The role of Regional Organizations in relation to the UN in conducting Peace Operations

The UN has the global responsibility for maintaining international peace and security; nevertheless, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes the special role Regional Organizations can play in facilitating the role of the UN in fulfilling this responsibility. ECOWAS does not see any contradictions because from experience, proximity to a conflict and the stake in its resolution are strong incentives that induce a commitment to stay the course in any conflict resolution effort.
Furthermore, geographical proximity and shared cultural values engender a better appreciation of the causes of a particular conflict, and the need to limit its contagion are strong reasons why regional organizations should be in the frontline of any effort to resolve a conflict.

However, ECOWAS also recognizes that caution needs to be exercised by regional organizations because the national interests of local players can complicate and prolong the resolution of a conflict. In a worst case scenario, tactical considerations could compel the parties to the conflict to move the battlefield to a neighbouring country used by the peacekeepers, to relieve the stranglehold imposed by those that are considered to be hostile to their interest. This is considered as the case in the relationship between the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It would be recalled that because ECOMOG established its forward operation base in Sierra Leone, exporting the Liberian insurgency into Sierra Leone was a way of diverting the peace mission’s attention and making its operations in Liberia more difficult.

ECOWAS’ experience has a lot of positive lessons to offer. The first is that it can intervene faster if it has the appropriate logistic support. The interventions in Cote d’Ivoire in January 2002 and in Liberia in 2003 are examples. The deployment in Cote d’Ivoire was facilitated by French and American support. Other novelties which ECOWAS adopted due to exigencies were:

(a) involving troop contributing countries in the planning of operations; this way, they were carried along from the planning stages; and

(b) Establishing contact groups at the highest political level to deal with contentious political issues.

Cooperation between ECOWAS and the United Nations

The United Nations has responded positively to several ECOWAS conflict resolution efforts in the past. It would be recalled that at the instance of ECOWAS, the Security Council convened on 19 November, 1992 and adopted Resolution 788 (1992) on Liberia. Similar initiatives enabled ECOWAS to secure Security Council endorsement of several of its military interventions. ECOWAS would therefore wish that the Security Council continues and expands as appropriate, its communication links with regional organizations to further its interaction with regional bodies.

The ECOWAS Mechanism has made provision for the establishment of Stand-by Units similar to those of the UN. Efforts to equip and train these units are underway. The UN has indicated
interest to assist in solving the problems which have been identified in this endeavour. The UN, however, has bilateral agreements with some ECOWAS Member States who subscribe to the UN Stand-by arrangements. At a point down the road, especially with the AU plans to encourage each sub-region to establish a brigade each, it might be necessary to address how best to synchronize all these arrangements.

Logistics has always been a major challenge to deploying ECOWAS missions. Again, looking at the UN for example, ECOWAS has decided to establish two logistics bases from which equipment would be drawn for its operations. These are quite ambitious, but they are essential to the efficient training and deployment of ECOWAS troops. ECOWAS would welcome UN expertise in addressing the technical, political and legal issues associated with establishing such facilities.

Training of peacekeepers is another area where ECOWAS expects much from the UN. In the area of training, ECOWAS has identified three peacekeeping training centres within the sub-region. National War College, Nigeria, is earmarked for strategic level training, while Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana, is for operational training and Koulikoro Peace Keeping Centre, Mali for tactical training. In addition, ECOWAS countries participate in the French-sponsored exercises under the Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) and the American-sponsored African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), both aimed at capacity building for peacekeeping. ECOWAS applauds the recent training given to the Headquarters staff of the United Nations Office in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) at Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre as a very positive development. It would be appreciated if more of such opportunities are created, especially for staff of the ECOWAS Mission Planning and Management Cell.

Lessons

Judging from the experience of ECOWAS, it is felt that effective conflict resolution and the maintenance of international peace and security would be enhanced if the following arrangements and proposals are pursued:

(a) Regional organizations take the front seat and are supported by the international community in the resolution of conflicts;
(b) Regional conflict resolution mechanisms are strengthened; they are invaluable assets in efficiently managing conflicts;

(c) The Regional Standby Units are provided with appropriate logistics assets; they can intervene faster and less expensively and then set the stage for the UN to intervene later, as ECOWAS has demonstrated in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone; and

(d) The international community takes a resolute stand against insurgencies and other forms of armed protest.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, the ECOWAS leadership is seized of the enormous problems of underdevelopment and their links to the various conflicts in its sub-region. It has taken several initiatives to right the situation. However, recurrent armed insurrections are sapping life out of these efforts.

I want to thank all members of the international community that have assisted ECOWAS in the past and have also shown concern about the way forward. International peace and security remains a collective responsibility. It is the wish of ECOWAS that my presentation today would provide a token contribution as we discuss the ways and means of making the world a safer place.
SESSION II:

REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF INITIATING AND SUSTAINING PEACE OPERATIONS
Introduction

There is no question about the primary responsibility of the United Nations (UN) Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. There is, however, a pertinent debate within Africa about how well the UN has lived up to this responsibility, even after the Cold War, particularly with respect to the resolution of African conflicts. Thus, from their inception in May 1963 and July 2002, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) respectively, pursued efforts to establish mechanisms for minding the gap in the African security architecture. As part of this paradigm, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa have also deployed efforts to complement the efforts of the OAU/AU by instituting regional security mechanisms for the prevention, timely resolution and responsive management of regional conflicts.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established by the relevant Treaty in Windhoek in August 1992. Even though SADC was envisioned as a REC with predominantly economic and development portfolios, the Common Agenda of the Treaty (Article 5A) nonetheless recognised the linkage and need for peace, security and stability (Article 5c), as the *sine qua non* for economic development. The SADC security framework was further deepened in August 2001 with the establishment of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (Blantyre, Malawi), instituting the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). Among others, the objective of the OPDS is to promote peace and security in the (SADC) region.

Furthermore, in August 2003, SADC agreed to establish a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, aiming “to
operationalise the mechanisms of the Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters.” It also adopted the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), seeking to identify strategies and activities to achieve the objectives set out in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.4

In actual fact, the second generation African security agenda and architecture does not end with the development and existence of RECs’ security mechanisms. In practice, the agenda reflects an African drive and effort towards continental collective security arrangements, critically informed by the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),5 the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP),6 as well as the Peace and Security Council (PSC)7 for conflict intervention; the African Standby Force (ASF),8 the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) provide the operational instruments for conflict prevention. Within this new architecture, the RECs’ security mechanisms, such as that of SADC, serve as regional building blocks. This paper focuses on the peacekeeping aspects of conflict intervention and issues related thereto.

Whether at the AU or RECs level, the several and joint security mechanisms face enormous challenges. Among others, these challenges revolve around the complexity of conflicts and limited entry points; lack of capacity and expertise, resource constraints; structural constraints with regard to the harmonisation of AU and RECs’ policies and mechanisms, as well as translating policy framework decisions and political rhetoric into actionable steps; and the insufficiency and/or inappropriateness of external assistance.

At the AU level, the operationalisation of the ASF is beset by considerable resource deficits in terms of equipment, logistics and funding for deployment and mission sustainment. These deficits have been in evidence within the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), for instance. Even though some RECs have successfully undertaken peace support interventions within their respective regions, these interventions have been essentially coalitions of the willing and able, under a lead nation or lead nations, with common and collective regional mandate, but no collective burden sharing commitments. Thus, the ability of RECs to undertake peacekeeping operations has been dependent on the ability and willingness of these lead nations to shoulder the associated burden. Additionally, between the AU and regional levels, there are challenges revolving around the harmonisation of efforts.
Within the context of the Challenges discourse and the theme: “The Regional Dimension of Peace Operations: Arrangements, Relationships and the United Nations Responsibility for International Peace and Security,” it is important not only to appreciate the framework of the African security agenda and architecture. It is equally, if not more important, to appreciate efforts towards the operationalization of the relevant mechanisms and the factors underpinning success, effectiveness or impedance.

This paper gives an overview of the SADC framework for peace support operations and an outline of its institutional arrangements. This is intended to provide the backdrop to a brief synopsis of peace support operations within SADC and, in turn, help to highlight key challenges to peace support efforts within the Region. Other sections of the paper provide brief comments on the practical steps for consideration by relevant policy makers and implementers.

For reasons of space, the paper assumes background knowledge of the AU and RECs regional security mechanisms and frameworks. As such, little attempt is made to delve into their details. Where necessary, to facilitate understanding, some notes are provided.

**Overview of SADC Early Warning and Peace Support Frameworks**

The peace support framework of SADC can be gauged from the statutory institutions, structures and procedures drawn from the relevant SADC politico-legal instruments. However, this will not suffice for an appreciation of the full ambitions and intent of the framework. A fuller understanding requires an overview of actual peace support interventions and deployments by SADC, by its Member States and/or within the region. Lastly, the framework needs to be viewed in the context of its relationship with the *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF*, or efforts to bring it in line with the AU System.

From the relevant SADC instruments, the following institutions provide the political, legal and military framework for peace support operations within SADC:

1. The Organ (OPDS) deriving from the Protocol on Defence, Security and Cooperation.
2. The Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), deriving from the Protocol and responsible for functions “relating to politics and diplomacy,” obviously
focusing on preventive diplomacy, conflict management and early warning.

3. The Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) deriving from the Protocol and responsible “to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to defence and security …,” focusing on the ‘hard’ aspects of military defence, peacekeeping and preventive deployment, among others.

4. The respective Sub-Committees of the above structures.

Under Article 11 (Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution), the SADC Protocol provides for the establishment of an early warning system, in order to facilitate timely action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict. In this respect, the SIPO provides for the establishment of a Strategic Analysis Unit [paragraph 8.3.1(IV)], to be responsible for the SADC Situation Room as the nerve centre of regional early warning and response.

In terms of cooperation and collaboration, the relevant instruments are replete with mechanisms and procedures that clearly aim at consultations at all levels, among others, for information sharing and decision making by Summit, ministerial and technical groups, as well as by the Chairperson.

Article 11 of the Protocol also provides for a peace support operations framework based on: enforcement action failing peaceful means of conflict resolution, as a last resort, in accordance with Article 53 of the UN Charter and only with the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Indeed, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact which, pursuant to Article 11(3e) of the Protocol, and addresses collective security arrangements against external threats to the Region, provides that such armed attacks and intervention actions by the Region shall not only be reported immediately to the UN Security Council but also to the AU PSC.

It is obvious that while these instruments do not specifically use the term ‘peace support operations,’ the spirit of their provisions and the technical understanding of the range of actions envisaged under them constitute a peace support operations framework. This is particularly evident from Article 9 of the Mutual Defence Pact relating to Defence Cooperation, as well as the series of ‘BLUE’ regional joint exercises.

Even so, the provision for substantive multidisciplinary defence and security structures, whose roles, functions and missions include peace support operations, is conspicuously absent from the two framework documents, namely the Protocol and the MDP.
that these framework instruments were largely established before the substantive development and adoption of the ASF Policy Framework, this may be understandable. It is therefore to be expected that the advance of the ASF project, as well as the CADSP, should influence amendments or additional protocols to provide for a substantive peace support operations framework and its alignment with that of the AU System.

Synopsis of Peace Support Operations within the SADC Region

Within the SADC region proper, there have been two operations that fall within the scope of this paper. These are the interventions in Lesotho (1998) and Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC (1998). Each of these is looked at briefly, followed by a brief synopsis of South Africa’s lead contribution to the African Mission in Burundi.

The intervention in DRC, 1998-2000

After the political opposition that resurfged in 1982 was either crushed or thwarted through electoral and political manipulations, a crisis engulfed the DRC in late 1996 in the wake of President Mobutu Sese Seko’s illness and medical evacuation to Switzerland. This resulted in a power vacuum, especially in North and South Kivu. Here, there were Hutu soldiers and militiamen, the Interahamwe, who had fled Rwanda after the genocide (1994) in fear of Tutsi retribution. The Interahamwe and Mai Mai (Zaire-based Hutu militia) combined with elements of the Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ) to create a strategic Hutu territory in eastern Zaire from where they increasingly expelled the local Tutsi, the Banyamulenge, and other ethnic groups.

In response, Rwanda and Uganda, as well as Burundi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces, provided support for a Tutsi counter attack that was swelled by other dissident ethnic groups, within the framework of the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), under Laurent-Désiré Kabila, an old aide of the late Patrice Lumumba. Following the failure of South Africa’s President Nelson Mandela to mediate between Mobutu and Kabila in May 1997, Kabila entered Kinshasa, while the embattled Mobutu fled the country to Togo; he died in exile in early September as Kabila renamed the country, then known as Zaire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

However, the marriage of convenience between Kabila, and Rwanda and Uganda, took a turn for the worse when, in July 1998,
Kabila ordered the expulsion of Rwandan members of the armed forces. This prompted another rebellion in the east in August 1998, spearheaded by the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD).

At the SADC meeting that followed shortly during the same month, Namibia and Zimbabwe (initially with about 2,500, but later 8,000 troops), and later Angola and Chad (with about 2,000), also sent troops in support of Kabila’s beleaguered government. It is important to note that the response of the SADC coalition of the willing (since countries such as South Africa had initially questioned the intervention) was at the request of assistance from the government of the DRC, a country that had joined the SADC family only in 1997. On the other side of the battle lines were Uganda and Rwanda, later joined by Chad and the Sudan.12

After a number of ceasefire collapses and two rounds of talks in Lusaka, Zambia and Sirte, Libya (April 1999), the Lusaka Peace Accord was signed in July 1999 by the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda. The Agreement provided for a ceasefire within 24 hours, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC, national dialogue about the country’s future, and the deployment of a UN or OAU peacekeeping force. After threatening the integrity of the ceasefire with their refusal to sign, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) which split from the RCD in February signed the Accord on 1 August, while the RCD signed on 31 August 1999. This paved the way to move the peace process forward.

Within the framework of the Lusaka Agreement, the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) was established by authority of Security Council Resolution 1258 (1999), which authorised the deployment of 90 UN Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) in the capitals of the State signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, neighbouring states and the headquarters of the belligerent parties. Although the Security Council subsequently authorized expansion of MONUC to 5,537 including 500 MLOs by October 2000 only 245 MLOs had deployed, while its full deployment and operations were hindered by the Council’s reluctance to authorise their deployment owing to lack of adequate security commitments by the Parties, following the violations that took place early in the year (March) between RCD and Zimbabwean forces, and the Uganda-Rwanda fighting in Kisangani in May 2000. After a brief setback following the assassination of President Kabila in mid-January 2001, there is renewed optimism for a peaceful
resolution of the conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes, in spite of periodic setbacks.\textsuperscript{13}

It should be added that notwithstanding the regional and international flak, particularly against Zimbabwe’s involvement, the intervention halted the advance of the invading armies, stabilised the situation and galvanised UN and international community action for the deployment of MONUC.

\textit{Operation Boleas: The intervention in Lesotho, 1998}

Between May and September 1998, law and order broke down in Lesotho as the opposition fiercely contested the outcome of parliamentary elections which the international community had declared as free and fair. The situation was exacerbated by a military mutiny. As power steadily slid through the hands of the government, and failing successful domestic mediation by South Africa, the Prime Minister of Lesotho requested military assistance from SADC Member States. In response, the South Africa and Botswana governments, respectively, ordered the intervention of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF).

The mission of the Combined Task Force (CTF) was to prevent further anarchy and create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order. In fact, the CTF was under instructions to stabilise Lesotho by neutralising and disarming dissident elements within the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), the end-game being to create a stable environment conducive to political negotiations between the parties. Within this broad mandate, the SADC coalition was tasked with the mission to:

- rescue the \textit{embattled} [sic] legitimate government of Lesotho;
- neutralise and discipline the mutineers in the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF); and
- restructure the LDF, including force downsizing and retraining of the officer corps, the professional element of the LDF.\textsuperscript{14}

Once stability had been restored, the South African government sought a political solution to the conflict by facilitating inter-party talks under the auspices of its Minister for Safety and Security, aiming at a framework agreement on fresh elections, transitional arrangements for the LCD to remain in power, and establishment of an interim mechanism to level the playing field, while the electoral commission was reconstituted.\textsuperscript{15}

Pertinently, it should be recalled that while the South African government insisted that SADC was invited by the distressed government of Lesotho, its intervention was also apparently animated by
more direct national interests, including the protection of the Katse dam.\textsuperscript{16} From 1 November 1998, the mandate of the CTF was changed to continuous stabilisation operations, including border security tasks (Campaign Charon).\textsuperscript{17}

**South Africa’s extra-Community contribution to the Burundian Peace Process: A pan-African strategy?**

Even though Burundi is not a Member State of SADC, the involvement of South Africa and its contribution to the peace process in that country make it worthwhile mentioning.\textsuperscript{18} As part of efforts at shoring up the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000,\textsuperscript{19} the AU originally had requested Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa to provide contingents, after the Regional Peace Initiative (Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa, the AU, UN and the Facilitation), had realised its inadequacy to mandate a mission in Burundi. Incidentally the West African countries, while stating their readiness to commit troops, had demanded a mandate from the UN. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the UN was not prepared to give a mandate, its clichéd reason being that there was no comprehensive ceasefire and therefore no peace to keep.\textsuperscript{20}

In consideration of the stakes in moving the process forward, President Nelson Mandela, the Facilitator, used his good offices to secure the timely deployment of a SANDF contingent, the South African Protection and Support Detachment (SAPSD).\textsuperscript{21} The force which was deployed in October 2000 was initially about 150 strong. Subsequently, following progress in the peace process with the signing of the ceasefire agreements of October and December 2002,\textsuperscript{22} the AU mandated the deployment of its first full-fledged peacekeeping mission, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), in early April 2003.\textsuperscript{23}

Out of the established AMIB strength of 3,335, the SAPSD contingent was massively augmented to more than 1,550, about 60 percent of the boots on the ground. The SANDF contingent provides lead nation resource capacities in heavy firepower (artillery, armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles) strategic and close air support, maritime, engineer, medical, maintenance and recovery, communications, and petroleum, oils and lubricants (this list is not exhaustive).

To put the financial implications of its contribution in perspective, the SANDF budget of some $70 million amounts to some 64\% of the AMIB budget of about $110 million for the first year’s deployment only. By the time the projected deployment of the UN Mission in
Burundi (UNMIB) gets under in early June 2004, AMIB would have executed its mandate for about 14 months.

Overview of Challenges

The preceding sections outlined the political underpinnings of SADC efforts towards substantive collective peace and security, and the operational realities informing its efforts. In practice, SADC regional interventions have been on ad hoc basis. The clear imperative from these sections is that because the PSC Protocol and the ASF constitute the only African peace and security road show, SADC needs to align its regional security mechanism with that of the AU.

Harmonisation with the AU

In the political arena, SADC needs to unify its peace and security structures and work towards a substantive security mechanism that is in harmony with that of the AU system. In this respect, it needs to ensure that its criteria for regional intervention do not preclude any of those factors entrenched in the Constitutive Act of the African Union or the PSC Protocol. For the moment, this is not the case as the SADC’s MDP tends to stipulate that it is only “an armed attack against a State Party” that shall be considered “a threat to regional peace and security … (and) shall be met with immediate collective action.”

Political Challenges

The following political issues underscore challenges to SADC peace and security efforts:

- Rationalising the SADC region, particularly in terms of its overlap with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), although COMESA has made it clear that it intends to restrict its peace and security interests to conflict prevention matters. Besides being wasteful of administrative and other scarce resources, the absence of a clearly defined region complicates SADC institutionalisation.
- The juxtaposition of the restructured Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to the SADC Troika in contradiction with recommended SIPO action. This duality of key SADC institutions raises fundamental questions about political institutionalisation within SADC, particularly in terms of political cohesion, unity of purpose, and Member States’ willingness to surrender political spaces to the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.
Making efforts to bring the ISPDC, which occupies the more difficult and sensitive political arena, up to speed with the ISDSC. To this end, paying attention to the underlying considerations, namely: 1) the legacy of the duel between the hawks (mainly Zimbabwe and Angola) and the doves (mainly South Africa and Mozambique); 2) Zimbabwe’s paralysing political instability; 3) the Great Lakes’ (DRC and Burundi) destabilising low-intensity conflicts that have tended to inform as well as deflect South Africa’s immediate foreign policy concerns within the SADC region; and 4) the lack of enthusiasm on the part of Member States to relinquish control over areas of functional portfolios assigned within the framework of the Old Organ.

Addressing the curious SADC provision that “each State Party shall participate in … collective action in any manner it deems appropriate” (Article 6.3 of the MDP), dividing SADC into groups that are characterised by Ngoma as consisting of “hawks, doves and penguins.” Consequently, this requires a provision for a dedicated regional security framework for a truly collective peace support capability.

Endowing its institutions with the human and material resources that are necessary to ensure the speedy implementation of decisions and the operationalisation of structures.

Operational Challenges

This paper has proceeded from the viewpoint that the more operational challenges relating to liaison, information sharing, early warning and early response; as well as coordination with the UN and operational transition between the UN and SADC, can only be dealt with by those regional structures whose establishment and operationalisation have been thwarted by the political challenges already outlined. The argument, therefore, is that once the pertinent and critical political issues are addressed, SADC would have removed the stumbling blocks to effective regional peace operations. This argument also applies to the issue of regional burden sharing and resource constraints.

Arguably, there has been considerable cooperation and collaboration within Summit, ministerial and other technical groups, as well as with the Chairperson. However, notwithstanding progress by these institutions and the ISDSC, substantive liaison, information sharing, early warning and early response in SADC have been hampered by its
tendency towards ad hoc arrangements. In particular, because the ISPDC is lagging behind the ISDSC, the Community has not been up to speed with preventive aspects of its regional security mechanism.

The real challenge, therefore, relates to how SADC can concretise its political cooperation and collaboration into functional liaison and information sharing that will also include SADC publics and policy research institutions. For instance, the reported mercenary activities in Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea in March 2004 provide a case study and a strong argument that early warning is not, and should not be, the preserve of state security and intelligence agencies.\(^{31}\) Within the framework of the SADC Protocols, it ought to be based on transparent multi-national institutions and should involve other extra-state agencies and organisations.

To that end, especially as the AU establishes its Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), SADC similarly needs to expedite the establishment and operationalisation of its regional early warning system (Article 11 of the SADC Protocol), based on the AU CEWS and into which it should feed as well. This will obviously require a degree of collaboration between the ISPDC and the ISDSC and should include a space for civil society organisations to ensure inclusion and objectivity. The West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) provides a classic example of collaboration between RECs and civil society in the area of regional peace, security and stability.\(^ {32}\)

It is impossible to accurately gauge the scope and level of UN collaboration with the region in the absence of centralised regional structures. Nonetheless, at least from 1998, the region has collaborated with the UN in the area of regional police training.\(^ {33}\) However, in terms of peace support operations, coordination with the UN towards the deployment of a regional peace operation is yet to take place within the framework of a centralised SADC peace support operations structure. Similarly, owing to the nature of its interventions, SADC as a region is yet to undertake a classic transition to UN peace operations.\(^ {34}\) In the future, though, SADC will need to undertake increasing collaboration with the UN, within the framework of the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF, as the SADC Standby Brigade (SASBRIG) could also be mandated for deployment by the UN System.\(^ {35}\)

To this end, it is proposed that SADC as well as AU coordination with the UN should be based on the following instructive generic principles:\(^ {36}\)

1. The UN should reciprocate SADC lead interventions with UN diplomatic support as a stamp of legitimacy.
2. The UN and SADC, within the framework of wider collaboration with the AU, should aim at strategic level coordination, which is fundamental and key to success of coordination at the operational and tactical levels.

3. In consideration of its limitations, SADC coordination with the UN should aim at gaining appropriate UN and multilateral international community support in critical areas, particularly strategic airlift, logistical mission sustainment and financial assistance.

4. SADC-UN coordination should also be aiming at operational complementarity between future co-deployed SADC and UN missions. Effective coordination and transition to UN peace operations should be achieved through the use of memoranda of understanding.  

5. When co-deployed, the concepts of operation of the SADC and UN peace missions should be harmonised at the sector level for mission critical activities, including exchange of information at all levels and in a timely manner.

6. UN coordination assistance should address critical weaknesses of SADC and other regional peacekeeping interventions.

**Operationalisation of SADC Standby Brigade**

In the operational arena, the most urgent challenge is how SADC can be up to speed with the establishment and operationalisation of its regional standby brigade structures for Phase 1 of the ASF Policy Framework ending on 30 June 2005. One way of appreciating the operational challenges is to outline the critical priorities for this effort. In this paper, it is suggested that the key priorities for operationalisation of the SADC Standby Brigade (SASBRIG) in Phase 1 are as follows:

**Priority 1:** Establishing a Planning Element (PLANELM) consisting of a core of five officers (and augmented by international expertise), by 1 October 2004. In conjunction with the AU PLANELM, this regional element will do force planning and preparation, including three key technical studies, for the establishment of the SASBRIG. The output from these studies should include costed plans for providing logistics; Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C3IS); and training support; to the ASF.

**Priority 2:** Establishment of a SASBRIG mission HQ level management capability, starting with a military HQ, by 1 October 2004.
Priority 3: The development and population of the ASF standby system consisting of observers, formed units and civilians, on standby in their countries of origin by 30 June 2005.

To achieve these priorities in a practical manner for the establishment and operationalisation of the SASBRIG, it is further suggested that SADC’s efforts should be guided by the following critical steps during the remaining time in Phase 1:

a. **Step 1**: Urgently establish and locate the SADC PLANELM to provide guidance on the structure and region-specific requirements for the establishment of the SASBRIG.

b. **Step 2**: Achieve appropriate decisions to establish the SASBRIG, including the composition and location of the standby brigade HQ, regional political and military command and control framework and its relationship with the AU PLANELM and with the AU PSC.

c. **Step 3**: Establish appropriate offers from Member States and regional consensus to contribute resources to the SASBRIG.

d. **Step 4**: Identify shortfalls in the resources contributed by Member States (to be undertaken by the SASBRIG HQ and PLANELM through verification visits and staff checks).

e. **Step 5**: Rectify shortfalls in the resources of SASBRIG through a number of solutions.

Resource constraints: ‘Collectivism’ without burden sharing

Burden sharing is an obvious rationale for collective security arrangements. Paradoxically, while SADC lead nations and their follow-on coalitions have normally been able to foot the bills for their individual efforts, SADC as a whole has been unable to muster sufficient political will for collective burden sharing. The challenge for SADC is to establish a regional mechanism for collectively sharing the burden of its interventions before intervention fatigue affects its lead nations. It should therefore establish collective framework mechanisms for the establishment, training, deployment and logistical sustainment of the SASBRIG. In principle, resources into the relevant supporting collective facilities, whether manpower; command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS); centres of peacekeeping excellence; joint training exercises; logistical bases; or funds; should be based on the per capita resources of its Member States.

Conclusion

From an Afro-optimistic angle, it has to be said that SADC has made admirable achievements since its inception in 1996, with about 23
Protocols and instruments to its credit. This argument is justifiable on the basis that by recognising what needs to be done and by achieving broad regional consensus on the general strategic direction of the Community, such negotiated instruments as the Consolidated (Amended) Text of the Treaty of SADC and its related Protocols represent regional progress in the political arena. In comparative terms, SADC has achieved in a short span of time, what other African regions have taken a considerable time to achieve.

Yet, a great deal more needs to be done to overcome the challenges to the achievement of a substantive regional security mechanism for effective peace operations. The mere existence of a security mechanism is not sufficient, without substantive framework provisions for appropriate capability at the operational level.

Pointedly, all AU Member States are also signatories to the UN Charter which, inter alia, provides that the UN Security Council has fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Arguably, the UN is yet to be fully up to the task after the watershed period of 1993-94. While the UN improves on the timely mandating of peace operations in Africa, key western nations have pursued a policy of abdication from African conflicts. To the contrary, western nations have chosen to pursue hybrid operations outside the umbrella of UN peacekeeping operations, or under special peace enforcement mandates.

The combination of these situations compels action on the part of the AU and RECs which cannot look on unconcerned or hope in a policy amounting to the outsourcing of the continent’s peace and security to the UN and the international community. This reality informs efforts towards Africa’s second generation peace and security architecture and agenda, devolving on the AU Peace and Security Council, particularly the ASF.

To this end, SADC and other RECs need to harmonise their respective regional security mechanisms with that of the AU. They also need to be up to speed with operationalisation of the regional standby forces that are to serve as building blocks of the continental standby force, based on UN doctrine and standards.

Particularly in the SADC region, more political will is required to underscore the establishment of a substantive regional security mechanism aligned with the AU PSC and the Policy Framework of the ASF. Subsequently, SADC will need to get up to speed with the operationalisation of its regional standby brigade, including mechanisms
for collective burden sharing, while also pursuing efforts for the operationalisation of its preventive structures.
ENDNOTES


2. The 14 Member States of SADC are: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles (withdrawing in July/August 2003), South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is to be noted that nine SADC Member States are also members of the 20-member Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). These are: Angola, DRC, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

3. The SADC Organ was first established in 1996, superceding the defunct Front Line States (FLS) which had been instrumental in the coordination of FLS’s military response to the destabilization operations of apartheid South Africa. The new Protocol entered into force in March 2004, 30 days after its ratification by Zimbabwe on 2 February 2004, to provide for nine signatures or two-thirds of the Membership. Angola, the DRC, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zambia are yet to ratify the Protocol.

4. The SIPO (third draft), which is divided into four sections, cover: 1) political; 2) defence; 3) state security; and 4) public sectors; and provides implementation guidance for the next five years.

5. NEPAD was originally envisaged as a vehicular forum for dialogue between NEPAD (Member States) and the G8 industrialised countries.

6. The need for a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) stems from the objectives of the Constitutive Act of the AU, notably from Article 3(a-h), as well as Article 4(d) of the Act, which provide for the “establishment of a Common Defence Policy for the African Continent”. Thus, during its inaugural Summit (Durban, South Africa, July 2002), the AU Assembly stressed that need and requested its Chairman to establish a group of experts to examine and make recommendations on all aspects related to the establishment of such a Common African Defence and Security Policy. The CADSP seeks to address common (human) security threats facing Africa, such as: small arms and light weapons;
peacebuilding and peacekeeping, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; landmines; child soldiers; nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; chemical weapons; HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other infectious diseases; terrorism; humanitarian issues; and environmental matters. Among others, the CADSP aims to ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa, in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act.

7. The PSC Protocol superceded the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Central Organ), which was established by the Cairo Declaration (1993). The PSC was established pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Protocol Establishing the PSC was adopted in Durban (2002); the Council was formally established in March and launched on 25 May 2004. Among others, the PSC Protocol provides for: a Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African Standby Force with a Military Staff Committee (MSC), as well as a Peace Fund.

8. The ASF is established pursuant to Article 13 of the PSC Protocol and upon the recommendations of the 3rd Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS), relating to the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF. Within the framework of the relevant Policy Framework (Article 13 of the PSC Protocol), the ASF will be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The ASF is to be established in two phases: 1) Phase 1 up to 30 June 2005: the AU’s objective is to establish a strategic level management capacity to provide military advice to a political mission (Scenario 1) and the management of co-deployed observer mission, while RECs establish regional brigade groups to achieve complex peacekeeping (Chapter VI) deployment capacity (Scenario 4); and Phase 2 up to 30 June 2010: the AU will develop the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while RECs continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces.

9. See also Article 11(3c and d), and 11(4e) of the Protocol.

10. See Article 6 of the MDP relating to Collective Self-Defence and Collective Action.
11. These exercises are: BLUE CRANE (1998) and BLUE HUWUNGWE (1999); it is significant that no joint multinational exercises have been conducted since 2000.

12. By early 1999, the war was estimated to have internally displaced some 500,000 and sent another 200,000 as refugees into neighbouring states, besides a number of alleged massacres, especially those in South Kivu in late 1998. It also involved child soldiers, including the 3,000 Mai Mai child soldiers located in the Kampalata camp near Kisangani in early 1998. The war has since been labeled the First African World War in view of the number of African countries involved.


15. Rocky, Cawthra and Abrahams, op. cit., p. 60.

16. Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, op. cit., p. 2 and p. 5. In addition to the justifications mentioned, the government of post-apartheid South Africa was compelled to play a lead role and insisted that the intervention, which was not tantamount to an invasion, was based on: 1) SADC agreements; 2) a last resort failing all peaceful mediation; 3) upholding democracy by protecting an elected government; and 4) signalling a tough policy stance against unconstitutionalism.


18. The intervention owed primarily to the key role played by former President Nelson Mandela and the South African government; it was outside the framework of Article 11(2c) of the Protocol, relating to interventions outside the SADC region.
19. Pursuant to this, the UN had in early 2001, issued an 11-point benchmark setting preconditions to the AU for the deployment of a UN mission.

20. Ibid.

21. The UN Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 1291 (1999) which, among other things, authorised the expansion of MONUC to 5,537, including 500 UN MLOs, the establishment of the Joint Military Commission (JMC), and their joint mandate in implementing and monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. There have since been a number of mandate revisions and upward force strength adjustments that have brought the strength of MONUC to just over 10,000.

22. The first ceasefire agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs: CNDD-FDD of Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and Palipehutu-FNL of Alain Mugababona), on 7 October 2002. The second ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 December 2002, between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza. Note should also be taken of the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Power Sharing in Burundi of 8 October, and the second Pretoria Protocol (the Forces Technical Arrangements) of 2 November 2003, as well as the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 16 November 2003, between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza).

23. AMIB’s deployment commenced with the integration of an augmented SAPSD of about 750 strong. The other troop-contributing countries are: Ethiopia (865) and Mozambique (228).

24. Hammerstad, Anne, Defending the State or Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads, SAIIA Report No. 39, November 2003, p.5ff. In this piece, the SAIIA Senior Researcher makes the point that imprecise definition of security and the limited inclusiveness of intervention criteria are some of the flaws in the SADC Protocol. In this context, it is pointed out that in addition to the lack of clarity on the range of possible actions, this SADC provision fundamentally excludes substantive criteria for the right of intervention of the AU in grave circumstances, namely: 1) war crimes; 2) genocide; and 3) crimes against humanity (Article 4h), as well as the right of a Member State to request intervention (Article 4j). There is
therefore a security gap as many of the post-Cold War conflicts in SADC have been intrastate and not inter-state. Indeed, it may be argued that the ambiguity of the scope of ‘collectivity’ and the range of action compromise the integrity of the Community and the credibility of its security mechanism to deter extra-regional adventurism and aggression.


26. Hammerstad, op. cit., p. 11. Schalkwyk and Cilliers, op. cit., p. 5, Note 15. www.sadc.int. SADC 2004 Calendar of Activities. Perhaps helped by the ‘tailwind’ of the ASF project, the ISDSC is scheduled to hold its 25th meeting (Lusaka/Maseru) in June 2004, whereas its counterpart ISPDC will only be holding its third meeting in the same month.


28. In particular Zimbabwe, which traditionally dominated the erstwhile concept of the Frontline states.

29. ISS Paper 88, April 2004. Ngoma, Naison (Lieutenant Colonel), Hawks, Doves or Penguins? A Critical Review of the SADC Military Intervention in the DRC, In this piece, Ngoma characterizes the SADC Alliance (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) that sent troops to the DRC as the hawks; those that did not (South Africa and Mozambique) as the doves; and those that remained neutral (Tanzania) or preferred a mediatory role (Zambia) as the quasi penguins.

30. Schalkwyk and Cilliers, op. cit., p. 4 and p. 18. Aboagye, F. B. (Lieutenant Colonel), ECOMOG, A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia, (Accra: Sedco, 1999), pp. 215ff. Writing on the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Aboagye observed a similar polarization in ECOWAS, informed by conflicting national, as well as personal, leadership interests and agendas.

31. The Thisday Newspaper, 26 May 2004, p. 2. In a report by Marlene Burger, the Paper states that: “the government has backtracked on official statements that intelligence supplied by South Africa to the governments of Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea led to the alleged coup plan being thwarted in March …
officials ... deny that South African authorities had any knowledge of a plan to overthrow the regime of Equatorial Guinea's President Teodoro Obiang Nguema.” See also The Beeld Newspaper, 25 May 2004, p.2 on the debate between the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, and Douglas Gibson, DA Spokesperson; and also www.worldnews.com, article titled: “Zimbabwe: Alleged mercenaries take SA govt to court”, Fri, 21 May 2004.

32. See www.wanep.org. With a membership of over 80 in 11 countries, WANEP functions as an informal mechanism for peaceful intervention in West Africa. WANEP is currently engaged with ECOWAS to provide a tool for early warning and response. To facilitate this engagement, WANEP has a liaison desk at the ECOWAS Secretariat.

33. Some of the training are: 1) the UN Civilian Police seminar for senior SADC police representatives (Durban, South Africa, February 1998); 2) briefings on the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) for Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (June 1998; some have since signed up to the UNSAS); 3) a two-week SADC regional police officers course (Pretoria, South Africa, November 1998); and 4) other UN training assistance at the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC). Indeed, some of the collaboration has been facilitated by international and local organisations, such as the ISS which has been involved in the running of Police Officers Courses for the Southern African Regional Police Commissioners Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO). Some of the courses are funded by the Norwegian Government and cover Violence Against Women and Children (VAWC), HIV/AIDS and pre-deployment UN Police Officers course for UN peace operations.

34. The episodes of UN coordination and consultations with the Region have largely been with selected SADC Member States, such as South Africa, in terms of its contribution of resources to UN peace operations in the Great Lakes, or to the impending UN deployment in Burundi. However, this coordination also involved the AU which mandated AMIB’s deployment.

35. The ASF Policy Framework provides for closer collaboration with the UN for assistance in the development of doctrine, training, on-the-job staff training, cooperation in UN logistical support, and UN consultations with African troop-contributing countries and troop-contributing organisations.
36. These principles have been expounded as lessons learned in an unpublished paper titled “UN-AU cooperation in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict” at the Policy Advisory Group Meeting (Cape Town, 21-23 May 2003). The meeting was co-organised by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the UN Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

37. In respect of logistical assistance, the relevant MOU should cover: provision of maps; communication and electronic facilities; office equipment; logistical supplies, including water, transport and petroleum, oils and lubricants; maintenance and recovery facilities; power generation equipment and power supply; medical aid, including medical evacuation; etc.

38. During Phase 1: the AU’s key objective is to establish a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions, while RECs would complement the AU by establishing regional forces up to a brigade level grouping to achieve Scenario 4 capabilities. During Phase 2 (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): it is envisaged that by the year 2010 the AU will have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces. The six scenarios are: 1) AU/Regional military advice to a political mission, e.g. in Cote d’Ivoire; 2) AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission, e.g. the OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE) or Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) in the Sudan; 3) stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission, e.g. AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) or AU Mission in the Comoros (AMIC); 4) AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building), e.g., AMIB; 5) AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers; and 6) AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.

39. Schalkwyk and Cilliers, op. cit., p. 6. It is believed that under the auspices of South Africa, SADC is developing proposals for the establishment of such a brigade group as the regional component of the ASF.

40. In the case of West Africa, for instance, the absence of Nigeria from the peacekeeping in Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999) and Cote d’Ivoire (2000-2004) had serious implications for the military
manpower, financial and logistical sustainment of these missions. In the case of the latter, assistance from the international community was urgently needed to make the meagre (1,330) deployment possible, much later after the deployment of French forces.
Cooperation and Capabilities needed to run a Peace Support Operation

To be able to run a peace support operation, a few things are needed. Critical among these are the following:

- Political will.
- Military Forces.
- Planning and Control Capabilities at the following levels:
  - Strategic Level;
  - Operational/Force Level;
  - Tactical Level.
- Civilian/Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The political will has to be developed and confirmed through various global and regional structures like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The military forces have to be trained to agreed standards and must attain the readiness and sustainability to be able to operate abroad. Means for strategic transport also have to be available.

For a regional structure, there are a number of important factors that are needed to be able to launch the military component of a peace support operation. These factors include the following:

- A network with the UN as well as international and non-governmental organisations (IO/NGO);
- A Country Fact Paper as well as a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) outlining the following:
  - Intents, phases, tasks and endstates
Logistics;
• Communications;
• Civil/Military Cooperation;
• MOVCON;
• Rules of Engagement etc.
• Ability to run a Force Generation including assessment teams;
• Ability to administer the economic aspects;
• Press and information capacity.

These are structures and capabilities that are needed at the strategic level, in order to be able to work in capital and regional headquarters like those of the AU, ECOWAS or the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

To run the real mission on ground in the area of operation, practical operational and tactical command capabilities are needed to organise Force and Sector Headquarters. These include the following:

• Military Planning capability
• Coherent procedures compatible with the UN including SOPs as well as Drafts and templates
• Communications
• Vehicles
• Security
• CIMIC.

Furthermore, in order to be able to ensure effective deployment capabilities and in-theatre sustainability, the UN has in recent years taken a number of initiatives and developed these improvements in the following areas:

• Strategic Deployment Stocks (drawing from the material available at Brindisi)
• UNSAS Rapid Deployment Level
• UNSAS “On Call Lists”
• Contributions from nations
• UN own key personnel
• Pre-Security Council Mandates
• Faster reimbursement arrangements.

These are all good initiatives, but they still need to mature.
The Standing High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG)

One of the capabilities needed is rapidly deployable forces of brigade size. As an initiative developed while Kofi Annan served as Under Secretary General (USG) at the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) with the Danish Defence Minister, Jens Hekkerup, the Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was organised in the late 1990s by a number of countries with extensive peacekeeping traditions such as Canada, Denmark, Austria and Sweden. The purpose was to increase UN rapid deployment capability, particularly against the background of the unfortunate operations in Srebrenica and Rwanda. Later, SHIRBRIG has been joined by units from countries like Spain and Lithuania. Furthermore, a number of countries like Senegal, Ireland, Chile and Jordan have become observers within the SHIRBRIG structure. The SHIRBRIG Steering Committee has recommended further co-operation with the AU and ECOWAS, as well as with specific countries including, among others, Ghana and South Africa.

The core of SHIRBRIG consists of the following:

• A Steering Committee with a rotating Presidency;
• The Permanent Planning Element in Copenhagen (PLANELM);
• A non-permanent brigade staff that gathers for training twice every year; and
• A force pool of about 5000-6000 soldiers in various units as mechanised battalions, marine units, medical units, engineer units etc.

The readiness is about 7 days for PLANELM for the personnel tasked with reconnaissance and planning, about 2 weeks for an advance HQ party and 30 days for all units to be loaded on board transport ships.

The SHIRBRIG concept is based on four key factors namely:

• Peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN;
• Individual country decisions to participate;
• Maximum 6 months deployment time; and
• A 60 days self-sufficiency, which is thereafter based upon UN logistics.

Every year, SHIRBRIG runs a number of training events, like a Command Post Exercise with the staff and the Danish HQ Company, two Commanders Conferences on actual planning for new missions, as well as a number of specialist meetings in logistics, communications etc.
UN officials from various institutions are invited to these events and occasional participants from non-SHIRBRIG countries are also invited. SHIRBRIG has, from 2004, also invited the African Union to send a staff officer to the PLANELM in Copenhagen on a fully sponsored basis.

SHIRBRIG’s first mission was to the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) in Ethiopia in 2000. SHIRBRIG later supported ECOWAS with planning for the UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire and was asked, in September 2003, to set up the Interim Headquarters in Monrovia for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Recent mission planning activities have had focus on Africa and SHIRBRIG is presently engaged in the planning and on-ground preparations for a new UN mission to Sudan.

SHIRBRIG has no defined geographical member strategy. However, it is clear that a totally global co-operation arrangement will cost considerable amounts of money for travelling and training. As most of its participating countries today are from the European region, there have been several discussions on how to support the development of regional SHIRBRIG structures, e.g. in Africa, South America and Asia. The SHIRBRIG Presidency as well as the Commander have, therefore, several times recently been in contact with the African Union as well as ECOWAS.

Lessons Learned from UNMIL

In December 2002, the SHIRBRIG PLANELM organised a planning exercise in New York in cooperation with DPKO. Without any previous planning or preparations, the PLANELM was given a task by DPKO to develop a mission concept for a potential mission in a generic African country. There were, however, obvious similarities with Liberia. The concept was handed over to DPKO and was later used in SHIRBRIG training and exercises, and also for development of the peacekeeping mission in Liberia in line with the following trend of events:

- On 17 June 2003, a cease-fire agreement for Liberia was signed.
- On 28 June, the Secretary General called for the deployment of a multinational force, under the lead of a Member State.
- On 2 July, ECOWAS leaders decided to deploy a vanguard force to Liberia.
On 31 July, ECOWAS leaders decided that the deployment into Liberia of the vanguard force of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) would begin on 4 August, 2003.

On 1 August, the UN Security Council took a decision to establish a UN Chapter VII mission effective from 1 October 2003.

On 10 September, SHIRBRIG was asked by DPKO to organise an Interim Force HQ, while the main HQ was in training but could not be operational until around 1 November.

On 24 September, Interim Headquarters (IHQ) personnel arrived in Monrovia.

On 1 October, UNMIL took official command in Liberia.

On 15 October, the first part of Main HQ arrived (the first set of officers arrived 15-20, while another 20 arrived on 20 October).

On 2 November, the IHQ left Monrovia.

The mission of SHIRBRIG in Liberia was as follows:

- To deploy to Monrovia;
- Establish a Headquarters that meets UN formal requirements;
- Assume operational control over the UN forces on 1 October;
- Develop a plan for operations during October and first part of November 2003;
- Hand over to the Main Headquarters on 1 November;
- Redeploy to Copenhagen and SHIRBRIG countries.

In pursuance of this mission, the major challenge encountered was in the area of communications. Initially, the only facilities available were private or SHIRBRIG cellphones with cashcards. The first UN telephone lines were established on 3-4 October and worked at only about 60 per cent capacity during the first few weeks. The first UN email became operational on 7 October; until then, national and SHIRBRIG satellite email and private accounts were used. As at 15 October, there were only 15 UN addresses on Lotus Notes/UN email.

Initially, these systems suffered low availability due to power supply problems. Other challenges encountered included the following:

- The UN computer had only office software, but also needed
  - Filing and library systems;
  - Security and backup systems; and
  - Database of templates etc.
- There was only marginal VHF communications (only 1 relay
station) initially, but this improved with the establishment of several relay stations around 20 October.

- HF radio in operation had only marginal effect due to lack of operator skills.
- ECOMIL's 1st Brigade was initially located at Royal Hotel complex where facilities were not appropriate for a Force or Brigade HQ, but this was temporarily re-located in STAR building, and later again re-located to Spriggs Payne airfield.

In terms of UN support of the military aspect of the mission, this was initially too small. In terms of UN civilian staff, there were only 30 out of the 300 staff. The mission focused its activities on only the next 48 hours and even with a lot of good equipment in containers, had too few people to get them distributed. Furthermore, while the vehicles were of good quality, they were too few of them available. Accommodation was also a major problem as there were no suitable living facilities.

**Cooperation with ECOWAS and others**

The experience of cooperation with ECOWAS revealed the need for the following:

- Strong political will
- Professional military leadership
- A lot of experience, requiring many capable units
- Development of communications and logistics
- Shortening of deployment time with an increased permanent planning team in the Secretariat with a permanent multinational brigade staff cadre as well.

While cooperation with DPKO was extensive, it was based largely on mutual personal contacts in developing documents like the Country Fact Paper and a military Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

A few words also need to be said as regards cooperation with international and non-governmental organizations. There were regular meetings with officials of the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) etc. Representatives of these organisations were invited to morning and evening staff briefings. Valuable knowledge about terrain, people etc, was received from international organizations and non-governmental organisations. This helped, particularly to protect and retrieve IO/NGO vehicles. The mission, in collaboration with representatives of these organizations, also undertook joint helicopter
expeditions to show presence, distribute medical supplies and pull out
the sick and wounded.

In carrying out the foregoing, SHIRBRIG’s strength were as follows:

- Good knowledge about UN specific procedures;
- Cohesive team where everyone knew their roles;
- Well established network with DPKO;
- Well organised force generation by the SHIRBRIG Presidency and personnel-contributing nations;
- The existence of a contingency fund which enabled the mission to start ordering tickets, etc;
- Availability of SHIRBRIG - procured equipment like computers, radios, mobile phones etc;
- Rapid support by nations regarding individual equipment etc and by DANLOG for food, medical equipment etc;
- The option to use not only PLANELM, but also non-permanent staff members as well as force specialist pool personnel;
- Availability of templates for Mission Analysis, Operational Plans (Opplans) and Operational Orders (Oporders) etc;
- Invaluable computer support by Danish Staff helpers; and
- SHIRBRIG’s background knowledge about Liberia due to earlier planning and staff training.

The Way Ahead

The world is big enough for all of us and there is extensive need for preparations for new peacekeeping missions. A vision for the future should envisage the following possible collaborations:

- SHIRBRIG – Europe
- SHIRBRIG – ECOWAS
- SHIRBRIG – IGAD
- SHIRBRIG - South America
- SHIRBRIG - Asia

To be able to develop further capabilities in peacekeeping, there are several options for enhanced regional cooperation and networks, such as the following:

- Regional Lesson Learned seminars about Peace Support operations and the relationship between the civil and military components of such missions;
- Establishment of permanent regional political/military secretariats and a few multinational Force/Brigade Headquarters;
• Secondment of UN or national advisers to new regional PLANELMs and Peace Keeping Centres;
• Greater participation of African advisers in programmes run by European/Western Peacekeeping Centres;
• On-the-job training at SHIRBRIG Copenhagen, SEEBRIG Constanza or at African/Asian Peace Keeping Centres;
• Common fact-finding and planning for upcoming potential missions;
• Sponsoring by European Union, G-8 or individual nations.

Finally, I must remark that SHIRBRIG is completely open for cooperation and is happy to support the development of peacekeeping capabilities with regional organisations and individual nations.
Introduction

Since the full-fledged emergence of complex United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations from the end of the Cold War, the international community has been grappling with how best to mandate, design and manage such operations. Much has been learned and codified – not least in the Brahimi Report and through the process of its implementation. But it remains the case that peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building operations are political arts as much as they are sciences. I have been asked to present on how South East Asia is facing the challenge of initiating and sustaining peace operations. And I will do that, at least initially. But first some words on the approach I am taking.

I believe that there are two distinct ways that regional organisations can respond to that challenge, each of which is determined by the circumstances that the region itself faces. Firstly, in a region that faces no serious challenge to its peace and security, the focus could be on how that regional organisation can organise itself to provide effective support to international efforts to address peace and security challenges in other regions. In other words: extra-territorial operations. An example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which is facing no major challenges in its primary region and so is now making its forces available in Afghanistan. Similarly, the European Union (EU) Operation Armetis. This is an emerging trend and worthy of a session on its own.

Secondly, in a region which does face significant challenges, we can look at how that regional organisation might be able to confront those challenges. It is this second response that is the primary focus of
this seminar and of my presentation today. With that as background, I will now do as the organisers asked and look at South East Asia.

The major regional organisation is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The membership of ASEAN comprises 10 nations namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. ASEAN’s primary focus is economic development through coordination and cooperation and one of the defining characteristics of ASEAN is the achievement of its goals through consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of another member state. The major challenge to the ASEAN region was the financial crisis of the late 1990s; it has not faced a major security challenge between its member states.

In association with ASEAN is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which consists of the 10 ASEAN states plus 10 dialogue partners -- Australia, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the USA and India, and three observer nations Papua New Guinea, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and Mongolia. The ARF first met in 1994 as a forum for a security dialogue in South East Asia. What was envisaged for the ARF was a three-stage process: starting with confidence building measures, moving to preventative diplomacy and finally conflict resolution. In the past ten years, the ARF has not moved far down that path; indeed there are those who would say that establishing conflict resolution mechanisms in the region is a solution looking for a problem.

I think that, in the context of this Seminar, a more interesting region is that of the South West Pacific and the regional organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Away from the direct focus of peacekeeping and peace building experts in New York, the members of the Pacific Islands Forum have pioneered many innovative and effective ways to deal with security challenges in their region. While some of the responses have worked for specifically local reasons, much of what has been done may be more widely applicable and should therefore be of interest to a wider international policy community.

The fact that so little attention has been paid to the South Pacific reflects a persistent “Atlanticist” bias in the United Nations, but also a distinct tendency in the South Pacific to favour pragmatic solutions over theoretical frameworks or abstract constructs. This tendency is also a very real strength, because the pragmatism also makes for successful and locally appropriate responses. This paper seeks to draw out the
concepts and lessons embedded in our pragmatic approach and present them for a wider audience.

Background to the Pacific Islands Forum

The nations of the Pacific Islands Forum are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Only two of the 16 members of the Pacific Islands Forum are developed countries. Most Forum Island Countries (FICs) gained their independence from the 1960s onward. They faced economic and developmental challenges common to most developing countries. These were compounded by the isolation of many Forum Island Countries and their fragile economies. Some also faced more serious threats to peace and security and to their future as viable states.

But there were also strengths which the region could draw on. These included a broadly similar formal political and legal culture, a sense of joint responsibility for the neighbourhood, habits of cooperation and regular meetings, and a single peak regional organization, the Pacific Islands Forum. There has also been a remarkable commitment to democratic processes. Westminster and presidential political systems in the region have, for the most part, worked -- elections have been held regularly, governments have accepted defeat and peaceful democratic succession has been the norm.

Against this background, the region had to respond to four serious challenges to internal peace and security: Vanuatu in 1980, the Fiji political crises of 1987 and 2000, the Bougainvillea conflict and the Solomon Islands conflict. All but one of these -- Bougainvillea, where the UN has played a small but important role alongside regional countries -- have been dealt with largely by the region itself.

Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Pacific

Let us now look at each of these four cases of conflict listed above in turn.

Vanuatu

Vanuatu was the first major crisis faced in the region in the post-colonial period and it set the tone for the way subsequent crises were managed. In brief, in 1980, very shortly after gaining independence, Vanuatu faced a secessionist threat that drew on Francophone-Anglophone differences. Countries of the region were deeply alarmed at the prospect of the break-up of one of their number
and agreed to provide the government of Vanuatu military support. The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Defence force was deployed with Australian logistical support and the secessionist threat was defeated. Although not free from challenges, Vanuatu has since then maintained national unity with an operating democratic system for the past 24 years.

**Fiji**

Fiji’s political crises (1987 and 2000), like that of Vanuatu, had at their root differences between two major groups within society. Unlike Vanuatu, the response was not to opt out of the state through secession but rather to capture the state by coup d’etat. This presented the region a rather different challenge and one not amenable to the Vanuatu-type response. Nevertheless, the aims in the region’s response were the same, that is: the restoration of democratic government and national unity. The paths followed were diplomatic—including, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, the application of sanctions—and also constitutional. The process of resolving the crises is still working itself out. But the important point to note is that regional pressure in favour of democratic norms meant that Fiji’s problems were not regarded as entirely internal matters, but issues that engaged the legitimate interests of its neighbours who have quietly worked to move the outcome in a democratic direction.

**Bougainville**

The Bougainville conflict was one of the most damaging and serious to have taken place in the South Pacific since the Second World War, claiming an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 lives. In this case, the region again took an active role in meeting this challenge to security. Its members took the lead in supporting negotiations between the government of PNG and the Bougainvillean parties and placing observers on the ground to give confidence to the implementation of the negotiated peace plan. Importantly, the region supported the peace process without seeking to impose a solution or timetable on the parties. Key steps included:

- The 1997 truce agreed to at a meeting held in New Zealand, and followed by the creation and deployment of a regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG).
- Making the truce “permanent and irrevocable” at a meeting hosted by New Zealand in 1998. The TMG was replaced by the Australian-led regional Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) to monitor the ceasefire, instill confidence in the
peace process and generally support the peace process. At the request of the parties, a small UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) was deployed to monitor the process and work closely with the PMG;

- Negotiation, with facilitation of regional countries through the PMG; bilateral aid programs and diplomatic efforts; agreement on a weapons disposal plan, a referendum on Bougainville’s future status, and arrangements for autonomy in the meantime (which were brought together in the comprehensive Bougainville Peace Agreement);
- Replacement of the PMG with the regional Bougainville Transition Team (BTT) as the peace process became increasingly self-sustaining. The BTT was deployed from July to December 2003; and
- Continued support to consolidate the peace process and assist in the transition to autonomy through efforts to improve law and justice, and bilateral aid programs.

Solomon Islands

The crisis in Solomon Islands involved conflict and competition between two major groups over land and resources. The initial regional response was to broker a peace agreement between the two main ethnic groups – in effect to end a civil war – and to send a civilian monitoring group to support the agreement, build confidence and encourage disarmament. But the competing groups were very loosely organized and the coherence of the state and its institutions – and consequently, its ability to act independently of violent social elements – was severely compromised. Therefore, what was initially an ethnic-based conflict quickly degenerated into general lawlessness and criminality where the viability of the state itself was at risk. The rule of law and governance collapsed.

Against this background, the Solomon Islands government appealed to Australia for assistance. Such assistance came in the form of a PIF-endorsed, Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). This police-led mission is restoring law and order and rebuilding the structures of governance in what will be a long-term support program.
General Observations on Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Pacific

While these cases each have their own dynamics, some general observations can be made about the circumstances of conflict prevention and peace building in the Pacific over the past 24 years.

First, the task has become more difficult and more complicated. There are many reasons for this but two stand out: one is the erosion, in many countries, of the capabilities of key institutions of state. This puts governance and institution strengthening at the centre of any successful attempt to restore order. It also means that a focus on justice and rule of law issues must be an integral component of any peace building effort as is the case in the Solomon Islands today. The other is that compared with 24 years ago, weapons - small arms in particular - have become much more widespread and this has made disarmament more important than ever.

Second, the implicit understandings about regional responsibility for the neighbourhood which existed at the time of the Vanuatu crisis in 1980 have become more explicit and formalized. This is best seen in the Biketawa Declaration of 29 October 2000, in which PIF leaders committed themselves collectively to democratic values and to upholding security of the region including, in particular, for non-traditional threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. The swift formal endorsement by all PIF foreign ministers, of the regional cooperative intervention in the Solomon Islands, is one example of the Biketawa Declaration in action.

Lessons Learned and Preventive Strategies

The Pacific region’s experience is not one of unmitigated success. Looking back, the key weakness in the Pacific approach has been one of timing and anticipation. While the region has arguably done better than most in putting conflict prevention strategies in place, it could have done better.

In the future, more effort will be needed to identify factors that predispose countries to conflict. In this regard, World Bank research by Paul Collier and others is relevant. For example, their finding that conflict is more likely where income is derived from extractive, export-oriented industries could have told us much about the likely risk of conflict emerging in Bougainvillea. Similarly, the findings on the close correlation between numbers of ethnic groupings and conflict (multiple groups or a single dominant group usually result in less conflict) could have told us much about the risk of conflict in Fiji, the Solomon
Islands and Vanuatu. Armed with these and other indicators, there is a need for more proactive strategies for heading off likely emergence -- or re-emergence -- of conflict.

The main message from the Pacific region’s experience is a hopeful one. Remedial action by regions acting cooperatively can stop conflict and turn around bad situations. But to be effective, some preconditions need to exist or to be created. These include the following:

a. A sense of shared responsibility for the region based on shared political values. While this was an important historical bequest to our region, it was also necessary to build it up and sustain it through intensive engagement on the part of leaders and foreign ministers, and through confidence building such as embodied in the Biketawa Declaration and institutions such as the PLF.

b. A “can do approach” to problem-solving, leading to prompt regional initiatives rather than waiting for problems to drift up to the agenda of the Security Council. In this respect, it could be said that regions are at the front line of conflict prevention, a goal that the UN Secretary General has placed at the top of his priorities. It is instructive, in this regard, to compare the regional response to the Solomon Islands with the UN’s response to the Liberian crisis and also to Haiti, where waiting for the emergence of Security Council consensus led to costly delays.

c. A pragmatic and non-doctrinaire understanding of the leadership role that capable regional countries can play. The key point here is that leadership counts and is necessary. The issue for the UN, and for the international community more generally, is how to compensate for:

- lack of leadership in some regions (could the Security Council or major metropolitan powers do more?)
- lack of trust in regional leadership (what confidence building processes are needed and what role can the UN usefully play? Should the UN play a role at all?)

d. A willingness to encourage wide regional participation in solutions, including from less well-endowed states. The engagement of Fiji and Vanuatu in the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group, alongside Australia and New Zealand, is one example. The contribution of almost all PIF countries to the Solomon Islands mission is another, as is the earlier decision to seek endorsement by all PIF foreign ministers of the Solomon Islands cooperative.

e. Selective engagement of the UN. Regional initiatives do not preclude UN action in parallel where this is helpful. Bougainville
is a case in point, where UNPOB has played a small but useful role. (The Commonwealth also played a small role in the Fiji and Solomon Islands crises). But even with UN involvement, the outcomes are better when the region remains heavily engaged, as happened in both Bougainville and Solomon Islands. In East Timor, the same applied. The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was, in effect, a regionally-based response, which later gave way to a UN presence but still retained a very large regional component).

f. A commitment to creating regional capacity to deal with governance and policing issues. This has been an on-going challenge for the Pacific as it has been elsewhere. But in the Pacific, we are evolving new ways of responding. The concept of ‘Pooled governance’ is a significant one and can be developed elsewhere. So too is the Australian initiative in creating its 500-strong international police deployment group. Developed countries have to make real and long-term commitments to governance. In some cases, this will involve “embedded support” through long-term placement of personnel in the government structures of recipient countries.

g. A willingness to mobilise civil society: the peace building experience in the Pacific has reconfirmed the lessons of other regions, namely that civil society is important to resolving conflict and rebuilding communities. Women, in particular, have had crucial roles to play, as have church-based organisations.

Conclusion

The actions in the Pacific region demonstrate the wisdom of the UN Charter’s drafters in encouraging, in Chapter VIII, “the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through … regional arrangements or by … regional agencies”. The challenge is how to make Chapter VIII work well all the time. The UN will continue to be preoccupied with conflicts that slip from Chapter VIII to Chapters VI and VII, but if we want a stronger conflict prevention and peace-building framework, we also need to focus on what should be done to help regions manage their own conflicts. The Security Council needs to do some serious work on this and we believe it needs to be a central theme of the High Level Panel as well.

Some issues to consider are the following:
a. broadening the scope for UN financial support for regional peace keeping initiatives – and also, where appropriate, sharing of expertise and skills with regional planners;
b. operationalising the research into factors that pre-dispose countries to conflict and, based on this, institutionalising mechanisms for early remedial action;
c. better coordination and engagement of UN’s specialised agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in support of regional peace initiatives – particularly on governance and longer term economic stabilisation. Perhaps a special “conflict recovery” facility could be created.
d. Encouragement and moral support for what regions do to solve their own problems – including through statements from the Secretary-General and the Security Council. (The Council could also consider adding a chapter on Article VIII actions in its annual report in recognition of the peace building burdens borne by others).
SESSION III:

STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN REGIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS
Introduction

Traditionally in complex emergencies, there has been a distinction between the military and the non-military domains: an approach built upon the principles of international humanitarian law that make a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, protecting the latter from armed attacks. In recent history, however, military forces have become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including provision of relief and services to the local population. At the same time, due to the changing nature of modern complex emergencies, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges as well as greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some of them to seek the support or protection by military forces on a case-by-case basis. Thus, practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.

These developments, together with cases of military interventions claimed to be for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, have led to an erosion of the separation between the humanitarian and the military space, and may threaten to blur the fundamental distinction between these two domains. It also raises significant concerns associated with the application of humanitarian principles and policies as well as operational issues. Furthermore, these developments necessitate increased communication, coordination and understanding between humanitarian agencies and military actors, and require knowledge of each other’s mandates, capacities and limitations.

The humanitarian community, therefore, felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from civil-military relations, and to come up with a reference paper that extends beyond the individual guidelines already developed, which cover either particular aspects of civil-military relations or civil-military relationship in a specific complex emergency.
This paper has thus been prepared with the overall goal of enhancing the understanding of civil-military relations, including the difficulties and limitations of such relations. While numerous complicated questions arise out of this relationship, what remains vital for the humanitarian community is to develop a clear awareness of the nature of this relation, as well as a common understanding on when and how as well as how not, to coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives.

The purpose of the paper, therefore, is three-fold. First, it attempts to highlight, in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Secondly, it reviews some fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military. Thirdly, attention is given to practical key considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

The paper will serve as a general reference for humanitarian practitioners: a tool to which they can refer when formulating operational guidelines that are tailored specifically for civil-military relations in a particular complex emergency, such as the ones developed for Iraq and Liberia during 2003. Any situation-specific set of guidelines requires sensitivity to the special circumstances of the particular operation and hence has to be developed on a case-by-case basis.

The focus of this paper is the relationship between humanitarian organizations and official military forces (i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command), be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. Such military presence may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

The different mandates, characteristics and nature of these diverse military actors may necessitate that the humanitarian community relate to different groups with varying degrees of sensitivity or even with fundamentally different approaches at times. For example, interaction with an occupying force would have to entail different considerations from that required vis-à-vis national forces, unarmed military observers, or UN commanded peacekeeping operations. The most important distinction to be drawn is whether the military group with which humanitarians are interacting is, has become, or is perceived to be a party to the conflict or not. Separate specific papers will be required
to address and advise on the particular circumstances and requirements of the relationships between humanitarians and any of these individual categories of military actors. Such policies may be formulated through various mechanisms. The present paper, however, is an attempt to address the subject of civil-military relations at a generic level. Therefore, it will not distinguish between the various military actors.

The relationship between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups, private military, security companies and mercenaries, as well as any national or international police presence, although highly relevant in today’s conflict situations, are excluded from the analysis of this paper to avoid dilution of focus. Issues of general security, including operational challenges faced under increasing threats of global terrorism, are also excluded for the same reason.

**Definition of Key Terms**

In order to facilitate understanding of the concepts elaborated herein and to avoid confusion arising out of a variety of possible definitions entailed in terminology, some key terms used in this paper are hereunder defined. These terms are civil-military coordination, complex emergency, humanitarian actor and military actor.

The term *Civil-Military Coordination* refers to the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

A *Complex Emergency*, as defined by the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme." *Humanitarian actors* are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian activities. *Military actors* refer to official military forces, i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to an hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN
peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

**Background to Coordination between Humanitarian and Military Actors**

The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, characterised by the distinct chain-of-command and clear organisational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community. The two groups have different mandates, objectives, working methods, and even vocabularies. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, which includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian action is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict. Most of the local actors engaged in humanitarian work are present on the ground long before the arrival of international personnel and will continue their functions after their departure. Susceptibility towards local sensitivities and adherence to the actuality and perception of impartiality and independence are therefore pivotal assets of any humanitarian operation, and this should be made known to the military. For humanitarian actors, on the other hand, it is important to be aware of the varied reasons and motivations why the military may undertake actions that can encroach on humanitarian space.

Within the context of civil-military relations, there are a number of situations where some level of coordination between the humanitarian and military actors may become necessary. As had been defined earlier on, civil-military *coordination* is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side. Such a relationship may be best described as one of *co-existence*, in which case civil-military coordination should focus on minimizing competition and conflict in order to enable the different actors to work in the same geographical area with minimum disruption to each other’s activities. When there is a common goal and agreed strategy, and all parties accept to work together, *cooperation* may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives.
In any circumstances, however, it is important to maintain a clear separation between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by distinguishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility. This approach is implicit in and builds on the principles of international humanitarian law, and is crucial to maintaining the independence of humanitarian action. The need for the humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an occupying power. Any coordination with a party to an armed conflict must proceed with extreme caution, care and sensitivity, given that the actual or perceived affiliation with a belligerent might lead to the loss of neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization, which might in turn affect the security of beneficiaries as well as humanitarian staff, and jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. Thus, cooperation – the closer form of coordination – with belligerent forces, should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.

However, the emphasis on distinction should not be interpreted as a suggestion of non-coordination between humanitarian and military actors. The particular situation on the ground and the nature of the military operation in a given situation will constitute the determining factors on the type of coordination that may take place. Possible features of civil-military coordination include the sharing of certain information, a careful division of tasks, and when feasible and appropriate, collaborative planning.

The military often have the capability to help secure an enabling environment on the ground in which humanitarian activities can take place in relative safety. The military may also have practical means to offer in the delivery of assistance, such as rapid deployment of large numbers of personnel, equipment, logistics and supplies. However, humanitarian expertise – including beneficiary identification, needs and vulnerability assessment, impartial and neutral distribution of relief aid, and monitoring and evaluation – will remain essential to an effective and successful humanitarian operation.

The nature of the relation between one or a group of humanitarian organization(s) and the military as well as the conduct of these actors in this relationship may also have an effect on other humanitarian agencies working in the same area and even beyond, possibly affecting the perception of humanitarian action in general. For example, the use of armed escorts by one humanitarian organisation may negatively influence the perception of neutrality and impartiality of other
humanitarian organisations in the same area. Coordination amongst humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations in a given complex emergency, is therefore desirable.

**Humanitarian Principles for Planning and Undertaking Civil-Military Coordination**

All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principles of **humanity**, **neutrality** and **impartiality**. This section outlines these cardinal humanitarian principles as well as other important principles and concepts that must be respected when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination.

**A. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality**

Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of **humanity** – i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of **neutrality** and **impartiality**. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of **neutrality** in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of **impartiality**. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.

**B. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations**

Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. Coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access.

**C. Perception of Humanitarian Action**
The delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be neutral and impartial – it must come without political or military conditions and humanitarian staff must not take sides in disputes or political positions. This will have a bearing on the credibility and independence of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must also be mindful not to jeopardize the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies have created and maintained.

D. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination

Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the basis of the needs of those affected by the particular complex emergency, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The assessment of such needs must be independent and humanitarian assistance must be given without adverse discrimination of any kind, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex/gender, religion, social status, nationality or political affiliation of the recipients. It must be provided in an equitable manner to all populations in need.

E. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action

At all times, a clear distinction must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants – i.e., between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict (including the sick, wounded, prisoners of war and ex-combatants who are demobilised). International humanitarian law protects non-combatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus, humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.

F. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action

In any civil-military coordination, humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities. The independence of humanitarian action and decision-making must be preserved both at the operational and policy levels at all times. Humanitarian organisations must not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies. Basic requisites such as freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of
communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media, must not be impeded.

G. Security of Humanitarian Personnel

Any perception that humanitarian actors may have become affiliated with the military forces within a specific situation could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, irrespective of the perceptions, humanitarian actors operating within an emergency situation must identify the most expeditious, effective and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. This approach must be balanced against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety, and therein a consideration of any real or perceived affiliation with the military. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.

H. Do No Harm

Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to ‘do no harm’. Humanitarian agencies must ensure, at the policy and operational levels, that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

I. Respect for International Legal Instruments

Both humanitarian and military actors must respect international humanitarian law as well as other international norms and regulations, including human rights instruments.

J. Respect for Culture and Custom

Respect and sensitivities must be maintained for the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries where humanitarian activities are carried out. Where possible and to the extent feasible, ways should be found to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and/or local personnel in the design, management and implementation of assistance, including in civil-military coordination.

K. Consent of Parties to the Conflict
The risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances. Negotiating such acceptance entails contacts with all levels in the chain of command.

L. Option of Last Resort

Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military must be the option of last resort. Such actions may take place only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need.

M. Avoid Reliance on the Military

Humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on resources or support provided by the military. Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale, and should also present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel/means. Resources provided by the military are often only temporarily available and when higher priority military missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support.

Practical Challenges

This section outlines the main practical challenges for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination, and the issues arising from those challenges. Such challenges include establishment of liaison arrangements, information sharing, use of military assets for humanitarian operations, use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, joint civil-military relief operations, separate military operations for relief purposes, and general conduct of humanitarian staff.

A. Establishment of Liaison Arrangements

Liaison arrangements and clear lines of communication should be established at the earliest possible stage and at all relevant levels, between the military forces and the humanitarian community, to guarantee the timely and regular exchange of certain information, before and during military operations. However, these activities should be conducted with caution. Either mentioning or concealing to the public the existence of direct communication between the humanitarian and
military actors could result in suspicion and/or incorrect conclusions regarding the nature of the communication. Due to its possible impact on the perception of humanitarian operations, at times, it may be reasonable not to disseminate or publicize the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military. Obviously, such a decision has to be balanced with the need to ensure accountability, transparency and openness towards the local population and beneficiaries.

There are a number of initiatives within the UN system that focus on preparing humanitarian personnel on civil-military issues and practical liaison arrangements in complex emergencies. This includes the UNCMCoord induction courses organised by OCHA’s Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU). This unit also conducts pre-deployment training and workshops tailored to a particular content and mission.

In addition to UNCMCoord Officers deployed by OCHA, UN agencies may deploy Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) to focus on specific sectoral and operational civil-military issues and DPKO may deploy Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLOs). Where established, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), an inter-agency facility, also provides a civil-military coordination function on an operational logistics level.

These arrangements raise a number of issues, some of which are as follows:

- How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted: in confidence or in transparency?
- What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison arrangements on the perception of the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities?
- How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian actors?
- How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?
- Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements and when is it better to maintain liaison on an ad-hoc basis?
- What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?
- When, if ever, should the liaison officers of the humanitarian and military communities be co-located in the same facility?
B. Information Sharing

As a matter of principle, any information gathered by humanitarian organisations in fulfilment of their mandate that might endanger human lives or compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations should not be shared.

However, to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to populations in need, information sharing with the military forces may at times become necessary. In particular, information that might affect the security of civilians and/or humanitarian workers should be shared with appropriate entities. Information sharing between humanitarian and appropriate military actors may include the following:

- **Security information**: Information relevant to the security of civilians and to the security situation in the area of operation;
- **Humanitarian locations**: The coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside military operating theatre;
- **Humanitarian activities**: The humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations, to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to warn of any conflicting activities;
- **Mine-action activities**: Information relevant to mine-action activities;
- **Population movements**: Information on major movements of civilians;
- **Relief activities of the military**: Information on relief efforts undertaken by the military;
- **Post-strike information**: Information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities.

The sharing of information, however, raises several issues including the following:

- What kind of information should/could be shared, with whom and when?
- How can information that may be important for humanitarian purposes be differentiated from information that is politically, militarily or economically sensitive?
- How do we determine which information might serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian?
For example, how do we ensure that information on population movements or aid beneficiaries will not be misused for military purposes?

- Should information that is shared with one military group be shared with all other military and/or political groups as well? How should we ensure that no side is favoured over another while being mindful of sensitivities involved in information?
- When and how should we verify information provided by the military?

C. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations

The use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be exceptional and only on a last resort. It is recognized, however, that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs, military and civil defence assets, including military aircraft, may be deployed in accordance with the Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (“MCDA Guidelines”) of March 2003. In addition to the principle of ‘last resort’, key criteria in the MCDA Guidelines include: (1) unique capability – no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist; (2) timeliness – the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action; (3) clear humanitarian direction – civilian control over the use of military assets; and (4) time-limited – the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale.

As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities. While there are on-going hostilities, it will be necessary to distinguish between operations in theatre and those outside. In theatre, the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes should generally not be undertaken. Only under extreme and exceptional circumstances would it be appropriate to consider the use, in theatre, of military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations. Specifically, this situation may occur when a highly vulnerable population cannot be assisted or accessed by any other means. Outside the theatre of operations, military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations may be used in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and guidelines. However, preference should first be given to military assets of parties not engaged in combat operations.
Moreover, any humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation. Military and civil defence assets that have been placed under the control of the humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis purely for humanitarian purposes, must be visibly identified in a manner that clearly differentiates them from military assets being used for military purposes.

Among the issues that may arise for consideration in the context of using military assets for humanitarian operations are the following:

- Who defines last resort and what are the exact criteria for last resort?
- How can we ensure the credibility and security for a humanitarian operation that uses military assets and how can we maintain the confidence of the local population for such operations?
- How can we make sure that humanitarian actors retain the lead role and direction of humanitarian efforts even when military assets are used as the only means available?

D. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria. In case the situation on the ground calls for the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, any such action should be guided by the principles endorsed by the IASC in September 2001.14

In contemplating the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, the following issues may need to be addressed:

- Who should provide the escort (UN forces, other international forces, government forces, forces of non-state actors, armed guards provided by security services companies)?
- How can we ensure that humanitarian operations will not become dependent on military escorts – to the extent that it becomes impossible to operate without them?
• How can the capability, credibility and deterrence of an escort be determined?
• How do we determine if the escorts themselves are a potential source of insecurity?
• How do we ensure that short-term gain in access by using armed escorts would not result in long-term loss of actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, independence and even credibility of the humanitarian operation?

E. Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations

Any operations undertaken jointly by humanitarian agencies and military forces may have a negative impact on the perception of the humanitarian agencies’ impartiality and neutrality and hence affect their ability to operate effectively throughout a complex emergency. Therefore, any joint civil-military cooperation should be determined by a thorough assessment of the actual needs on the ground and a review of civilian humanitarian capacities to respond to them in a timely manner. To the extent that joint operations with the military cannot be avoided, they may be employed only as a means of last resort, and must adhere to the principles provided in the above-mentioned “MCDA Guidelines”.

One must be aware, however, that the military have different objectives, interests, schedules and priorities from the humanitarian community. Relief operations rendered by military forces could be conditional and could cease when the mission of the military forces changes, the unit moves or if the assisted population becomes uncooperative. Such action by the military can also be conducted primarily based on the needs and goals of the force and its mission, rather than the needs of the local population.

Some of the issues that must be considered in this regard are the following:
• How can the impartiality and neutrality of a humanitarian action be preserved when it is carried out as a joint civil-military operation?
• What are the implications of a joint civil-military operation regarding access to all civilians in need and the safety of humanitarian staff?
• What happens if the military is suddenly redeployed to another mission or location, after the start of the joint operation?
F. Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes

Relief operations carried out by military forces, even when the intention is purely ‘humanitarian,’ may jeopardize or seriously undermine the overall humanitarian efforts by non-military actors. The other parties to the conflict and the beneficiaries may neither be willing nor able to differentiate between assistance provided by the military and assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. This could have serious consequences for the ability to access certain areas and the safety of humanitarian staff, not to mention the long-term damage to the standing of humanitarian agencies in the region and in other crisis areas if humanitarian assistance is perceived as being selective and/or partial. Assistance provided by the military is susceptible to political influence and/or objectives and the criteria used in selecting the beneficiaries and determining their needs may differ from those held by humanitarian organizations.

For these reasons, military forces should be strongly discouraged from playing the role of the humanitarian aid providers. Their role in relation to humanitarian actors should be limited to helping to create a secure operating environment that enables humanitarian action. If need be, diplomatic efforts should be used to explain and reiterate to political and military authorities the concern of the humanitarian community in this regard.

However, there may be extreme and exceptional circumstances that require relief operations to be undertaken by the military as a last resort. This might be the case when the military are the only actors on the ground or the humanitarians lack the capacity and/or resources to respond to critical needs of civilians.

In considering the challenge of separate military operations for relief purposes, however, the following issues would need to be addressed:

• What are the means and possibilities of humanitarian agencies to discourage separate military operations for relief purposes?
• In what circumstances should exceptions be recognized? For example, if belligerent forces were the only ones who could reach vulnerable populations and therefore alleviate extreme human suffering? Should the humanitarian community advocate for the involvement of military forces in such cases?
• If the military engages in relief activities, what kind of coordination arrangement should be established with the humanitarian community?
G. General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff

Finally, for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination, issues concerning the general conduct of such staff also need to be considered. In this regard, the independence and civilian nature of humanitarian assistance should be emphasized at all times. A clear distinction must be retained between the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and those of military forces – i.e., travel in clearly marked vehicles, clearly mark offices and relief supplies etc. Weapons should not be allowed on the premises or transportation facilities of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian personnel should not travel in military vehicles, aircraft etc., except as a last resort or for security reasons. Humanitarian workers should not wear any military-uniform-like clothing. Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities and thereby negatively affect the safety and security of humanitarian staff.

In addressing this question of general conduct of humanitarian staff, however, there are also certain pertinent issues that cannot be glossed over. In this regard, the key issues that will always have to be addressed are as follows:

- How should differences of opinion regarding civil-military coordination be settled between humanitarian and military actors? Who decides?
- How should public appearances (TV, radio, ceremonies, events, social functions, events sponsored by the military, etc.) be handled, in view of the sensitivity required in fostering the appropriate public images and perceptions?
ENDNOTES

1. In the last two years alone, military support and/or protection for certain humanitarian operations has been provided in various complex emergencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, northern Uganda and Sierra Leone.


5. For details, see endnote 4 above.

6. For example, such as the Coalition Forces of the Occupying Powers currently deployed in Iraq.

7. Field practices on engagements with non-state actors will be collected in the forthcoming ‘Manual on Field Practices on Negotiations with Armed Groups’. The Manual will be published in summer 2004 and relevant conclusions and principles from the Manual may be used to update this paper as appropriate.

8. The definition of ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ is identical to that used in the “Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian
Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses a different definition of Civil-Military Coordination; see DPKO’s paper on ‘Civil-Military Coordination Policy’ dated 9 September 2002.

9. As an example of principles and practical considerations including specifics on permissible and impermissible action when interacting with an Occupying Power, see the “General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq” of 8 May 2003.

10. These are questions to be addressed when drafting guidelines for civil-military relations in particular complex emergencies.

11. For the full text of the MCDA Guidelines, see internet address in the Annex at the end of this paper.

12. Last resort is defined as follows: ‘Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.’ (See paragraph 7 of the MCDA Guidelines).


14. See IASC Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001. This paper was approved by the IASC and reviewed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs.
CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN LIBERIA: UNMIL, ECOWAS, STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

by

Mr Souren Seraydarian

I am delighted to be here and to have the opportunity to address this group of distinguished participants. In my presentation, I will discuss the roles of state and non-state actors in the context of conflicts and peace operations in West Africa in general and in Liberia in particular. My main focus will be the consolidation of peace and the necessary components in the effort to push the peace process forward. I will also briefly outline current efforts by the United Nations (UN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other actors to address the regional dimension of the crisis in Liberia and its neighbours.

State and Non State Actors in the West African sub-Region

As we all know, borders in West Africa are notoriously porous – weapons, loot, combatants, natural resources, refugees, trafficked women and children all flow relatively unhindered in and out of unstable countries where impunity reigns and the state has little control. Problems such as these easily spread throughout a region where borders cut through ethnic groups, cultures and economic ties. A conflict in any one country easily spills over into neighbouring countries and
has a ripple effect throughout the whole sub-region. A sub-regional approach is therefore not only desirable but absolutely necessary.

In the West African sub-region, both state and non-state actors have played their roles in starting and driving conflicts as well as in the efforts to resolve and manage conflicts. With regard to commencing and fuelling conflicts, the main non-state actors have been rebel groups such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, the Forces Nouvelles in Cote d’Ivoire; and the National Patriot Front of Liberia (NPFL), United Liberation Movement-Koromah (ULIMO-K), United Liberation Movement-Johnson (ULIMO-J), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

I must however hasten to say that at the same time, state actors, including member states in the sub-region, have supported, directly or indirectly, non-state actors (rebel groups) in neighbouring countries. The RUF in Sierra Leone was a creation of the former Liberian president, Charles Taylor, whose government maintained them. Another example: the Kamajors and Donsos in Sierra Leone, which were initially civil society groups, were reorganised by the government into civil defence forces to fight against the RUF.

Thus, we here see a blurring of the separation between state and non-state actors in conflicts. This is becoming an important factor that must be taken into account in any arrangements for regional peace operations.

I should mention that international non-state actors have also played a role in fuelling the conflicts in the sub-region, in particular private companies and individual entrepreneurs who have been involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources and in arms trafficking.

On the positive side, many non-state actors have played major roles in the efforts to resolve and manage conflicts in
West Africa. These include local civil society groups, religious groups such as the Inter-religious Councils in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the sub-regional women’s organisation known as the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network. Such non-state actors have initiated dialogue among the warring factions, promoted national reconciliation, advocated for justice and, along with international NGOs, supported peace-building efforts and recovery programmes. In this connection, these non-state actors have forged useful relationships and partnerships with the UN, the European Union, other donor countries and ECOWAS in all stages of peace operations.

In sum, the way conflicts in West Africa have played out has produced very complex relationships between state and non-state actors in peace operations. These relationships in turn shape how peace agreements emerge. Thus, we often see rebel groups graduating into state actors as they are included in transitional governments or governments of national reconciliation. As we can see, state and non-state actors have forged partnerships both in waging war and in resolving conflicts. I will now discuss our peace efforts in Liberia and indicate how we have built partnerships and interfaced with both state and non-state actors in that country.

**Liberia**

Liberia has, for quite some time, been at the centre of a regional vortex of instability reaching into the neighbouring countries. Over the past 14 years, Liberia has missed many opportunities for peace offered by both ECOWAS and the United Nations, including the deployment of ECOMOG in 1990 and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNIMOL in 1993.

In July 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was negotiated in Accra, Ghana, between the government of Charles Taylor, the rebel factions LURD and MODEL, and the various
political parties of Liberia. Liberian NGOs and civil society groups were very active during the negotiations. Hence, the peace accord was in effect an agreement between state and non-state actors. In addition to ECOWAS, which played a major role in negotiating the agreement and putting an end to the violence and civil war, international players included the United Nations, the European Union and the United States.

In July 2003, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) as a vanguard force. The deployment of ECOMIL was facilitated by a partnership between state, non-state, regional and international actors including the UN and the United States which provided support through a private company, Pacific Architects and Engineers Inc (PAE). In August, the Security Council afforded Liberia a chance to begin addressing entrenched security, governance and rule of law quandaries by establishing the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation. It is our mandate to assist the Liberia people to implement the peace process.

In my mind, the most important ingredients in the peace process are the establishment of security and stability; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants; economic development; the extension of state authority; the establishment of rule of law; and the conduct of credible elections.

Security

The first component – and this is also a precondition for UNMIL to carry out its mandate – is the establishment of physical security and stability throughout the country. UNMIL has now deployed peacekeeping troops in all areas of Liberia and is in the middle of disarming and demobilising combatants from all three factions. This process has considerably reduced the harassment of the civilian population, which used to be commonplace just a few months ago. In guaranteeing security,
reform initiatives such as the restructuring of the army, are a priority and it is expected that a bilateral donor take on this task. We also expect ECOWAS member states to support this effort.

Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

One of the biggest challenges for the consolidation of peace in Liberia is without doubt the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of former combatants. The body which oversees the DDRR process is the National Commission for DDR. It includes both state and non-state actors as well as international and regional organisations, namely the former government of Liberia, the rebel factions LURD and MODEL, the UN, ECOWAS and the International Contact Group on Liberia. Donor countries and non-state partners, such as local and international NGOs, have forged an impressive partnership in implementing the demobilisation and reintegration part of the programme. The disarmament and demobilisation are proceeding very well and, as of today, a total of 37,200 combatants have been disarmed.

Economic Development

The rehabilitation and reintegration phases of the DDR program constitute a much larger challenge than the disarmament and demobilisation phases. The United Nations family of organisations, in collaboration with donors, will provide schooling and vocational training to ex-combatants. But the vexing question is: how do you reintegrate former combatants if there is nothing to reintegrate into? Communities are still shattered and the unemployment rate hovers around 70 – 80 per cent. If former fighters are not provided with a livelihood, they are more likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of
spoilers, including warlords who may promise wealth in return for taking up arms again. It is vital that Liberia’s economy is revitalized in order to create employment for the thousands of idle youth and former combatants.

Another way of expanding the economy is through regional trade. Regional infrastructure development is crucial. This includes building cross-border roads and improving interstate communications; further integrating the economy by expanding trade networks and removing the numerous hampering roadblocks throughout the sub-region. Economic development can be supported by state actors on a domestic and bilateral basis, by non-state actors in business networks, and by regional actors such as ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, integrating economies and coordinating activities.

**Extension of state authority**

The next necessary component of the peace process is the extension of state authority. To encourage economic development on a national level, non-corrupt government institutions need to be present throughout the country providing basic services. UNMIL is working with the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), itself a coalition of the three factions, to establish accountable government institutions.

This work includes the regulation of the timber, diamond mining and shipping industries which, if properly governed, could be great sources of income for the Liberian government. Illegal activities of non-state actors in these sectors need to cease in order for the sanctions imposed by the Security Council to be removed. Indeed, until a modicum of good governance is introduced, sanctions will remain. We need however to see, on the one hand, a stronger regional commitment in reinforcing sanctions, such as the travel ban and the cross-border trafficking of weapons. On the other hand, there needs to be support for Liberian endeavours to lift sanctions that
have a negative impact on the economy such as on timber and other natural resources.

We need a regional commitment – and this includes regional state and non-state actors – to combat regional crime such as the smuggling of arms and natural resources and the trafficking of women and children. While these activities are often carried out by non-state actors, they are often covertly sanctioned by governments.

**Rule of Law**

This leads me to the next component in a successful peace process – the creation of functioning rule of law institutions. We used to think that by establishing physical security in post-conflict countries, we had solved the problem and could safely pull out. But we have learned the hard way – often by having to return and do the job all over again – that peace does not equal the absence of violence and war. In order for peace to be sustained and democracy to take root, social and economic development, health and education are necessary. This requires basic institutions of government and establishment of the rule of law.

As Liberia and other crisis countries have experienced, the disintegration of rule of law has led to a situation where violence, arbitrary killings and human rights abuses go unpunished, which in turn has led to mob justice and general lawlessness. When people’s lives and possessions can be randomly taken away, they become afraid to invest in the future. And without investments – whether it is planting for the next season, sending the children to school, buying equipment for a business, or joining a civil society – there can be no development.

Seen from the ground in Liberia, we need a police service which can prevent crime and bring lawbreakers to justice. We also need a judicial system with courts that can try accused
criminals, and a corrections system which can house tried prisoners in a humane way. And it is vital that the whole rule of law structure is overseen by a democratic leadership and functions according to international legal norms and with respect for human rights. Not until there is public trust in these institutions, will there be a foundation for peace and democracy.

In this effort, UNMIL’s rule of law components – police, judiciary, human rights and corrections – are working very closely together to ensure a holistic approach to police restructuring, judiciary and correctional reform, and the promotion, monitoring and protection of human rights. Our partners on the Liberian side include the transitional government as well as faction representatives, NGOs and civil society members brought together in several national commissions, including the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR).

While building rule of law institutions, there must also be a focus on transitional justice. For Liberia – emerging from a conflict that has included widespread human rights abuses, violations of humanitarian norms and generalised impunity – it is crucial to unearth the past through an adequate investigation and truth recovery. This requires efforts to put into effect the mechanism of truth and reconciliation foreseen in the peace agreement. Without this process, traumas and grievances will remain and become obstacles in building the foundations of rule of law. Liberia must here find a balance between truth and reconciliation on the one hand, and the punishment of serious crimes against humanitarian law as well as war crimes. Again, there is a clear role for civil society groups, advocacy groups and local NGOs in promoting reconciliation and in combating impunity.
Elections

The final component of a strategy to consolidate peace is the conduct of credible elections. In accordance with the peace agreement signed by the Liberian parties in Accra, Liberia will hold elections in October 2005. UNMIL is working closely with UN agencies, ECOWAS, the International Contact Group on Liberia and NGOs to strengthen the capacity of the National Elections Commission to carry out the enormous task of developing a new electoral law, planning the demarcation of new constituencies, and conduct voter education and registration.

The Elections Commission is in turn bringing together a broad spectrum of actors including government representatives, private sector actors, women’s groups, NGOs and other community-based organisations for a national consultative process on how this work should be carried out. Implementation is especially hard in a country where a large part of the population has been displaced and where there are no birth certificates or other proof of citizenship or age.

While elections have a great importance in the peace process, I would like to caution here that elections do not equal democracy. As we have seen before, not only in Liberia but also in places like Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Haiti, holding elections without the necessary peace-building activities I have outlined, can lead to old, corrupt and autocratic leadership being reinstalled. The conduct of elections can therefore not by themselves provide an exit strategy for UNMIL or any other peacekeeping operation.

Regional Cooperation

With peacekeeping missions now in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, the United Nations – and that means member states, both individually and collectively – has a unique opportunity to fully develop a regional approach.
Representatives of the regional UN missions meet regularly to coordinate their efforts to combat sub-regional problems such as the movement of fighters and small arms and the use of mercenaries. Efforts to harmonise and coordinate DDRR policies are also underway in order to prevent combatants from crossing borders to shop for the largest benefit package. Further military cooperation between missions, such as the division of border-patrolling responsibilities and the sharing of information and resources, are also under development to the extent that troop-contributing countries are willing to commit.

However, without determined efforts by the countries in the region, this work will come to naught. Regional and sub-regional organisations have crucial roles to play, both in peacekeeping and peace building. I am therefore delighted to see that attempts are being made to revitalise the Mano River Union and I applaud the launching of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. This initiative must receive strong support by African nations and donor countries alike so that by 2010, there is a robust African stand-by force that can be used not only in Africa, but also within the framework of peace operations approved by the Security Council in other parts of the world.

However, the most prominent organisation in West Africa remain ECOWAS. It has shown great commitment and timely action in sending peacekeeping troops to Liberia and has also played a vital role in negotiating the peace agreement. And even though the UN has a strong presence in the sub-region, it can never replace the local knowledge and long term involvement of ECOWAS, as well as the role of its mediator, which is a necessary complement to the relative strength of the UN in terms of resources and international leverage.

ECOWAS, however, needs logistical support to carry out large peacekeeping tasks and enhanced capacity to support
its monitoring role in the implementation of the peace agreement. Capacity building of ECOWAS is absolutely essential for it to continue and expand its great efforts.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, our experience in Liberia has taught us that the inclusion of both state and non-state actors is vital in order for the peace process to move forward. It has also taught us that an optimal outcome can only be achieved through a collaboration between the United Nations and regional or sub-regional actors. While the UN brings resources and legitimacy as an international broker, ECOWAS brings knowledge and experience. The joint effort should be bound on complementarity and the comparative advantage of each institution.

Even though the challenges to sustainable peace and security in West Africa are daunting, the current international commitment to the sub-region is greater than it has been for a long time. And, at least in the case of Liberia, this may be a final opportunity for its people to build a lasting peace. It is highly unlikely that the international community will return yet another time. We must therefore all work hard to assist Liberia and the sub-region as a whole to get onto a path towards sustainable peace and long-term development.

The way out of crisis in West Africa includes a sub-regional approach; and establishment of peace and security through DDRR; funding of the security and judicial sectors; a social and economic development strategy supported by resources; functioning institutions; and finally good governance. All of us have a role to play in getting Liberia and the sub-region back on their feet.
UN AND OSCE: COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

by
Professor Ali L. Karaosmanoglu
and
Ms Sebnem Uдум

In the post-Cold War era, the role of regional organizations has been highlighted and proved to be an important one in peace operations conducted or authorized by the United Nations (UN). Specifically, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is regarded as a well-suited organization for peace operations in Eurasia, not only because it includes all the major actors of Eurasia, but also because it links the three dimensions of security, namely, military, economic and humanitarian.

In Europe, there are three major regional organizations -- the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union (EU) and OSCE -- which can contribute to peace operations together with the UN. These organizations have resources and capabilities to perform useful crisis-management roles all over Eurasia. This would greatly help a cost-effective burden-sharing between the UN and regional organizations. The UN, however, cannot evade its primary responsibility by leaving as many peace operations as possible to regional organizations.¹ A division of labor will be necessary in most cases. At least, a UN authorization is always required for the legitimacy of regional action.

The OSCE took up several conflict management functions since its 1992 Helsinki Summit, namely conflict prevention, monitoring, early warning missions, cease-fire mediation, confidence and security building, and post-conflict rehabilitation. The UN and OSCE started cooperating in the same year when the OSCE (then known as Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE) was declared as a regional arrangement within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Concerning conflict prevention, the OSCE now has 19 field operations in the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the

¹ THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF PEACE OPERATIONS
Caucasus and Central Asia. The UN and the OSCE are cooperating in operations in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Tajikistan and Georgia.

For the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), the OSCE dealt with issues about institution and democracy building and human rights; it also engaged in a similar mission in Tajikistan for the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). The UN supported the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina in elections, media matters and human rights. Also, in Croatia, the OSCE took over vital tasks from the UN after the latter’s mission expired in certain provinces. The UN and OSCE are working together in Georgia, where they are handling ethnic issues by an informal division of labor. Finally, in Albania, the OSCE is in cooperation with international organizations including the UN.

Neither the OSCE area nor the division of labor between these two organizations is free from challenges. Thus, this study aims at understanding the nature and extent of cooperation and coordination activities between the UN and the OSCE by looking at the peacekeeping missions they have undertaken and determining the outstanding issues. Lessons drawn from past experience and expert evaluations for guiding principles will constitute the basis of the criteria on which recommendations for effective coordination and successful cooperation will be built at the end of the analysis.

The paper, then, is structured as follows: the first section sets a background for the UN and OSCE coordination and cooperation activities by looking at their respective positions regarding security and peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. The second section looks at the peacekeeping operations in which the two organizations are working together with an emphasis on the contribution of OSCE. The third section is an attempt to detect the issues and challenges in these operations, both individually and at the regional level. In the final section, the paper outlines the lessons drawn from these experiences and recommendations to improve the quality of the division of labor between the UN and the OSCE.

**UN and CSCE/OSCE in the Post-Cold War Security Landscape**

In the *Agenda For Peace* (1992) and its *Supplement* (1995), the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outlined the security issues in the post-Cold War era that are threatening and would threaten international peace and security, whose maintenance is the ultimate goal of the UN. To that end, he identified preventive
diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building as the major methods to ensure peace and security. In addition, he emphasized the significance of cooperation with regional organizations:

In this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if... their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly with the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII [of the UN Charter]... Regional arrangements or agencies possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions [that “Agenda for Peace” covers]...

Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organizations ...would encourage States outside the region to act supportively.²

As practice corroborated the importance of regional organizations and as the number of joint operations increased, The Supplement inserted the forms and principles of such cooperation, as an addition to the Agenda of 1992.³

Meanwhile, after the end of the Cold War, the debate on European security was also intense, which yielded some options that were put forward to maintain security and ensure peaceful transition in the continent.⁴ The CSCE (which became OSCE after 1995) was advocated as one of the viable options, because it was the only institution to bridge the East-West divide during the Cold War; therefore it was argued that the CSCE would play a significant role in overcoming the division of Europe in the post-Cold War. Its membership ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok,’ that is, including the United States, Russia and the Central and Eastern European states(CEEs), was highlighted so as to free Europe of bloc mentality.

Though OSCE did not become the prominent organization to ensure peace and security in Europe,⁵ it was recognized as a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in the 1992 Helsinki Summit, and emerged as a viable one to complement UN Peacekeeping Operations(PKO) owing to its conflict management functions. The OSCE has been unique since its inception by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, because it has a broad understanding of security that includes and links military, economic and humanitarian dimensions. The underlying principle of the OSCE is cooperative security, which is based on the argument that security is indivisible and that the cooperation of
It was the Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, adopted in January 1992, which, for the first time, touched upon peacekeeping in the CSCE context, seeing it as an instrument for crisis management and conflict prevention, and asked the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to “…give careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in peacekeeping.” The Chapter III of Helsinki Document includes provisions on CSCE peacekeeping. According to this, CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping is an instrument for conflict prevention and crisis management, to be undertaken in times of crises between or within States. They can involve civilian and/or military personnel and “…and may assume a variety of forms including observer and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces.” Regarding cooperation with the UN, the Helsinki Document recognizes the importance of the peacekeeping experience of the UN and undertakes to conform with the principles of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter for PKOs. CSCE/OSCE PKOs do involve enforcement action, which means that an enforcement action can be authorized by the UN Security Council.

The Helsinki decisions enhanced the UN-OSCE institutional relations, which eventually led to their cooperation in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet area. Institutional parameters of cooperation in Headquarters and for the field have been set by the 1993 ‘Framework for Cooperation and Coordination’, complemented by the item of UN General Assembly 47th session agenda entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” and Resolution 48/5 of 1993 which granted the OSCE an observer status.

The UN and OSCE have cooperated in peacekeeping – the OSCE serving as a subsidiary or a component of the UN missions. From a practical perspective, such cooperation addresses two aims: First, in the post-Cold War era, the UN seeks to engage regional organizations more into PKOs, which changed nature in order to deal with intra-state/inter-ethnic conflicts. In this context, the OSCE is a well-suited organization with its comparative advantage in the humanitarian aspect of security, and being a low-profile actor that is not regarded as
an antagonistic organization in the Eurasian area because of its inclusiveness in membership. Second, the involvement of OSCE in UN PKOs serves the aim of integrating the Russian Federation firmly into Europe, thereby eliminating the Cold War divide, and contain its influence in its ‘near abroad.’ The next section briefly looks at the extent of their cooperation in some six PKOs.

UN and OSCE Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations

OSCE missions of conflict management can be grouped in some five categories:

- Long-term conflict prevention through democratization, strengthening human rights, rule of law, and minority rights;
- Monitoring, early warning and conflict prevention;
- Mediation in cease-fires;
- Preventing the recurrence of fighting and helping for conflict resolution; and
- Post-conflict security building.

However, most missions perform multiple tasks as could be seen in the OSCE and UN cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Kosovo, Georgia and Tajikistan.

The OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, established in 1995, deals with democratization, human rights, education, elections/implementation, and security cooperation, as different categories of its task. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) is cooperating with the OSCE on media matters, monitoring and promoting human rights. The OSCE mission to Croatia, established in 1996, assumed tasks, such as human and minority rights protection, promotion of reconciliation, that of rule of law and conformity with the highest internationally recognized standards, facilitating return and integration, police affairs, freedom of the media, civil society development and project management. In 1998, upon the expiration of UN mandate in Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, OSCE took on the responsibilities of the UN Police Support Group (UNPSG).

As a result of the collapse of law and order in Albania in 1997, the OSCE established its “presence” in Albania. The mandate of the mission comprised democratization, development of free media, promotion of respect for human rights and the preparation and monitoring of elections. In line with the developments in the region, the mandate expanded to cover monitoring border areas. The OSCE is active in fields, *inter alia*, political affairs, parliamentary observation,
local government, rule of law, donor coordination. It is cooperating with international organizations, including the UN (also the European Union and the Council of Europe), and it coordinates international efforts such as those of the “Friends of Albania” Group, a forum of countries and international organizations to provide Albania with financial support, technical assistance and other sorts of aid.12

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was established in 1999 to contribute to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244 on the situation relating to Kosovo,13 and is a distinct entity under UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Playing the leading role in human resources capacity and institution-building and human rights, OMIK established departments for democratization, political party development, human rights and rule of law, elections, temporary media commissioner, Kosovo Police Service School, and administration and support.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of the newly independent states ridden with conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The OSCE mission to Georgia was established in 1992, in order to promote negotiations for the peaceful political settlement of the conflicts in these two regions. There is an informal division of labor such that the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) operates in Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia. In addition to its efforts to reach a definition of the political status of South Ossetia within Georgia, the OSCE is monitoring the peacekeeping forces, liaises with the Joint Control Commission (JCC), and collects information on the military situation in South Ossetia. In Abkhazia, it is supporting UN peacemaking efforts by trying to reconcile the Abkhazian demands and the territorial integrity of Georgia.14 The OSCE is also working closely with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Georgia.

In Tajikistan, the OSCE is cooperating with UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), in terms of assisting the UN in the implementation of the peace process and acting as guarantor organization to the Tajik Peace Agreement of 1997.15 They are also working together with respect to the promotion of human rights and democratic institution-building, protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, and electoral and legal assistance.16

**Challenges of Peacekeeping in the OSCE Area**
An assessment of UN and OSCE division of labor in peacekeeping necessitates a grasp of the political landscape of the OSCE geographic area and challenges that peacekeeping can face in such area. Gianluca Burci identifies some outstanding issues:

The ex-Yugoslavian case demonstrated that traditional peacekeeping principles could not operate in situations of vicious internal conflicts of a tribal nature that take external support. Under such circumstances, the organizations could not maintain impartiality and were presented with limited policy options under pressure to address humanitarian disasters. Broadly, in Europe, the involvement of numerous regional organizations (OSCE, NATO, WEU, EU, CIS, Council of Europe) can cause rivalries, confusion and overlapping with the UN, as was the case in the Yugoslav conflict. Since it is already hard to arrive at a clear mandate out of a UN Security Council Resolution, it is much harder to define mandates so as to make them complementary when several organizations are involved in a PKO. As a result, the international community grew reluctant to support these operations; particularly the main European powers and the United States have been very reluctant to engage directly in conflicts, and invest heavily in them.

Russia’s stance towards its ‘Near Abroad’, and its aim to preserve a sphere of influence there, is another important variable that affects OSCE policies and its peacekeeping activities. Russia’s concerns about overcoming the division of Europe in the post-Cold War are not soothed, and it favors the OSCE as the most viable organization to address security issues in Europe, instead of NATO or the EU. Nevertheless, Russia’s concerns continue due to the fact that the OSCE focuses more on democratization, electoral assistance, human rights and conflict management than on political and economic issues; and that the operations are concentrated in the Balkans and former Soviet republics instead of those in Western Europe. Under such conditions, Russia feels being led by leading countries, and finds it in contradiction with its security interests. The Russian attitude reflects itself upon the management of on-going conflicts in that region. Russia views the OSCE as a forum to curb the influence of NATO members acting through the UN or the OSCE, thereby weakening both
institutions that would eventually increase its power. A case in point is Moldova, where the OSCE activities were undermined by Russia.

The civil war of 1992 in Moldova ended with the secession of the territory to the east of the Dniester river. In Transdnestria, since 1993, OSCE has been mandated with the tasks of facilitating a comprehensive political settlement, providing assistance to the parties in negotiations, working towards a withdrawal of foreign troops, and advising on human rights, democratic transformation and the repatriation of refugees. Russia wants to maintain the status quo in Moldova – since it helps Russia to control the affairs in the country – by diplomacy and military force: The former via its membership in the OSCE and as the regional great power, and the latter by its troops in the security zone on both banks of the Dniester river. Russia did not withdraw its troops, bases and ammunition from Transdniesteria and also from Georgia; hence she failed to fulfill the commitments given at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. Russia’s refusal to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia was a major factor overshadowing the Maastricht conference of OSCE. Although the deadline for pulling out the troops and arsenals from Moldova had been extended to December 2003, Russia made clear that the troops will stay on.

Having looked at the challenges of peacekeeping in the OSCE area, we may now re-focus our attention on the UN and OSCE cooperation to observe these challenges in practice.

Division of Labor between the UN and OSCE: Observations, Lessons drawn and Recommendations

The developments regarding peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War highlighted the importance of the existence of a network of mutually complementing and reinforcing security organizations. The intrastate conflicts, especially in the Balkans, demanded going beyond the traditional peacekeeping of the UN. An important element in the new generation of PKOs has been the involvement of regional organizations and, in this sense, the contribution of the OSCE has been studied in the previous pages. This section tries to identify the problems, unique aspects and factors that favor or constrain the success of UN and OSCE cooperation.

The OSCE has a comparative advantage to deal with European security issues owing to its inclusiveness, ideological neutrality, low cost and comprehensive approach to security. However, its other characteristics present it with disadvantages: The decisions are taken by the principle of consensus (a ‘consensus-minus one’ principle has been introduced recently to be able to take decisions in the case of gross
violation of international principles). Besides, the OSCE does not have quick reaction and rapid deployment capabilities. Due to this lack of coercive means, it was asserted that OSCE instruments and mechanisms would only be effective when used in cooperation with the UN, NATO or the EU -- institutions which can project power. Regarding its field operations, the mandates are not clear-cut to indicate the fulfillment of their tasks to effect withdrawal.  

P. Terrence Hopmann pertinently argues that “the ability of OSCE to achieve its potential in the management of post-Cold War conflict in Eurasia is significantly limited by traditional ideas held over from the Cold War era which place the unilateral prerogatives of certain powerful states above the long-term interests of the community of nations living in Europe.”

Undoubtedly, Russia’s cooperation in Eurasia is essential for peace and stability. The OSCE is well-placed and equipped to encourage cooperation. On the other hand, however, there is a fear that OSCE’s involvement in conflicts together with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) may result either in the derailment of OSCE or in the legitimization of Russia’s hegemonic tendencies in the former Soviet space.

Moreover, the potential of OSCE is limited not only by the lingering Cold War habits, but also by a new trend that has been dominant since the end of the Cold War. Almost all the post-communist states are willing to open up to the West and are hankering after a European identity. The OSCE, with its highly heterogeneous composition, cannot perform an identity-consolidating function and cannot be a source of attraction for them. Their primary orientation, therefore, is to NATO and the EU.

On the other hand, one can also argue that the strength of the OSCE lies in inter-institutional cooperation. The OSCE is an organization that is politically acceptable and capable of providing early warning and preventive services. In the former Yugoslavia, it has a high profile in its missions to stabilize and build peace in the conflict-ridden areas. The OSCE developed capacities to conduct large-scale diplomatic monitoring missions such as in Bosnia and Croatia, and to set up and implement elections in a post-conflict situation, as in Bosnia and Albania. As a result, its experience in civil-military cooperation increased in such situations. Moreover, in Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, it has gained practical experience in police monitoring, and the police personnel have been trained under difficult regional conditions in cooperation with specialized international institutions, above all, the UN. These are valuable operational capabilities which raised the
OSCE’s visibility and status as a regional arrangement of the UN, and as one of the security organizations in Europe.\textsuperscript{29}

Despite the decent set of rules governing cooperation between the UN and the OSCE, at the implementation level, their relationship sometimes became competitive rather than cooperative due to prestige concerns and the lack of a clear division of labor.\textsuperscript{30} In the case of Georgia, for example, where the UN and the OSCE are located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively, the UN refused a representation in South Ossetia, and the OSCE’s presence in Abkhazia is insignificant\textsuperscript{31}: It has deployed a member of its mission to the UN Office for the Protection of Human Rights.\textsuperscript{32} In the Yugoslav conflict, the involvement of many actors signaled the lack of a clear policy, and led to the establishment of contradictory mandates: traditional peacekeeping was combined with humanitarian functions, but the force was not adequately equipped for enforcement.\textsuperscript{33}

UN and OSCE cooperation in peacekeeping is likely to be shaped by a pragmatic case-by-case approach geared towards the requirements of specific situations, and considerations of comparative advantages or the policies of key actors, unless they apply clear-cut policies regarding a precise distribution of jurisdiction and definition of forms of cooperation. The important point is to avoid overlapping or rivalries, and ensure complementary and mutually reinforcing roles. Paralleling those established in the Supplement, these principles should include primacy of the UN, use of both organizations in terms of comparative advantage and expression by the OSCE of a European approach for the management of European conflicts.\textsuperscript{34}

There are few deliberations on UN and OSCE cooperation, and out of them it is possible to extract some observations and recommendations. First, the involvement and commitment of major powers are important in order to demonstrate a strong political will and provide the necessary resources for a successful operation. Second, the efforts of civilian organizations for the success of a civil society build-up should be backed up by a sufficient number of forces, to ensure credibility of such force. Third, international organizations should coordinate their efforts at the levels of policy, working as well as those of reporting and evaluation.\textsuperscript{35} The Bosnia case demonstrated that problems arose due to lack of awareness of each other’s mandates; thus for the future, joint planning in advance would help avoid disunity and a lack of common purpose.

In general, organizations involved in a PKO should work in a multi-institutional approach that stresses complementarity and cooperation,
and that avoids a rigid chain of command within, and the subordination of one institution to another. It is important to improve the exchange of information and personal contacts on the ground and between the headquarters of various organisations in order to develop a culture of cooperation. Current consultations with NATO and the EU are examples of such information sharing. This may serve as a model to improve OSCE-UN cooperation. It is also necessary to improve cooperation in fact-finding and monitoring missions. Last but not least, a sound financial basis for operations should be ensured.

The OSCE needs a division of labor with the UN or other organizations since it needs funds to support its missions. Burcu puts forward some recommendations to address the problems in the division of labor between the UN and the OSCE and categorizes them in three areas: Distribution of jurisdiction, legitimation and field deployment.

In terms of distribution of jurisdiction, he envisages models of interaction that include alternate lead (as in Georgia), joint jurisdiction on specific disputes and referral of disputes from one organization to another as foreseen in Article 52 of the UN Charter. The legitimizing function of an organization authorizes the launch of a PKO, defines its scope, terms of reference, etc. This function can play a key role in containing the Russian influence on conflicts in the former Soviet space. The third area is the division of labor regarding field deployment. They can either co-deploy PKOs or the operation can be started by one and continued by the other or, as a third option, they can conduct joint operations (like the UN did in Haiti).

The aims of the UN and OSCE overlap, but since the dynamics of such cooperation are also in transition, they lack clarity, i.e. both the UN and OSCE are in a process of transformation and the policies of the United States and the Russian Federation are unpredictable, so this brings problems in the planning and implementation of PKOs. Therefore, it is hard to define a precise division of labor for the UN and OSCE in terms of their cooperation in PKOs. Although “an overburdened UN should see a valuable opportunity for sharing its load where it is practicable and commonsense to do so,” the UN itself will continue to be needed for the planning and implementation of modern complex peace operations and for the global authorization and coordination of such activities.
ENDNOTES


9. Ibid, Article 22.

10. Therefore, a PKO can be carried out by the OSCE with an authorization of enforcement from the Security Council, which would involve a division of labor between the two organizations. See Natalino Ronzitti, “OSCE Peacekeeping,” in Michael Bothe,


15. The Mission was established in 1993.


18. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


31. Ibid.

32. OSCE Cooperation with the United Nations,


34. Burci, ibid., p.302.


39. The OSCE does not need a UN Security Council Resolution for operations short of enforcement action: See Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

40. Burci, op.cit., pp. 304-12.

WOMEN AND REGIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

by

Ms Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff

Introduction

At the start of the 21st Century, the international system appears to be evolving in a manner that suggests that in future, regional rather than global peacekeeping arrangements may well be the order of the day. The sole surviving super power seems to have embarked on a unilateralist course in dealing with perceived and actual threats to world/American peace and security, and would, it seems, prefer to create any kind of coalition be it of the willing, the not-so-willing or even of the reluctant, rather than turn to the United Nations (UN). European politicians may be divided on how to react to the American position but are united in their unwillingness to court the displeasure of their electorates by sending their soldiers to be maimed or killed in far off countries outside the boundaries of even an enlarged European Union. Since intra-state conflict is proving endemic to certain regions, one increasingly probable international response may well be regional implementation of internationally/globally funded peace keeping operations.

Ambassador Souren Georges Serayderian, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) spoke yesterday of transitional regional interventions that are subsequently replaced by full blown UN missions; however as regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) develop capacity, capability and standing, it is not too far-fetched to imagine a scenario in which an interim sub-regional intervention might be replaced by a more permanent regional, rather than UN, presence. Even if the scenario outlined above never comes to pass, there seems little doubt that peace operations in the future will have substantial regional dimensions.
What then can be said of the concept: “Women in Regional Peace Operations”?

Issues in Women’s Participation in Peace Processes

West Africa and ECOWAS have had the richest recent experience of intra-state conflicts and regional peace operations. The UN Security Council has acknowledged that civilians and particularly women and children account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict. It is also well established that the 15-year-old Mano River Basin crisis has had a disastrous effect on these groups. War in West Africa has resulted in the permanent destabilization of millions of lives; displacement, economic ruin, sexual violence, family separation and breakdown, amputations, forced marriages, mental and physical illness and premature death in peacetime are just some of the consequences suffered by women.

The corollary of the foregoing is that women and girls have had a great deal to gain from regional interventions to stop conflict and violence and to restore peace. Women’s groups have often taken the lead in calling for international intervention in intra-state conflicts. Real women and girls (not member states nor even the international world order) are the primary beneficiaries of peace operations and this should not be forgotten.

It is therefore interesting to see that at an occasion such as this, at which an evaluation is being made of past efforts at and future developments in peace operations, women and children are noticeably absent. With due respect to the organizers of this event, it must be said that this omission is unfortunate. While I am very happy and proud to confirm that my family and I have benefited from the security provided by the ECOWAS Monitoring Group(ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone and Liberia, I refuse to be the token representative of the vast numbers and variety of women and children affected in the West African security crisis.

A product survey is being undertaken and the main consumers are not being consulted. To understand how to organise more effective and efficient peace operations, you need to talk to the end users and not just to the service providers. It is still not too late and I would urge the partners of the Challenges Project to consider, if they have not already done so, consulting civilians, particularly women and children, who have been at the receiving end of past peace operations for their
recommendations. Such a consultation perhaps need not be done with the full attendance of peacekeeping professionals.

Since no new factors or developments have emerged that suggest that women and girls will cease being the most victimized and vulnerable segment of society whenever or wherever conflict emerges, the need to seek out their input in an exercise such as this one remains an issue of high priority.

Peace operations, as has already been pointed out, cover far more than the essential security enforcement activities of armed forces. They run from the institution of early warning systems and other conflict prevention strategies through negotiation and conclusion of peace agreements, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement (DDR), through all kinds of reconstruction of physical, political and economic infrastructures of what might or might not have been a “failed state” and on to the restoration of civil authority, elections, transitional justice mechanisms and the return of democratic governance. All citizens (including women and girls) have a stake in, and a right both to be taken account of and to participate in all these processes mentioned. The reality of most peace operations has however been very different.

The litany of women’s complaints against the global establishment is familiar. In this case of women, peace and security, as in so many situations, women say (and it is in fact true) that they have been sidelined, marginalized, silenced, ignored and excluded from genuine participation in peace processes and post-conflict peace building.

**African Women in Peace Processes**

In Africa, however, despite (or perhaps, because of) the hostile environment confronting them, women have succeeded in making a number of successful conflict prevention and peacemaking interventions. Fear of insecurity is indeed the Mother of Assertiveness.

National women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Liberia Women’s Initiative (LWI) and Save Somali Women and Children emerged to give voice to women’s concerns and these groups came together with many other similar organizations across Africa to establish a continent wide women’s platform for peace that has had considerable impact on the development of policy frameworks at the levels of the UN and the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU).

Sierra Leonean women first moved their domestic peace process forward by their leadership of the democratization process that produced an elected civilian government, mandated to seek peace as a
first priority. These women then combined, under the auspices of Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS), with their sisters from Guinea and Liberia, to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET). Among its many peace building initiatives, MARWOPNET succeeded in 2001, through separate meetings with the three individual Heads of State of the Mano River Union countries, to break the impasse that had stalled diplomatic efforts to resume the peace process and which threatened to ignite open hostilities between Guinea and Liberia. The UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, and the Security Council have publicly recognized MARWOPNET’s contribution to peace in the sub-region. In December 2003, the General Assembly awarded MARWOPNET the UN Human Rights Prize for 2003 in recognition of its achievements.

FAS itself was formed in 1996 by 22 African women from all walks of life, as a response to the explosion of conflicts on the continent. FAS has been supporting peace initiatives by African women at the community level and advocating for mainstreaming of women and their concerns at the highest levels of the AU, ECOWAS, UN and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

Although Burundian women succeeded in persuading first the late Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, and then the former South African President, Nelson Mandela, to allow them participate in peace negotiations that resulted in 23 of their recommendations being included in the final peace accord, and although Liberian women finally managed to obtain observer status at the many rounds of ECOWAS-sponsored peace negotiations in the mid-1990s, the impact of women on ECOMOG both in Liberia and Sierra Leone, was limited. Indeed, in the final months of 1998, all of Sierra Leone’s civil society was frustrated and demoralized by its collective inability to convince the ECOMOG leadership to heed its warnings about the unreliability of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in guaranteeing the country’s security at that point in time. These warnings sadly came to pass in the bloody rebel/SLA invasion of Freetown in January 1999.

Women in the Peace Operations of the 21st Century: Some Recommendations

It is probably true to say that to date neither the OAU/AU nor ECOWAS has undertaken the complete multiplicity of processes comprised in peace operations. Indeed, all that has been said since the start of the seminar might suggest that regional peace processes are unlikely to grow beyond “emergency fire services” due to resource
As the issues of women, conflict and regional peace operations are likely to remain inextricably connected for the foreseeable future, there follow hereunder, some recommendations for addressing the challenges of women in peace operations in the 21st century.

Concerted efforts by women culminated in the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2001 which deals with Women, Peace and Security. The importance of 1325 cannot be over-emphasized; it reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace building and stresses the importance of women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and also the need to increase their role in decision making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution. The Resolution and the UN Study that resulted from it make a number of excellent recommendations on the treatment of women by UN Peace Operations which should be taken on and implemented as soon as possible by regional organizations in their preparation for and implementation of regional peace operations. It will be recalled that Security Council Resolutions are binding on all UN Members States.

The major recommendations arising from the two documents mentioned above are the following:

- Increasing the number and role of women in field based operations especially as military observers, civil police, and human rights personnel;
- Incorporating a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and ensuring that field operations include a gender component;
- Provision of training to military, civilian police and civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations on the protection, rights and particular needs of women as well as the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures. This gender sensitivity training is particularly important for personnel who come from countries that are geographically and culturally proximate to the theatre of operations as the more “at home” the peacekeeper feels, the more likely that his home-based prejudices and patriarchal attitudes will surface and interfere with his professional performance.
In addition to implementing the Resolution 1325 provisions, regional organizations should take the lead in identifying, encouraging and training women to undertake high level decision-making roles in peace operations. The process of “growing” women leaders to participate in peace operations should be led and undertaken by the regional organizations themselves and not left to member states. The training should be as practical as possible, including providing opportunities for women to participate short-term in on-going peace operations as work experience.

Regional organizations should also facilitate contact and interaction between armed forces, police and other professionals who are likely to be called upon to participate in peace operations and civil society (especially women groups). Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities should be permanently institutionalized at the domestic level. The first time peacekeepers come into contact with civil society activists should not be in the theatre of operations. Related to the preceding point is that member states should take seriously, the obligation to maintain civilian control of national armed forces so that military commanders do not come to international peacekeeping unused to the discipline of civilian political control.

Regional peace operations should ensure that all actors involved in negotiating peace agreements adopt a gender perspective. Peacekeepers can find assistance in implementing this recommendation in the Framework of Model Provisions for Peace Agreements developed by the Experts Group Meeting convened by the UN Division for the Advancement of Women in Ottawa, Canada, in November 2003. Incorporating model provisions would enable peace agreements to be used as a means to promoting gender equality and ensuring participation of women.

Conflict is very taxing on the emotional and psychological well-being of all those involved. It is therefore necessary for appropriate counseling and mental health services to be provided, not only to peacekeeping personnel but also to the beneficiary population, particularly women and girls. Much of the counseling currently offered is too superficial and short-term to address the depth of harm inflicted on the minds of the perpetrators, victims and witnesses of the violence and atrocities that attend intra-state conflict.

Particular attention and protection should be provided to women and girls against the upsurge of domestic and sexual violence against women by male civilians, which often accompanies the cessation of
hostilities. Peace keepers should not limit their activities to keeping the public peace, if in private women are continuing to suffer abuse.

Women, particularly from the informal economic sector and the community level, can be incorporated and utilized in early warning systems. MARWOPNET has recently made a similar call to the Joint Security Council of the Mano River Union.

Peace operations should also, in future, ensure gender parity in the award of local supply contracts. The administrators of peace operations may be scrupulous in achieving gender parity in recruitment of national support staff; but that gender lens is taken off when it comes to awarding local supply contracts which often may give nationals the opportunity to rebuild capital lost during the fighting.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, I reiterate the call on regional organizations to accept that making the commitment to place the welfare of women and girls at the heart of peace operations implementation, and going on to make good on that commitment, will be the best way to address the challenges of regional peace operations in the 21st century.
SESSION IV:

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY BUILDING FOR REGIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS
INTERNSHIP SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY BUILDING FOR REGIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS:
PERSPECTIVE FROM AFRICAN UNION
by
Ambassador Sam Ibok

Introduction

I am happy to be here for this seminar and to share with you, the perspective of the African Union on the subject “International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations”.

I should like to preface my remarks with a note of appreciation to Africa’s partners, who are too numerous to be mentioned individually in this short address. Whatever anyone has to say about the role of these partners, the fact remains that without their support at varying levels, we would not have come as far as we have today, and this applies to the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Regional Organisations.

Of course, in any field of human endeavour, one can always choose to be an Oliver Twist, always asking for more. On both sides of the political spectrum, there is ample room for improvement. As Africans, we need to do more for ourselves, recognizing that, somehow, our continent had long lost the geo-strategic importance that in once had, especially in the days of the Cold War.

Today, the world is confronted with new and emerging threats, new challenges that have changed the paradigms for international cooperation and partnerships. In turn, these challenges have produced new priorities such as the combating of terrorism, the threats of weapons of mass destruction and, sometimes, unilateralism in international relations. Add on to this list, an unquantifiable development, that for want of a better description, is surreptitiously described as ‘donor fatigue’, in the face of an ever-increasing and enlarging list of African problems. So, let us acknowledge the contributions that many in the international community have made to the enlargement of Africa’s capacity for peace and security initiatives, especially as they relate to peacekeeping operations.
My second point of departure is to state the obvious: Peacekeeping is a time-consuming and expensive venture. Capacity is at the heart of peacekeeping, as we Africans have come to recognize. It is a cross-cutting issue, whether you are talking about traditional peacekeeping or other components that are now embraced in the comprehensive operations. These would include issues such as humanitarian work, civilian policing, democratization, elections, demobilization, disarmament, reintegration and resettlement along with mine action (commonly known by the acronym DDRR) and the integration of women and other vulnerable groups who are often the most affected during conflict situations.

Add to this long and inexhaustive list, an issue like HIV/AIDS that is not just a health issue any longer, but also a security issue. HIV/AIDS has not only decimated the most active segments of our populations in Africa, but is impacting, without much recognition or acknowledgement, on the efficiency of our military establishments. During and after every peacekeeping operation, the devastation caused by this pandemic is becoming increasingly obvious, even though in many of our countries and military establishments this issue remains a no-go area as we continue to be in our state of denial on the impact of HIV/AIDS.

The Imperatives of Capacity Building

In order to be able to deal with all these problems, we need to build capacity and increase our level of preparedness to address them before, during and after peacekeeping operations. No one organization, and definitely no one region, is in a position to address all these problems single-handedly; thus the imperative of building true partnerships to overcome them. Capacity building, therefore, comes in different forms and phases – before, during and after every peacekeeping operation.

In order to address the problems that have been highlighted in many documents dealing with lessons learned from peacekeeping deployments in the past – and the UN has undertaken several such exercises including the best-known Brahimi Report – several urgent actions need to be taken. We need to work towards and reflect the multi-faceted nature of peacekeeping deployments in countries afflicted by civil conflict. This means, among others, promoting the rule of law and engaging in early reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, including through the integration of the military, policing, humanitarian institution-building, reconstruction and civil administration functions of peacekeeping
operations. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it is indicative of the magnitude of the problem, when one talks about capacity building.

The Challenge of Cooperation

But let us return to the basics, by looking first at a simple thing like coordination. I should like to focus on two levels of coordination: first, horizontally between the AU and Regional Mechanisms on the one hand, and partners outside Africa, on the other; secondly, lateral coordination between the AU and Regional Mechanisms. I believe that at the level of the G8 and the European Union (EU), as well as among other donors, there are currently extensive, on-going programs with African nations and institutions to support the development of African capacities to undertake peacekeeping operations and related activities.

There is, however, a need to enhance coordination among the partners, over initiatives taken by them in Africa, to avoid duplication and ensure cost-effectiveness. By so doing, our partners will be able, in a more efficient manner, to help channel individual and collective efforts towards the achievement of the African vision for its capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, and consolidate peace. Complementary programs and partnerships among donors focused on clearly identified African priorities can lead to the achievement of more tangible goals. An immediate benefit will be that such consultations will help to ensure transparency and synergies in the efforts of the donors and their African interlocutors.

The Need for Data Bases

To complement these consultations, it is also being proposed that we need to jointly develop and sustain capacity to generate data bases of information on donor activities to support the development of African capacities to undertake complex peacekeeping operations and related activities. In this regard, I believe that it is of the utmost importance to fast track the proposed UN’s offer to build on the global database on peacekeeping training assistance (originally created in 1996 and overseen by the Training and Evaluation Service of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations), by creating a website with links to the websites of all donors, the AU and regional organizations describing their activities in peace and security, with special focus on assistance for peacekeeping capacity building.

Speaking from personal experience at the AU, it is amazing how a small thing like information on the training of African officers can delay the launching of an African peacekeeping deployment. About two
months ago, we met with representatives of the EU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss the issue of capacity building for peacekeeping in Africa. We were informed that EU member states collectively train about an average of 100 African officers in European countries every year and about 1000 African officers in African countries every year. But where are all these trained officers? Every time we want to have a deployment, it is very time-consuming to identify competent and professional officers in Africa, not because they are not there, but because information on them is not always readily available. Is it, for instance, conceivable that with the help of our partners, we can build databases on African officers who have been trained and are available for deployment either by the AU or by the Regional Organisations?

Enhancing Communication, Consultation and Cooperation between African organizations

The issue of coordination also affects cooperation between African organizations. It is a fact that, until recently, there was very little coordination and a lack of interface between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on peace and security issues. The outcome is that in implementing the decision by the Heads of State and Government of Africa to establish an African Standby Force (ASF), there is some degree of confusion on who has to do what, including the organization of the much-talked-about Regional Brigades. Though this may look mundane and simple, it is my considered view that African organizations need to be assisted to engage in the minimum level of consultation and coordination, with information technology and web-based arrangements and mechanisms.

Nature of Capacity Required to Support Regional Peace Operations in Africa

I would not like to waste your time at this important seminar, producing a shopping list of items for international support, but I believe it would be useful to indicate the nature of capacity that is required in Africa to support peacekeeping operations. I should also like to add, that I speak from the perspective of the establishment of the African Standby Force that was decided upon by the African Union. Given that the period provided for the full operationalization of the ASF is about a decade, it seems to me that the following capacities must be developed correspondingly, within that decade also.

Topmost on my list, is the need for the AU and the Regional Organizations to develop and maintain full time capacity to manage a
preventive deployment and a complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission. Essential to the development of such capacities is the need to focus on issues such as – and I shall quickly run through them – the standardization of doctrine and procedures; equipment standardization (or at the very least, identification of key areas where inter-operability is essential; standardization of policy, and development of appropriate technical capacities for peacekeeping deployment.

In this context, one of the key priorities that will be required to operationalize the African Standby Force during the first phase, will be the establishment of a Planning Element at the AU Headquarters and at the Headquarters of a Regional Organization such as Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) which is in a position to establish a Regional Brigade.

At the level of the AU, such a Planning Element will undertake and lead the staff work and preparation for the ASF in the areas of command, control, communication and information systems and training support. At the level of the RECs, the Planning Elements will focus on force planning, preparation and training of the regional standby elements. The next priority will be the establishment of Mission Headquarters level management capability or Brigade Headquarters within the RECs, at some point but also as a matter of priority.

I had earlier referred to the two critical areas identified by our Chiefs of Defence Staff as impeding the deployment of peacekeeping operations in Africa, namely, logistics and sustenance. It will be important, early in the implementation stages of the ASF, to address the issue of establishing AU military logistical bases that should incorporate regional logistical bases, to facilitate rapid deployment and mission sustainability. For a region like West Africa, where work has reached an advanced stage on this issue, an arrangement of co-location should be worked out between the AU and ECOWAS. This is one area where partners could negotiate issues such as strategic airlifts and enhanced capacity for addressing the problem of logistics with the AU and the RECs.

**Funding Support for Capacity Building**

Recently, the Institute for Security Studies of South Africa and other think tanks in Africa undertook a review of the efforts made so far on the establishment of the ASF. One of the areas that was discussed extensively, was the whole problem of funding for peacekeeping deployment. Apart from recommending that AU member states should set up and increase their contributions to an ASF Trust
Fund or the AU Peace Fund before appealing for external assistance, experts have recommended that the AU and the RECs should engage in sustained negotiation with external partners to harness initiatives such as the US-sponsored African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), the French-sponsored Reinforcement de Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), the British Peace Support Training (BPST), etc. to support training and capacity building for the ASF. I wish, in this regard, to strongly support the appeals that had been made to the partners, to support designated African Centres of Excellence for peacekeeping training such as the National War College of Nigeria, and the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, among others, to accomplish their full potentials.

Conclusion

Finally, I should like to leave you with a few thoughts on how we should continue to approach the issue of international support for capacity building for regional peace operations. First, at the level of the UN, I believe it would be appropriate for the world body to look beyond its so-called institutionalized mandate of providing only advice to the AU and the RECs. Clearly, as many have advocated, it should be possible for the UN to concretely support African initiatives, including support from the logistics centre in Brindisi.

In any case, we at the AU would like to see a broader and more flexible interpretation of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. If it is accepted and acknowledged that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it stands to reason that when the regional organisations take an initiative, they do so on behalf of the UNSC. The least they can and should expect from the UN, is concrete support to strengthen their capacities.

Secondly, support should be provided to enable the AU and regional organizations to learn more and, where possible, benefit in concrete terms, from the model of the UN Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), for developing the African Standby Force. There are many similarities and we do not have to reinvent the wheel. If SHIRBRIG is working for the UN, it can be adapted for the AU.

Thirdly, the UN should be encouraged to develop arrangements with the AU and regional organizations that would enable them to partner with the UN planning and strategic management capabilities. As already mentioned, discussions among international donors and the UN
should be encouraged to pursue options that would address the financial needs of African-led peace support missions.

Fourthly, the EU or the G8 should involve concerned donors and Africa interlocutors, to establish regular consultations on support for African peace and security initiatives. This should be done, especially, in capitals where African continental and regional peace and security institutions are located.

Finally, I wish to observe that I have attended many such seminars in the past, where, as is the case here in Abuja, many distinguished participants have advised on the way forward only for those proposals and recommendations to be documented in reports. Could I, Mr. chairman, request that an Action Plan for taking forward the recommendations of this meeting be elaborated by the organizers. For instance, can we agree on some kind of division of labour, whereby the partners will sensitize their constituencies of these proposals, while we in Africa can share them with our institutions, with a view to implementation? Unless we do that, I am afraid, the value added from this most important Seminar would have been lost, and the next time we meet again, we shall go through the motions again. Talking, and talking, and documenting the outcome of our talk shop.

I remain confident that, with the help of our Swedish friends, the Nigerian National War College, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we will ensure a wide circulation of the conclusions of this Seminar for follow-up and other appropriate actions by all the stakeholders. I wish to assure you that the African Union stands ready to partner with you, to take forward the conclusions of this Seminar in order to implement at least some of the brilliant proposals that we have heard in the past three days from knowledgeable and articulate professionals in the field.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY BUILDING FOR REGIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS: A EUROPEAN POLICE PERSPECTIVE

by

Mr Lars Forste

What can be done to assist in building police capacity in multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations? Here are some suggestions, based on lessons learned from experience in the European Union (EU) and also accepted by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Needs-Assessment

First, it is important to get a clear picture of the situation in order to develop a needs-assessment. This should be based normally on the mission mandate, and an identification of the real needs in the mission or crisis area. The needs-assessment should describe what has to be done to improve local police capacity and identify the ways and extent to which the international community can best support regional capacity-building.

It is important to obtain the host nation's own input to the needs-assessment, as the goal is to support the national development in a modern and democratic direction.

Key Areas of Capacity-Building

The EU has identified the following key areas in which capacity-building is often essential:

• Rule of Law;
• Police;
• Military;
• Civil/public administration; and
• Civil protection (rescue services, firefighting, medical services, etc.)

Two other areas of importance are the following:

• Human Rights; and
• Mass media development

It is important to maintain a holistic view in strengthening these key aspects of a multidisciplinary peace operation.

As is well known, the strength of a chain is no more than the strength of its weakest link: if that link fails or is missing, the whole chain fails. In many peace operations, the police component may be the only member of the legal chain that is present in the area. Other members of the legal family, such as prosecutors, judges and correction officers, may not be available as seconded or contracted personnel in the mission. In such circumstances, where one or more are missing, the efforts of the police component may suffer heavily. This is an area that deserves more attention, and cooperation on this issue should be further developed.

In all the key areas mentioned above, a culture of cross-professional cooperation and coordination is necessary, and in turn the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations will benefit. But cooperation and coordination within the international community are not enough to strengthen democracy and citizen influence in a post-conflict situation.

It is essential that a bridge of confidence and trust be developed between the police and the citizens in order to build a sustainable democracy on a sound foundation. This can be built by establishing Citizens’ Advisory Groups with ordinary members of the community, the village or the region, such as priests, tradesmen, school teachers, bus drivers, etc. These groups can be very useful in advising and supporting their own police service in the common interest of creating a peaceful and law-abiding society. Another tool for establishing the police as an active and self-evident part of the community is the practice of modern standards of community policing, a concept that is well known in EU countries.

Perhaps we need to dwell further on the last two key areas of capacity building listed above, namely human rights and the mass media.

**Human Rights**

With regard to human rights, training is a matter of great concern. The human rights curriculum should not only include the necessary knowledge of human rights conventions, declarations, rules and regulations, but should go well beyond them by including training on topics such as:
• Use of Force – the principles and legal dimensions of intervention, and the general principle of legality (all police interventions must be made within the framework of law; the basic principles are: the principle of necessity; the principle of purpose; the principle of proportionality, and the principle of consideration);
• Code of Conduct;
• Code of Ethics;
• Integrity and Ethical Behavior;
• Gender Issues and Equality – violence against women or children;
• Domestic and Sexual Violence – violence against women or children; and
• Diversity Awareness – discrimination by race, ethnicity, religion, gender, opinion, etc.

Human rights and human dignity training carried out successfully will play an important and crucial part in strengthening democracy in a post-conflict area. In the light of the growing complexity of conflicts, this training should be multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional. The role of the police component will be an important part of human rights training, but other members of the legal family (prosecutors, judges and correction officers) as well as representatives of other components of the mission are also important actors in order to maintain a holistic approach and the presentation of a solid and unified message.

Mass Media

The development of the right approaches to mass media is another area for capacity-building as the role of the media in a developing democracy is of crucial importance. The media may have been used as a tool of the former state apparatus, or even a component part of it. But in a democracy, the media has an important role in monitoring the application of human rights, focusing on corruption and instances of abuse by the police.

Moreover, it is useful to bear in mind the role of journalists in the exercise of the right of freedom of opinion. There may be merit in including journalists in human rights training given by police, not just as students but also as lecturers. The media can be a very helpful instrument for cooperation in a crisis situation. In addition, a good and responsible media can promote well-informed citizens, strengthen openness in a society and generally encourage democracy.
EU Police Missions in the Balkans

Currently, the EU has two police missions in the Balkans: one in Bosnia and Herzegovina with more than 900 members from 33 countries; and another in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) with over 200 members. The main tasks for the two police missions are monitoring and advising, with some added training tasks.

The EU operates in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, but a UN mandate for EU peace operations is not a necessity and the EU is likely to develop its peace operations policies outside the UN framework.

The circumstances where an EU presence may be deployed would include the following examples:

• Following a UN operation (UNMIBH, followed by EU Police Mission);
• Alongside a UN operation (KFOR, with UNMIK);
• For a limited time prior to handing over to the UN (SHIRBRIG, prior to UNMEE); and
• As one component of a multi-component operation (as in the four pillar structure in Kosovo).

Training for Future Missions

In terms of training, it is necessary to note the following key facts about the EU experience:

• The current EU approach is to focus on the prefix ‘multi’: multi-disciplinary, multi-dimensional, multi-functional, multi-institutional, multi-national etc.
• Training should be executed on the basis of dialogues with ‘partners’, meaning other member states, other international and regional organizations, the host country and NGOs.
• The EU also wants to run in-service training in mission areas.
• Computer-assisted training programmes are being developed in several Member States with possibilities for simultaneously training a large number of participants, located in different places around the globe, in the same exercise.
• Working groups, such as the EU Training Group including the EU Training Police Group, have been established.
• Harmonized standards for training courses have been developed.
• A Crisis Management Exercise was held from 18 to 27 May 2004; its aims were to exercise and evaluate a range of EU crisis management structures, procedures and consultation.
arrangements (including the development of concepts of operation), and to validate the EU decision-making process in the context of an EU-led operation without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

Research and studies by the respective Member States also underpin the emerging joint training policies and programmes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the fact cannot be over-emphasized that training, research, and cooperation and coordination are very important. As regards cooperation and coordination, it is important to note that these terms imply and convey a ‘holistic perspective’: As greater cooperation and coordination are needed in peace operations, it is important to include the police perspective in the future work of the Challenges Project and also increase the involvement of prosecutors, judges and correction officers in peace operations.
Does Education Matter!

I am indeed pleased to participate in this Seminar organized jointly by the National War College of Nigeria and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden. I wish to express my sincere thanks to the organizers for having invited the United Nations University for Peace (UPEACE) to be present and for allowing me to address the participants in this Seminar.

It is indicated in the programme that I will be speaking about South America. Although I have some knowledge of conflict issues and regional bodies in Central and South America, I am unfortunately not so competent to cover such a vast issue. I will therefore devote my time between a brief description of the UN University for Peace, and the specific efforts by the UN University for Peace to foster regional cooperation and to support peace efforts by the international community and, more specifically, by the United Nations. And I will briefly describe the perception of the current situation in South America and the programme to promote peace and security in Latin America. And then, finally, a few remarks about the very idea of peace education as an important element in peace keeping, particularly for the 21st Century.

The United Nations University for Peace held a workshop here in Abuja just two months ago on the theme: “Education for Peace: Curriculum Development for the West African Region”. It was co-hosted by the National Universities Commission (NUC) of Nigeria and the University of Jos, Jos, also in Nigeria. At the Opening Ceremony, the Regina Pacis Girls Secondary School, Abuja, paid tribute to the meeting by singing “The Peace Anthem” which was composed especially for that workshop and which goes as follows:
The Peace Anthem:
"Nigerians, let there be Peace
Africans, let there be Peace
Our leaders let there be Peace.
Let us give Peace a chance in our lives.
Give Peace a chance.
Give Peace a chance to take control of our lives.
Let us shun crisis.
Let us avoid disagreements.
We need Peace in Nigeria.
We need Peace in Africa.
We need Peace all over the World.
For Unity and Progress, we must stop ethnic clashes.
We must stop inter-tribal wars,
The foul cries of marginalization,
Leadership struggles, cultism and vandalism.
We must learn to resolve our conflicts
With dialogue and tolerance”.

Such attractive words reflect so well the innermost idea of “Education for Peace”.

The UN General Assembly established the University for Peace almost 25 years ago. During the first period of its existence, it focussed its activities on Latin and Central America. The region was, as we all recall, overflowing with conflicts. From its base in Costa Rica – and you may be aware that Costa Rica is probably the only country in the world which has no military and a high standing of respect for human rights – the University for Peace has, during its initial period, made several modest but useful interventions in strengthening the peace efforts in the region. As part of the major overhaul of the United Nations in the late 1990s undertaken by the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General instructed in 1999 that the University for Peace become global. Since then, the University for Peace has expanded its scope and is now actively working in almost all regions of the world. More about this in a while.

This is, in many ways, an auspicious moment to be in Africa and in Nigeria, especially as the African Union has, just the past week, launched its new Peace and Security Council. As it was stated at the inauguration:
The Peace and Security Council has been designed to be a strong signal to the African People and the International Community of our determination to put an end to the conflicts and wars which have ravaged the continent so far too long.

I am also pleased to be in Nigeria. Nigeria has contributed so much to the UN and international peacekeeping efforts. I have had the privilege – and many good experiences – of working with peacekeepers from Nigeria.

The Road to Sustainable Peace goes through Education for Peace!

To put my very presence at this Seminar in some perspective, I will like from the outset to raise the fundamental issue: DOES EDUCATION MATTER? Can we expect to be able to educate ourselves and our fellow citizens to become less violent and more peaceful? So does Education for Peace Matter?

We are together here this week in Abuja to discuss “Lessons learned and Best Practices” (and the regional dimensions). But this ‘Lessons learned and best practices’ exercise is exactly based upon the fundamental assumption that we can describe, document and communicate our understanding, knowledge and know-how and that we can transfer this from one person to another, which is what education is all about.

The international community has since long declared “Education for All” as a major aim. The UN University for Peace is founded on the very premise that Education for Peace matters, and that Education for Peace can change people’s attitudes, instil tolerance, respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights and acting in a peaceful manner with our fellow citizens. In the recent prison abuses in Iraq, it is revealed that some of the military had not been told of, and were even less educated on, the Geneva Conventions and the treatment of prisoners.

Perhaps education has to be re-invented: Education must be put in a context and be related to problems and realities. In a recent book, Gustavo Lopez Ospina (Director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, UNESCO, Ecuador) has said:

Education should be based on life, on the overwhelming desire for radical transformation and moral change in the character of society. It should be concerned with
promoting collective wisdom and human understanding, unveiling the truths that have been concealed for various reasons, and representing elements of scientific rationality and folklore that have been built and enriched generation after generation.

Education should seek to develop, to the utmost, human potential, throughout our entire lives, so that people can engage in self-realization and fully express themselves in the hope for a viable future. “Education for All” and “Lifelong Education” should be pillars of this vision.

The University for Peace has a special interest in your programme which focuses on Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century. The University for Peace is looking forward to have a very close collaboration with the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Also, the fascinating contributions and studies being provided to this programme will clearly find their way into our teaching globally.

The University for Peace has launched a research program for clarifying the root causes of conflicts, developing strategies and policies to prevent conflict and to build peace in the 21st Century; and for Defining a Framework of International Law and Institutions for Peace and Security in the 21st Century. This is in line with the mandate for the University for Peace, in which it is stated that the University must address all causes of conflict.

I am certainly not adding anything new by stating that the world is spending over 800 billion US dollars annually on arms and wars – and hardly anything for avoiding conflicts! We are spending billions of dollars teaching young people how to fight and to kill but only a few millions on teaching how to live in peace, how to avoid conflicts or settle conflicts in a peaceful manner. The UN peacekeeping operations cost in the neighbourhood of around 3-4 billion dollars annually with 57,000 UN peacekeepers now in the field. In addition to that, it is of course recognized that many countries are supporting peace and peacekeeping efforts through direct support or through the funding and training of peacekeepers. Also, part of the funding for development could be seen as support for peace efforts.

One topic which has been mentioned during our discussion here, and which I had tried to address during the past few years, is the uncontrollable proliferation and sales of heavy arms to many poor developing countries. While we cannot refuse even the poorer countries to be able to defend themselves, it is immoral for the big powers – mainly the permanent members of the UN Security Council – to
promote so aggressively their sales of arms. I have tried, together with a group of interested organizations, to lobby against such sales of armaments, but it is obvious we are up against big business and vested interests.

As already mentioned, the United Nations University for Peace was established by a resolution of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1980 to provide a focus within the UN system for education, training and research on all issues related to the prevention of conflict and the building of peace. As a matter of fact, as already mentioned, it is stated in the decision of the UN General Assembly that the University for Peace should be concerned with all obstacles to Peace. This is quite a tall order and perhaps somewhat delicate to translate into direct action.

The University has developed and launched a rigorous academic programme and is now teaching close to 100 students from over 30 countries at its main campus in San José, Costa Rica, and offering five full Masters Programmes comprising Foundation Course in International Peace Studies; International Law and Human Rights; International Law and Dispute Settlement; Economic Development, Stability and Peace; Gender and Peace Building; and Environmental Security, Sustainable Development and the prevention and resolution of Resource-related Conflicts. These programmes were developed on a multi-cultural and inter-disciplinary basis, and quality is assured under the supervision of a high-level Academic Council of distinguished scholars from 12 countries.

Furthermore, two more full Masters programmes will be offered from this coming fall in Peace Education with a program on Security and Development, and another on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. The University for Peace is the only UN body entitled to grant degrees. The University is also concerned with education and training of the military and the police. We also have a Youth programme. Media is a critical factor, and a separate institute for Media, Peace and Security is currently offering courses precisely in Media, Peace and Security.

The University is not only teaching in Costa Rica but at several other locations such as Bangkok, Thailand and Budapest, Hungary. Indeed, it is not the idea that the small campus in Costa Rica shall be the only activity. The main idea behind the University is to establish partners all over the world and through its Center for Information Technology, the University is applying state-of-the-art technologies, including DVD, CD-Rom and the Internet as well as videos, to disseminate knowledge on all aspects of conflict prevention and peace building to partner universities across the world, so that they can teach
thousands of leaders, teachers, experts and young persons at large for the future. This is the central aim of the University. In this way, UPEACE will become, in the words of its honorary president, Kofi Annan, “the Center of a world-wide movement of education for Peace”.

In accordance with its mission from the UN General Assembly, the strategy for the development of UPEACE comprises the following three mutually-reinforcing components:

• Development and testing of rigorous, multicultural teaching materials through practical teaching.

• Extension of its programmes into all regions of the world so as to build partnerships; to understand different cultural concerns, circumstances, needs and aspirations and to gain access to up-to-date information on all key issues in the field of conflict prevention and peace building.

• Conversion of this knowledge and expertise, using state-of-the-art education and information technologies, into formats suitable for dissemination and use by universities and other educational institutions across the world, through the International Programme on the Development and Dissemination of knowledge in the Field of Education for Peace.

The University for Peace programme will offer a substantial multiplier on the initial investment in the systematisation of experience and knowledge, conveying the essential knowledge and skills in the field of conflict prevention and peace building to thousands of students, professionals, civil society leaders and potential leaders across the world.

A substantial programme to strengthen education for peace in Africa has been developed through in-depth missions to 12 countries and in consultation with a wide spectrum of academics, civil society leaders, researchers, officials and the military and police. As a result, a unique body of knowledge has been accumulated on research and teaching activities in progress across the continent and on the practical needs as well as the obstacles in ensuring capacities in the fields of education, training and research for peace. A solid network of motivated partner institutions in Africa has thus been established.

This process has led to the design of a major programme of support to African universities and other formal and non-formal educational institutions to build up their capacities to teach and research the vital issues of conflict prevention, peace building, environmental security, reconciliation and human rights, upon which peace as well as social and economic progress depend. Three highly successful curriculum
development workshops have been held, in Uganda, Nigeria and South Africa. University for Peace has also initiated teaching activities in Central Asia, and a new programme for Education for Peace in Asia and the Pacific is currently being formulated.

Over the past several years, it has been an established fact that there is an intense demand among young people all over the world to study and to devote their lives to all issues related to peace, security and development. Universities and other teaching institutions in developing and transition countries are, however, not always able to provide such crucial teaching and to live up to the enormous demands. University for Peace is the only UN institution authorized to grant degrees. And we have seen that the demand for course materials, training and support from the University for Peace is immense.

It is equally important to provide education and training for those who are already engaged in such fields as humanitarian assistance, security sector and judicial reform, post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and economic development, and who need to acquire special skills in the prevention and mediation of violence and conflict.

The central importance of education in all its aspects as a process that should build the foundations of peace and progress, and thus reduce the prejudice and hatred on which violence, conflict and terrorism are based, is increasingly recognized. Thousands of qualified experts are needed in the developing countries to prevent and mediate conflict and to achieve reconciliation, to teach non-violence, tolerance and human rights, to build the basis of good governance and democracy and undertake the targeted programmes necessary to achieve sustainable development. And these future leaders and teachers must be trained in their home countries, as we cannot all travel to Costa Rica!!

The challenge to the world community, therefore, is to build the capacity and the human capabilities needed in the developing and transition countries to prevent conflict and to establish solid foundations for peace and progress. Thus education, through all channels and at all levels, coupled with training and research, is essential to educate the thousands of qualified leaders, teachers and experts so urgently required.

Regional Cooperation and Peacekeeping in Latin America

Peacekeeping activities have not been a prominent subject with the regional organizations in Central and South America. Latin America offers a heterogeneous picture, from both a political and an economic
point of view. While some states in the region have seen a destabilization of their general political situation, others have succeeded in their consolidation efforts.

Latin America appeared, in the late 20th century, as very promising. It became the only continent where practically all governments were democratically elected. However, realities at the end of the century and the beginning of the 21st century do not fully confirm this positive outlook. Latin America is facing very difficult times. Recent developments in the region, notably in Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia and Haiti demonstrate that the consolidation of a democratic environment, a critical achievement of the 1990s, cannot be taken for granted. There is indeed an urgent need to strengthen efforts towards social consensus, effective democracy, political stability, human rights and the rule of law, environmental security and sustainable development, and peace. One of the critical factors in promoting development, stability and peace is the skills and attitudes of the peoples of the region. It is therefore particularly important to strengthen leadership for peace in all walks of life, including political and military leaders, business and labour leaders, academia and the media.

Latin America has experienced war between Peru and Ecuador, popular uprisings in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Haiti. Also, the border region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, “the Triple Frontier”, is a serious trouble spot with drugs and arms traffic continuing to grow. In Colombia, over 1500 persons are killed annually in violent attacks and there have been over 2000 kidnappings annually for many years. Half a million people in Colombia are displaced because of the fightings.

A major cause is poverty. The Economic Community of Latin American Countries (ECLAC) has recently estimated that 210 million people in the region are poor or very poor, and this is a doubling from what was the situation in the mid-1980s. Brazil has not been a participant in any external regional conflict for more than 140 years. On the other hand, Brazil is considered a highly violent country with high level of crime, social injustice, human rights violations, and particularly urban violence as a consequence. It is interesting to note that unrest and violence cost the countries in Latin America over 140 billion dollars per year. The costs for caring for victims of violence are estimated to be higher than the costs of all primary education in the region.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has recently reported that between 7000 and 8000 children under 18 years of age are child soldiers in
revolutionary armed forces in Columbia, and there are many more if other armed groups are included. Over 6,000 children are armed in Rio de Janeiro alone, and the death rate of youngsters because of firearms in Rio has now reached 240 per 100,000 inhabitants or 40 times more than in US, and 200 times higher than in Japan or Europe.

The University for Peace has built an influential network in Central and South America and has gained valuable experience over many years. UPEACE has been directly involved in the peace processes in Central America through several programmes of education and training for Peace. To strengthen the University’s activities in the Southern Cone of Latin America, the “World Center for Investigations on Peace” was established in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1997. This operates throughout Latin America, playing an active, catalytic role in mobilizing academic resources and networks.

Another element in the UPEACE network is The World Center for Training and Research on Conflict Resolution in Bogotá, Colombia. The Colombian Government and a diverse group of Colombian institutions and interests, including the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, formally established this in December 2001, explicitly as a Center of the University for Peace.

President Alejandro Toledo of Peru has outlined a vision of what is now the challenge for politicians in the region. He states that:

it is not enough only to build schools, roads or bridges. The challenges to the leaders are to invest aggressively in the minds of people. It may be that investment in education is not very attractive, because it offers only a medium or very long term return, but there is no alternative.

The Organisation of American States(OAS) was instrumental in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was signed in September 2001. It is covered in a Plan of Action that was approved by the 2001 Summit of the Americas. It includes recommendations and goals on:

• Making Democracy work well;
• Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
• Justice, Rule of Law and Security of the Individual; and
• Hemispheric Security;
The role of Spain in this regard must not be overlooked. This was particularly highlighted at the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Madrid in 2001.
As to regional cooperation and peace keeping efforts, the situation provides for a somewhat mixed picture. First and foremost, with the exception of Haiti, no UN/or other international organization has had any direct involvement in crisis taking place in South America. This is a truth with some modification, as the United States involvement in the drug and civil – guerrilla – war in Colombia is rather extensive. Secondly, the Mercosur Region, the Andean Community, the Central American grouping and Caricom (the Caribbean Regional Community) are all active regional organizations, but they do not usually include military collaboration. As an example, Mercosur does not include military cooperation. So when the UN asked Mercosur to provide UN peacekeepers for Haiti, that request was rejected, but most of the countries in the region agreed to participate in an independent and sovereign manner. Brazil has now taken the lead, but there are some more details to this, which I may not elaborate on. However, South America has been participating actively in UN peace-keeping activities elsewhere, and countries like Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina and Ecuador have all sent observers, police and military personnel.

In essence, the picture and situation in Africa is not the case in South America. With the exception of Haiti, there has been no conflict that has required outside direct involvement in the region.

Conclusion

Let me, as a conclusion, go back to my first statement: *Education matters, and Education for Peace is essential as a part of laying a foundation for Sustainable Peace!!!* Education is an important instrument for capacity building for, and certainly a key element in, securing Peace.

What I have presented here is perhaps more esoteric than the organizers had wanted it. The Challenges Programme deals with facts and figures and hard-learned lessons. But as we apply our collective wisdom to influence the young who are our future leaders, politicians and administrators, we must recognize that Education for Peace will have to be an integral part of peacekeeping.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY BUILDING FOR REGIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS: PERSPECTIVE FROM NIGERIA

by

Lt Gen M. L. Agwai

Introduction

I am not only glad to be part of this important Seminar, but also grateful for the opportunity to share Nigeria’s experience on the theme of this event. Nigeria has been an active regional and international player in the maintenance of global peace and security. To date, Nigeria has participated in 25 of the 51 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, three Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) missions, two Organisation of African Unity (OAU) missions and one bilateral mission in the then Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1964. As at the end of May 2004, Nigeria had 3,315 peacekeepers comprising of troops, military observers and civilian police deployed in six UN missions around the globe.

We therefore feel justifiably honoured that Nigeria has been chosen as the venue of this important Seminar, in view of the key role she continually plays in the realm of peace support operations (PSO). And I must thank both the Project Coordinators and the organizers of the Seminar for deeming it fit to grant me the opportunity to contribute to this very important discourse.

The rising tide of inter and intra state conflicts coupled with the changing dynamics in PSOs has made the roles of regional/international organizations and arrangements indispensable in the maintenance of global peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, PSOs have changed from their classical orthodoxy; they have become more complex and multi-dimensional in nature. One of the realities of the post-Cold War era is that there has been an upsurge of inter and intra state conflicts, particularly in Africa, with untold political and socio-economic consequences. Unfortunately, amidst this trend, has been the development of a selective deployment of UN PSOs in crises areas,
particularly in Africa, with forces that are less multi-national, ill-equipped and poorly trained. One of the results of this trend was the mass genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

In response to the aforementioned trend, and in order to check the wanton destruction, carnage and spread of the conflict that was then unfolding in Liberia, Nigeria, in 1990, took on the challenge of becoming the lead nation in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), with attendant high cost in human and financial resources. This was at a time, when, in other conflicts in the continent, troop contributing countries (TCC) were mainly poor African countries that could not adequately meet the complex and multi-disciplinary demands of PSOs. It was also observed that while European states had reduced their financial support and troop contributions to African missions, their troop commitments to missions led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the Balkans, other UN missions in the Middle East and Europe and missions where they were involved on bilateral grounds, such as Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, were not reduced.

Another dimension of these developments, was the increase in the introduction of capacity building initiatives for developing nations by developed countries. The net result of all these has been the increase in calls by both African and international concerns for strengthening of Africa’s capacity for conflict management and peace operations, especially through sub-regional and regional organizations and arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as reiterated in Paragraph 54 of the Brahimi Report. The establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and Civilian Crisis Management Capacity by the European Union (EU) in April 2001, as well as the Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Team (REACT) by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the decision to create a NATO response and conflict management mechanism by ECOWAS, with a peace and security council along with funding and military support components, were all direct fall-outs of these developments.

It is therefore in this connection that I tend to agree with all the previous speakers, that the Abuja edition of the Challenges Seminar has offered one of the best fora to deliberate and share experiences on the challenges associated with regional PSOs in general, and in particular the development of regional capacity as well as arrangements for peace operations and relationships with the UN, in its responsibility for international peace and security.
However, some pertinent questions that need to be asked include the following:

a. What has been the impact of regional organizations, arrangements and relationships on PSOs today; i.e. how effective have they been?
b. Have the various initiatives aimed at capacity building fully achieved their objectives?
c. What are the challenges involved in all these, particularly in the light of Nigeria’s experiences?
d. Are there better ways of strengthening Africa’s PSO capacity than the arrangements already in progress?
e. What is the way forward?

While some of these questions have been addressed by the various presentations over the last few days, some of the issues discussed certainly apply to Nigeria, ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and other regional arrangements. Accordingly, I intend to address the Nigerian perspective under 2 broad areas namely, the challenges posed to regional organizations and arrangements vis-à-vis their relationship with the UN in its role in the maintenance of global peace and security, and the associated problems and impediments to strengthening the roles of the UN and regional organizations in arrangements towards achieving their objectives in PSOs in Africa. I shall endeavour to give the way forward on the major issues raised.

Challenges Posed to Regional Organizations and Arrangements in the Maintenance of Peace and Security

From Nigeria’s perspective, the major challenges to regional organizations and arrangements in the discharge of their responsibilities under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, could be divided into 4 categories namely: the need for effective capacity building, attaining rapid response capability, mobilising adequate funding and logistics support, and building effective and transparent partnerships and support to meet the changing dynamics of PSOs.

The Brahimi Report and subsequent reports of the Secretary General and the Security Council (SC) have recommended the deployment of high quality peacekeeping forces. This was because without well-equipped and well-trained troops, the UN would not meet the standards recommended by these reports for robust operations; thus wasting member states’ money in supporting low performing troops. The need for quality assurance is especially serious now that most
peacekeeping forces come from developing countries. Although a number of developing countries still send capable professional forces to UN and regional missions, few can provide adequate strategic lift capability and specialized “enabling” units (engineering, communication, substance logistics, transport, intelligence and medical) that complex operations often need.

However, some of the logistical deficit could be augmented via private sector contracts as was the case with the US-funded Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE Inc), whose services were extended to ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and early 2000, and recently to the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). It is pertinent to mention that Nigeria almost single-handedly shouldered the financial burden of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) intervention forces in Chad and the greater part of ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

But even if operational deficits would be reduced in this manner, the political deficit could be said to remain. This is because it has increasingly become difficult either for the UN or regional organizations to function effectively in situations where only some of their members are willing to shoulder operational burdens. The net consequence of this is the regionalization of peacekeeping which has been reinforced by the present US administration’s preference for ad hoc coalitions over almost any permanent alliance of institutions, and which suggests that the imbalance in operational burden sharing in UN and regional operations will linger for long.

In line with the Brahimi Report, the UN has introduced so many initiatives and concepts to enhance its rapid deployment capability. These include some improvements in its Standby Arrangement System, the formation of multinational brigade-size forces by members states, the development of On-Call Lists and Strategic Deployment Stocks, as well as programmes to assess the readiness of troops pledged to the UN prior to their deployment. As mentioned in some previous discussions, the AU and ECOWAS are presently in the process of developing these initiatives, though with many difficulties.

There are other Brahimi Report recommendations either already implemented or being implemented by the UN, that are designed to boost her capacity for complex PSOs, and which need to be given serious consideration by regional organizations and arrangements, particularly on the African continent. These include providing logistic cushions given by the Secretary-General’s pre-mandate procurement
authority, procurement of Strategic Deployment Stocks, restructuring and strengthening of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Civilian Police Division, promoting fast and effective public information in the field and strengthening of best practices. Others are improving the capacity for anticipating, planning and managing operations, especially the concept of an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), as a panacea to the problems of planning complex missions with large civilian components and improving the funding capability of the Secretariat.

In the area of improving the quality of peacekeepers, the development of Standardized Generic Training Modules (SGTM) by the Training and Evaluation Services of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (TES-DPKO) will impact positively on national training for PSOs. Furthermore, while the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Reinforcement des Capacities Africaines de Maintien de la paix (RECAMP), African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) and other training assistance extended to some African countries by Western countries have undoubtedly improved the operational and logistical capability of the beneficiaries, there is however the need to revisit the objectives, content and modus operandi of such aid to make them more useful to the beneficiaries.

A discussion on the above challenges cannot be complete without taking a brief look at the nature of the relationship between the UN, regional organizations/arrangements and member states. The various reforms undertaken by the UN would only achieve their desired objectives if done in consonance with beneficiaries i.e. the regional organizations and arrangements. Consequently, such relationships should not be subservient but should be collaborative, cooperative and transparent. There are many impediments, from our perspective, that hinder member states, regional organizations and arrangements in meeting the multi-dimensional demands of PSOs. Solutions to these impediments can only be proffered after a more detailed examination of the problems.

**Problems and Impediments to the UN and Regional Organisations in Achieving their PSO Objectives in Africa**

Past UN Secretaries-General from Perez de Cueller to Boutros Boutros-Ghali have each brought their personality to bear on developing good working relationships between the UN and regional organizations.
For instance, Boutros-Ghali’s African diplomacy was clearly seen in the success he recorded in bringing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League and the UN closer together. The same was observed during the latter parts of the Somali conflict in 1992. Kofi Annan’s cautious but bold diplomacy has equally endeared him to many world leaders and regional organizations. Present UN programmes in Africa leave nobody in doubt of the priority attention accorded the continent in the UN agenda. But beyond the personality of the Secretary-General, there are some pertinent issues in the nature of cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements, that need to be addressed and fully explained to the understanding of all, to enable them discharge their PSO obligations more effectively.

First, is the need to review the provisions of the UN Charter that require Security Council approval of financial assistance to regional organizations undertaking peacekeeping operations. Lack of proper cooperation between the UN and regional organizations has led to the failure of regional peacekeeping efforts in the past. Some good examples are our peacekeeping efforts in Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which suffered tremendous setbacks because requests by the OAU and ECOWAS for funds from the UN went unheeded. Now there is improvement, as the UN works closely with AU in several ways. But this critical area still needs to be revisited by member states in view of the current trend of regionalization of PSOs.

Secondly, there is controversy between UN and regional organizations in the implementation of Article 53 which, in part, states that:

…no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures against an enemy state as defined.

The changing nature and regionalization of conflicts have made peace enforcement a pre-occupation of regional organizations. The fluidity of the conflicts coupled with their attendant consequences would, in some cases, demand intervention before authorization. The Security Council should therefore restrain its wrath and be willing to give retrospective authorization for enforcement in genuine circumstances. After all, there were many coalitions of the willing which, in the recent past, have intervened without recourse to the Security Council; hence testing the integrity and legitimacy of the UN.
Third, but no less important, regional organizations are somewhat uneasy with Article 54 of Chapter VIII which states that:

the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of the activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

This provision essentially places the Council above regional systems and suggests a subservient relationship. There is therefore the need to create a procedure for relaying information between regional organizations and the Security Council that neither affects the dignity of national governments nor denies the Security Council timely information.

**Consultation Between Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the Security Council**

A lot has been achieved in this direction since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1353 and the subsequent work of the Security Council Working Group on consultation convened in 2001. TCCs are now more informed on operational updates from mission areas through frequent briefings by DPKO and information disseminated from the UN Situation Centre. TCCs and the Security Council should continue to work towards improving this relationship. We therefore join other TCCs to request for more involvement in the formulation and amendment of peacekeeping mandates.

The Security Council should also explore ways of making its deliberations on mandates or matters of operational concern available to TCCs that have deployed troops in operations in question. Other means should also be exploited to enable TCCs make inputs to Security Council deliberations on operations through the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Presently, TCCs, and member states make inputs only to the Secretary General’s and General Assembly reports through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and C34 reports.

**Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and Self-sustainment**

As observed by many speakers, one of the intractable problems facing developing member states, particularly African TCCs, in meeting their peace support operation obligation, is the provision of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), self-sustainment and other heavy logistical enablements. The regionalization of PSOs has further pauperized some already impoverished African TCCs, due to the colossal amounts they spend on the procurement of COE and on self-sustainment.
Firstly, the UN TOE drawn for various missions are alien to the inventory of African TCCs. The equipment are manufactured by developed countries to meet their standards and the prices of such equipment are also fixed by them. Secondly, some of the self-sustainment requirements and standards do not conform with the customs and existing practices of African countries. Worse still, reimbursement rates are largely hinged upon developed countries’ standards. To ameliorate these, more efforts should be made towards regular payment of UN reimbursements. While the possibility of up-front payment of reimbursements to TCCs (in order to cushion the procurement of COE) could be explored, self-sustainment standards should be determined by capability rather than by equipment.

**Wet Lease Memorandum of Understanding**

The recent preference by the UN for TCCs to provide COE in UN missions under a wet lease arrangement has further inhibited African TCCs from discharging their PSO obligations effectively. Under the arrangement, TCCs are denied varying degrees of support they would otherwise have been availed by the UN through a ‘dry lease’ agreement. Our experience in Sierra Leone and now with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), has shown that the Wet Lease arrangement has not worked. The strain on the overstretched resources associated with the provision of peacekeepers by governments, has made most African TCCs to call for a review of the arrangement so that major COE and logistical assistance could be provided by the UN. With the UN plan to establish new missions in Sudan and Burundi, it is hoped that adequate arrangements will be made to support African TCCs willing to deploy troops in those theatres under a dry lease arrangement.

**Difficulties in Implementing Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**

As was revealed by many speakers, the African continent has the largest number of conflict resolution mechanisms which, for various reasons, cannot be implemented effectively. The Horn of Africa alone has four mechanisms. To recap, some of the African regional organisations that have created conflict resolution and management mechanisms include AU, ECOWAS, South African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).
But at a time when the UN, on the behest of the Brahimi Report, is carrying out massive reforms to strengthen its capacity to support PSOs, African regional organizations are doing less in that direction due to the following:

- Lack of Funding. Most regional organizations are cash strapped and therefore lack capacity in the relevant structures and capability to support PSOs. For example, while the AU appropriations of 6 per cent from the regular budget (about $1.8m) is considered grossly inadequate for the tasks at hand, external funding, which forms a larger portion of contributions, comes in slowly and with conditions. The way out is for regional organizations to have effective and realistic funding mechanisms to support their peace support roles. Continuous appeals must also be made by organizations to donors to channel their assistance through centralized endowments or peace funds.
- Lack of coordination and harmonization between the security mechanisms of regional and sub-regional organizations.
- Insufficient expertise in multi-dimensional command and control functions at brigade and higher levels due to lack of funding and equipment.
- Inadequate equipment and logistics.
- Inadequate staffing of appropriate branches.
- Lack of regional cohesion arising from linguistic divides, lead nation crises, duplication of efforts as well as the lack of political will to substantially, if not fully, empower some structures.
- Operation of mechanisms whose capabilities are yet to meet the standards set by the Report and recommendations of the Brahimi Panel (This underscores the need for consultation between AU, ECOWAS, the UN and the international community).
- Lack of viable structures for strategic level management of Peace Operations.

Besides the above general limitations, the lingering problems plaguing the establishment of the African Standby Force(ASF) must be addressed urgently in order to enhance rapid deployment of regional forces to crisis areas. Although some of the measures have been described briefly over the past few days, it is however pertinent to make mention of the following, based on our experience:
• **Self-Sustainment of sub-regional Brigade-size Forces.** The earmarked sub-regional brigade-size forces must have self-sustainment capability for 60 days after the issuance of relevant mandate by the AU.

• **Multi-dimensional Strategic and Mission Level Management capacities.** The deployment of the ASF will require speed and this has implications for training and management of the standby force structures and units. This in turn calls for the establishment of a planning component at the regional and sub-regional HQs to augment the various military HQ staff. In addition, the planning components, like in the UN, should be supported by an On Call List of trained staff, for effective management of both the ASF and on-going missions. In order to save costs, some of the planning staff could be employed while others could be seconded from the UN or member states. In addition, the fact that the donor community may not be able to provide all the requisite resources to establish sub-regional brigades, suggests that their establishment should be phased.

• **Standardisation of Doctrine, SOPs and Regional Centres of Excellence.** There is the critical need to harmonise the various Standard Operating Procedures(SOPs) and doctrines of member states in line with the UN, in order to enhance the peace support capabilities of the ASF and minimize the risk of confusion during operations. The existing AU generic SOPs therefore need to be reviewed in line with recent experience in the AU Mission in Burundi(AMIB). This should be pursued along with the need to improve the AU training capability both at the regional, sub-regional and national levels. ASF training at all levels will be required to focus train-the-trainer arrangements that should be conducted at specially agreed and designated centres of excellence, in order to optimize resources in the establishment and running of such centres. External field training assistance should also focus on pre-deployment training for units earmarked for specific impending missions. This is because, over the years, recipient countries of such broad-based training assistance programme as ACRI and RECAMP have rarely been able to field the same units that participated in such training. The ECOWAS three-tier centre of excellence approach to training is also recommended to be adopted by other sub-regional organizations in Africa, in view of its clear advantages...
for standardization of doctrine and effective utilization of resources.

**Mission Sustainment and Mechanism for Regional Logistical Bases and Depots**

Nigeria’s experience in Chad in 1980 clearly revealed the serious limitations of the then OAU in sustaining PSOs after the first 60 days of operation. Incidentally, we experienced the same difficulties during the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone where Nigeria was compelled to single-handedly shoulder the financial commitment.

Under the ASF concept, the AU will take the responsibility for self-sustainment of peace missions after the initial 30 days of deployment. Unfortunately, at present, neither the AU nor ECOWAS has central logistical sustainment facilities or the financial capabilities, thus leaving the burden of self-sustainment of ASF to coalitions of the able and the willing.

Due to its political and financial implications, the initial plan to establish logistics depot in the five sub-regions of Africa may not be easily attainable. Consequently, we strongly advocate the establishment of two logistics bases, one each on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, by the AU to support its PSOs. The other options are the continued use of PAE along the lines of ECOMOG and UNMIL or use of the UN Logistics Base, Brindisi, as a base depot with a forward regional base in Africa. However, it must be mentioned that all the options would require the full support and cooperation of the UN, regional organizations and donor communities in order to be implemented.

**External Initiatives Towards Peace Support Capabilities**

Closely allied to the need for logistics bases, is the issue of effective capacity building through training and manpower development. The AU as well as ECOWAS have continued to receive sustained support from their external partners in the form of infrastructural development and training programmes. Notable among these programmes are ACRI/ACOTA(US), RECAMP (France), as well as the British Peace Support Training(BPST) and other assistance from Norway, Canada and Denmark. Other Nordic countries have helped tremendously to enhance skills, further doctrinal standardization and improve logistical capacity for African peacekeeping.

However, we must observe that much as these Western initiatives provide tangible benefits, including training and confidence
building, they do not address the most crucial needs of African peace support endeavours, namely the issues of logistical sustainment and funding for the deployment of African peace missions. Except for assistance from the EU and on-going arrangements for assistance from the G8, a considerable portion of the external initiatives have been of a bilateral nature and these have rather tended to widen already existing disparities in African regional capacities for peace support operations.

This is not to say that the training assistance has not been rewarding as it has continued to provide a reservoir of knowledge, professionalism and logistical support to the benefiting African states. Such assistance has also encouraged the development of good civil-military relations and the machinery for effective collaboration between Western and African state and non-state actors.

In order to target external initiatives against real needs for the establishment of rapid deployment forces especially ASF, the relevant initiatives should shift from training to logistical support and funding. To achieve this, the AU, in collaboration with the sub-regional organizations, should persuade the external partners to provide external assistance on a regional and not bilateral basis. It should also ensure that whatever logistical and funding support that is available is targeted towards deployment, sustainment and operations, except for minimal assistance towards headquarters capacity building, and for respective centres of excellence.

Other critical measures that need to be undertaken in order to make African states truly self-sufficient in responding to crises are the following:

- Supplying the appropriate equipment in the right type and quantity. In other words, developed countries should respond to Africa’s limitations in PSOs rather than their internal political concerns.
- While Western and African countries must develop strong and mutual co-operation to enhance effective capacity building, Western countries must minimize competition among themselves and collaborate with one another to ensure attainment of the objectives of their training assistance. African countries, on their part, must strive to work closely with donor countries to develop effective programmes that would really support the benefiting states in order to attain their PSO objectives. It is equally important for the AU and the regional organizations to give political legitimacy and appropriate checks and balances to support the effective implementation of the initiatives.
Training initiatives must also be reviewed from time to time to ensure their effectiveness. They should focus more specifically on imparting peacekeeping skills rather than showcasing military capability.

If training assistance is to be more helpful, it should target able and dedicated African TCCs. This is not the case today as Nigeria, with all her commitments to regional and international peace and security, is still receiving less attention in terms of training support in comparison to some other countries.

While multilateral channels should be encouraged over bilateral arrangements, regional and sub-regional organizations must also possess the necessary mechanisms and demonstrate the requisite integrity so as to convince donor countries that aid received will be utilized justifiably.

Although Western initiatives are quite well appreciated, as they are indeed helpful, they can never replace actual participation. The maintenance of global peace and security is a collective responsibility. We therefore hope to see more Western troop contributions to peace support operations in Africa.

**Vital Need for Mechanisms for Resource Mobilization**

As had been observed earlier, the enhancement of African rapid deployment capability through ASF cannot be achieved without adequate logistics and financial support. Thus, if the establishment of ASF is to achieve the desired objectives, its administration must not be based on any precarious arrangements. There is therefore the urgent need for a resource mobilization mechanism, which should/will target member states, in accordance with the principle of accepting greater responsibility for African peace and security. Towards this end, member states should accept budget quotas to contribute to the ASF Trust Fund. Costs of ASF could also be underwritten by lead nations while a vigorous resource mobilization drive should then be launched to supplement the contributions of member states.

**Harmonisation of Early Warning Mechanisms**

The Protocol on the Peace and Security Commission(PSC) provides for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System(CEWS), to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. The harmonization of this system with ASF is necessary in order to achieve timely deployment of ASF units.

To this end, there is the need to establish an Observation and Monitoring Centre(OMC) at the headquarters of PSC which should be
integrated with other regional Observation and Monitoring Zones (OMZ). This, however, could be better achieved through the establishment of an effective continental communication network with a harmonized information collection, collation, processing and evaluation system.

**Strengthening of Civil Society Organisations and NGOs**

Finally, our experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown the indispensability of the role of civil society organisations in the management and prevention of conflicts. A holistic and effective conflict prevention mechanism is one that supports and fosters collaboration and cooperation between the UN, regional and inter-governmental organisations and civil society groups.

Sadly, however, it may be observed that cooperation between inter-governmental organizations, regional and civil society organizations in the realm of conflict management and prevention remains very limited and needs to be strengthened considerably. Many of these organizations, often limited by lack of resources and institutional capacity, remain in great need of international assistance to improve their effectiveness. The UN, regional organizations and civil society organisations, therefore, need to form partnerships that would support civil society initiatives in promoting peace and security.

**Conclusion**

Time will not permit us to discuss the roles of the UN, regional organizations, arrangements and relationships in the discharge of their responsibilities in the maintenance of global peace and security, exhaustively. However, our experience in PSOs over the past four decades has revealed four major challenges facing these organizations and arrangements in carrying out their assigned roles. These are the issues of effective capacity building, attaining rapid response capability, mobilising adequate funding as well as logistics support, and the imperative of transparent and effective partnerships for meeting the changing dynamics of PSOs.

Arising from these challenges are some critical problems and impediments that need to be addressed urgently, in order to enhance the capacity of regional organizations and arrangements in meeting their obligations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. These include conflicts in cooperation, COE and self-sustainment, Wet Lease MOUs, difficulties in implementing conflict resolution mechanisms and ensuring mission sustainment, and the dearth of effective mechanisms for logistical bases and depots. Others are the limited external initiatives towards
developing peace support capabilities, vital need for mechanisms for resource mobilisation, and the need for systems towards strengthening the role of civil society groups and NGOs. A possible way forward has been charted. Some of the major suggestions proferred need to be recAPPED.

In order to boost their capacity for complex operations and enhance the rapid deployment capability of their member states, regional organizations and arrangements must not only give serious consideration to, but must also carry out actual reforms in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. Prominent amongst these are an effective and well-funded Standby Arrangement System, provision of Strategic Deployment Stocks, pre-mandate authority, restructuring of the secretariats as well as strengthening their anticipation, planning and management capacity to support PSOs.

As regards conflicts in cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, three vital areas need to be addressed by member states. These are the issues of funding of regional organizations to undertake PSOs, authorization of enforcement actions by the Security Council under Article 53, and the duty imposed on regional organizations/agencies under Article 54 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which requires the formulation of a procedure for relaying information between the organizations, which would neither affront the dignity of national governments nor deny the Security Council timely information.

The lingering problems of COE and self-sustainment as well as the problems inherent in Wet Lease agreements were also analysed briefly. As suggested, the UN, regional organizations, donor communities and member states have a collective responsibility on this issue. Furthermore, inadequate logistics and funding have remained the bane of PSOs till this day. Moreover, the problems of implementing conflict prevention mechanisms in Africa, particularly those pertaining to funding, logistics, staffing, restructuring, rapid deployment and development of multi-dimensional mission level capacities, are indeed worrisome. The fact must be obvious, however, that conflict prevention and management mechanisms, as means to ends, can only be effective if given the appropriate financial, logistics and political backing. The UN, regional organizations, donor communities and member states must all play their roles as recommended, if these mechanisms are to attain their objectives.

The problem of capacity building, as it relates to the extension of donor training assistance, has been one of the burning issues
addressed. Solutions have been proffered to some critical impediments identified and which deserve urgent attention. Granted that these initiatives are helpful to developing countries, they do not however address the most crucial needs of African peace support endeavours, i.e. the provision of logistical sustainment and funding. Consequently, in order to make these initiatives more meaningful, there must be a deliberate effort by Western countries and indeed all other stakeholders, to ensure the provision of appropriate equipment of the right type and in the right quantity, the development of mutual cooperation and collaboration to evolve programmes that would be rewarding to the benefiting states and the evaluation of assistance programmes from time to time.

Other recommendations are the need to encourage support through multilateral channels and finally, to encourage more troop contributions to the resolution of African crises by Western countries, in addition to their training assistance. This is because, since PSOs are a collective responsibility, they are better conducted by multinational forces. Consequently, both the endowed nations and the impoverished ones must cooperate as well as collaborate with one another and with all other stakeholders, to ensure the attainment of lasting peace in the world.
THE CREATION OF RULE OF LAW TOOLS FOR USE BY MEMBER STATES: THE MODEL TRANSITIONAL CODES FOR POST CONFLICT CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT

by

Ms Vivienne O’Connor

Introduction

In September 2003, two separate debates took place within the United Nations Security Council, on the issue of Justice and the Rule of Law: The United Nations Role. In the course of both debates, Member States were unanimous in their support for the Secretary-General’s affirmation that the rule of law “lies at the heart of [the United Nation’s] work in rebuilding war-torn countries”. The central focus of the Security Council debates was articulated by the then Chairman of the Security Council, Mr. Jack Straw, who posed the question: How can the international community be better prepared in supporting states coming out of conflict? A clear message emerged from the ensuing debates: be prepared or be prepared to fail.

Given the years of experience of the United Nations in dealing with rule of law issues in peace operations, Member States were keen to see this knowledge harnessed to ensure that “lessons learned” are put into practice and that useful tools are developed for use in future peace operations. The importance of developing practical tools is clear as the United Nations, regional organizations and individual Member States are becoming increasingly more involved in dealing with the rule of law in peace operations.

The Importance of Addressing the Rule of Law and Interim Law Reform in Peace Operations

Each and every peace operation, irrespective of location or causes of conflict, is confronted by the same phenomena: lawlessness,
general insecurity and public disorder. The occurrence of such phenomena has a severely detrimental impact on the conduct of the peace operation and the fulfillment of its basic mission tasks. The failure to secure law and order, and install an effective system of justice, has further negative effects on the way in which the local populace views the peace operation. A sense of disillusionment grows where personal security and the security of property is not protected.

In crafting mission mandates, the Security Council has given credence to this fact, through the incorporation of rule of law components into peace operations. The role played by the United Nations has varied from the high end of the spectrum where it assumed primacy for maintaining law and order (Kosovo and East Timor), to missions that are more advisory or assistance-oriented in nature (Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Afghanistan). Whether the United Nations is assuming exclusive authority for advancing and implementing the rule of law, or whether it is merely advising a transitional government, it is nonetheless confronted with a mammoth task.

Re-establishing law and order in a post conflict society involves a plethora of activities that span the breadth of the criminal justice system; courts, prosecution, defence counsel, police and prisons. Each component must be addressed fully and in a coordinated and integrated fashion. As the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia, Mr. Jacques Klein, recently pointed out to the Security Council, to address one without the others would be akin to “trying to clap with one hand”.

What lies at the core of criminal law enforcement, and represents the very foundation for the re-establishment of justice and the rule of law in a post-conflict setting, is the applicable criminal law. All other rule of law tasks flow from this. In a post-conflict setting, it is not merely a case of pulling a readily applicable body of criminal law from the shelf. Just as lawlessness and public disorder are common phenomena of all post-conflict environments, oftentimes, so is inadequate or objectionable criminal legislation. This fact has been recognized by the recent report of the Secretary-General on “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post conflict societies”, which states that the legislative framework in conflict and post conflict states “often shows the accumulated signs of neglect and political distortion, contains discriminatory elements and rarely reflects the requirements of international human rights and criminal law standards”.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES
The impact of this is only heightened when one considers that the authorities in a post-conflict state must deal, not only with ordinary law and order problems that besiege it, but also with the newer sorts of crimes that emerge in post-conflict settings. These include trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, people smuggling and organized crime, to name but a few. Prosecuting such crimes requires an adequate legislative basis, that criminalizes the offence and gives police adequate powers to investigate it. Thus, the competent legislative authority in a post-conflict state faces the double task of bringing criminal legislation in line with international human rights and criminal law standards (by removing discriminatory provisions and provisions that breach these standards, and replacing them) and legislating for newer crimes that are thwarting the transition from conflict to peace.

As a matter of course, this necessitates some form of transitional or interim criminal law reform. This has been evidenced in missions in Cambodia, Afghanistan, East Timor, Kosovo, the Thai border camps, for example. The sad reality is that this process of reform is often done on an ad hoc basis, as a reaction to immediate crime problems faced by the authorities. While these problems are immediate, solutions are often lagging. Interim criminal law reform can be a lengthy process that occurs while crime goes unchecked as actors in a criminal justice system continue to operate from an inadequate body of law that may be missing core crimes or that may discriminate against persons or violate their fundamental rights. From one peace operation to the next, one witnesses a constant re-invention of the wheel whereby policy-makers and legal drafters start from scratch in the drafting of new legal provisions. Clearly, this is an unacceptable state of affairs. It is this anomaly that the Model Transitional Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice Project seeks to redress.

The Model Transitional Codes for Post Conflict Justice as a “Rule of Law” Tool

The Model Transitional Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice Project focuses on the issue of interim criminal law reform in peace operations and seeks to provide “rule of law” tools to assist in this process. The tools exist in the form of a body of model transitional codes and laws. They represent a valuable resource to be looked to as a source of inspiration for legislative authorities or individuals tasked with drafting new laws for post-conflict States. The codes are not intended to supercede the pre-existing criminal legislation,
nor are they meant to be imposed upon a post-conflict state. In order for any of the Codes’ provisions to become enforceable, a legislative enactment by the competent legislative authority would be required.

The model transitional codes consist of an integrated compendium of laws, covering all aspects of criminal justice and public order – substantive criminal law, procedural law, detention and prison standards and guidelines, and police powers and duties. The package of transitional codes includes four major components: a model penal code (the Transitional Criminal Code); a model code of criminal procedure (the Transitional Code of Criminal Procedure); a model law on detention standards (the Transitional Detention Act); and finally, a model police law (the Transitional Law Enforcement Powers Act). The transitional codes package includes legal text accompanied by extensive commentaries. The commentaries are a valuable and crucial component of the transitional codes package. They explain the choices and significance of wording and provisions used by the drafters, elaborate upon the content of the legal provisions, and provide practical experience based upon the prior application of similar provisions in the field.

The model transitional codes have developed with the post-conflict environment as their frame of reference. From extensive research that was carried out, it was concluded that sufficient similarities existed, such as the crime problems experienced or resource issues, to justify the assertion that a set of codes could be created that were universally applicable in the context of peace operations.

The codes, drafted with the exigencies of its context of application in mind, were also greatly inspired by the “lessons learned” from past missions that involved interim law reform. A further important source of inspiration, in drafting the codes, was international best practice standards in international human rights law and criminal law. Much research was conducted to ensure that the standards contained within the model transitional codes are fully compliant with these best practice standards, while at the same time taking into account the practical impediments to their realization.

Such impediments include factors like lack of personnel, lack of financial resources, and even a lack of basic physical resources, such as courthouses and prisons, so often the case in a post-conflict setting. This implies that, while the States can aspire to the eventual implementation of the “gold standard” in terms of human rights protection, in the early stages of a post-conflict environment, it is sufficient that the criminal laws and procedures comply with the baseline,
or the minimum human rights standards as articulated in international norms and standards. In this regard, the codes provide a useful benchmark.

The process of creating the codes began in August 2001, when the Model Transitional Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice Project was launched as part of the United States Institute of Peace’s (USIP) larger, multi-dimensional project on peacekeeping and the administration of justice. The Irish Centre for Human Rights (ICHR), National University of Ireland, Galway, was designated as a coordinating body for the drafting of the codes. Thereupon, a core team of international experts was assembled, consisting of practitioners, lawyers, police, military and academics from different regions and legal backgrounds. This team of experts participated in a series of expert consultative meetings over the course of the first year and half of the project’s existence.

Upon the creation of drafts of the model transitional codes, a lengthy and inclusive process of consultation with experts began, which spanned the course of 18 months and is ongoing. Consultations have occurred, and are occurring, with individuals, organizations and through a number of meetings organized by USIP and ICHR in cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

In June 2003, USIP and ICHR with the support of OHCHR, convened a three-day vetting conference in Geneva, Switzerland, drawing 80 experts from around the world with experience in post-conflict justice. In February 2004, a further set of meetings was held in Galway, Ireland, the first of which centered on substantive and procedural criminal law (focusing on the criminal code and procedure code), the second on policing laws (focusing on the Transitional Law Enforcement Powers Act) and the final meeting brought together experts on corrections and detention standards and prison management (focusing on the Transitional Detention Act).

In summer 2004, fieldwork consultations were conducted in Timor Leste and Kosovo, with international and national personnel currently working in these missions. They included judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, human rights monitors and individuals who have been involved in the process of transitional and more long-term criminal law reform. The final set of meetings consisted of a set of regional consultations brought about with the aim of testing the utility and potential applicability of the model transitional codes in different regional contexts. Abuja, Nigeria was the location for the first in this series of
such meetings, which was conducted with practitioners and scholars from countries such as Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan, Burundi and Uganda in June 2004. This meeting is due to reconvene in September 2004 in London, England.

In July 2004, the International Institute for the Higher Study of Criminal Sciences (ISISC) in Siracusa, Italy, will host a series of consultative meetings with Islamic legal experts from Morocco, Egypt, the UAE, Syria, Sudan and Libya who will be brought together to review the model transitional codes and their compatibility with Shar’ia law. A further Asian regional consultation meeting is planned for November 2004 in Thailand. The creation of the model transitional codes has truly been a collaborative and cooperative process. The codes are the product of the work of some 200 practitioners and academics in this field.

In addition to the creation of the substantive law and commentaries contained in the model transitional codes, USIP and the ICHR have developed what has been termed a “User’s Guide to the Model Transitional Codes”. This is designed to serve as a useful companion to the model transitional codes. The User’s Guide, as its name implies, is to provide guidance on using and applying the codes. It also provides a summary of the codes’ provisions.

Another important element of the User’s Guide is the methodology and strategy it sets out for assessing and approaching the legal framework. It advocates a framework that seeks to understand and respect the pre-existing legal culture and history, the importance of approaching the issues in a thoughtful and strategic manner and balancing the maintenance of law and order with the application of international norms and standards. The User’s Guide will be presented at the forthcoming Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Rule of Law Tools Workshop in Geneva in September 2004. Thereafter, it will form part of the rule of law tools being developed by the Office of the High Commissioner.

The model transitional codes are due to be completed in 2005, after which they will be published. A number of codes-related projects, currently in the early stages of development, will follow. These include the creation of a rule of law assessment tool, which would assist personnel involved in conducting pre-mission rule of law assessments, and the creation of rule of law training tools that could be used as training modules for mission personnel.
Conclusion

Given the increasing importance being attached to the rule of law by the United Nations and Member States, the codes represent a timely endeavor. The need for advance work and planning for the inevitable rule of law challenges that present themselves in post-conflict States goes without saying. During the Security Council debates on 24 September 2003, the Secretary-General stated that “[w]e have learned that rule of law delayed is lasting peace denied”. The model transitional codes and the User’s Guide to the codes seek to contribute towards the timely re-establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict environments by providing tools that can be looked to and immediately applied by the United Nations, regional organisations or Member States engaged in interim law reform.

What has been created is a “tool box” that may be dipped into at will to prevent the inevitable delays that ensue in this process, a process in which efforts are often duplicated and the wheel is constantly being re-invented. The more expeditiously such reform is conducted, the more expeditiously an adequate criminal law framework can be put into place that not only addresses the pressing law and order issues facing the local community, but that also adequately protects the fundamental rights of the individuals within that community.

Of course, the reform process would need to be supported by broader rule of law initiatives, such as training and vetting of criminal justice actors, rebuilding of courthouses, provision of basic resources to support the criminal justice system and eventually more long-term criminal law reform. Interim criminal law reform is merely a single step in a journey of a thousand miles on the road to the restoration of peace and stability in a post-conflict state. That said, it is indeed a significant step.
CONCLUDING SESSION

COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS IN BUILDING CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE OPERATIONS
CONCLUDING REMARKS I
by
Ambassador Glyn Berry

As you have been informed, I chair the Working Group of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations (UN). With the position of Nigerian Ambassador to the UN temporarily vacant after Chief Arthur Mbanefo’s departure from New York a few months ago, I took the normal place of the Nigerian Head of Mission at the UN as Chair of the Committee for this year’s session of the Committee in March and April.

Let me say what an honour and privilege it is to be here in Abuja. In their Keynote and Welcome Addresses, their excellencies the Honourable Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs reminded us of the critical role which Nigeria has long played in United Nations peacekeeping, a role which is universally respected and which, as Chair of the Special Committee Working Group, I appreciate perhaps even more than most. It is also, in this context, a pleasure to see Chief Mbanefo once again, a person whom I regard as both a top-of-the-line professional and, for me personally, an excellent mentor.

The primary purpose of this conference, as our colleagues from the Folke Bernadotte Academy informed us by way of introduction, was to focus on the regional dimension of peacekeeping, with a special emphasis on co-ordination and co-operation. They enumerated a number of questions which complex peace operations raise for regional organizations, including the inadequacy of resources available to them in terms of personnel, equipment and financing. They highlighted, inter alia, the need for improved co-ordination between regional organizations, other players in the peacekeeping/peace operations business and the United Nations, in an era in which hybrid operations have become the norm, and the related need for training and capacity building, particularly among evolving regional actors such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Our various partners from the UN, the AU, ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) underlined the need for both global and regional efforts to forestall and resolve conflicts as well as to react to them, and the importance of partnerships in this context. And it was the concept of partnership that was very much the watchword and largely framed our discussions during the past three days.

In the course of the seminar, a number of invaluable observations were made and highly relevant questions posed around this recurrent theme. I see them as having fallen into three main categories: the scope and operational performance of partnerships; the role and effectiveness of the partners themselves, and the focus and results of such co-operation. I shall speak at some length about the first two, say a few words about the last, and finally touch on the Special Committee with regard to what it has said about regional organizations.

The Role and Scope of Partnerships in Peace Operations

Let us begin with the role of partnerships and the need to make them work to the best effect, particularly given the plethora of challenges confronted by present-day peace operations. Among the challenges, as listed by Ambassador Souren Serayderian, are the need for robust mandates in spoiler-rich environments, for improvements in the capacity of regional organizations in many areas, for better and more extensive training, for adequate deployment of civil police and other rule of law components, for exchanges of best practices between different entities, and for improved information-sharing commensurate with the more complex demands on organizations involved in one or other aspect of peace operations. Strategic partnerships, his presentation underlined, are all the more vital as the UN confronts an unprecedented surge in peacekeeping demands.

As a number of presentations have suggested, it is simply not good enough against this background to wait for events to unfold before different organizations seek to formalize their co-operation. Foreign Affairs Minister Adeniji underlined that co-ordination and co-operation must begin at the very earliest stage. He strongly urged, for example, that the UN be involved from the beginning in the planning of peace operations by regional organizations in order to ensure that any later transfer of responsibility to the UN is smoothly engineered. There is, I think, an important point of focus here for the Challenges Project.

With regard to the conditions needed for partners to work effectively and efficiently together, we gained valuable insight from both
Colonel Festus Aboagye on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and from Group Captain Garry Dunbar on the Pacific Islands Forum. Col Aboagye noted the importance of the complementarity and mutual consistency of instruments, structures and criteria for interventions by SADC and the AU. Ambassador Sam Ibok made a broader but similar point regarding the need for effective co-ordination between African regional organizations, providing several examples of serious lacunae in this regard. This could suggest, as a first step, that we need an inventory of constraints which currently impede, or have the potential to do so, collaboration between organizations which are otherwise obvious partners, in whatever region they may be located. This too could be a useful contribution by the Challenges Project.

Group Captain Dunbar pointed to a number of factors: the commonality of institutions and political cultures, adherence to democratic principles, shared legal norms, an inclination for pragmatic solutions, a strong regional ethos and effective and engaged regional leadership in the form of Australia – which have made the Pacific Islands Forum rather successful in conflict prevention and peaceful settlement. This suggests to me that we need more dialogue between regional organizations in different parts of the world to exchange views on what successful experiences are transferable. Again, perhaps, a role here for the Challenges Project.

As well as interesting insights into what makes for effective co-operation between organizations operating at the regional level, there was considerable discussion of the roles of, and constraints on, regional organizations themselves, constraints which must be attenuated if the partnerships in which they engage are to be more effective. There was general agreement that with their closeness to, and familiarity with, the problems of their own neighbourhoods, regional organizations have a natural role to play in peace operations, particularly with the UN already overstretched; but there was agreement also that they were generally performing sub-optimally in this respect.

In this regard, we had a number of interesting presentations and observations relating to the AU, ECOWAS and SADC, which raised a number of pertinent questions and suggested directions for further analysis and action. Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas explained how ECOWAS, an organization originally established to promote economic integration and development, came to play, by virtue of the peace and security-development nexus, an important role in filling a gap left by the Security Council’s post-Somalia aversion to African engagement. Yet
although relatively well endowed with training assistance, ECOWAS confronts significant capacity constraints with respect to planning, standardization of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), rapid deployment, equipment, financial support and operational sustainment. One can add to these, preventive deployment and complex peace operations, as Ambassador Ibok did with reference to the AU.

External support from the UN and bilateral donors is clearly needed but there are two questions that we must ask in this regard: Can the UN help to fill this gap while itself overstretched by new demands? And if so how? And how can external donors be persuaded to devote more resources to critical capacity-building requirements – and not only in ECOWAS, but also in the AU, SADC and in regional organizations elsewhere? Perhaps the Challenges Project can nudge forward the debate on the latter issue.

A particular problem noted by Ambassador Ibok was simply lack of information both among African organizations and between them and donors – for example, on which officers have received training by the European Union (EU) – so that this valuable resource may be much better used. And are donors themselves doing enough by way of simple coordination? Why, one presenter asked, by way of example, why just a G8-African peacekeeping assistance effort, and not a G8 plus?

I should add that while an expert on neither the AU nor SADC, I was left with some questions regarding the future role of both. Ambassador Ibok underlined that the AU was a continental rather than a regional organization, that it currently lacks peacekeeping capacity, and that, in the pyramidal continental architecture, it is regional organizations which are the first to take peacekeeping initiatives. We were also told by Colonel Aboagye that SADC, unlike ECOWAS, has generally not operationalized its various instruments, including those related to peace and security, and that even these need to be made more consistent with those of the African Union. There is surely a role here for outside donors, provided they retain a firm respect for African ownership. But I also found rather chastening Ambassador Ibok’s point that Africa is a great deal lower than it once was on the global geo-strategic radar.

On a number of occasions the point was made that if cooperation is to be maximized partners need to be structured to ensure that they do not obstruct or duplicate one another. Brigadier Sten Edholm noted the advantages enjoyed by SHIRBRIG in that it has ensured compatibility between its own procedures and those of the UN. But one issue we perhaps need to address, then, is: how we can
ensure compatibility between the operating procedures and structures of regional organizations such that they are better equipped to co-operate with each other and with the UN? There seemed to be a general agreement in favour of as much interaction and cross-fertilization as possible between SHIRBRIG and African organizations. Another potential item of interest, perhaps, for the Challenges Project.

We were reminded during the presentations that the potential partners extend well beyond those of an inter-governmental nature, to embrace specialized agencies of the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups, including women. But also noted was the sometimes delicate way in which partnerships embracing these elements need to be structured. One might ask, in this respect, as at least one presenter did: how can we ensure that considerations of gender are mainstreamed across the partnership arrangements we have been discussing?

Yesterday was also a day when we were reminded that there is a great deal more to peace operations than the military, in which a variety of players I have just described, as well as inter-governmental regional organizations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have their own important niches, such as those related to police, corrections, other critical rule of law elements and human rights, all of which come to play a much greater role in peace operations. We need to ask whether we are fully exploring the potential, or whether, in these cases too, we face a capacity-building challenge.

Not to be forgotten here is the private sector whose role, both for good and ill, in regional and local conflicts but also in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, needs to be considered. There are productive as well as destructive forces in the corporate world which perhaps have been rather neglected in discussions on peace operations. One might ask, here, whether there is a place for private sector involvement in the Challenges Project.

A quick word on rule of law. A study of the more effective inclusion of rule of law elements in peacekeeping operations was completed by the Secretariat in August 2002 but has yet to be implemented. An important question for the Challenges Project, I think, is why it has not been, and how this can be remedied.
The Focus and Results of Partnerships in Peace Operations

As for focus and results, we clearly need to look well beyond peace operations to preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention of all kinds. This means inter alia reinforcing the role of the new Peace and Security Council in Africa and the early warning capacity of ECOWAS and similar mechanisms, as well as other such bodies elsewhere. The world has still to learn that an ounce of prevention is worth several pounds of cure. To make the peace stick, it was agreed, we need lots more rehabilitation and reintegration and not simply demobilization and disarmament – the critical RR in DDRR. But how are we to do this with some donors averse to including more than a minimum of RR, as well as DD, in peacekeeping operations for which budgets are assessed? This is a major political challenge both for the international community generally, and for the Challenges Project in particular.

A few concluding words which are offered very much as personal observations.

In looking to the future – which is very much the thrust of the Challenges Project – we must be careful to specify what future we have in mind. Are we to pursue the ideal scenario, which might entail a UN standing army, well-equipped and trained, rapidly deployable, highly interoperable and fully capable of fulfilling the most robust of mandates? Are we to aim also at missions able to call on the full array of programs and funding, from the UN system and elsewhere, to do full justice to requirements for the initial period of peacebuilding and of post-conflict reconstruction which is now generally accepted to comprise the integral part of an exit strategy for any peacekeeping operation? Or should we set our sights on medium to long term objectives which are more modest but are informed by realism? I have an innate preference for the latter.

First, we must recognize – uncomfortable as it may be from some perspectives – that western states, for a variety of reasons, are less willing to commit troops and police to blue-helmeted peacekeeping operations, particularly outside regions of strategic interest to them, than they are to alliance-run operations, or to coalitions of the willing under one rubric or another. It is these operations to which western governments, with limited troops to deploy, will inevitably be drawn, given the combination of high strategic importance and maximum interoperability.

We must also remember that UN peacekeeping still operates pursuant to the principle of "consent". The UN is arguably not the right
organization to do peacekeeping if there is no or incomplete consent, as we saw in Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and when only the deployment of well-equipped, self-sustaining troops can stabilize an untenable situation to permit the restructuring of a UN mission and the revision of its mandate. In these circumstances, “robust forces” must be deployed that are configured not only to be able to use force, but to keep the initiative, to defend themselves if challenged, to deal proactively with any situation, particularly during a mission start-up, and thus to carry out their mandates as defined.

Against this background, in the Secretary General’s report on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in its 2003 report, there was a healthy new tone of realism with regard to non-blue-helmet peacekeeping, in several respects expressing acceptance, without pejorative comment, of the far more complex peacekeeping world in which we now live. It noted, for example, the need in Africa to work “with the multiplicity of today’s peacekeeping partners”. It posed the very basic question of when peacekeeping operations “should be led by the United Nations and when ......another organization or arrangement (should) be assigned the responsibility for ‘robust’ military peacekeeping?”. It also made en passant reference to “the stop-gap deployment of staff for interim headquarters by the Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)”. Most noteworthy were several paragraphs which provide several examples of the importance and effectiveness of non-UN players in peacekeeping, summarized in paragraph 92, in which the Report noted that there had been positive developments towards the creation of strategic partnerships in meeting new peacekeeping challenges, most notably in Africa, with UN missions envisaged as components of efforts drawing on the comparative strengths of different organizations, including ECOWAS and the EU. The idea of partnership is not new, of course, we recall the Brahimi panel’s recommendation for the UN standby arrangements to include “coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces, created by Member States working in partnership, in order to better meet the need for the robust peacekeeping forces that the Panel has advocated”. Such forces are,
however, being given greater recognition as legitimate parts of the peacekeeping landscape.

The UN Special Committee and Regional Arrangements for Peace Operations

The Special Committee, in its more recent reports, has recognized the valuable contribution of regional arrangements to peacekeeping, and has urged that cooperation between the United Nations and relevant regional arrangements and agencies be enhanced. The Committee has also supported and encouraged external assistance from the UN and bilateral donors for the strengthening of African peace-keeping capabilities. In these respects, however, as in many others, the Committee has been merely catching up with operational reality and has not itself generally been able to make policy on the nature and scope of the interplay between UN and regional operations where peacekeeping is involved.

There are, I think, a number of reasons for this acceptance taking time to develop in the UN itself and we still have a way to go. First, among many member states, there is a firm conviction that the UN, with its universality, is the most legitimate player in the peacekeeping business. Connected to this is a concern that recognition of a growing role for regional organizations can only serve to incrementally legitimize what is commonly known as the “commitment gap”, the imputed reluctance of western states to place their troops under UN command, and the consequent heavy dependence of UN peacekeeping missions on the armies of countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

This being said, the Special Committee, in its most recent report, gave its most fulsome and detailed endorsement to date of the role of regional organizations, even as it has reiterated the “central role” of the UN. Specifically, in paragraph 70, and I quote:

the Committee recognizes that regional organizations have unique and complementary capacities to offer in support of UN peacekeeping operations. The areas where regional organizations might be able to add value include rapid reaction capabilities in addition to those capabilities the UN already possesses, over-the-horizon capabilities, co-ordinated civilian and civilian police capabilities, specialized capabilities, provision of coherent headquarters, regional expertise, sharing of best practice and training. In addition, regional organisations might be
able to assist the UN in identifying contributions on offer
from their own Member States, or act as a one-stop
shop.

So what should we be aiming at for the future, once we accept that
peacekeeping today, largely, is about complementarity and partnerships?

The Future of Partnerships in Peace Operations

First, I would suggest that we need to revisit the notion that the
UN has the central role in peacekeeping, as the Committee always
reiterates. Is it not the time to begin a serious reappraisal, starting from
the acknowledgment that the chosen peacekeeping modality should
depend on the realities on the ground, on what is needed to respond to
them effectively, and on the capabilities available, rather than on which
institutions should be pre-committed to the task? Arguably, what we
first need to do is to abandon any inclination to regard non-blue-hatted
peacekeeping as necessarily the default option. In the case of Africa,
specifically, this seems to have gained easier acceptance, perhaps
because the nations of the sub-continent are anxious to develop their
own conflict management and peacekeeping capabilities and have no
wish to rely on former colonial states to conduct such activities in
Africa’s own backyard. African states best know their own political as
well as physical terrain, and have a stronger interest than others in the
political, economic and social stability of their region, the absence of
which threatens the welfare of them all.

Second, not only should the UN, and member states with the
means to do so, support and encourage regional peacekeeping, they
should do so very pro-actively, and with substantial resources – and
not just in Africa. There are areas of the world where public opinion
and sometimes constitutional constraints restrict the involvement of
national armed forces to operate in far-flung places, and in these
circumstances preparation for and active involvement in regional
peacekeeping may well begin an evolutionary process towards greater
international engagement. We should be doing our utmost to encourage
such developments.

Thirdly, in the listing of General Principles in each Special
Committee report, we dutifully repeat the mantra of respect for the
principles of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of States, and of non-intervention in matters that are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. We also reaffirm
our adherence to basic principles of peacekeeping, such as the consent
of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence. We will, perhaps, need to reappraise these principles in future years, given the increasing acceptance that troops in peacekeeping missions must be obliged to protect civilians when able to do so, and given the slow but growing acceptance of an international responsibility to protect. This again, requires the acceptance of more robust mandates best carried out by regional organizations of other multinational forces which are UN-authorized if not UN-led.

Fourth, western states need to go well beyond the G-8 African Peacekeeping Initiative in facilitating the development of African peacekeeping capacity, whether with training, equipment, rapid deployment capabilities and/or the establishment of planning and management structures. While it may be too much to expect western members of the Special Committee to accept any UN injunction to increase their efforts in this regard, they might just acquiesce in a useful discussion by the Committee on the costing of requirements for the development of, say, the five regional brigades, originally the main element of the AU’s plans for the enhancement of regional capacity. In any event, we need more specific and measurable markers in this regard.

To further improve the UN’s capacity to do robust peacekeeping – and not just among its African member states – there is a requirement for the majority of the current UN Troop Contributing Countries(TCCs), comprising a good half of the membership, to improve their military and police capabilities. command and control above unit level, logistical sustainability of forces over time, and equipment investments, are all areas of major weakness. While it will not happen tomorrow, the UN will, in the course of time – and sooner rather than later one hopes – enter into an ongoing and serious dialogue, particularly with the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) and individual countries with large and effective military planning staffs, on how they might jointly address this problem.

Fifth, in order both to make partnerships with regional organizations more effective, and to maximize incentives for western states to remain engaged directly in UN-hatted missions, the Department of Peace Keeping Operations(DPKO) itself is going to have to address critical deficits in intelligence (which has proven to be a particularly contentious subject), security and command and control, which in the context of an alliance or a coalition of the willing are more easily resolved. This has a number of implications. For example, there needs to be much greater institutional cooperation at both strategic and
working levels, such as in advanced planning for missions through a
broadened IMTF concept, and through more secondment arrangements
and joint exercises with NATO, the EU, the OSCE, evolving African
institutions and other organizations which are in the peacekeeping and/or
peace-building business, as well as with individual nations with the
requisite capabilities.

Ideally, this would already be happening as the UN confronts a
disconcerting surge of peacekeeping demands, but such cultural change
does not occur overnight. It is within the purview of the Special
Committee to press in this direction, although whether members can
arrive at a consensus to this effect is currently open to question.

I would suggest, also, that to the degree possible, the UN
should seek to be part of European-wide debates on the restructuring
of national armed forces to make them more flexible and mobile,
developments from which the UN itself can benefit.

In failed states particularly, which constitute an exponentially
increasing focus of international concern, the UN will likely find itself
increasingly engaged with a broad and expanding array of players both
within and outside the UN system. Again, this means a more intensive
approach to dialogue and information exchange with other organizations,
including the international financial institutions, plus contingency planning
for complex missions much heavier than in the historical past with civilian
components. If the UN is to remain peacekeeping primus inter pares,
it will have to be appropriately equipped, particularly with respect to
the planning – or perhaps, more correctly, the planned co-ordination –
of civilian components. There is much left to be done here, and many
lessons still to be fully learned.

Conclusion

The work of the Challenges Project could be in all the respects
highlighted above and the time-line looks right. First, through much of
the coming year, we will – hopefully – be in the throes of seeking
implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary General’s High
Level Panel, which is to both identify the new challenges to collective
security and the means to deal with them more effectively. Second, the
Special Committee has instructed the Secretariat to conduct an
independent review of the implementation of the Brahimi Report during
the 59th session. Both of these should provide an opportunity for
consideration of the respective place of the UN and of regional and
other architecture in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding world of
tomorrow, and how each may reinforce the other, effectively.
CONCLUDING REMARKS II
by
Ambassador Michael Sahlin

Admiral Adedeji, Excellencies, “General-ships”, Distinguished Guests, Friends and Colleagues,

We have had three very full, very informative and thought-provoking days. We have been warmly welcomed, generously dined and very well looked after. My first words are therefore words, on behalf of the Partners of the Challenges Project, of great appreciation and gratitude to you, Admiral Adedeji, and to your National War College staff. I know how much hard work has to be done to make events like this successful, and you and your staff deserve our highest praise. I would also like to thank the conference secretariat and all the staff here at Le Meridien Hotel, both those we see and those behind the scenes, for their support and constant helpfulness in looking after us so well. And I cannot fully express our appreciation without saying a special word of thanks to the lady ushers whose personal grace and visual elegance have added a very special element to our proceedings.

Ladies and Gentlemen, at the beginning of our Seminar, I posed a number of questions regarding the nature of peace operations in the 21st century and the challenges of change. We have sought to identify the challenges that regional organizations, particularly those here in Africa, are encountering in initiating and sustaining regional peace operations. We have asked ourselves how to improve the response to regional conflict by closer cooperation between the United Nations(UN) and regional organizations. Those of us from outside Africa have been keen to learn from our African colleagues how you see these challenges and other issues of implementing complex peace operations.

I am sure that I speak for all when I say that we have been very well rewarded.

Africa is a great continent. The statements made by speakers and the comments made in discussions have given us all a much deeper insight into African thoughts, concerns, approaches and priorities
as you face the problems of conflict and the search for sustainable peace. By holding this Seminar in Abuja, I believe that it has added a great deal to our understanding and to the overall picture of the challenges to peace operations here in Africa. You have helped us to integrate a number of aspects in a way that would not have been possible if the Seminar had taken place outside Africa. For that, the Partners extend to Nigeria our particular thanks.

But, in addition, I hope that this Seminar has also contributed to the discussion and exchange of views among Africans on these topics. I am delighted to have seen the presence and close attention paid by so many military officers to our deliberations. There have often been well over 120 people in the room all listening closely and benefiting from the expertise and knowledge of the speakers, and then bringing their own experience and views to the discussions. That itself is one of the purposes and objectives of holding these seminars, and it is yet another reason to thank Nigeria for hosting this event.

In his Welcome Address, His Excellency, Alhaji Rabiu Kwankwaso, the Minister of Defence, described this Seminar as “crucial to Nigeria because Nigeria attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of regional and global peace”. His Excellency, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, with his first hand experience of the United Nations and heading two UN peacekeeping missions, gave us a highly thoughtful ‘tour d’horizon’ of the challenges facing Africa in fielding effective peace operations as well as the aims of the newly established African Union Peace and Security Council. “The issue of capacity”, he said, “becomes an area on which to focus primary attention”. Among his many valuable thoughts, he also drew attention to the indispensable need for close political engagement and collaboration between the UN and the appropriate regional organization in the pursuit of a UN peace operation.

There have been many other points raised for us to think about and digest. Several speakers, in one way or another, have highlighted the importance of the concept of partnership; the complexities of overlapping institutions and sub-regional organizations; the need for addressing the issues of institution building; the significance of early warning and early action; the high price that may be paid if the UN Security Council is slow in adopting a resolution to legitimize action. Again and again, we have heard of the importance of achieving good cooperation and coordination, and these are matters that we shall focus on at the Beijing Seminar in early November.
As the host institution for this Seminar has been the National War College, perhaps it has been natural that much attention has been drawn to the military aspects of peace operations. But we have been privileged to hear the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) in Liberia describe the hard, on-the-ground facts that the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) operation has had to face, in the absence of even the most basic infrastructure and the tasks of meeting the urgent needs of a civilian population that has suffered so much in past years. I am sure that many participants found the presentations on humanitarian assistance, on gender issues and on capacity building very informative. And it has been good to hear about the work of other regional organizations and mechanisms.

This morning, Ambassador Sam Ibok gave us a graphic description of the need for capacity building in Africa. He presented some very interesting ideas, and he gave this Seminar a challenge of his own – namely, he requested an action plan so that some of the excellent proposals that we have heard from experts and professionals in the past three days can move forward to implementation. He challenged us to make this a ‘do-shop’, not just a ‘talk-shop’. There is nothing that the Partners of the Challenges Project would like better, and I assure him that we shall do our best to stimulate action in appropriate quarters.

This afternoon, Ambassador Glyn Berry has given us a comprehensive summary of many of the issues that have been raised at this meeting. His review of our discussions will be very useful to the Challenges Project Partners as we consider how to move ahead.

At the Ankara Seminar last November, General Agwai made a comment that is worth repeating: “The UN, or any other organization, can only be as strong as its members want it to be”. This applies to the African Union Peace and Security Council, to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and to others, just as much as it applies to the UN itself. All the more reason why the Challenges Project believes that its primary target audience is the Member States. And to that end, I believe that this Seminar has made a rich contribution.

General Agwai, Ambassador Mbanefo, Admiral Adedeji, and to all our Nigerian colleagues, on behalf of the Partners of the Challenges Project, I thank Adedeji once again for hosting and organizing so well this valuable conference.
CONCLUDING REMARKS III

by

Rear Admiral Amos G. Adedeji

I am delighted to make these concluding remarks as host of the 14th International Seminar of the Challenges of Peace Operations Project. When you set out to hold an important event such as this Seminar, and you experience what we all did in the last three days, I believe that you should be more than relieved that the end has come. I am not only relieved; much more, I am very satisfied and grateful that this Seminar started and ended on a great note. I believe you will all agree that this event was a highly successful one. Anyone in my position would be over-joyed as I am today.

Peace is a universal value which is sought after by all the peoples and nations of the world. By the same token, violent conflict is now a global problem which is threatening the entire human race and its civilizations. This has led to various efforts to map out how best to deliver peace where it is needed most. How this should be done, I believe, has remained a central preoccupation of the Challenges Project since it started in 1997.

The Abuja Seminar has looked at the Regional Dimension of Peace Operations in the 21st Century, in furtherance of the overall objective to make practical recommendations for the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations. And this has been reflected in the composition of this Seminar, hence the multinational and multidisciplinary backgrounds of our resource persons and participants. The quality of presentations and contributions was quite high, right from the opening ceremony, when our Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs set the tone, through all the sessions. We have, therefore, come to an inevitable conclusion: it has been a very successful event.

For us at the National War College, Nigeria, we shall savour this experience for a very long time. And it will not end there. As
representative of Nigeria in the Challenges Project, I assure you all that we shall play our part with all the commitment and diligence required of us. We shall relate more vigorously on this subject, to the rest of Nigeria, to Africa through the relevant training institutions, and to the rest of the world, also through the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). This, I believe, will greatly enhance our performance in the new role of providing peacekeeping training at the strategic level for the entire West African sub-region.

Furthermore, we shall put into practice, the rich lessons of this Seminar in all our activities at the National War College. I would also like to invite our Partners in the Challenges Project to assist us in building and enhancing our capacity as a training institution, when we come calling on them. This would fit the spirit in which we are leaving this place: the imperative of achieving the right interface between institutions, regional organizations and the United Nations, in this business of peace operations.

We have had such a wonderful and fulfilling time at this Seminar that I am tempted to go on and on. But, even today, it has been such a full day of useful discussions and suggestions that has left us satisfied and perhaps exhausted too. I shall therefore go on to my Vote of Thanks. And there are so many people to thank for what we have achieved today.

This Seminar has enjoyed the full approval and support of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. He has shown interest and support in our preparations. Our Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff and the Inspector-General of Police have all been wonderful in their support for this Seminar. I thank you all, Sirs, and request you to please do it again! I must also express my profound gratitude and thanks to our former Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and our former Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Chief Arthur Mbanefo who graced our Seminar with their distinguished presence and also chaired some of the sessions.

The Project Coordinators, Ambassador Sahlin and his staff at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, have been with us throughout our journey to this event. I thank you very much. To our partners in the Challenges Project, I extend our appreciation and thanks for your being here and for all your contributions. I wish our Chinese Partners the best of luck as they prepare for the next Seminar. Our resource
persons have been magnificent and I thank you all, for without your contributions, we would not be celebrating now. All Participants are, of course, deserving of our gratitude for being here and making it all a success. To the rest of us who played one role or the other, I thank you too and may God bless you all.
PART 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AND
RAPPORTEURS’ REPORT

Rapporteur-General
Prof. Okey Ibeanu - MacArthur Foundation, Nigeria

Rapporteurs
Dr. Israel Igwe - Federal Civil Service Commission, Nigeria
Dr. B. Bakut - Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nigeria
Dr. A. Hameed - Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nigeria
Wg Cdr M Naiya - National War College, Nigeria
Major S Ibrahim - National War College, Nigeria
Mr. Lanre Obafemi - National War College, Nigeria
Mr. Simeon Alozieuwa - University of Abuja, Nigeria
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Preamble


The seminar was part of Phase II of the Challenges Project which seeks to address the issues of how to improve multidisciplinary and multicultural cooperation and coordination in peace operations, clarify the roles of the United Nations(UN) and regional organisations in peace processes, build the capabilities of member states in peace operations and thus harmonize the roles of states, regional bodies and the UN in such operations.

The seminar programme was structured to include an opening session, four plenary sessions and a concluding session. Each of the plenary sessions focused on a core issue area as follows:

a. Major issues and opportunities in the interface between the UN and regional organisations in peace operations;

b. The role of regional organisations in initiating and sustaining peace operations;

c. The role of state and non-state actors in regional peace operations; and

d. International support for capacity building for regional peace operations.
SESSION I:
Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations

A major issue identified by the Seminar is the changing nature of conflicts and peacekeeping. Among other things, it was observed that conflicts are occurring less between states and more within them, and they are no longer limited to military issues alone, but that wide-ranging social, humanitarian, political, economic and legal issues are also now involved. Also, conflicts and peacekeeping increasingly raise human rights concerns, which are made even more visible by media attention. These have heightened the issue of accountability on the part of the peace operations community. Finally, the changing character of peacekeeping operations means that they are no longer a monopoly of the United Nations, but increasingly involve regional initiatives and even some individual states acting alone or in concert.

In the context of these far-reaching changes, coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations becomes crucial for the success of peace operations. This entails harmonization of planning, mobilization and deployment; coordination of resources, personnel and logistic support; and clear definition of the roles of the UN and regional organisations, particularly after the UN takes over the mandate of an operation from a regional body. These issues are central to the success and sustainability of regional peace operations.

Finally, post conflict operations require much more attention and careful planning, especially regarding disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR).

SESSION II:
Regional Organisations and the Challenges of Initiating and Sustaining Peace Operations

On the challenges facing regional organisations in initiating and sustaining peace operations, the Seminar noted that most regional organisations are established for economic and developmental purposes rather than as security organisations. It is therefore a major challenge, both in human and material resources, for those regional organisations that are increasingly taking on security issues, especially peace operations. For such organisations to achieve their objectives of
restoring, maintaining or promoting peace, greater attention must be devoted to the following key issues:

- The existing mechanisms for regional peace and security operations need to be improved and harmonized with continental and UN initiatives.
- Regional organisations should consider and develop permanent plans or standby arrangements to enhance peace support interventions.
- Regional organisations should share information and experiences and cooperate with international organisations and NGOs; the SHIRBRIG experience should be very useful to regional initiatives.
- Regional organisations need to evolve workable arrangements for raising financial resources required for peacekeeping operations. Reliance on a few member states is not a sustainable arrangement.

SESSION III:
State and Non-State Actors in Regional Peace Operations

A prominent feature of contemporary regional peace operations is the number and complex interplay of actors, state and non-state, military and civilians, who are now involved in such operations. The Seminar noted that the challenges and processes of initiating and implementing regional peace operations are particularly problematic where there is a multiplicity of regional organisations. This therefore calls for greater coordination and harmonization of the activities of the many state and non-state actors. As part of this, non-state actors such as women’s organisations and humanitarian agencies have to be recognized as important partners both in peacekeeping and in post-conflict peacebuilding activities.

In spite of difficulties, such as balancing the demands for unfettered access by humanitarian operatives with the security considerations of military peacekeepers, or reconciling the independence of humanitarian operatives and the need to provide armed protection to them, the Seminar called for increased confidence building and cooperation between military peacekeeping missions and humanitarian agencies. In each mission area, modalities need to be developed to ensure that the activities of the two groups are complimentary rather than contradictory.
Finally, right from the planning stage, peacekeeping operations should anticipate Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) activities and should fully integrate the interests and welfare needs of women and children, who are often principal victims of conflicts, in their planning and implementation.

**SESSION IV:**

**International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations**

Since peacekeeping operations are increasingly being conducted by regional organisations that are often handicapped by inadequate resources and experience, the Seminar emphasized the importance of international support for capacity building for regional organisations and peace operations initiated by them. For Africa in particular, capacity building for the proposed African Standby Force (ASF) is very crucial. Although Africa has well-trained troops that are capable of carrying out missions anywhere, the continent still requires support in the area of equipment and logistics such as airlift, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and medical facilities.

The Seminar noted the need for a common approach to capacity building. Issues that confront regional organisations as they build up their capacity for peace operations include information, preventive deployment capacity, standardization of doctrine and procedures, effective planning, training, logistics and sustainability.

Finally, the Seminar urged that peace education could be a form of capacity building for peace operations by inculcating and spreading values that help to prevent violent conflict.
DAY 1: TUESDAY, 1 JUNE, 2004

Opening Ceremony

The Seminar started at about 9am, with the arrival of the Minister of State for Defence, Dr Roland Oritsejafor and other senior officials of the Nigerian government. The Minister of State for Defence represented the Honourable Minister for Defence, Alhaji Rabiu Kwankwaso.

Welcome Address by the Honourable Minister of Defence, Alhaji Rabiu Kwankwaso

The Honourable Minister welcomed delegates to the Seminar, especially those from the United Nations(UN), African Union(AU), Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) and other organisations. He noted that the Seminar is crucial to Nigeria because the country attaches great importance to the maintenance of regional and global peace, stressing that it is for this reason that Nigeria has made enormous human and material sacrifices for peace and security in different parts of the world.

He said that Nigeria has participated in over 23 peacekeeping operations in different countries and that the country has produced 11 Force Commanders for peace operations at the global, regional and sub-regional levels. He informed the audience that the Nigerian Government is keenly awaiting the outcome of the Seminar, principally because of its focus on the regional dimension of peace operations in the 21st century. He noted that with the increase in intra-state conflicts and other complex intra-state emergencies resulting from failed states or the total breakdown of government institutions in some countries, the UN is now constantly under pressure to authorize new missions. And in carrying out the Security Council’s mandates, the UN has been hampered, often by insufficient local knowledge and also by inadequacy of resources in terms of personnel, materiel and finance. Thus, there is a need for greater coordination and cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in carrying out Security Council mandates.
The Minister further noted that in the face of the growing challenges posed by conflicts and peace operations, regional organisations have been evolving different ways and capabilities for dealing with such challenges and problems. It is however important to note, he said, that regional action can have both advantages and disadvantages. It may be that states in a region may have interests in the stability of the local environment and thus commit themselves to peace operations near their homeland. They are also likely to be more familiar with the cultures and attitudes of the people in the conflict zone than outsiders. However, nearby states may also be ‘too close’ to the issues and may have their own agenda in a crisis. Thus, conflicting interests and lack of mutual trust may militate against the peace process. These have been experienced in West Africa and elsewhere in Africa to varying degrees. The Minister therefore enjoined the Seminar to generate practical solutions that would be useful to Africa and the world in general, in this respect.

He advocated for a strong partnership between the UN and regional organisations in peace operations, especially taking into account the on-going efforts aimed at improving the capabilities of such organisations. The UN, he said, should continue to shoulder those responsibilities it can and assign those it cannot to the regional organisations. This arrangement would enable both agencies make the most effective use of available resources. In conclusion, he urged that the focus of the Seminar should be to generate practical solutions that would enhance the conduct of both UN and regional peace operations in the 21st century. He wished delegates fruitful deliberations.

Opening Remarks by Ambassador Michael Sahlin, Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Ambassador Sahlin thanked the host organisation, the National War College, Nigeria, and its Commandant, Rear Admiral Amos Adedeji for organizing the Seminar. He also thanked Ambassador Arthur Mbanefo and Lt General Martin Luther Agwai for their consistent support to the Challenges Project.

He explained that the Challenges Project, the full title of which is “Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century” arose as a response to several developments in peacekeeping during the 1990s. These he outlined as the following:

i. The changing nature of conflicts, essentially the increase in intra-state as against inter-state armed violence, the
result of which is that the international community now deals not only with military issues in peace operations but also increasingly with the humanitarian, social, political, legal, economic, human rights and media angles.

ii. The growing challenges in terms of mobilization of resources i.e. the demands for troops, civilian personnel with relevant skills, logistical and communication equipment, funds, etc and the questions over how these resources can be put to best use.

iii. The emergence of multinational forces with troops from willing states but authorised by the UN and coalition forces composed of troops from willing states and not authorized by the UN.

iv. The greater recognition of issues in the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in peace operations.

v. The progressive reduction in troop contributions to peace operations from developed countries and the marked reduction in troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations generally.

vi. The expanding nature of modern peace operations which now cover the entire spectrum from conflict prevention to peace-building, as elaborated in the Brahimi Report.

He urged that all these are challenges which discussions at the Seminar could do much to broaden and deepen. But before proceeding to the sessions that would focus on these substantive issues, he invited the Challenges Project leader, Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg to make a presentation on the background, structure and progress thus far, of the Project.

Presentation on “The Challenges Project: Coordination and Update Report” by Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg

Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg explained to Seminar Participants that the project which started in 1997, is an effort to identify some of the problems of peace operations and offer recommendations towards solving them. The objective of the project, she said, is to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations.

Ms Hilding-Norberg listed partner organisations to the Project around the world as follows:
She also listed several international institutions and associations that have made valuable contributions to the Project since its inception. These, she said, include the United Nations, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence and the International Peacekeeping Yearbook.

In addition to these, she further indicated that several training institutions and organisations around the world have been contributing to the Project either by way of offering intellectual perspectives and resources or by outrightly hosting parts of the various Seminars since 1997. These she listed as the following:

- CENCAMEX Gendarmerie Peacekeeping Training Centre, Argentina.
- Commonwealth of Independent States HQ for Military Cooperation and Coordination.
- PFP Training Centre, Turkey.
- Royal Police Academy of Jordan.
- South African Army War College.
- Swedish International Centre.

- United Service Institution of India Centre for UN Peacekeeping.
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training and Evaluation Service.
Apart from these major contributors, she also identified other organisations that have contributed to the Project in diverse ways. Among these are:

- AusAID of Australia.
- Defence Corporate Services and Infrastructure, Australia.
- Hanns Seidel Foundation.
- Jordan Radio & Television Corporation.
- London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Jordan Ministry of Tourism & Antiquities.
- NATO Information & Liaison Office.
- Royal Court of Jordan.
- Susan & Elihu Rose Foundation.
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- University of Melbourne, Australia.
- University of Bilkent, Turkey.

Drawing attention to the multinational character of the Project, she noted that the following 14 countries are actively involved in its work: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, United States and Russian Federation. However, the entire project is coordinated by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, with financial support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the progress of the Project, Ms Hilding-Norberg explained that work thus far has been conducted in two phases. Phase I, which ran from 1997 to 2002, featured 10 Seminars with inputs from 230 organisations and 50 countries. The Concluding Report for Phase I was submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations by late Ms Anna Lindh, then Foreign Minister of Sweden on 25th April 2002. It was after its presentation that Partners agreed to a second phase, to address specific challenges identified in the Phase I Concluding Report.

The second phase which is currently underway, she said, will be concluded by 2005. Under Phase II, the Project has been addressing the following questions:
i. How do we most effectively improve multidisciplinary and multicultural cooperation and coordination at strategic, operational and tactical levels?

ii. What should be the respective roles of the United Nations and regional organisations and arrangements in peace operations?

iii. How can governments, with differing resources and capabilities, best respond to challenges posed by peace operations? and

iv. What might be some of the most helpful ways in which member states could support UN peace operations?

In addressing these questions, three seminars have already been organised under Phase II. These are:

1. The Rule of Law on Peace Operations (Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, Australia, November 2002).

2. Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism (Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, May 2003).


After the Abuja Seminar, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies would host another one on the theme: Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations in early November 2004. The concluding event in 2005 will be held to submit the recommendations of the Phase II Seminars to the UN Secretary General.

Keynote Address by Ambassador Olayemi Adeniji, Honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Olayemi Adeniji began by stating that having served as head of two UN peacekeeping missions, he had gained a personal appreciation of the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. He said that the hosting of the Seminar by an African country, at this point, could not have been more timely, in view of the fact that on 25 May 2004, the AU inaugurated its Peace and Security Council (PSC). The statement of commitment on peace and security by member states of the PSC underscores the realisation by African leaders that the quest for peace and security on the continent needs to be backed by the resources and commitment of member states, with support from international partners. This realisation, Ambassador Adeniji said, is
anchored on the fact that no meaningful development can take place in an environment of conflict and insecurity, and that more formal opportunities needed to be created for the international community to show greater commitment in dealing with African conflicts.

Ambassador Adeniji explained that the UN Charter did not actually make provision for peacekeeping operations. Such operations, however, were initiated soon after the organization came into being, so that the Security Council would not be totally incapable of action in the face of a conflict like the one in Palestine in 1948. But while the relevant provisions of the UN Charter were conceived for intervention in conflicts between states, the role of regional organizations was hardly considered. The end of the Cold War, however, forced modifications in peacekeeping both in the criteria for intervention and the depth of intervention. The post-Cold War years have witnessed a trend whereby many long-suppressed internal conflicts have emerged, threatening sovereign states and even the security of entire regions.

This situation, Ambassador Adeniji explained, forced a reconsideration of the concept of peacekeeping to include intervention in intra-state conflicts, and also broadened such interventions to include settlement of the causes of such conflicts. Peacemaking and peacebuilding thus became integral parts of peacekeeping. These enhanced the role of regional organizations in the resolution of conflicts. The relationship between the UN Security Council and the various regional organizations has therefore become an increasingly important issue in the effort to discharge joint responsibility in dealing with new conflicts.

Africa, in particular, Ambassador Adeniji observed, has been a testing arena for this relationship. This started with the internal conflict in Liberia in December 1989, in response to which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a Monitoring Group to that country, particularly to arrest the deteriorating humanitarian conditions which involved both Liberians and foreigners. This was at a time when the UN was preoccupied with the Gulf (Iraq-Kuwait) crisis. The UN was later to establish an Observer Mission in Liberia, after it had deployed UN peace operations in Sierra Leone and in Cote d’Ivoire. The current UN peace operation in Liberia is in fact a follow-up to the forward deployment of ECOWAS troops into that country in August 2003.
Against this background, Ambassador Adeniji noted that in the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, certain issues still need to be properly clarified. These, he said, include the following:

i. If, as is being encouraged by the United Nations, a regional organization were to agree on the necessity of a peacekeeping mission, how can the UN be involved from the beginning and at what stage should such a mission become a full ‘United Nations’ mission?

ii. After a regional peacekeeping operation has been taken over by the United Nations, what role, if any, should the regional organization continue to play?

iii. How can co-ordination between the United Nations Security Council and the regional organization concerned be institutionalized and operated?

iv. What should be the contribution of the international community generally to a regionally authorized peacekeeping operation?

Ambassador Adeniji further pointed out that the experience of ECOWAS had shown that the greatest problem of regionally-inspired peace operations is sustainability. In the specific case of ECOWAS, this was essentially due to the weakness of West African states, militarily and financially. Generally, he said, such weaknesses hamper implementation of decisions to establish a mission. The AU is in a similarly weak resource position and thus incapable of offering any help. In fact, AU often resorts to giving mandates to regional organisations, such as ECOWAS. Thus, the problem of deficits in capacity has become a primary issue of focus of regional peacekeeping operations.

The Keynote Speaker further drew the attention of participants to the fact that AU, at an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, set up an Africa Standby Force (ASF) which is expected to facilitate rapid assembly of troops for peacekeeping missions agreed upon by the Union. This, he recalled, is coming against an earlier decision on establishment of a Regional Standby Force by the ECOWAS.

There are a few extra-African inspired initiatives aimed at building national and regional capacities for peacekeeping, such as the French-sponsored Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) and similar American-supported
training assistance programmes. Apart from training, however, Ambassador Adeniji pointed out that there is the need for equipment; as experience has shown, even where ECOWAS was able to assemble troops and to deploy them in theatre, lack of equipment has been a major impediment to effective operations. Although there has been some progress in this direction, like the American logistics support to ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the forward deployments in Liberia by the EU and United Kingdom, a lot more could still be done.

The Keynote Speaker further observed that there have been instances of regional organisations authorising a deployment but with uncertainties as to when the UN will take over responsibility for such operations. Much, therefore, needs to be done to clarify the transfer processes in such situations, so that the capacity of regional organisations are not over-stretched. An interim arrangement, he said, might be one in which the initial authorization or deployment of a mission by a regional organization is undertaken in collaboration with at least a major power, as has been the experience in Cote d'Ivoire and Central African Republic. But even after the UN has taken over an operation that was initially authorized by a regional organization, the relationship between both parties needs to be further studied and clarified.

Ambassador Adeniji observed that undoubtedly, the UN may be better equipped to conduct peace operations once authorisation is granted, but that regional organisations may also provide it with a better understanding of the political issues involved. Consequently, regional organisations may be better placed to provide political insights and initiatives to accelerate the peace process. What is needed, therefore, is closer collaboration between the UN and regional organisations. Such collaboration should be considered early in the planning for peace operations, and one particular area in which much closer collaboration is needed is in determining the nature and timing of transitional justice instruments.

Concluding, Ambassador Adeniji argued that the process of disarmament is a necessary first step in resolving national conflicts, stressing that disarmament of combatants, as well as their demobilization and re-integration should always be implemented in quick succession, instead of the current practice of carrying out disarmament and demobilizing with scant attention to re-integration.
Session One: Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface Between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations

The Session was chaired by Ambassador Arthur Mbanefo, Nigeria’s immediate past Permanent Representative at the United Nations. Three presentations were made by:

i. Ambassador Souren Seraydarian (Representing UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations);
ii. Ambassador Sam Ibok (Director, Department of Peace and Security, AU; and
iii. Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas (Executive Secretary of ECOWAS).

Chairman’s Opening Remarks

The Chairman began by revealing that the hosting of the Seminar by Nigeria marked the realisation of a dream which started in year 2000. He recalled that the journey to the day’s event started when he, as Chairman of the UN Special Committee on Peace Operations, attended a seminar on Challenges of Peace Operations in Tokyo, Japan. On that occasion, he was asked whether Nigeria would like to join the Challenges Project. He accepted the challenge and did everything possible to ensure that Nigeria hosted the seminar. This was informed by the fact that Nigeria has been a prominent contributor and actor in both UN and regional peace operations. Indeed, the country started participating in peace operations immediately on attainment of independence and that was in the Congo in 1960.

He said the hosting of the Seminar became a reality because of the fortune of working with two Nigerians who have distinguished themselves in the UN system, namely Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji (Foreign Affairs Minister) and Lt. Gen Martin Luther Agwai (Chief of Army Staff, former Deputy Commander UNMIL and Deputy Military Adviser to the UN Secretary General). Stressing that he could not have worked with better people to actualize the dream of the international community for Nigeria to host the Seminar, he thanked Ambassador Michael Sahlin (Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy) and Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg (Challenges Project leader) for their consistent support. He informed the audience that Amb Sahlin is not new in Nigeria as he had a stint at the University of Ibadan, many years ago.

He traced the origin of the Challenges Project to Ms Hilding-Norberg’s earlier research on peacekeeping operations. The research
was supported by the Government of Sweden and inherited by the country’s army. He further noted that peacekeeping operations have become complicated in recent times, hence, the need for the Seminar to examine some of its many angles. He then invited the Speakers to make their presentations.

"Consolidating Peace in Liberia: UNMIL, ECOWAS, State and Non-State Actors" by Ambassador Souren Seraydarian

Ambassador Seraydarian began by observing that there is a need for African solutions to African problems. This is not, however, a slogan to limit the role of the UN in the resolution of African crises. The international community should be actively involved in solving Africa’s crises.

He said that the efforts of the AU and regional bodies show the capacity of Africans to confront their problems. He noted, however, that the present situation is such that once these bodies decide on the road map to peace, they generally turn to the UN for resources. This is largely because they do not have the resources or capacity to resolve these crises. Thus, the UN continually remains relevant in conflict resolution in Africa. This poses a number of problems for the UN.

Firstly, the UN is usually not involved in the initial negotiations of peace processes. He cited the case of the Arusha Agreement over Rwanda, stressing that the limited military support by the UN was because it was not involved from the beginning. Secondly, the UN is hampered by lack of means to implement some of the mandates given to it. He said he cited these examples to show that the success of every effort depends on the political will to provide military, financial and other resources needed to pursue the peace process to its logical end.

He observed that while there is clearly an upsurge in UN interventions, several problems remain, particularly the following:

- To find well-equipped and trained troops to implement complex mandates of today;
- To have troops rapidly deployed; and
- To deploy robustly so as to establish UN credibility.

He further observed that in the face of escalating conflicts, contributions to peacekeeping missions have been dwindling. This may not be unconnected with the fact that contributing countries are now required to equip troops for deployment. And there may be spoilers, those who will exploit the weakness of the operation to derail it.
The UN, he said, has identified the major areas of possible support to regional organisations. These are:

- Information sharing.
- Logistic support.
- Facilitating training.
- Cooperation with civilian police, etc.

He further stated that the UN has been working with regional organisations in these respects. He cited an example from the situation in Georgia, where the UN continues to cooperate with the Commonwealth of Independent States in the area of human rights. In Afghanistan, UN cooperates with coalition forces to extend government authority to all parts of the country. The UN and donors provide transportation in Liberia. Subsequent rehabilitation of the initial ECOMOG deployment in Liberia to the blue helmets shows the ability and continuity of the UN missions.

He noted, however, that as at now, there is yet no clear direction in the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping missions. The UN continues to cooperate with regional bodies to pursue peace and conflict resolution. However, if this is to work, there must be some flexibility. There also has to be a more regional approach to peacekeeping e.g. region-wide arrangements to control cross border flow of small arms. Finally, he stressed that the UN only reflects the will of the international community; thus UN success in peacekeeping will continually depend on the political will of member states.

“Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations: The Perspective from AU” by Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director of Conflict Management Unit at AU

Ambassador Ibok began by admitting that the inability of regional bodies to really fund and manage peace operations successfully is not limited to the AU Secretariat alone. He said that even when African leaders under the aegis of AU meet and commit themselves to a mandate, the Secretariat is left to beg to raise the resources for the implementation. He stressed that this situation led to the new security architecture, which is like a pyramid with the UN at the top, supported by the international community; the AU in a position to offer continental perspectives on a crisis; and then the regional organisations which, by
virtue of their proximity to the crisis point, are better able to understand its ramifications and act accordingly.

He said that the pyramid envisages a situation where regional bodies may order deployment of a peacekeeping mission endorsed by the AU, and both can then approach the UN for help. This, he said, was done recently in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

He noted that experience has shown that UN DPKO will always assist in planning peacekeeping operations, but that is where the assistance now often stops. This is because of the unique mandate of the UN which makes it impossible for it to order deployment without approval by the Security Council, as well as the internal dynamics of international politics within the UN. This was recognized in Harare, Zimbabwe, at the second OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff’s Summit in 1997, where it was also agreed that what has constrained peacekeeping in Africa is logistics and resources.

He observed that what external donors concentrate on is training. He said, however, that while training is needed, the urgent area of focus should be on logistics and sustainability. He argued that peacekeepers should be allowed to use equipment they are trained to use. He absolved UN officials of any blame over the shortcomings of peace operations in Africa, arguing instead that it is the non-provision of peace operations in UN Charter that is the problem. He said that even in Africa, there is no regional organization that can deploy troops except ECOWAS.

This is because they will not get assistance from the UN, since the UN will wait until all the parties to the conflict must have consented to the peace process before it comes in. He asked what the deployment is for, if there is no agreement towards tranquillity in a country or region?

He noted that for effectiveness, there should be joint planning and execution by both AU and UN. Similarly, he said the AU should involve regional bodies in planning and execution of peace operations. Citing the case of Burundi, he stated that AU had deployed troops to the mission in the belief that UN would take over the operation. The budget was assessed at $120 million but so far only $10 million had been raised. This led to the inability of Commanders to feed troops. This, he said, presents a real problem for the mandating authority. African leaders will thus have to, as of
necessity, take more responsibility for peace operations on the continent.

In conclusion, he observed that people, most of the time, refer to Africans as not doing much to resolve African problems. But there is no conflict in Africa which an African leader or organization is not spearheading efforts to resolve. The need is for donors and Africa’s friends to pull resources together to support African initiatives. Peacekeeping has always been a universal venture. It is not limited to any continent. The AU believes in the multinational character of peacekeeping and the UN should not leave that responsibility. Even so, Africans should double their efforts in conflict management and resolution.

Discussions

Issues raised following the paper presentations focussed on the role of super powers in peace operations; identifying the yardstick for determining UN involvement; the need to put more funds/resources into sustainability rather than training of peacekeepers; the irony of manufacturers of small arms being initiators of peace on the continent; and the role of the AU in Darfur, Sudan.

On the impression that the UN has the resources to support peace operations in Africa but is reluctant to do so, this was refuted by the Chairman, who also explained that the UN works on consensus and this is often not easy to achieve.

“Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface Between the UN and Regional Organisations: The ECOWAS Perspective” by Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas

There is a growing relevance of regional bodies in peace operations. This is because the UN is more suited for inter-state conflicts rather than intra-state conflicts. And it is the latter type of conflict that is fast becoming the norm. Of about 6 UN interventions in Africa, 3 are in ECOWAS member countries. At the earlier stages, however, it seemed as if ECOWAS was left to devise its own strategy to tackle these crises.

ECOWAS has been cooperating with the UN in election monitoring, conflict management and resolution. ECOWAS and the UN Office in Liberia are meeting on how to deepen cooperation and evolve a comprehensive peace process in Liberia. ECOWAS is desirous to expand its interface with UN in seeing peace in its region. Conflicts in
the region have worsened the human and material conditions of the people. There has been a notable deterioration of the most vulnerable sections of the population. This has given rise to several undesirable phenomena such as the problem of child soldiers.

ECOWAS has two instruments, namely, for non-aggression and for non-interference. But these were meant to prevent or resolve interstate, not intra-state conflicts. Thus, when civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989, ECOWAS was constrained. Thousands were trapped and those who could leave became refugees in neighboring countries and a big problem to those countries. This was why ECOMOG was born.

The ECOMOG operation in Liberia was funded largely by the resources of member-states. The operation was criticized because there was no instrument or provision for it in the ECOWAS Charter and no unanimity of country opinions towards resolution of the conflict. However, ECOWAS tried to bring all the warring sides to a negotiating table and eventually elections were held in Liberia. As a result of the experience in Liberia, a mechanism was devised in 1999 to reaffirm the Protocol i.e. non-aggression, respect for peoples rights with the setting up of the Mediation and Security Council, the Council of Elders and ECOMOG as a permanent peacekeeping instrument for the sub-region. All these are serviced by a Secretariat. The Secretariat has a monitoring centre, and there are four observation and monitoring zones in the sub-region.

Additional protocols have been included, such as the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In addition to these protocols, the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Defence and Security was appointed with four departments of the Secretariat under him is overseeing the 4 departments. Thus, subsequent deployments of ECOMOG by ECOWAS no longer raised the issue of hegemony as in the past. A Small Arms Unit has also been established to tackle the issue of small arms trafficking and proliferation in the sub-region.

ECOWAS does not see any conflict between its role and that of the UN. The advantage of regional bodies is their proximity to the area of conflict. Furthermore, cultural affinity and the desire to contain the spread of conflict often compel sub-regional organisations to take the first step. ECOWAS also recognizes that neighbours may have interests in a conflict e.g. the conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where the
latter was exporting insurgents to the former. But ECOWAS has developed the following strategies to address all these problems:

i) consulting/involving all contributing states;

ii) establishing contact groups among states so that large scale meetings may not always be needed;

iii) involving the UN in helping to resolve conflicts e.g. Security Council resolution on Liberia.

Logistics has always been a major problem in deploying troops. However, given that the UN has indicated greater readiness to assist in solving problems in the sub-region, ECOWAS needs help from the UN in the areas of troop deployment and training. Three centres have been selected to train troops and civilian officers engaged in peacekeeping. These are the National War College, Nigeria; Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana and the Peacekeeping Training Centre at Koulikoro in Mali.

Dr. Chambas also urged that there is need for the international community to take a definite stand on insurgents (i.e. those who seek to take political power via undemocratic means) as ECOWAS has done.

He concluded by stressing that ECOWAS sees the link between poverty and conflict in the sub-region. The nexus between the two needs to be more clearly and widely recognized. Thus, while seeking to resolve conflicts and consolidate peace, there is need to also seek for development in the sub-region.

**Discussions**

Addressing the concerns raised about funding, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary admitted that it is one of the challenges ECOWAS has faced. ECOWAS has relied for all its activities on contributions by member states. This proved to be an unreliable source of funding. Many countries have accumulated arrears. He however explained that a new mechanism has been devised to levy a certain percentage on member-countries’ imports. This is put into the Central Bank of each member state, which then makes it available to ECOWAS. All member-states levy this tax and have established an ECOWAS Account. Progress has been made in major contributing countries while there are problems in some other countries.

Thus, for the first time, the ECOWAS budget this year is based on this arrangement and not on assessed contributions. A certain percentage of this fund goes to the Peace Fund so that ECOWAS can
immediately deploy troops before support can come from outside the region. The African Development Bank (ADB) has also come up with a suggestion on a post-conflict fund. The EU is also trying to make contributions through the AU to the sub-regional units/organisations.

**DAY 2: WEDNESDAY, 2 JUNE, 2004**

Session Two: Regional Organisations and the Challenges of Initiating and Sustaining Peace Operations

The Second plenary session of the Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Takahisa Kawakami from Japan’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Three papers were presented namely:


b. “International and Regional Cooperation within the UN Framework: Lessons Learned from UNMIL Interim Headquarters” by Brigadier Sten Edholm of the Swedish Armed Forces; and

c. “Peace Keeping and Peace Building in the Pacific” by Group Captain Garry Dunbar, Head of International Organization Department, Australian Defence Organization.

The presentations appraised regional organisations and the challenges that confront them in initiating and sustaining peace operations. The Speakers focused on the experiences of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) South East Asia and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and Europe (SHIRBRIG), and provided lessons from across the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe.

It was noted that much as many regional organisations now engage in peace operations, these groups at inception were not strictly military organisations, even though they share the belief that a peaceful environment is a pre-requisite for economic development. The effort to balance and manage these dual functions has sometimes led to internal friction and stress which are reflected in the operational efficiency in peace operations endeavours.

The Speakers also observed that there is the need to harmonize the various regional security mechanisms with those of the continental and global bodies, e.g. SADC with the African Union (AU) and the
United Nations (UN), in order to remove legal and political obstacles which the absence of such harmonization has sometimes imposed on speedy intervention in crisis areas. Between these bodies, there is also the need for a lot of confidence-building to enhance substantive liaison, information sharing, early warning and early response.

It was observed that the major impediments to the above listed areas have been largely as a result of the ad hoc nature of regional arrangements. This in turn inhibits speedy or quick response to crisis situations.

The session further noted that regional organisations should share experiences with other organisations engaged in peace operations within their regions, be they governmental or NGOs. Such sharing of experiences would enhance their capability in future operations, as could be seen from the example of SHIRBRIG.

Another issue that was raised during the presentations is the question of what resources are available to regional organisations to initiate and conduct peacekeeping operations successfully. It was noted that presently, in the SADC, South Africa appears to bear a substantial part of the financial commitment to the organization’s peace support activities. Similarly, in the Pacific Islands Forum, the more economically prosperous Australia and perhaps New Zealand, are the countries that provide most of the financial support for peace efforts, unlike in the SHIRBRIG arrangement, for instance, where every member state bears their own cost. This situation needs to be improved upon; ideally the organisations should have dedicated funds for peace support operations without having to rely on specific member states.

Discussion

Following the presentations, discussants made contributions to the issues under deliberation, and areas of ambiguity were cleared to them by the presenters. The questions and contributions helped in no small measure to further put the issues that had been raised by the presenters in better perspective. This was duly acknowledged by the Chairman, Mr. Takahisa Kawakami while bringing the session to an end.

Session Three: State and Non-State Actors in Regional Peace Operations

In the third session, five presentations were made as follows:
The Session examined variously the important role of state and non-state actors in peace operations. It noted that state actors and regional organisations usually encounter problems in carrying out peace interventions wherever there are too many regional organisations operating in the same region. The example of Europe was used to illustrate this point, as various organisations like the OSCE, NATO, EU, CIS, Council of Europe among others, have had to contend with problems of rivalry, confusion of mandates and overlap of functions and activities during operations.

The need to accord non-state actors greater recognition in peace operations was also emphasized, especially during the post-conflict period. Such organisations as women, age grade youths and hunters associations as well as traditional rulers and business leaders, should be taken into confidence in peace efforts. This is essentially because such organisations, institutions and individuals could wield immeasurable influence over their peers and the communities involved in the conflicts.

The place of the humanitarian community in peace operations was duly acknowledged. Humanitarian agencies were indeed recognized as indispensable, particularly in view of the increasing number of civilian casualties in many intra-state conflict situations. It was however observed that the necessary confidence between the military and the humanitarian community has often left much to be desired. There is thus the need for deliberate confidence building between the two communities. It was recognised that women and children suffer untold trauma during conflicts and that efforts should be made to involve them, especially through women’s organisations, in pre and post conflict peace building processes.
Accordingly, both the UN system and regional authorities need to work out a realistic rehabilitation agenda with the humanitarian community at the onset of peace operations in order not to be overwhelmed by humanitarian demands as the peace operations progress. Certainly, such an agenda should include post-conflict reconstruction of the infrastructure needed to sustain the peace.

Discussions
Discussants devoted considerable attention to the issue of the place of women in peace operations. Protagonists of the enlarged role for women in peace operations were however directed to work upon the military policies of states. They were also reminded that men also suffer untold trauma as their families become victims of several misfortunes while they are away on peace operations. Nigeria’s former Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who chaired the session, however concluded the exchanges by acknowledging that women do need to be given more attention in peace operations.

DAY 3: THURSDAY, 3 JUNE, 2004
Session Four: International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations

The session was chaired by Major General Tim Ford (rtd) former Military Adviser to the UN, and there were three presentations made by:
- Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director, Department of Peace and Security, AU Secretariat, Addis Ababa;
- Mr. Lars Forste, Assistant Commissioner, Swedish National Police; and
- Professor Erling Dessau, Special Advisor to the Rector, UN University of Peace, Costa Rica.

Chairman’s Opening Remarks
The Chairman thanked the National War College and its officials for the excellent arrangements that were made in preparation for the Seminar. He said he was delighted that Nigeria has joined the Challenges Project, stressing that Nigeria is one of the highest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. He said he looked forward to delegates’ views on building capacity for regional peace operations.
“International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: The African Union Perspective” by Ambassador Sam Ibok

Ambassador Ibok began by observing that international support for Africa in the area of peacekeeping has been considerable and without such support Africa would not have come thus far. He said that although there is international support, Africans still ask for more, stressing that there is more that both sides can do. He said Africa needs to do more so that it would not loose regional relevance, that the region has already lost much reckoning following the end of the Cold War, and that donor fatigue has come at a time when Africa is faced with a myriad of problems.

His second point of departure was that peacekeeping is time-consuming and Africans have come to realize the lack of capacity to implement decisions made. This is largely because peace missions now encompass the humanitarian aspect, civilian police, good governance, democracy, demobilization and reintegration, etc. In essence, the scope of such operations is increasingly expanding. Furthermore, he noted that in Africa, HIV is not only a health matter, but has also become a security issue. It has devastated large populations and after every conflict HIV has impacted negatively on the population. In order to deal with all these problems and more, there is need to build capacity for proper intervention. No one organization or regional body can fulfill these needs. Capacity building must therefore be multifaceted.

The UN has undertaken several analyses of peace processes and their impact, such as the Brahimi Report. But there is still the need to know/understand the workings, and inter-relationships between the military, civil administration and other aspects involved in peace building.

In this regard, what is probably most important is coordination. There is horizontal coordination involving the UN, regional(AU) and sub-regional organisations as well as donor agencies. There is also vertical coordination so that there would be no duplication of functions. AU is currently trying to cope with a situation where member-states are developing French, British and American trained peacekeepers separately. There is need for common approach to capacity building. This will not only save funds, but also release funds for development.

Peacekeeping in Africa is beset by several problems. Efforts are still on-going to generate data on the capacity building assistance
that has been received by African countries in the area of Peacekeeping. Speaking on behalf of the AU, Ambassador Ibok observed that it is amazing how a small thing like information can delay the deployment of peacekeepers. He recalled that only a week earlier “AU met with EU officials and we were surprised to know that Europe trains about 100 Africans on peacekeepers every year and they also train 100 inside Africa yearly. But the AU did not know of these people. If not for the Americans, AU would not have known Brig General Okonkwo. They said they have worked with Okonkwo in Liberia, vouching for his dedication and effectiveness. This shows the need to build a database of peacekeeping in Africa”.

Until recently, there was little interface between AU and sub-regional bodies. Even now, AU mostly mandates sub-regional bodies to deal with issues, without any terms of reference. In terms of building the proposed African Standby Force, it is difficult because sub-regions are left to organize their forces and some of them are discussing with donors while others are just waiting for AU.

The presenter stated that while he was not offering a checklist of requirements for establishing the Standby Force, attention must be paid to the following:

i. preventive deployment capacity;
ii. standardization of doctrine/procedures;
iii. identification of relevant issues;
iv. establishment of what has been called the planning element – it is only ECOWAS that can establish a regional brigade;
v. Information systems;
vi. Training;
vii. Establishment of mission;
viii. Logistics and sustainability should be addressed at the onset i.e. establishment of reciprocal logistics bases. AU believes that in ECOWAS where work has progressed to an advanced stage, there is a need for the sub-regional body to work with AU to establish bases, so that there will be no wastages. Such bases should be sited only in the politically most stable countries and the militaries of such countries should not have access to them.

The international community should extend support to designated African institutions so that a reservoir of skills can be built in the
continent. At the level of the UN, it would be appropriate to look beyond institutional mandate and consider how the provisions under Chapter VIII can be used to harness the contributions of regional agencies. If global peace is UN responsibility, it stands to reason that initiatives by regional organisations are on behalf of the UN. The UN should therefore respond to such regional initiatives, quickly. Ambassador Ibok urged that if SHIRBRIG is working for the UN, it could be adapted by AU for the establishment of an African Standby Force.

Finally, he urged the seminar to consider an action plan that partners and Africans can take back to their agencies, so that in another meeting, what has been done after the Abuja Seminar can be considered. This will help impact on how the AU and regional bodies do business. The EU is ready to partner with others in this initiative and will implement its recommendations.

“International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: A European Police Perspective” by Mr Lars Forste

Mr. Forste explained that the EU is establishing African support initiatives with regard to peacekeeping in general and civil policing during peace operations in particular. The EU, he said, believes that it should work with and in conjunction with other regional bodies. To this end, it is also in contact with various other organisations in seeing that peace support assistance to Africa is institutionalized. He shared with the audience the EU experience in the Balkans as well as on-going multilateral efforts in Europe to improve civil policing in peace operations. He stressed the importance of human rights and media training in support of peace building processes and urged that greater attention be paid to the policing component of such operations under the Challenges Project.

“International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: Perspective on South America” by Professor Erling Dessau

Prof Dessau began by informing the audience that the UN University for Peace is located in Costa Rica, the only country that does not have any army. He said the university has a programme for promoting a culture of peace through education in West Africa. He recited a Peace Anthem rendered during a different occasion in Abuja early in the year. He noted that education for peace matters, and that
since delegates had gathered to learn, the lessons learnt could be documented and transferred from person to person. He explained that education for peace targets or tries to educate people about peace.

The University, he said, looks forward to having close relationship with the Challenges Project and will also collaborate with Folke Bernadotte Academy. It has developed a programme of identifying sources or causes of conflicts. Professor Dessau observed that the world spends about $8 billion annually on war. There are 57,000 UN peacekeepers on ground today. In the last 2 years, a group has been lobbying the Security Council on the proliferation of small arms from even Security Council members to developing countries. However no success has been achieved.

On UPEACE specifically, Prof Dessau explained that the University runs Masters Programmes in many aspects of peace operations and it is the only UN body entitled to grant degrees. The media is incorporated in the programme of the university. The idea is to have partners all over the world. It will develop tapes and CD ROMS to disseminate ideas on education for peace. Prof Dessau further explained that UPEACE had consulted about 15 countries in Africa and had seen tremendous interest in education for peace. He therefore assured participants that the university will provide training materials to several institutions on the continent and it is important to involve those already engaged in peace processes. Thousands of people are required to teach human rights and other attitudes necessary for preventing conflicts.

Finally, Prof Dessau pointed out that peace operations are not popular with regional bodies in Central and Latin America. Countries in the region all have elected governments. But this has not guaranteed sustained peace. Countries like Columbia have been in turmoil. Thus, peace education matters.

Discussions

Questions were raised about the ability of the AU to sustain a Standby Force in terms of funding; standardisation of training; capacity building and the absence of a link between the AU and ECOWAS. In response, it was pointed out that the African Standby Force would be located within national armies. Units would be pulled from their national armies if the need arises; what would be required is standardization. As it is, most of the training programmes are done at the bilateral level and AU and ECOWAS may not be involved. For instance, America may
make training available to a country or a range of countries. But a training manual is now being developed so that anybody can use it and this will lead to same standards all round.

In terms of funding, it was explained that about 6 per cent of members’ contributions to AU is now automatically transferred to peacekeeping. Some countries do make voluntary contributions in excess of the 6 per cent, e.g. South Africa. AU is in talks with EU and others for funds and there are also plans to partner with the private sector which has a stake in maintaining peace.

On the question of linking defence and foreign policy, it was noted there is a study on African capacities on peacekeeping skills but it is being updated. There is a document that was adopted in Sirte, Libya, which seeks to establish the linkage between Defence and Foreign Policy.

Another issue being addressed is post-conflict reconstruction, for which the AU does not have the resources. So advocacy is being adopted to sensitise partners on the need for post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, AU is partnering with NEPAD on a whole range of issues on peace building.

As regards peace education, the UN University for Peace also informed the Seminar of a decision to collaborate with 53 universities in Nigeria.

On the relationship between ECOWAS and the UN it was noted that in terms of documentation, there has been none; the African Centre in Washington is undertaking research on “Lessons Learnt”. Also the UN has a special coordinating machinery in each mission and reports dedicated to working with ECOWAS. A report is expected to come out before the 58th session of the General Assembly in September 2004.

On the concern that the training in Nigeria would not be commensurate with the country’s experience in peacekeeping as only a very small number of officers will be trained at a time, it was explained that training would not be limited to the officially designated sub-regional institutions. Other institutions that are already training will continue. Coordination would be required to bring all these experiences together.

It was also pointed out that the selection of the National War College as a Centre of excellence for peacekeeping training at the
strategic level by ECOWAS is a vital step in building knowledge in peacekeeping because of the experience the College has accumulated over the years. The point was made that one of the problems of African armies has to do with writing i.e. preparation of training manuals, papers, modules and briefs without which the operations of African Standby Force will be hampered. The College can help to fill the gap in this regard. Some contributors also argued that instead of planning for peacekeeping operations, greater emphasis should be placed on preventive diplomacy.

Efforts by the international community to help Africa on a dynamic and realistic basis, for instance, by incorporating foreign bases in Africa into the various regional security mechanisms, were discussed. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the presence of a French arrangement helped to stop the escalation of the crisis. The sub-regional mechanism depended a great deal on the French instruments, even for internal movement. In Comoros, the bases also helped, but in another country it has not worked because the country where the base was located refused it to be used.

On the efforts of ECOWAS towards economic integration of the West African sub-region, it was reported that there is slow but steady progress on the economic integration of the sub-region. Trading in ECOWAS internally is about 11 per cent of the total trade by member countries of the sub-regional grouping. There are still bottlenecks and efforts are being made to expand. One example of this is the sub-regional shipping line, Economarine, which is yet at its infancy. Monetary integration is also going on. The customs union is also being created. There are no more tariffs on trade between member states, but there are many checkpoints that make movements difficult. But attempts are underway to harmonize the various stops/checks by customs, in order to increase trade.

On conflict prevention, it was explained that ECOWAS now has 4 observatory bureaus covering the entire sub-region. But there is need to build more capacities in this respect, especially the capacity to prepare briefs on flashpoints. This would ensure that when leaders meet, they can consider the briefs and, where the need arises, the Council of Elders would be sent to such flashpoints to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.
PART 3

APPENDICES
Appendix A

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDS</td>
<td>African Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations and Training</td>
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<td>Assistance</td>
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<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the</td>
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<td>Liberation of Congo</td>
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<td>AMIC</td>
<td>AU Mission in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Armed Political Parties and Movements</td>
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<td>APPM</td>
<td>Africa Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Bangladesh Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Assistance Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPST</td>
<td>British Peace Support Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTT</td>
<td>Bougainville Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAECOPAZ</td>
<td>Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento conjunto</td>
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<td></td>
<td>para Operaciones de Paz</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>CEES</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENCAMEX</td>
<td>Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misiones al Exterior</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>C³IS</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CMLOs</td>
<td>Civil-Military Liaison Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces pour la defense de la democratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent Owned Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANILOG</td>
<td>Danish International Logistics Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Community of Latin American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Cote D’Ivoire</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOVAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Femmes Africa Solidarite</td>
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<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Zairean Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FICs</td>
<td>Forum Island Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICHR</td>
<td>Irish Centre for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISISC</td>
<td>International Institute for the Higher Study of Criminal Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISPDC</td>
<td>Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Interstate Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Control Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lesotho Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWI</td>
<td>Liberian Women’s Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network</td>
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<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Assets</td>
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<td>MCDU</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Mutual Defence Pact</td>
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<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Cote D’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
</tr>
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<td>MLOs</td>
<td>Military Liaison Officers</td>
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<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MOVCON</td>
<td>Movement Control Unit</td>
</tr>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>NUC</td>
<td>National Universities Commission</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
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<td>OLMEE</td>
<td>OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>OMC</td>
<td>Observation and Monitoring Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMIK</td>
<td>OSCE Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMZ</td>
<td>Observation and Monitoring Zones</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security</td>
</tr>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects and Engineers Inc</td>
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<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Peace Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>REACT</td>
<td>Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Team</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RECAM3</td>
<td>Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix</td>
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<td>RTPC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>South African Protection and Support Detachment</td>
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<td>SARPOCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Commissioners Coordinating Organisation</td>
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<td>SASBRIG</td>
<td>SADC Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<td>SGTM</td>
<td>Standardized Generic Training Modules</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>UN Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SRSN</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<td>TES-DPKO</td>
<td>Training and Evaluation Service, Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>TGoB</td>
<td>Transitional Government of Burundi</td>
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<td>TMG</td>
<td>Truce Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>United Liberation Movement-Johnson</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNCMCoord</td>
<td>United Nations Civil Military Coordination</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Centre</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
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<td>United Nations Observations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>United Nations Office in West Africa</td>
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<td>UNPOB</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office in Bougainville</td>
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<td>UNPSG</td>
<td>United Nations Police Support Group</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangement System</td>
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<td>UPEACE</td>
<td>United Nations University for Peace</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAWC</td>
<td>Violence Against Women and Children</td>
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<td>Verification Mission Team</td>
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<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SEMINAR PROGRAMME

MONDAY, 31 MAY 2004

Arrival

Accreditation and Registration

Social/Visit Activities (Optional)

1600 – 1730 Partners Working Group and Meeting.

1900 – 2100 Reception (Hosted by Nigeria).

TUESDAY, 1 JUNE 2004

Seminar Day 1:

0830 - 0900 Registration/Assemble in Conference Hall

0900 - 0915 Welcome Address by Nigerian Host – Alhaji Rabiu Kwankwaso, Hon. Minister of Defence, Nigeria.

0915 - 0945 Coordination/Update Report by Challenges Coordinators – Amb Michael Sahlin, Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy and Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg, Project Leader, Challenges.

0945 - 1015 Keynote Address – HE Amb Olu Adeniji, Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria.

1015-1030 Seminar Photo Session

1030-1100 Morning Tea.
Session I: Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations.

Chairman – HE Amb Chief Arthur Mbanefo, Fmr Chair of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

1115 – 1145 Presentation on UN DPKO and Peace Operations: the USG, DPKO or Representative.

1145 – 1215 Presentation by AU Representative

1215 – 1300 Discussion.

1300 – 1400 Lunch (Seminar Venue).

1400 – 1600 Presentation by Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary, ECOWAS

Discussion

1600 – 1630 Break

1630 – 1730 Partners Day 1 Co-ordinating Meeting.

1900 – 1930 Assemble for Hosted Dinner at Le Meridien Hotel: Dinner Speech by Gen AO Ogomudia, Chief of Defence Staff, Nigeria.
Seminar Day 2

0830 – 1100 Session II: Regional Organisations and the Challenges of Initiating and Sustaining Peace Operations.

Chairman: Mr Takahisa Kawakami, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

0840 – 0910 Presentation on SADC – Col Festus Aboagye (rtd), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

0915 – 0945 Presentation on UN SHIRBRIG – Brig Sten Edholm, Fmr Force Commander, UN SHIRBRIG.

0950 – 1020 Presentation on South East Asia – Gp Capt. Garry Dunbar, Head, International Organization Department, Australian Defence Organization.

1025 – 1125 Discussion.

1100 – 1130 Morning Tea.

1130 – 1330 Session III: State and Non-State Actors in Regional Peace Operations.
Chairperson: General AA Abubakar, Former Head of State of Nigeria.

1150 - 1220 Presentation by USG or Representative, UN Department for Political Affairs

1220 - 1250 Presentation by Mr. Manuel Bessler, Senior Adviser, UN OCHA
Discussion

1330-1430 Lunch (At Seminar Venue).

1430-1630 Session III continues.

1430 -1500 Presentation by UNMIL, Mr Souren Serayderian, Deputy SRSG UNMIL.

1500 – 1530 Presentation on OSCE – Prof. Ali Karaosmanoglu, Chair, International Relations Department, University of Bilkent, Turkey, and Ms Sebnem Udum, University of Bilkent, Turkey.

1530 – 1600 Presentation by Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Femmes Africa Solidarite.

Discussion

1630 – 1700 Break

1700 – 1745 Partners Day 2 Coordination Meeting.

1900 Dinner: After Dinner Speaker – Chief Arthur Mbanefo, Former Permanent Representative, Nigerian Permanent Mission to the UN.

THURSDAY 3 JUNE, 2004

Seminar Day 3


Chairman: Major General (retd) Tim Ford, Fmr Military Adviser to the UN.
0840 - 0910 Presentation by AU - HE Mr. Sam Ibok, African Union

0910 – 0940 Presentation on EU – Assistant Commissioner Lars Forste, National Criminal Investigation Department, Sweden.

0940 – 1020 Presentation on South America – Dr Erling Dessau, Special Adviser to the Rector, UN University for Peace, Costa Rica.

1020 – 1100 Discussion.

1100 – 1120 Morning Tea.

1125 – 1205 Presentation by Member State – Lt Gen Martin L Agwai, Chief of Army Staff, Nigeria.

1210 – 1240 Presentation on Model Transitional Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice Project – Ms Vivienne O’Connor, Irish Centre for Human Rights.

1340 – 1310 Discussion.

1310 – 1400 Lunch (At Seminar Venue).

1400 – 1600 Concluding Session: Coordination and Cooperation between Organisations in Building Capacity for Effective Peace Operations.

Round Table Chair – Dr Glyn Berry, Minister Councillor Canadian Permanent Representation to the UN, and Chair, Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations Working Group.
Summary of Issues raised in Days 1, 2 and 3 by Chairman followed by a General Discussion.

1530 – 1545
Concluding Remarks – Project Coordinators, HE Amb Michael Sahlin, Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden.

1545 – 1600
Concluding Remarks – Abuja Seminar Host, Rear Adm AG Adedeji, Commandant, National War College, Nigeria.

1630-1830
Partners Meeting and Workshop.

2000
Concluding Dinner: After Dinner Speaker: Representative of China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, China, Host of 15th Challenges Seminar.

FRIDAY 4 JUNE, 2004
Seminar Day 4
‘Working Sightseeing’ visit to Jaji and Kaduna.

SATURDAY 5 JUNE, 2004
Seminar Day 5
Departure.
Annexe C

BRIEF PROFILES OF KEY RESOURCE PERSONS

Project Coordinators

*Ambassador Michael Sahlin* has been, since 2002, Director General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Sahlin graduated with a PhD in Political Science from Uppsala University, Sweden, where he worked as a lecturer in Political Science from 1973 to 1977. In 1977, he joined the Swedish Foreign Service. In 1982-83, he worked as Secretary in the Submarine Commission following service as First Secretary at the Embassy of Sweden, Madrid, Spain from 1983 to 1984. In 1984, he served as Head Secretary in the Defence Commission, after which he served as Secretary, Standing Committee on Defence in the Swedish Parliament during 1987-91. In 1991-1994, Sahlin served as State Secretary in the Swedish Ministry of Defence. During 1995-98, he was appointed and served as Ambassador of Sweden to Turkey, followed by service in 1998-2000 as Ambassador at large, responsible for Swedish support to EU candidate countries. He was Ambassador of Sweden to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia(FRYM) 2000-2002.

*Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg* is the Project Leader of the Challenges Project (*Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century*) at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden (2003-). She holds a Bachelor of Science(International Relations) from the London School of Economics & Political Science(LSE), a Maitrise(Politique Internationale) from University of Brussels. The Challenges Project originated in 1996 as part of her research at the LSE on comparative approaches to peace operations. She was employed between 1997 and 2003 by the Swedish National Defence College(NDC) as Challenges Project Director and Coordinator.

Special Guests

*Alhaji Rabiu Musa Kwankwasa* is the Honourable Minister of Defence of Federal Republic of Nigeria. Born in 1957, he is an engineer by profession, and was elected Member representing Madobi Constituency, Kano State, and subsequently also Deputy Speaker,
Federal House of Representatives (1992 – 1993). In 1999, he was elected Governor of Kano State and held the office until 2003.

Ambassador Olayemi Adeniji was born on 22 July, 1934 in Ijebu Ode, Ogun State. A career ambassador, Adeniji was Nigeria’s Ambassador to Australia from 1976 to 1977, Switzerland (1977 to 1981) and France (1987). Adeniji was Director for European Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs (1981-1983), Member, Advisory Board to UN Secretary-General on Disarmament. Later in the 1980s, he was Chairman, UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament and was later appointed Special Representative and Head of UN Missions in Sierra Leone.

Session Chairmen


Ambassador Chief Arthur C.I Mbanefo served as the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations from October 1999 to July 2003. Chief Mbanefo is a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria, being the President of the latter Institute from 1978 to 1979. Over the years, he has worked as a formal and informal adviser to some of the Governments of Nigeria, particularly the Federal Government, and has served on numerous national committees, commissions and investigative bodies both as a member and Chairman. At the United Nations, he was the Chairman of the Group 77, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and also Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations.
Major General Timothy Ford (Retd) is based in Sydney, Australia as an international peace and security consultant. He retired from the Australian Army in January 2003, following an extensive career in the Australian Defence Force and the United Nations. During his military career, General Ford served in a wide variety of command, staff, and training appointments, in the Australia Permanent Mission in New York, and as Chief Military Adviser to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ), New York, from September 2000 until September 2002. He commanded the Military Division in the DPKO and provided strategic military advice to the UN Headquarters including the Security Council, Member States and the 15 UN peacekeeping missions in the field.

Ambassador Takahisa Kawakami is the Special Adviser to Japan’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Between November 1995 and March 2000, Mr Kawakami served as the Principal Officer and Deputy to the Director of the Asia and Middle East Division of the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations. His immediate last appointment was as Director of the International Peace Cooperation Division at the Foreign Policy Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dr Glyn Berry is the Minister Counselor of the Canadian Permanent Representation to the United Nations, and Chair of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations Working Group.

Lead Presenters

Lt Gen Martin L. Agwai is the Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army. He enrolled at the Nigerian Defence Academy in 1970 and graduated in 1972, winning the Sword of Honour for being the Best All Round cadet and the Gold Medal for being the First in the Order of Merit in his Course. Thereafter, he attended several courses, both local and overseas. In 1996-1997, he attended the National War College, Nigeria and in 1999, attended the National Defence University (NDU) in Washington DC, USA where he obtained an M.Sc in National Resource Strategy. He has held several appointments in the Nigerian Army and in November 2000, he was appointed Deputy Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In November 2002, he proceeded to the UN headquarters in New
York as Deputy Military Adviser in the Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

**Rear Admiral Amos Gbadejo Adedeji** is the Commandant of the National War College, Nigeria. Born in 1949, he enrolled at the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, in December 1970 and graduated as a midshipman in 1972. He attended a number of other courses in Nigeria, United Kingdom and India including the National War College, Nigeria where he emerged as the Best All Round Participant of Course 3 (1994-95) in addition to winning the prize for the best research paper. He has served as Commanding Officer of several Nigerian Navy ships, Directing Staff at both the Command and Staff College, Jaji and the National War College, Flag Officer Commanding Naval Training Command and was the Chief of Policy and Plans, Naval HQ from April 2002 to March 2003.

**Mr Manuel Bessler** is Senior Advisor of the Policy Development Branch of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations in New York. Between 1991 and 1999, he worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in different field missions, including as Legal Advisor and Head of Information Department in Haiti, Head of Mission in Chechnya and Head of Delegation in Iraq. Before his work with the ICRC, he was a practicing law in Zurich, Switzerland. He holds degrees from the University of Zurich and Harvard Law School.

**Group Captain Garry Dunbar** has, since January 2002, been the Director, United Nations and Peace Operations, in the International Policy Division of Australian Defence Headquarters. Born in Balaklava, South Australia, he joined the Royal Australian Air Force in January 1969. A trained pilot of various military aircrafts including the UH-1H helicopter, C-47(Dakota) and the C-130(Hercules), he also attended the Indonesian Air Force Command and Staff College (SESKO-AU) in 1986/87 and latter the Joint Services Staff College. Over the years, he has held several important posts including Commanding Officer, No 36 Sqn(C-130H aircraft in the tactical air lift role) and Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of Air Staff. Following further promotion, he held the positions of Air Attache in the Australian Embassy in Indonesia;
Director, Air Power Studies Centre; and Australia’s first Defence Liaison Officer at the Australian Mission in East Timor.

**Mr. Lars P. Forsté** is an Assistant Commissioner with the National Criminal Investigation Division of the Swedish National Police. He holds an LL.M. degree from University of Lund, Sweden. He has held several important posts in the Swedish National Police and headed the Counter-Terrorism, Counter-espionage and VIP Protection units of the Swedish National Security Service. He has also served with UN peace missions, notably as Deputy Regional Commander in Bosnia Herzegovina, and with OSCE as Head of Police Training in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

**Mr. Souren Georges Seraydarian** is the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). He holds a Ph.D. in International Law and Political Science and a post-graduate Diploma from the Diplomatic Academy in Austria. He joined the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in 1969 and rose to become Representative of the Director-General of UNIDO to the UN and its specialized agencies in Geneva. Since 1993, he has served in several capacities within UN peace missions in Haiti, South Africa, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Afghanistan, rising to the rank of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations.

**Col Festus Boahen Aboagye (rtd)** is head of the Training for Peace Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa. He served on several UN peace operations and also with ECOMOG in Liberia (1997-1998) and attained the rank of Colonel in the Ghanaian Army before his retirement. From August 2000 to May 2002, he served with the OAU as Senior Military Expert for the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and peace process. From March 2003 to March 2004, he served the African Union as a Consultant/Panel Member for the development of the Policy Framework for the African Standby Force and later as Senior Military Advisor to the Head of the African Union in Burundi (AMIB). He joined the ISS in March 2004 as program head for the Peace Missions Program. He is the author of *The Ghana Army, A Concise Contemporary Guide to its Regional Centennial History (1997-1999)* and *ECOMOG, A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia.*
Ms Vivienne O’Connor is based at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway. She is the Co-Director of the Model Transitional Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice Project, a project that she has been involved in since August 2002. Ms. O’Connor also lectures human rights law in the Medical faculty of the National University of Ireland, Galway. She holds a Bachelor of Civil Law (BCL) from University College, Dublin, and a Masters of Law (LLM) in International Human Rights Law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights. She is currently writing a Ph.D. on the subject of rule of law in peace operations and the potential use of the transitional model codes in such a context.

Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu is Chairman of the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University. He holds a Doctorate in International Law from the University of Lausanne (1970). He has been a Fellow at the Hague Academy of International Law, a Fulbright Fellow, and a NATO Fellow. He was a visiting scholar at Stanford University in 1980-1981, and at Princeton University. He has been member of Turkish delegations to various inter-governmental conferences, including the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Dr. Karaosmanoglu has researched and published on security affairs, foreign policy and peacekeeping operations. His articles have appeared in such journals as Foreign Affairs, Europa Archiv, Politique Etrangere, Security Dialogue, International Defence Review and Journal of International Affairs.

Professor Erling Dessau is a Senior Advisor to the Rector of the United Nations University for Peace in Costa Rica. He holds a Ph.D from University of Copenhagen (1959).

Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas is the Executive Secretary (Chief Executive Officer) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He holds degrees in Political Science from University of Ghana, Legon, (B.A. 1973) and Cornell University Ithaca, New York (M.A. 1977, Ph.D 1980) as well as a law degree from Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA. He was appointed Deputy Foreign Secretary of Ghana in 1987, served as First Deputy Speaker of the Ghanaian Parliament (1993-1994) and also as Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament with oversight responsibility for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between April 1997 and December 2000, Dr Chambas was Deputy Minister of Education in charge of tertiary education in Ghana.

**Ms Sebnem Udum** holds a B.Sc in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University and an MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies with a Certificate on Non-proliferation Studies. She also has an MA in International Relations from Bilkent University, where she is currently a Ph.D. student with a focus on Security Studies. Her research interests include Turkish foreign and security policy, international security issues especially in Europe and the Middle East, and non-proliferation.

**Brigadier Sten Edholm** of the Swedish Army is a former Commander of SHIRBRIG, the multinational Standing High Readiness Brigade for UN operations, based in Copenhagen. Born in 1948, he had a background in the Royal Engineers of the Swedish Army. After staff work in the 1980s, he was transferred to the Swedish Army Aviation, where he was a battalion Commander, and later Director of Swedish Army Aviation. In 1999, he was appointed Head of the International Operations Department at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, and later Deputy Director of the Joint Operations Staff.

**Ambassador Sam Iboh** is Director of the Department of Peace and Security at the Secretariat of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

**Ms Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff** is a member of the Executive Board of the international women’s organisation, Femmes Africa Solidarite and also a leading member of the Sierra Leonean organization, Women Organised for a Morally Enlightened Nation(WOMEN). A lawyer and gender rights activist, she served as the Executive Secretary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone from March to September 2002.

**Members of Editorial Committee**

**Dr Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi** is the Director of Research and Publications at the Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College, Nigeria. He has been a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Jos between 1984 and early 1997. He was also a Commonwealth Scholar at the London
School of Economics and Political Science, where he obtained his Doctorate in International Relations. He has taught and researched extensively on conflict management and resolution. One of such efforts is the book *The African Crisis Response Initiative: Issues and Perspectives*, which he edited with T. A. Imobighe. He was also on the Nigerian delegations to the Second OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1997, and the West Africa Ministerial Symposium in Dakar, Senegal, in 2003 organized by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. Dr Zabadi is the Desk Officer of the Challenges Project at the National War College, Nigeria.

**Gani Joses Yoroms** is a Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator of Defence and Security Programme at the Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College, Nigeria. He has a graduate certificate in Defence and Security Management from the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and a Ph.D (Political Science) Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria. Dr Yoroms is involved in teaching, research and supervision of research projects at the National War College. He is part of the team of experts constituted by the Centre for Democracy and Development (London) to work on a “Handbook on Security Sector Transformation in West Africa”. He is also currently working with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (West Africa) to develop a framework for Security Sector Reform in West Africa. Dr Yoroms is a co-editor of the book “The Media and Conflict Management in Nigeria” (Forthcoming). He has published in both local and international journals and books.

**Ms Julie Sanda** is a Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator of Conflict Studies at the Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College, Abuja. She has participated in and/or coordinated several projects, chief among which are: Survey of Conflicts in Nigeria (1997 – 1999); Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (2002); Ethnic Militias and National Security; the Challenges Project, Abuja Seminar (2004); Building A Regional Security Architecture for West Africa (2004). As a member of the Academic Faculty, she also teaches and supervises research in the War College. She has consulted for both government and non-governmental organizations and has also undertaken several collaborative projects with civil society organizations, principally in legislative advocacy for the Bill on Violence Against Women, Freedom of Information Bill, Enhancing Civil-Military Relations and HIV/AIDS Awareness for youth. A political scientist, she is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association, Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) and the Peace Studies Association of Nigeria (PESAN).
Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) and the Peace Studies Association of Nigeria (PESAN).

*Nnamdi K. Obasi* is a Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Human Security Programme at the Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College, Nigeria. He holds B.Sc and M.Sc degrees from the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), Ile Ife, Nigeria. He has authored two books: *Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa* and *Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria*; he has also contributed chapters to several other publications. Obasi has served as a Consultant on several local and international projects on several issues of peace and human security. He is the Liaison Officer of the National War College, Nigeria on the Challenges of Peace Operations Project.
### Appendix D

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization/Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Alaciel Campos Dugone</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>CAECOPAZ, Argentina</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Garry Dunbar</td>
<td>Gp Capt</td>
<td>Australian Defense Force, Australia</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Bruce Oswald</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>APCML, Australia</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Timothy Ford</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Tim Ford Consultants, Australia</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Glyn Berry</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Canada to UN, USA</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>David Lightburn</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Zhang Li</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence, China</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Zhuang Maocheng</td>
<td>Sen Col (rtd)</td>
<td>CISS, China</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Vivienne O'Connor</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>ICHR, National University of Ireland, Ireland</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Takahisa Kawakami</td>
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<td>Institute for Security Studies, South Africa</td>
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<td>Henri Boshoff</td>
<td>Col (rtd)</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies, South Africa</td>
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<td>Jonas Alberoth</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden</td>
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<td>Brig Gen</td>
<td>Swedish Army</td>
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<td>Anna Karin Enestrom</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Lars Forste</td>
<td>Asst Comm</td>
<td>National Criminal Investigation Department, Swedish National Police</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Lena Nilsson</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command, Sweden</td>
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<td>Annika Hilding-Norberg</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Michael Sahlin</td>
<td>Amb</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden</td>
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<td>Tony Stigsson</td>
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<td>Joint Forces Command, Sweden</td>
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<td>Charlotte Svensson</td>
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<td>Murat Bilhan</td>
<td>Amb</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic Research, Turkey</td>
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<td>Emel Derinoz-Tekin</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic Research, Turkey</td>
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<td>Saadet Gulden Ayman</td>
<td>Prof Ms</td>
<td>USAID Foreign Policy Forum, Turkey</td>
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<td>Derek G. Boothby</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Manuel Bessler</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>OCHA, USA</td>
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<td>Erling Dessau</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>UIPEACE, France</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Francisco Cobos Flores</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>UNMIL, Liberia</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Souren Seraydarian</td>
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<td>UNMIL, Liberia</td>
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<td>Peter Tingwa</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>UNMIL, Liberia</td>
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<td>Marie Therese Keita</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>UNOWA, United Nations</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg</td>
<td>Ms</td>
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<td>Eric Berman</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Michael J Dooley</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>US Army PKSOI, USA</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Victoria Holt</td>
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<td>Henry L. Stimson Centre, USA</td>
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<td>Harvey Langholtz</td>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>UNITAR POCI, USA</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Moria Shanahan</td>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Henry L. Stimson Centre, USA</td>
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### OTHER ACADEMIC / RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

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<td>OAU Ile Ife</td>
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**NGOS / CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS**

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**OTHER FEDERAL/STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

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**EMINENT PERSONS**

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#### DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, NIGERIA

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**NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, NIGERIA**

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### THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF PEACE OPERATIONS

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<td>Subah, C</td>
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<td>125</td>
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<td>126</td>
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### NPF & OTHER SECURITY AGENCIES

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<td>129</td>
<td>Balogun, Tafa</td>
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<td>IGP</td>
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<td>Alobi, M.E.</td>
<td>CP</td>
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<td>131</td>
<td>Garrick, Kayode</td>
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<td>Director</td>
<td>Office of National Security Adviser</td>
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### MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

<table>
<thead>
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<td>134</td>
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<td>Min Counselor</td>
<td>MFA</td>
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**OTHER ACADEMIC / RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS**

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**DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN NIGERIA**

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<td>Gennady, VI</td>
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**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**
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<tr>
<td>Faya, J N</td>
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<td>Annakarin, L.</td>
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<td>Yuka Hamanogi</td>
<td>Pol Adviser</td>
<td>Fmb of Japan, Nigeria</td>
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<td>Zulu</td>
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<td>Jonas, SA</td>
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<td>Emb of B/Fasu, Abuja</td>
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**NGOS / CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS**

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<td>Bamuel, Harald</td>
<td>Dr</td>
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<td>Hennmann, Jens-U</td>
<td>Mr</td>
<td>Coordinator Security Policy Projects</td>
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<td>Tsamala, Seen-Jacques</td>
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<td>Burger, Carmen</td>
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<td>Sayy, Sybil</td>
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<td>Arikpo, Janet</td>
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**OTHER FEDERAL/STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

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**EMINENT PERSONS**

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Lagos
Appendix E

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

National War College
in collaboration with
  Nigerian Army,
  Ministry of Defence,
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  Nigerian Navy
  Nigerian Air Force
  Nigeria Police Force
  Department of State Security Service
  and
  the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden
Appendix F

MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT COMMITTEE

Coordinator
Ms Julie G Sanda

Civilian Academic Staff
Dr Joses G Yoroms
Mr Nnamdi K Obasi
Mr Okezie O Nwankwo
Mr Danladi Bot

Military Personnel
Major S S Araoye
Major B Kurubö
Wg Cdr Usman
Staff Sergeant I Garba
WOII E Oloye

Other Civilian Staff
Mr Victor Ogedengbe
Mr Tijani Mohammed
Mr Moses O Owolabi
Ms Kate Anyaeji
Mr Nelson Begha
Ms Aisha Itseko
Ms Aisha Adamu
Ms Nafisa Atta
Mr Musa Dangrem
Ms Judith Chukwuma
Ms Helen Akpama
Mr Ayuba Ibrahim
Mr Olutoye Amode
Appendix G

CONTACT ADDRESSES OF PARTNER ORGANISATIONS

COORDINATING INSTITUTION
Folke Bernadote Academy
87264 Sandoverken
Sweden
Phone: +46 (0) 612-82200
Email: info@folkebernadotteacademy.se
Web: www.peacechallenges.net

PARTNER ORGANISATIONS/INSTITUTIONS
Swedish National Defence College
Box 27805, 115 93 Stockholm, Sweden,
Phone: +46 8 788 9391, Fax +46 8 788 9648
Website: www.bibliotek.fhs.mil.se

Russian Public Policy Centre
3 Louchnikov Pet., Moscow, Russian Federation,
Phone: +7 095 206 8292, Fax: +7 095 206 8579.
Website: www.nira.go.jp

Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
P.O.Box 850 747, Amman, 111 85 Jordan,
Phone: + 9626 593 4400, Fax: 9626 593 4408
Website: www.id.gov.jo

Institute for Security Studies
P.O. Box 1787, Brooklyn Sq, 0075 Pretoria, South Africa,
Phone: + 27 12 346 9500, Fax: +27 12 460 998.
Website: www.iss.co.za

U.S Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA 17013-5049, USA,
Phone: +1 717 245 3722, Fax: +1 717 245 3279.
United Service Institution of India
Tula Ram marga, Post Bag 6, Vasant Vihar, 110057 New Delhi, India,
Phone: +1 91 11 614 6849, Fax: 11 91 11 614 9773.
Website: www.usiofindia.org

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
International Peace Cooperation Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Tokyo, Japan,
Phone: +81 3 3580 3311, Fax: +81 33591 4914.
Website: www.mofa.go.jp

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
P.O.Box 100, Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada B0S 1E0,
Phone: +1902 638 8040, Fax: +1902 638 3344.
Website: www.peaceoperations.org

Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff
CAECOPAZ, Puerta 4 – Campo de Mayo, 1659 Buenos Aires, Argentina,
Phone / Fax: +54 11 4666 3448.
Website: www.caecopaz.mil.ar/

Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law
Law School, The University of Melbourne,
VIC 3010 Australia.
Phone: + 61 3 8344 4775, Fax: + 61 3 8344 0054
Website: www.apcml.org

OR
Building 100, Randwick Barracks,
Avoca Street, Randwick 2031 Australia.
Phone: + 61 2 9349 0654, Fax: + 61 2 9349 0757
Website: www.apcml.org

Centre for Strategic Research
Kircicegi Sokale 8/3, G.O.P. –06700, Ankara, Turkey,
Phone: +90 312 446 04 35, Fax: +90 312 445 05 84
Email: strategy@mfa.gov.tr
Website: www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/sam
National War College
Herbert Macaulay Way (North), P.M.B. 323, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria
Phone: +234 (0) 9 2347606, Fax: +234 (0) 9 2728423
Email: abujachallenges2004@yahoo.com
Website: www.nwc-ng.org

China International Institute for Strategic Studies
No. 6 Hua Yan Bei Li, Chaoyang District,
P. O. Box 9812, Beijing 100029 China
Phone: +86 10 667 47811, Fax: +86 10 620 21048
Email: ciiss@sina.com, peacekeeping2004@yahoo.com.cn
Appendix H
THE ROAD TO ABUJA:
CHALLENGES PROJECT SEMINARS
FROM 1997 TO JUNE 2004

<table>
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<td>September 1997</td>
<td>Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>Russian Public Policy Centre, Moscow, Russia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1998</td>
<td>Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Amman, Jordan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 2001</td>
<td>Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Buenos Aires, Argentina.</td>
<td>How to Determine Success in and of a PKO and Training &amp; Education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>April 2002</td>
<td>United Nations, New York, USA. Presentation of Phase I Concluding Report</td>
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<td>November 2002</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force/Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, Melbourne, Australia. The Rule of Law on Peace Operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy, Krusenberg, Sweden. Peace Operations and Counter Terrorism.</td>
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Appendix I

About

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, NIGERIA

The National War College, Nigeria, established in June 1992, prepares selected senior military and police officers and their counterparts from strategic Federal Ministries for higher level policy, command and staff functions by equipping them with the knowledge and expertise needed to exercise these functions in single or joint service assignments, in both national and international environments. For each set of intakes, the College runs an 11-month Course, leading to award of the Fellow of the War College (fwc).

The objectives of the College are to:

- Prepare Senior officers for planning at operational level, probably within a cooperative regional framework.
- Underpin command and staff studies with a firm understanding of geographical considerations affecting Nigeria, Africa and the world at large.
- Provide knowledge of the political and strategic framework for operations in conjunction with allied formations.
- Examine the principles of leadership and art of high-level command.
- Practice planning and shaping of the battlefield, in order to meet strategic aims set at National Defence Council Level.
- Relate within a democratic framework, the higher management of defence to the broadened national interest and in particular, to study the principles of resource allocation and force structuring within finite budget limits.

The National War College is designated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as the coordinating centre for strategic level peacekeeping training in West Africa.
THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS:

Since the 1990s, regional organisations have played an increasingly active role in regional security affairs, not only in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and confidence-building but also in terms of peace enforcement. Focusing the regional dimension of peace operations, the National War College of Nigeria in cooperation with the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden hosted the 14th International Seminar under the Challenges of Peace Operations Projects in Abuja from 31 May to 4 June 2004.

Session topics at the Seminar focused on four major areas namely: major issues and opportunities in the interface between the United Nations and regional organisations in peace operations; regional organisations and the challenges of initiating and sustaining peace operations; state and non-state actors in regional peace operations; and international support for capacity building for regional peace operations. Presentations and discussions paid particular attention to arrangements for developing regional capacity for conduct of peace operations and their relationship to the United Nations in its responsibility for international peace and security.

This publication presents edited texts of the papers delivered by key speakers, rapporteurs’ reports of the four sessions and an Executive Summary of the entire Seminar.

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