COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
IN AND ON
PEACE OPERATIONS

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ON
CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

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Chief Editor
SHI ZHENGBAI

Managing Editors
ZHUANG MAOCHENG
LIU ZHAO
LU JIANXIN

Peacekeeping Affairs Office, MND
China Institute for International Strategic Studies
FOREWORD

Peace and development remain the themes of our present time. The development of any country requires a sustained world peace. Therefore, people all over the world are longing for peace in general and the people in conflict ridden places are craving for the early coming of peace in particular. Peacekeeping operations are an important means by the United Nations to safeguard world peace and security. Since the establishment of UNTSO in 1948, there have been dozens of UN peacekeeping operations initiated, which have proved their positive and beneficial role in relaxing tensions and bringing about peaceful solutions to many conflicts.

There are now many new challenges for the UN peacekeeping operations, with the question of “how to strengthen and improve UN peacekeeping operations” being the most important and pressing one facing the international community. The United Nations and many other organizations, governmental and non governmental alike, have made a relentless effort in that regard. “Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century” has been an unofficial research project of international cooperation among a dozen partners or so. Since its birth in 1997, its partners have respectively organized 15 international seminars on the same heading, but with different priorities each time. Its Phase I research outcomes have been perceived as very critical by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

The China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) has the honor to be part of the Phase II of this unofficial research project. The Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence and CIISS co-hosted the Beijing International Seminar on Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century from November 3 to 5, 2004.

The seminar focused on three themes: 1. Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations: the Challenges for Member States in the New Era. 2. Expectations from the International Community and the Challenges for Troop Contributing Countries. 3. Diversified Tasks and the Challenges for Education and Training. The participants had wide-ranging and in-depth discussions on all three themes. Some participants shared their insights and came up with very constructive recommendations.

This book is a collection of the major speeches and presentations delivered at the seminar, including those by some department leaders of the Chinese government and the Chinese Armed Forces. It is believed that the seminar outcomes, both plentiful and substantial, have had valuable inputs into the Phase II Concluding Report to be submitted to the UN Secretary General in the latter half of 2005 and will contribute to the strengthening and improvement of U.N. Peacekeeping operations and to the promotion of regional and world peace.
The success of the Beijing International Seminar should be accredited to the joint efforts by all participants and partner organizations. First of all, we would like to thank Under Secretary General Jean Marie Guéhenno and Under Secretary General Kieran Prendergast. They had planned to be present at the Beijing International Seminar but cancelled their trip on very short notice because of their pressing commitments at the UN headquarters in New York. Fortunately, both of them sent their personal representatives to deliver speeches on their behalf for the seminar's opening. We would also like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security for their valuable support. We are also grateful to all participants, especially the presenters. Their careful preparations and active involvement contributed to the positive outcomes.

We would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our appreciation for the challenges project coordinators Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, and Ms. Charlotte Svensson of the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden. They did a huge amount of communication and coordination for the Beijing International Seminar. Their enthusiasm was an important factor contributing to the success of the seminar. Lastly, we are indebted to our colleagues working for the hosts—the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. They worked very hard to make the Beijing International Seminar a great success. Their work was not only time consuming but also required great attention to details.
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Major General Shi Zhengbai
Senior official in charge of Peacekeeping Affairs
Ministry of National Defence, China

Respected Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today, the 15th Seminar on the Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century is being held in Beijing. Firstly, on behalf of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence of PRC and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, I would like to express our heartfelt thanks and extend warm welcome to the officials, experts, scholars and all the guests attending this opening ceremony.

This seminar is the last one which will conclude the second phase of the Challenges Project. The Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies are very pleased and feel honoured to co-host this seminar.

Since the first phase of the Challenges Project started in 1997, the officials, experts and scholars from many countries as well as the United Nations have carried out comprehensive and profound research, analyses and discussions on such important and pressing issues of international security, the role of United Nations and regional organizations, the status quo of peacekeeping operations and the current problems, etc. The Concluding Report of the first phase was submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2002, in which many constructive ideas and recommendations were put forward on how to carry out peacekeeping operations more effectively for the maintenance of world peace and stability. The Report received broad attention in the UN, particularly from the Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan himself, and from the relevant member states. When the first phase was over, the Challenge Project entered its second phase in light of new events and characteristics which had emerged in the international security environment. The Concluding Report will be completed by mid-2005 when it will be submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

As is known to all, every peacekeeping operation involves huge and laborious work and its success relies heavily on cooperation and coordination of each party and even the whole international community. Cooperation and Coordination involves every aspect, such as cooperation and coordination between the internal departments of the United Nations, between the United Nations and the member states or regional organization concerned, among the member states and troop contributing countries. It also involves the cooperation and coordination between the internal departments of the member states and the troop contributing countries. It is an extremely complicated and difficult issue. No doubt, this hard work is also a hard nut to crack for all the
countries and people who love peace and are willing to fight for peace, and this work needs relevant experts and professionals from all over the world to carry out comprehensive and profound exchanges, discussions and communications. This seminar will provide a good platform for discussion and communication, and its result will enrich and improve the Concluding Report of the second phase of the Challenges Project, and it will certainly play a positive role in the present and future UN peacekeeping operations. All the officials, experts and scholars present here have vast experiences and have undertaken in depth theoretical research in this field. I am convinced that you will take this opportunity to air your views freely without any reservations, which is the objective of this seminar. I sincerely wish it success.

As one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, China is always dedicated to the maintenance of world peace and stability, and attaches great importance to and participates in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. The People’s Liberation Army of China adheres to the foreign policy of the Chinese government. It has been expanding the scale of participation in the UN peacekeeping operations. As the unitary coordination and management organization of PLA peacekeeping operations, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence of China is willing to exchange views and experiences with all the foreign representatives present here face to face and discuss the issues of common interests, and make our contribution to world peace and stability. The CIISS bears the same opinion as ours. Therefore, we cherish this opportunity and make careful preparations for this seminar, and we hope we will create a good working and living environment for all the friends present. Besides, I think I should mention that in the process of preparation, the coordinator of the Challenges Project, particularly Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, has helped us in a great deal of coordination work and supported us all the time. I would like to extend my wholehearted gratitude to Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg and to the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I would like again, on behalf of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defence of China and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, to express our thanks and welcome for your coming all the way to Beijing. I wish you will enjoy your work and life here.

Thank you very much.
WE ARE HERE FOR PEACE

Mr Shen Guofang
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of PRC

Entering into the 21st century, the world is undergoing profound and complicated changes. The great cause of human progress is facing historical opportunities as well as unprecedented challenges. The forces in favor of peace are growing and conditions for development are improving. The world is seeking for the common goal of peace and stability, development and prosperity.

At the same time, there have been increasing threats and challenges in this world. Traditional security problems like ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes are to be better solved while non-traditional security problems like terrorism, cross border crimes and epidemic diseases are getting more serious. The imbalance of development is more outstanding and North-South gap further widening. Under the circumstances of globalization, the above mentioned threats and challenges are interwoven, which makes them more difficult to handle. The Iraq War also exposed the deep conflicts and differences of the international community in the means and methods of dealing with threats.

We have been trying for a long time to find a way to effectively cope with global threats and challenges, but it seems we have not been successful. I believe, in this world, security for one country is only temporary if there is no common security. It is impossible for one single country to sustain its development without common development. For the peace and development of human beings, we must uphold multilateralism, step up collective actions, promote international cooperation and enhance, inter alia, the role and authority of the United Nations.

The United Nations was founded after the Second World War. Its primary task is to safeguard world peace and the core of its concept is collective security.

Over the sixty years since its founding, the United Nations has undergone trials and hardships and made outstanding contributions to world peace and security. In this regard, 59 UN peacekeeping operations starting from UNTSO to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti deserve well of the UN.

Peacekeeping operations were gradually developed after the United Nations went through a series of crises. Peacekeeping operations are not formally recorded in the UN Charter, but they fully conform to its purposes and principles, serving as one of the most important and effective means of practicing multilateralism and achieving collective security in the field of international peace and security.
For millions of people who are suffering from conflicts, “the blue helmet” is a symbol of peace and sometimes the most desired hope. Compared to the loss of around a hundred billion dollars each year caused by conflicts, peacekeeping operations are of low cost but tremendous benefit. That explains the significance of enhancing the UN peacekeeping operations.

Today, UN peacekeeping operations are facing new situations and new challenges, which, in my opinion, can be summarized into the following two sets of contradictions:

First, the contradiction between expectations and reality. The United Nations is currently carrying out 16 peacekeeping operations with more than 70,000 personnel involved. The peacekeeping budget for this year will reach 4 billion dollars. However, demands for new missions are increasing and people are having higher expectation of UN missions. This indicated the success of peacekeeping operations on the one hand, while on the other, it exposed the shortage of personnel and funding. Someone even says that UN peacekeeping operations have failed to keep up with its ambitions and the rapid reaction capability has been used up. These words overstate the fact, but they merit our attention.

Second, the contradiction between mission and capability. The change of security threats and conflict nature and the diversification of the cause of conflicts have continuously expanded UN peacekeeping operations both in the form and in the content. Its function is expanded from the supervision of ceasefire and withdrawal of troops to a multidimensional and multidisciplinary one that includes assisting political transition, economic reconstruction, return of refugees, humanitarian aid, electoral supervision and disarmament, etc. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping operations should make tremendous improvements either in concept renovation, comprehensive planning, or in rapid deployment, logistic support and even the discipline and language capacity of the peacekeepers.

The improvement of UN peacekeeping operations requires the member states to keep its promise of collective action and multilateralism by investing necessary political, financial and personnel resources. It also requires peacekeeping operations themselves to keep up with the times and carry out rational and necessary reforms. In my opinion, the key to success is how to handle two issues: First, how to strike a balance between tradition and reform. We should adhere to the essential framework and principle of UN peacekeeping operations, especially in three points: ① The key to solve a conflict is in the hands of the conflicting parties. UN peacekeeping operations should give their priority to political rather than military aspect.② Deliberate selection or double standard should be avoided in the deployment of peacekeeping operations. ③ We should stick to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as well as other operational norms.

Surely, to meet new challenges under new situations, UN peacekeeping operations need to be reformed, particularly in enhancing overall planning, improving operational efficiency, boosting rapid response capability and strengthening personnel training. The Brahimi Report has put forward many constructive suggestions, which are expected to be put into action after the deliberation of the member states instead of stopping at the paper work forever. We are also waiting for strategic ideas and proposals from the UN High level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
Second, how to strike a balance between playing a leading role and a coordinating role. The UN Security Council is undoubtedly the primary organ in safeguarding world peace and security and plays a leading role in peacekeeping operations. However, it should not be an exclusive one. It should reach out for new partnership, which includes three aspects:

1. The Security Council should further increase its communication with the UN Secretariat and the troop contributing countries based on its Resolution 1353.
2. The Security Council should improve its coordination with other UN agencies, especially by making use of their advantages and enthusiasm to eradicate the root cause of conflicts.
3. The United Nations should give more role to regional organizations while maintaining its leading role. In addition, more attention should be paid to the coordination between military, police and civilian components in peacekeeping missions. I also want to emphasize that major demand for peacekeeping operations comes from Africa. That demand should be better taken care of. And the Security Council should give more guidance and support to regional organizations in Africa.

China is following an independent foreign policy of peace. We have always maintained that the UN should strengthen its functions and play a leading role in major issues concerning world peace and security. We have been actively involved in UN peacekeeping operations.

Since the end of the 1980s, China has dispatched more than 3000 servicemen, police and civilian officials to 15 peacekeeping operations. In 2002, we joined the UN Standby Arrangement System. In 2003, China dispatched engineering troops and a medical team to MONUC. It was the first time that China sent non-combatant troops to a UN peacekeeping operation in Africa. In the same year, China dispatched by far the biggest contingent to UNMIL. This year, China sent an anti riot police team of 125 persons to Haiti, China's first participation in a UN peacekeeping operation in the Western Hemisphere and first police contingent in UN peacekeeping operations.

Today, nearly one thousand Chinese peacekeepers are serving in a dozen of UN missions. They are contributing to UN peacekeeping operations with their good performance. They are the best sons and daughters of China and of the United Nations. Here I have one example. In DRC, one Uruguayan soldier, who did not belong to the mission area of the Chinese Contingent, wrote some words on the back of his name plate: “If I am injured, please send me to the Chinese hospital.” This shows his full trust in the Chinese medical team in the peacekeeping mission.

I would like to reiterate that the Chinese government will continue to expand its participation in UN peacekeeping operations and make more contributions to world peace and security as well as strengthening the role of the United Nations.

In May of this year, one Chinese peacekeeping soldier named Fu Qingli was awarded a “Dag Hammarskjold” medal. This young man, aged 26, sacrificed his life for the peace process of DRC. I want to conclude my speech with some of his words when he was alive: “We are here for peace.”
Respected Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to address the Beijing International Seminar on Challenges of Peace Operations: into the 21st Century. The theme of this seminar is “Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations”. Peacekeeping is one of the vital tools employed by the UN in maintaining world peace and security. Cooperation and coordination among all the parties involved must be strengthened in order to make peacekeeping operations really effective and to reach the anticipated objectives. That explains the importance of this seminar. May the seminar be crowned with success!

My remarks today will mainly cover two aspects: ① The major features of the present international security situation; and ② To improve and boost the UN peacekeeping operations.

1. The Major Features of the Present International Security Situation

At present, the international situation is still experiencing profound changes. Peace and development remain to be the main themes of the present times, which, however, have been blemished by sharp increase of unstable and uncertain factors. Power politics is still in existence, terrorism is on the rise again, and local conflicts and humanitarian crises crop out now and then. Despite of the winding up of large scale military operations of the Iraq War, peace in Iraq is far from being a reality. A possible solution to the long lasting Middle East issue is still up in the air and sanguinary conflicts have been popping up here and there. Instead of bringing benefit to every country in the world, economic globalization has widened and is still widening the gap between the North and the South. All in all, the current international security situation has taken on the following features:

1. The security issue has become diversified. While the traditional security issues spawned by ethnic and religious conflicts as well as by border and territory disputes still exist, non traditional security threats are, in the meantime, projecting themselves with a rapid increase. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transborder crimes, environmental pollution, drug
trafficking, the spread of infectious diseases and whatnot have turned into prominent nagging issues affecting the security and development of mankind. They are intertwined, mingled and transferable with the traditional security issues, thus posing a new challenge to the international security environment.

2. The security threats are getting increasingly intricate. All security issues, traditional or non-traditional, owe their emergence to complex causes, which explain their diversified nature and different forms of manifestation. There is no single master key which can offer a final solution to any security threat, and instead, threats should be handled by looking into their roots as well as the secondary causes with the priority given to the root causes. So, the answer to the solution of the security issues rests with the elimination of the specific source that breeds the security issue by cashing in on various means such as political, diplomatic, economic, military, cultural, scientific and technological and legal measures.

3. The security interests are incrementally globalized. In the world of today when the process of economic globalization is pressing on constantly, the various interests of all countries keep on infiltrating into each others’ turf, which has projected its correlative nature more prominently than before. Wherever the famine, humanitarian crisis, chaos caused by war, or terrorist attack befall, they are no longer a security issue for the victimized country or region alone but an issue that will have a bearing on peace and development of the world. For this reason, the solution to major international security issues demands concerted efforts of the international community. No country alone can enjoy absolute security only by relying on its own power, no matter how mighty it is.

The new features of international security situation require us to break way from the Cold War mentality and promote and replace it with a new security concept in order to serve the common interests of mankind and to shape a security environment which will facilitate the cause of common development and common prosperity. The core of the new security concept initiated and promoted by China is mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, which is conducive to the establishment of a fair and rational international political and economic order by the international community and is contributive to the development of democracy-oriented international relations.

“Mutual trust” means that all countries should go beyond the differences in ideology and social system, discard the Cold War mentality and power politics, stay free from mutual suspicion and hostility, boost mutual trust through dialogue and develop a cooperative relationship among countries on the basis of mutual trust.

“Mutual benefit” means all nations should conform to the objective requirements of the trend of globalization. While pursuing security interests of their own, other countries’ security interests should also be respected. To do this, the outdated “zero sum” approach should be done away with, and one nation’s own “absolute security” should not be secured at the cost of other nations’ interests. Instead, efforts should be made to realize common security for every country through earnest and positive participation in international cooperation in security matters.
“Equality” stands for equal membership for every country in the international community despite of their differences in size and strength, and nations should respect and treat one another on an equal footing. They should not intervene in the internal affairs of others, and not impose one’s own value and ideology on others. Consultation on an equal footing is the only effective avenue in solving various conflicts and problems.

“Coordination” emphasizes boosting multilateral and bilateral cooperation in security matters among all states. All conflicts between states and international security issues of common concern should be settled fairly and rationally through dialogue, by observing the approach of seeking common ground while reserving differences, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. The hidden danger of war and various insecurity factors should be uprooted with concerted efforts through coordination, so as to promote regional and world stability and development.

The new security concept imitated and promoted by China bases on mutual trust with mutual benefit as its goal, equality the guarantee and cooperation the means, which are interlinked and mutually reinforcing to make up an organic whole. To wit: Build up mutual trust through equal dialogue and boost common security and common prosperity by way of mutual benefit and cooperation. Despite of the numerous negative factors existing in the current international security situation, we believe that we’ll surely be able to manage all threats and challenges and create a brilliant future through the concerted efforts of the international community and by sticking to this new security concept.

II. Improving and Strengthening UN Peacekeeping Operations

The end of the Cold War and the crumble of the bipolar world structure has not only blessed the world with the historic opportunity for the robust burgeoning of multi-polarization, but has also stretched the space for the UN to play a tangible and effective role in keeping the international peace and security, hence the boom of UN peacekeeping operations. Ever since the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East for the first time in 1948, the UN has, hitherto, carried out 59 peacekeeping operations, out of which 16 are still ongoing. Notwithstanding the bitter experience of some frustrations, these operations in general have played a positive or even an indispensable role in mitigating the tense situations and in facilitating the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The successful experience in Mozambique, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and East Timor and whatnot command worldwide appreciation and rightful affirmation. “The blue helmet” has not only become the pronounced symbol of the UN, but has also become the emblem of peace and hope in the conflict stricken areas.

All that said, we should not fail to notice that the changes of the post-Cold War international situation, the changes in recent years after ushering in the new century, inter alia, have generated a string of new challenges for UN peacekeeping operations. First of all, local conflicts are cropping up with increasing frequency despite of the reality that the general trend of the international situation is developing toward relaxation. Thus, peacekeeping operations are required in more and more areas and the UN is taking on increasingly heavier responsibilities in terms of peacekeeping.
Second, the sharp change of the nature of post-Cold War local conflicts has contributed to the corresponding expansion of the functions of peacekeeping operations. They are no longer the traditional operations to “keep peace”, which are mandated to oversee the ceasefire and supervise the disengagement of the parties to the conflict, but has been stretched to multi functional operations including preventive deployment, peace making, peace building, peace support and even peace enforcement with different tasks like supervising elections, helping the reconstruction of the interim authorities and various sectors of the society, thus making the peacekeeping operations much more complicated and difficult. Third, regional organizations and other players are getting increasingly involved in international security affairs. As a result of this development, how to coordinate effectively the relations between the regional organizations and the UN in peacekeeping operations has become a matter of great importance. Fourth, peacekeeping operations have been diversified, adding many difficulties for the peacekeepers education and training to the troop contributing countries. Fifth, the turbulent situation of the conflict ridden areas together with the spread of international terrorism have exposed the lives of the peacekeepers to increasingly greater danger. Sixth, the contradiction between the demands and the UN capabilities for peacekeeping operations has been much sharper. The serious shortage of necessary resources has affected the actual effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations. And so on and so forth, there are too many to enumerate.

It goes beyond any doubt that challenges facing peacekeeping operations in the new century are enormous. But the greatest challenge is nothing more than that of failing to effectively respond to the above mentioned challenges. If the UN peacekeeping operations are expected to play a bigger role, we believe:

Firstly, the UN’s authority in the international security affairs and its leading role in peacekeeping should be upheld. The UN is the one and only international organization in the world that has been endowed with the responsibility of maintaining world peace and security. No other organizations or countries are in the position to replace it. All peacekeeping operations should be authorized or approved by the UN Security Council. Unilateral military actions against a sovereign country are not the right choice. Besides, efforts should be made to guard against imposing double standards practice on the Security Council, so as to avoid blemishing the reputation and image of the UN.

Secondly, on the premise of ensuring its leading role, the UN should keep on encouraging regional organizations and other players to take an active part in various peacekeeping operations. The Security Council must define a clear cut and achievable mandate for each operation, and tighten up supervision over and enhance guidance to the organizations and ad hoc coalitions involved in the operation. On the part of the latter, the mandate from the Security Council should be strictly observed. They should closely cooperate and coordinate with the UN, and timely report to it on the progress and problems in the execution of the relevant operations. In addition, a stable mechanism of coordination should be set up between the UN and all the organizations and ad hoc coalitions involved in order to ensure the successful execution of all the operations.
Thirdly, stick to the principle of solving disputes through peaceful means such as through good offices, mediation and negotiation, and refrain from resorting to coercive action on the least pretext. Even for the humanitarian interventions, it should also avoid resorting to force. The purpose of UN peacekeeping operations should be to promote peaceful solution of the conflicts through all possible means instead of pushing them toward the direction of being sharpened. If a decision of taking coercive action to achieve peace must be made, it should be made with great caution. Once this kind of action is taken in very rare cases when it is extremely necessary, best efforts must be made to veer it into the path of political settlement as soon as possible, so as to promote peace process.

Fourthly, adhere strictly to the cardinal principles of “consent, neutrality and non-use of force except for self-defence”. Experiences have proved that it is extremely difficult to stay neutral and impartial when the UN gets prematurely involved without prior consent of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, there is a danger that the UN itself might be turned into a party to the conflict, thus getting deviated from the fundamental purpose and course of the peacekeeping operation, making it even more difficult for the conflict to be solved and landing the peacekeepers in greater danger.

Fifthly, ensure the UN sufficient resources for peacekeeping and improve and boost the capability of the UN in peacekeeping. The timely and rapid deployment and successful execution of UN peacekeeping operations rests on the political support from all the member states and adequate manpower and financial resources. To improve and boost the UN capability in peacekeeping requires the UN departments in charge to improve and perfect the planning, organizing, training, guiding and coordinating mechanisms for peacekeeping operations as well as all the member states to provide effective support, strengthen the UN Standby Arrangements System and boost the rapid deployment capabilities for peacekeeping operations. All member states should honour their commitment of providing manpower and equipment to and pay their share of dues for UN peacekeeping.

Sixthly, efforts should be made to uproot the source that spawns conflict and beef up the capabilities of preventing conflict. In dealing with conflict, prevention is more important than striving for settlement. The world cannot secure peace and security effectively if poverty is not reduced, and injustice at home and in international relations is not eliminated. To maintain peace requires not only various peacekeeping operations when conflicts break out but also, and even more so, various concrete measures to eradicate the roots that fuel conflicts so as to prevent conflicts and humanitarian crises from happening. To this end, the international community should offer energetic supports to the UN and make joint efforts to help the poverty stricken states to develop their economies and to root up injustice by capitalizing on political and economic levers. Moreover, preventive diplomacy should also be promoted to neutralize internal conflicts of some countries and disputes between states through dialogue on equal footing.

Ladies and gentlemen,

China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace with the purpose of upholding world peace
and promoting common development. China values all along the UN authority in dealing with international security issues and stands for beefing up the role of the UN. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has persistently and faithfully honoured its commitment in defending international security. China joined the UN Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations in 1988 and participated in peacekeeping operation for the first time in 1990. Ever since then, China has been consistently supporting the UN in undertaking peacekeeping operations that are in keeping with the tenet of the UN Charter, and has been incrementally increasing the dimensions of its participation. The Chinese armed forces support wholeheartedly and carry out truthfully the foreign policy of peace laid down by our government, and have been actively taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. So far, 2,782 military personnel have been dispatched to participate in 13 peacekeeping operations successively. Among them, there are 764 military observers, 2,012 peacekeeping troops and 6 staff officers. In addition, we have likewise dispatched civil officials accredited to the UN peacekeeping setup, one of them is a woman. Of all the UN peacekeeping troops involved in various ongoing peacekeeping operations that are directly led by the Security Council, the number of troops sent out by China hit the top of the list among the five permanent members of the Security Council. All the Chinese military personnel involved in various peacekeeping operations have strictly adhered to the mandate from the Security Council, submitted themselves to command and observed discipline. They have cooperated well with their colleagues from different countries and fulfilled their duties satisfactorily, and for that matter, have been praised extensively by people from all ranks. The Chinese military personnel have put in a lot of hard work and some of them even laid down their dear lives for the UN peacekeeping operations.

UN peacekeeping is a matter of concern by all parties involved and on it they place their hopes. For the purpose of further improving and building up the capabilities of the Chinese troops in peacekeeping operations, we would like to learn from the troops of other countries their experiences in peacekeeping, step up exchanges and cooperation with them in peacekeeping so as to contribute more to the UN peacekeeping and to the world peace.

Thank you for your attention.
I wish to thank most sincerely the China Institute for International Strategic Studies here in Beijing for inviting the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Jean Marie Guéhenno to this seminar. As you are aware, Mr. Guéhenno fully intended to attend this seminar, but the current high demands in the area of peacekeeping have caused the Secretary General to keep his most senior staff at Headquarters in New York. I am honoured to deliver the remarks below on Mr. Guéhenno’s behalf.

Before I begin, I would like to thank all concerned for agreeing that this meeting should be held in Beijing.

China’s role in the world stage is significant and growing, and if the international security system is to adapt successfully to the realignment of influence, then China must play a leading role in United Nations peace operations. The deployment of small but very capable Chinese peacekeeping units in Congo, Liberia, Haiti and elsewhere is an important step. These foundations must be built upon.

Distinguished General Xiong Guangkai and Mr. Shen Guofang
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Peace operations are again at a crossroads. The Challenges Project, with its many national partners, once again offers a timely opportunity to discuss the many challenges we have to deal with today, and I appreciate the opportunity to relay to you a few personal reflections on trend and realities that appear to be dominating today’s peacekeeping arena.

First, most of the conflicts in the world today are internal conflicts. Over 90% of those who have been killed in the armed conflicts of the past decade have been killed in civil wars. The figure is over 95% if one includes indirect war deaths, through starvation, disease, and so on. According to the soon to be published Human Development Report of the Human Security Center at the University of British Columbia, one of the most robust research findings on civil wars is that strong and growing economies are associated with reduced risks of armed conflict. For a country with a GDP per capita of $1,250, for example, the risk of being involved in an armed conflict within a five year period is just a quarter of that of a country with a GDP per capita of $250. Countries with an income of $5000 or more have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conflict over the same
period. I will return to such development factors, and the need to address them in an integrated fashion, later.

Such internal conflicts, or rather, the winding down of conflicts, cause peacekeeping demands that exceed what the UN or any regional or sub-regional organization, by itself, can meet. From the UN’s perspective it is very welcome that a growing number of international organizations and actors are engaging in post-conflict work. UNMIL Deputy SRSG Seraydarian spoke to you on this issue during the previous Challenges seminar in Abuja. Regional and sub regional organizations should equally welcome continued investment in the UN’s capacity for peacekeeping. After all, the fact that DPKO has reached a total of 17 operations now, with more potentially on the horizon, is ample confirmation of the fact that UN peacekeeping remains indispensable.

Second, if the current demand for UN peacekeeping remains roughly constant over the next five years, concurrent with the demand for non UN peace operations, then we are going to face a serious resource deficit in the field. There is a need to take a very serious look at the total pool of financial and human resources military, civilians, and police—available for post-conflict work; and, to agree on reliable bases for their allocation to UN and other operations, as and when needed. Innovative resource generating initiatives such as the EU’s battle group concept, and the concept of strategic reserve units, remain needed to deal with the gap between demand and capacity.

Third, that there will be demands for peacekeeping is one of the few things in this business that is predictable. As for the rest, we should be prepared to expect the unexpected. We need to equip ourselves for competent, quick and flexible response. Operations continue to have to be mounted at short notice, and without the sort of planning lead times that would give our SRSGs, Force Commanders and their staff the preparation they would ideally want. Moreover, though we are learning lessons and codifying best practices, we must also recognize that each operation faces unique political, economic, social and security challenges, with different mandates and a different array of partners and spoilers. Cookie cutter or rigid template approaches will not, therefore, provide a short cut to rapid and effective deployment.

Fourth, the complexity of post-conflict transitions means that our operations must advance concurrently on many tracks political, humanitarian, development, human rights and security often in high risk environments. Many of their tasks are peace building, as much as peacekeeping, and so our integrated peace operations must be linked to longer term peacebuilding and development approaches.

To illustrate this, look at Haiti. In Haiti, we on the peacekeeping side were able, in the mid 1990s, to do in narrow terms what was asked of us. We restored a secure environment, and oversaw the conduct of elections. The World Bank invested over two billion dollars. But we left when the country was still without viable institutions or a stable economy, and we have watched the system crumble, and are now back, as are the World Bank and others.

I also believe that we probably left Cambodia too early. We stayed just long enough to ensure the disengagement of the main factions, and to oversee the voting, but then we left quickly, and the
resulting coalition government proved unstable and eventually fell apart in violence. In terms of the mandate from the Security Council, this was a success: Cambodia was no longer a stage for great power rivalry, and was at peace. Thankfully, it largely remains so. But had we continued to provide assistance and support to governance institutions rather than departing so precipitously, we could have left behind a more stable political and economic order.

Nor is it only examples from the past that can make us concerned. In Sierra Leone, we have helped restore a stable security environment. The country is physically safe, elections have been held, and there is a semblance of normality about daily life. But Sierra Leone still ranks 177 out of 177 on the United Nations Human Development Index. That is a cause for concern, and a reason to cooperate more closely with those organizations working on economic and social development.

Addressing multiple, interdependent problems at the same time, however, takes integrated programmes from within and beyond the UN system. I would like to elaborate, therefore, on the coordination and cooperation needed in today’s environment of complex, multi-dimensional peace operations.

My basic message on this subject is a simple one: to be able to deal effectively with the main conflicts in the world today, there needs to be much greater coherence between us in the peacekeeping community, and our counterparts in the international financial institutions, the development and humanitarian agencies, and the bilateral actors. If we engage on our largely separate tracks, we will fail the people who need us most.

Not all of the challenges of integration, however, lie in the hands of the UN Secretariat and its partners. We need the help of Member States, too. We continue to experience the inherent weakness of using rules and regulations designed for yesterday’s peacekeeping in today’s complex peace operations. One of the greatest of these challenges has been the discrepancy between the financing of different activities. Certain security activities are traditionally covered by assessed contributions while reconstruction or development activity must rely on voluntary contributions that may arrive late, or be much smaller than what is required. Yet the success of a peace process depends on both. For example, peacekeeping budgets today will largely cover the disarmament and demobilization costs of former combatants but not activities designed to reintegrate them or the large numbers of women and girls associated with the fighting forces, back into society.

A brief review of recent post-conflict situations shows that there is normally a surge in assistance pledges in the immediate post-conflict period, but then a decline after a couple of years. This meshes very badly with many post-conflict situations, in which their absorptive capacity of the economy is initially very low, and then rises once there is some stability. In other words, the reconstruction money tends to dry up just when it would do the most good.

The result is obvious failed expectations, and bitterness. This can even result in popular anger which can threaten the mission, and the men and women you put at the UN’s service.

At least in some cases, it would be better if things were the other way around: it might be better if
economic assistance could be flowing fastest in the period 3-7 years after a peace agreement has been signed.

The time horizon in which we operate can, therefore, make a significant difference. The Security Council normally establishes the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations for 6 or 12 months. The Council does not always envisage that missions will be ended so quickly, of course, but the short mandate cycle does make it difficult to plan effectively for longer term stabilization.

So we need to learn lessons in setting our time horizons, in partnering with others, and in sequencing our efforts. Where do we begin? I would begin with four principles that should guide member states over the next several years:

i. **Coherent strategic planning.** The international community’s support to countries emerging from conflict would be far more effective if planning and implementation of complex peace operations were broadened to include the whole range of actors needed for enduring stability. Mechanisms for consultations need to be developed to link the UN, the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the major donors into discussions on post-conflict engagement.

ii. **Coordinated deployment.** The array of capacities needed to stabilize post-conflict situations is enormous. To get the capacities that are sometimes needed the establishment of justice systems, the fiscal systems, the engagement with civil society the United Nations often needs to work with other actors, including regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. UN member states should work to make the UN as flexible as possible in terms of working alongside other contributors large and small, public and private, regional and national. Unity of command over a narrow span of issues is less important than unity of effort over a wider one.

iii. **Filling the gaps.** There are two sets of gaps. There are the gaps within peacekeeping itself. These include the participation in blue helmet operations by the Western countries. We recognize that Western armies are downsizing, and that there are other calls on their resources. But they have capacities that are simply unavailable elsewhere. And also, their participation sends critical signal of political commitment and determination. Other gaps within peacekeeping narrowly defined include the need to strengthen doctrine, planning and training. Between this purely military side of peacekeeping and the wider array of peacebuilding efforts lie a second series of weak links: they are rule of law, including police, courts and prisons, and the broader issue of security sector reform, about which everyone speaks, but which remains largely under Supported. I would also stress the need to get better at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. Without these, there can be no real post-conflict security.

iv. **Tenacity and persistence.** Governments can best support the transition from war to peace by staying the course. One year mandates, one year secondments, one year funding cycles these things work against peace, and should be changed. Is all this asking for a lot? Is it a call for new resources that simply aren’t there? I don’t believe so, for three reasons.
First, each new civil war costs the world, on average, about 50 billion dollars, roughly half to the country concerned and half to the rest of us. Research by Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank and Oxford University has noted that peacekeeping represents one of the best possible investments that can be made to promote international peace and security. For a cost of just a few per cent of the annual war losses, peacekeeping can hugely reduce the direct losses of war.

Second, peace operations help to create the economic foundations that lead to sustainable peace. Where there is no external security force, former belligerents often continue to overspend on the military, undermining the budget discipline that will help to set them on the road to economic growth. Insecurity leads to overspending, and overspending leads to insecurity. Peace operations can break that vicious circle.

Last, the additional measures that are needed are not particularly expensive. Coherent planning doesn’t require more money at all. It requires member states, which are represented at the UN, at the World Bank and at the International Monetary Fund, to work together in concert a little more. Nor does coordinated deployment cost money. What it requires is all of us including the member states work to make the UN and Bank rules a little more flexible. As for filling the gaps in DDR, security sector reform and rule of law, these are investments relatively small ones that we cannot afford not to make.

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, who visited this city for negotiations with Zhou Enlai almost exactly 50 years ago, said the following:

“Working at the edge of the development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown. Much of what is done will one day prove to have been of little avail. That is no excuse for the failure to act in accordance with our best understanding, in recognition of its limits but with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in which it is our privilege to cooperate.”

Central to that “creative evolution”, I believe, will be the increasing cohesion between the security actors on the one hand, and the array of other actors now clearly required to stabilize the types of conflict that still plague our world.

Thank you.
Peace, we must always remember, is more than the mere absence of war. As such, it is now widely recognized that peace operations should aim not only to restore order but also to help warring parties move their political or economic struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where a peaceful settlement process can be undertaken and where future disputes can be addressed in a similar fashion. In other words, ‘peacekeeping’ is only one component of the effort to achieve sustainable peace. This fact was enshrined in UN doctrine by the Brahimi report of 2000, which defined peace operations as “entailing three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace building” (S/2000/809, para 10).

This is a lesson we learned the hard way. In many situations around the world, the international community has invested considerable time, money and energy in peacekeeping, only to see the country slide back into more devastating violence either due to inadequacies in the original peace agreement and/or for want of commensurate investment in peace building. Indeed, nearly half of all civil wars that end in a peace agreement re-erupt within five years. That is largely because peace agreements and those who implement them have too often been satisfied with keeping, rather than building, the peace.

Many peace agreements are rich in details of how guns will be silenced, how power will be shared and even how resources will be allocated. But they are often weaker on how society can move beyond a tense standoff: how accountable, impartial institutions can be created, how trust can be restored, how human rights will be protected and the rule of law re-established; how local capacities can be coupled with whatever international commitment is available to assist the process of physical and psychological rebuilding.

The experiences of Angola and Rwanda a decade ago remind us that the loss of life that follows a failed peace process can be tragically high. More recently, in both Haiti and Liberia, new armed conflicts broke out within a few years of the end of a UN peacekeeping operation. And in other notable cases of failure, for example in Bosnia and Somalia, peacekeepers were deployed when there was no peace to keep, with tragic consequences.

But the UN has also contributed to some genuine successes. Despite important challenges facing these societies, peace has taken hold in El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Guatemala and East
Timor.

From these successes and failures, we have learned a series of important lessons (which the Secretary General very eloquently described in his 18 October speech at the University of Ulster) and begun to understand the range of tasks that must usually be undertaken in order to achieve a sustainable peace. A sizeable portion of these tasks fall to civilian, as opposed to military or police, personnel. These include, illustratively and in no particular order:

- Provision of good offices and diplomatic support to the negotiation of peace agreements;
- Creation or strengthening of national democratic institutions, political parties and other participatory mechanisms, including the media;
- Support for compliance with international human rights and humanitarian standards, including through technical assistance and monitoring;
- Electoral assistance, including development of electoral law, code of conduct, electoral councils and assistance with the conduct of elections;
- Strengthening and developing rule of law institutions; policies and practices;
- Creation of conditions for resumed economic and social development;
- Sustainable return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees;
- Stimulation of maximum involvement of civil society, especially women, and of national NGOs;
- Attention to the needs of children and adolescents, especially young men;
- Provision of social services;
- Job creation, micro-credit schemes and promotion of income generating activities, particularly for demobilized soldiers and returning refugees and displaced persons;
- Physical reconstruction;
- Psychosocial trauma counseling for war-affected groups.

These tasks enlist a huge range of local and international actors. Within the UN, a large number of Secretariat Departments, Agencies, Funds and Programmes contribute to the endeavour. Of these, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) plays a major role, not least as the UN focal point for peacemaking, prevention and peace building.

Through its support to the Secretary General and many of his Special Envoys and Representatives, the department often takes the lead in support of a peace process that in turn sometimes gives rise to a peacekeeping mandate for the UN. DPA supported SRSGs are currently engaged in peacemaking or good offices missions in Sudan, Colombia, Myanmar, the Middle East, Somalia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and Bougainville. This peacemaking role can often be very intensive and lengthy. In El Salvador, the SRSG (Alvaro de Soto) spent two years working with the parties towards the eventual agreement reached in 1992. In Cyprus, the SG, working through his SRSG (de Soto again), in the longest lasting good offices mission on the books, eventually drafted and presented to the parties a massively complicated proposed agreement which would have allowed for the reunification of the island and its entry as a single, federal state into the European Union. Unfortunately, the plan was rejected in a referendum, although it still stands as a model
agreement in many ways. In another recent, more successful and much more truncated (indeed a highly time pressured) process, the SRSG for Afghanistan (Brahimi) convened some of the key stakeholders in Afghanistan in the German city of Bonn, leading to the December 2001 Bonn Agreement and the deployment of UNAMA.

DPA also sometimes takes over or oversees peacebuilding functions as a peacekeeping mission withdraws, in order to ensure political continuity in that fragile transitional period. Such support is currently being rendered in Guinea Bissau, Central African Republic and Tajikistan. DPA also supports the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), which is charged with verifying compliance with the Peace Agreements reached in 1996 and which draws to a close at the end of this year. In a context of increasing polarization, MINUGUA has encouraged political alliances around the peace agenda in order to foster cooperation between the Government and civil society.

Through its Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), the department provides support and guidance to Member States in the conduct of elections. In 2004, Member States placed over twenty new requests, with the result that EAD is assisting with more than thirty elections. This includes the recent elections in Afghanistan, as well as upcoming elections in Iraq, Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Democratic Republic of Congo.

One of the starkest lessons of the past decade or so has been that conflict prevention is infinitely cheaper and wiser than allowing violence to simmer and then explode, with dire consequences for the countries and regions concerned. DPA has been charged with moving the United Nations from a culture of reaction to one of prevention and in June 2001 the Secretary General submitted a major report on “Prevention of Armed Conflict” to both the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/55/985 S/2001/574). The report presented some concrete steps to enhance the UN system’s capacity to undertake timely preventive action and DPA is working with all parts of the UN to follow up on the report and to ensure that the SG receives ample early warning of incipient crises, as well as concrete recommendations for action.

But DPA is of course part of the broader UN system, which in turn works with many actors, including local civil society and opinion leaders, Member States (on whose support it particularly depends), regional organizations and NGO partners. Nor does the UN claim always to be the most appropriate lead actor. The OSCE has played a crucial peacemaking and even a peacebuilding role in the former Soviet space and in the Balkans; the OAS has done the same in Latin America and the AU is increasingly playing a lead role in Africa. The European Union has greatly advanced its capacity in civilian crisis management too.

Just over a month ago, the Security Council heard from members of some of these regional organizations and recognized the increasing importance of civilian aspects of conflict management in addressing complex crisis situations and in preventing the recurrence of conflict (S/PRST/2004/33 of 22 September 2004):

“[T]he participation of a strong civilian component is key to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the re-establishment of public order, functioning public
institutions, reconstruction, rehabilitation and peacebuilding for longer term sustainable development. A substantial civilian participation in crisis management is also essential for a strategy of military disengagement”.

At the open debate on this issue, all Council members spoke in support of the UN’s work on the civilian and political aspects of peace operations. Opening the session, the Secretary General noted that the support of UN Member States, and Council members in particular, would “make the difference between success and failure for our current peacebuilding efforts”. To that end, he highlighted some key areas:

First, **sustained support**: Although the incremental building of peace, from the ground up, may not grab headlines, it must command the vigilant attention and long term commitment of Member States and especially the Security Council. As mentioned above, leaving the root causes unaddressed only causes conflicts to fester and re-erupt with devastating consequences. We have said “never again” too many times already. Recent research suggests that donor interest and attention tends to level and then drop off just as local absorptive capacity picks up and levels of disillusionment regarding unmet expectations begin to rise. It is vital that the international community stay engaged through this phase.

Second, **resources**: Although in some cases the delivery of resources to post-conflict reconstruction has improved, there is still a global dearth and a huge geographical imbalance in what is available and how quickly. The international community spent 20 times per capita on post war reconstruction in Bosnia & Hercegovina as it did in Sierra Leone. Is it any wonder that peace has been more shaky in one than the other (although it is far from perfect in either)?

Third, **integration**: Unless the work of Member States, the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and local actors is well coordinated and coherently undertaken, it risks being far less than the sum of its parts. Failure in one sector can undermine progress made in others. Contacts between the UN and its partners are far more frequent and productive than they used to be but achieving coordinated results on the ground in specific cases is largely still elusive.

Fourth, **security**: There must be a reasonable balance between the contribution that UN civilian staff can make in any situation and the risk they assume in order to do so. In the aftermath of attacks on the UN in Iraq and Afghanistan (including the recent abduction of three of our electoral staff), staff security can no longer be taken lightly. One of the most regrettable challenges now facing peace operations in the twenty first century is that UN personnel, NGO humanitarian staff and other internationals are now all too often targets for violent action. One of the effects is that we are having to spend significant amounts of money, resources and time on security and protection. Member States have a right to expect that appropriate care will be taken of the lives of their nationals who work in peace operations, but they must also recognize the financial costs that will be involved.

Of course, the efforts of even the most well meaning external actors will be for naught if the people who must live with the consequences of success or failure, namely the people of the country
concerned, are not fully engaged in and committed to the peace. There is a big difference between the stake of external actors, no matter how much money and time they spend, and that of the local population. For peace to take root, it must be “owned” by the local people.

We spend a lot of admittedly useful time and energy on coordination between international actors, but regrettably little time on how better to partner with the local population. We still find ourselves at conferences full of well meaning outsiders with no locals represented to talk about the future of their country. We still find ourselves, for example, spending millions to ship in bottled water for international staff rather than investing in water treatment plants and training local staff to run them. We still lament the lack of legitimate interlocutors but fail to find ways to identify such people in the absence of hasty elections. We pay lip service to the idea of the local population being “in the driving seat” but too often they feel as if that is because it’s a chauffeur driven car, with international actors in the backseat dictating the route, destination and speed.

The reality of post-conflict environments, especially where there is not (yet) any way to designate a legitimate, representative local interlocutor, is that the international community does end up dictating the terms. But we can do so in ways that respect (rather than undermine) the principle of and potential for local ownership of the process.

Even in most devastated environments, there are highly qualified persons from the country concerned who understand situation in a way no international ever could and who are capable of leading peacebuilding efforts if only given necessary resources, technical assistance and political support. In some recent operations, such as Afghanistan, we have begun to apply many of these principles. But we have a long way to go in effectively marrying international support with local national capacity and will for peace in a way that can guarantee peaceful outcomes.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Many of the challenges that I have mentioned here today have been under consideration by the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. In addition to examining the many new challenges that the international community must confront in the twenty first century, the Panel is also seeking to provide new perspectives on existing challenges such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. I believe it will make some far-reaching recommendations that bear directly on our work in these areas and I fervently hope that some of them will help us to do a better job for the people we serve.

The Panel will report to the Secretary General in exactly a month. I urge the Partners in the Challenges Project to give close attention to those aspects of the High Level Panel’s report that address peace operation issues. I trust that Member States will carefully consider the recommendations that are relevant to peace operations and I hope that 2005 will see us make a great leap forward in this crucial set of activities. Seminars like this have certainly helped provide the reflection and thinking necessary for that to happen.

Virtually all the activities that I have described demand cooperation and coordination. Cooperation
from Member States in their willingness to provide political support and resources according to their capabilities and interest; cooperation and coordination between the UN, regional organizations, governments and non-government organizations; cooperation and coordination in educating and training personnel before sending them out to the field; cooperation and coordination between the military, police and civilian components of an operation; and of course close cooperation with national leaders and local populations to encourage and assist them to find lasting solutions, to their own problems.

One of the valuable contributions of initiatives such as the Challenges Project is that it brings together many different disciplines, with different experiences and perspectives, to bear on the complexities of making modern peace operations more successful and effective. What are constantly needed are good ideas and pragmatic proposals, born out of hard earned experience, and then action to make sure that those ideas and proposals are implemented.

I wish the Challenges Project every success in its endeavours.
REMARKS

By Mr. Jonas Alberoth
Director General (Acting)
Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

General Xiong Guangkai, Mr. Shen Guofang, Excellencies, Dear Seminar Participants, Colleagues and Friends,

On behalf of the Partners of our Project, it gives me very great pleasure to welcome you all to the 15th International Challenges Seminar.

It is indeed a great honour and privilege to be here in Beijing, and we deeply appreciate the generosity and warmth of welcome extended to us by the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. Please allow me, on behalf of all participants, to congratulate our hosts and partners to an interesting, topical and relevant seminar programme. We will cover so many issues, from so many angles, and enjoy so many experts and exchanges.

Our common denominator is the development of peace operations. Our project is a continuing process to address continuing challenges, critical challenges to peace and security, human dignity, and ultimately human life. Tragically, in our time, there is an increased need for such a process.

The full title of the Project is “Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century”. During the project’s second phase, we have been joined by new partners and held seminars in new places, and today, in addition to everything else, I take much pleasure in welcoming the United Kingdom to our committed group. The Challenges “we” has become a tight but dynamic family of institutions and individuals from a wide range of UN Member States.

We are also very pleased to have substantial representation from the United Nations here today. Dear friends, we are strong supporters of your difficult work and full of admiration for your inspiring dedication to the contradictory art of peacekeeping complicated, but stimulating, frustrating, but meaningful, long lasting, but short mandated, as many of us have experienced ourselves. And, far too often, a single light blue shred of hope in conflict ridden parts of the world.

0The Challenges Project will relentlessly continue to offer support and assistance, culminating in our second concluding report, which we hope and aspire to be able to hand over to the Secretary General of the United Nations in mid-autumn next year. And yes, you may convey this humble, but
I would like to focus my remaining remarks on the theme of this seminar, “Cooperation and Coordination on Peace Operations”.

Peace operations have become more and more complex and multifunctional in recent years. The crises and conflicts that have arisen have demanded a wide range of responses and involved a wide range of actors. The nature of peacekeeping itself has changed, and although there continue to be situations in which traditional peacekeeping is the answer, the demands that are placed on peacekeepers whether military, police or civilian are now much more extensive.

Today’s peace operations demand skills that may range from the monitoring of agreements to the use of robust force against warlords or in order to protect civilian populations from genocidal acts; from the maintenance of law and order to the development of new community police forces; from advice on the respect for human rights to the rebuilding of governance and rule of law institutions; from emergency humanitarian assistance to comprehensive programmes aiming to promote social and economic development. There is a requirement for a span of competences and capabilities covering both a necessary specialized perspective and an understanding of the dynamics of multifunctional peace operations, including the most important realities, methods, possibilities and difficulties of cooperation and coordination between various civilian and military functions. In short, our toolbox needs to be amended.

We should also actively address how we can best promote cooperation and coordination in the areas of conflict prevention and peace building.

In meeting these challenges, the UN is not alone. Increasingly and inspiringly, we have seen regional and sub-regional organizations developing their own capabilities to carry out peace operations. Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations as well as directly between regional organizations is mutually rewarding and strengthening and should be further encouraged and developed.

All these tasks, and many more, require the cooperation of many providers and the coordination of many talents. They depend on the willingness of governments and the international community to make available resources in the form of political support, troops, equipment, money, and humanitarian and development assistance. And those suppliers have a right to expect that whatever they provide will be put to the most effective use in the implementation of peace operations. It is not a coincidence that the primary target group of the Challenges Project is the Member States.

In the seminar, as our hosts have pointed out in their letter of invitation, we will explore a number of questions on how to best improve cooperation and coordination on and within peace operations. What are the expectations of the international community? What do we expect from Member States? In what particular skills would it be best to focus our energies to improve the chances for successful peace operations? How can we best educate and train peacekeepers for the complex tasks that confront them? What actions can be taken to develop the necessary capabilities in those parts of the
world that need them most?

With this seminar we are approaching the time of preparing our final report on the second phase of the project. I believe that one of the strengths of this project is that the Partners are the institutes and individuals who contribute to it. If our report is to be innovative and relevant, it must be free to contain a broad range of views. The interventions at the seminars, both the formal statements and the exchanges that follow, provide much of the material from which the content of the report will be drawn. I therefore invite all participants to provide us with your ideas, your comments, and your suggestions. The primary audience of our final report will be the Member States on whose support peace operations are so dependent, but the report itself does not seek the prior endorsement of governments. It is no more and no less than an independent report of the Partners of the Challenges Project.

Looking out in this hall I see an ocean of experience and dedication to our common cause. There is an inspiring amount of knowledge on peace operations gathered in Beijing this fine morning. Take the opportunity to engage actively in the discussions and to expand your horizons and networks in the margins of the seminar. Enjoy yourselves intensely and mingle with determination. Let us make something special out of these days. I view of our serious and challenging task, we are obliged to.

There is one person in particular, who wishes he was here to mingle, and that is Ambassador Michael Sahlin. He is currently on leave of absence from the Academy and at the receiving end of our results and recommendations as the European Union’s Special Representative to the Republic of Macedonia. Through us, he forwards his warmest regards and wishes for a successful Beijing seminar, to all of you.

We are a diversified group of participants, ranging from experienced Challenges veterans to important newcomers to the project. In order to synchronize our point of departure I will now ask my colleague, our competent project leader and driving force behind our achievements, Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, to give us a traditional project update. And I know, that she has a lot in store for us.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear participants, thank you for your attention.
It is indeed a great honour to be here in China, a major troop contributing country to UN peace operations, and to address this distinguished audience.

1. Peace operations have become increasingly complex in the past few years. The Challenges Project is an effort to identify some of the problems and to offer recommendations for action to find solutions.

2. Peace operations cannot be successful without the commitment and support of Member States. Thus the primary target audience of the Challenges Project continues to be the Member States.

3. By fostering and encouraging a culture of cross professional cooperation and partnership, the primary objective of the project is to make practical recommendations that will benefit the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations.

4. The Challenges Project is a joint effort by many Partner Organizations from different disciplines and from 14 leading peace operations countries. Contributions to the project have been made by colleagues of international institutions and associations, including the United Nations, regional and sub regional organizations, international think tanks like International Peace Academy and SIPRI, the Stockholm Institute for International Peace Research. Discussions on the practice and theory of peace operations are combined with issues of education and training. Some 15 peacekeeping training centres have contributed to the project with their perspectives on the issues, and some also by hosting parts of a seminar. The overall project is coordinated by Sweden.

The countries involved in and sponsoring the overall project illustrate the multinational character of the effort and include Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Important contributions have been made by a number of public and private sponsors.

6. The Challenges Project began with a seminar in Stockholm in 1997. The first phase of the project (from 1997—2002) was brought to a close with a Concluding Report, which was presented...
by the Foreign Minister of Sweden, the late Anna Lindh, on behalf of all the Partners of the Project, to Secretary General Kofi Annan on 25 April 2002. The Concluding Report was a product of a series of seminars held during the previous five years in nine countries around the world and attended by a wide range of highly experienced civilian and military peacekeepers and academics from some 230 organizations and 50 countries. It contained 14 subject areas and made 69 practical recommendations. Subsequently, Partners agreed to a second phase of the Challenges Project, to address some of the specific challenges identified in the Phase 1 Concluding Report, and to report again in 2005.

7. In Phase II of the project, the Partners are addressing issues related to:
   • How do we most effectively improve multidisciplinary and multicultural cooperation and coordination at strategic, operational and tactical levels?

The Phase II Recommendations should be developed to address:
   • How can governments, with differing resources and capabilities, best respond?
   • What might be some of the most helpful ways in which Member States could support UN peace operations?

8. Topics that have been addressed during Phase II Challenges seminar series include the following:
   • Rule of Law, Australia
   • Peace Operations and Counter Terrorism, Sweden
   • Challenges of Change, Turkey
   • The Regional Dimension and the United Nations, Nigeria

9. This Beijing International Challenges Seminar on Cooperation and Coordination on Peace Operations: Challenges for UN Member States in the New Era will be an important contribution to the project work and analysis, and we look forward to the days ahead.

10. On 4 November 2003, the UN Secretary General established a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to consider the wide range of security issues currently facing the world. That Panel is expected to produce its report by the end of 2004, and it is the intent of the Partners to take into account any findings of that report which have implications for peace operations, when finalizing the Challenges Phase II report.

11. On 14 April, 2004, a Group of Friends of the Challenges Project was established in New York. It consists of the Permanent Representatives to the UN of Partner Organizations and they now meet biannually. The objective of the Group of Friends is the following:
   -To promote the existence and relevance of the Challenges Project,
   -To offer guidance to the Project Partners concerning the critical issues affecting peace and security from a policy perspective and their relevance to the Challenges Project,
   -Where appropriate, to introduce into UN forums recommendations of the Challenges Project and initiate follow-up actions in UN committees.
12. The Challenges Project is an evolving process. A Phase II Concluding Report seminar workshop will now be hosted by the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom in Shrivenham, in early 2005. The UK Minister of Defence recently committed the UK MOD as Partners in the project. Exact focus and theme of the UK meeting is yet to be confirmed, but we understand our British colleagues intend to emphasize the element of implementation and action. The Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report is planned to be presented at a Concluding Event to the UN Secretary General and Ministers of Partner Organizations in mid/late 2005. The objective of the Phase II report is to initiate global, regional, national and sub-national implementation processes to take place in mid 05 and beyond.

13. Before I conclude, allow me to mention the projects contributions to the international debate on the challenges of peace operations through:

- Challenges Seminar Reports (see Abuja report and the Project website at www.peacechallenges.net)
- Input to the United Nations through a SG Report, the SC, the GA, the UN Special Committee for PKO and to the G8
- Contributions to international journals relevant to Peace Operations
- Increased knowledge about peace operations in the official languages of the UN: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish
- Concrete exchanges and cooperation between organizations and countries (in particular, between participating training and education centres)
- Contributions to the establishment of an early warning centre for Africa (ISS, Pretoria), the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (USIP, USA), the launch of the United Services Institution of India Centre for United Peacekeeping, the conduct of a Rule of Law Conference in Carlisle (US Army PKSOI, APCML, USIP), and a Training Civilians Seminar in Tokyo (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Concluding, the Project Partners have enjoyed and benefited greatly from our Chinese colleagues participation and valuable contributions to several previous Challenges seminars. For example, one occasion is documented in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Journal ‘Perceptions’. It has been and is a great privilege to cooperate with such professional and friendly colleagues as our Chinese Partners and hosts at the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. We have much to do over the next few days, so I will stop here, and thank you for your attention.

The Partnership

The Challenges Project is a joint undertaking by a group of Partner Organizations, which form the Steering Group of the project (in order of hosting): Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (in coop w. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, National Police Board, National Defence College), Russian Public Policy Centre (in coop. w. the
Diplomatic Academy and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, United States Institute of Peace (in coop w the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute), United Services Institution of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada, Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff (in coop w the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law (in coop w Australian Defence Organization), Turkey Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in coop with the Armed and Police Forces and University of Bilkent), Nigerian National War College (in coop with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ministry of National Defence of China (in coop w China Institute for International Strategic Studies) and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom (in coop w Ministry of Defence).

For further information, please contact the Project Coordinators or visit the Challenges Project web-site: www.peacechallenges.net

Overall Project Coordinators
Mr Jonas Alberoth, Director General (Acting) of the Folke Bernadotte Academy
jonas.alberoth@folkebernadotteacademy.se, tel. +46 612 822 00

Annika Hilding Norberg, Project Leader, Challenges, Folke Bernadotte Academy
annika.hilding-norberg@folkebernadotteacademy.se, tel.+46 70 510 6545

Charlotte Svensson, Project Officer, Challenges, Folke Bernadotte Academy
charlotte.svensson@folkebernadotteacademy.se, tel.+46 70 386 7372
SESSION I

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN AND ON PEACE OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES FOR UN MEMBER STATES IN THE NEW ERA
Over the last several years we have witnessed significant changes to the operating environment for peace operations. Peacekeeping operations have been launched on a scale not seen before. They have broader and more complex mandates. There is no single type of peace operation and the different mandates reflect this range. There are peacekeeping operations addressing issues of internal conflict within fragile states, e.g. MONUC. Others are more involved in peacebuilding and stabilization, e.g. UNAMSIL and UNAMA. Some have a more traditional mandate focusing on separation of forces, e.g. UNMEE. In other cases, there are multiple missions established within a particular area of regional conflict, such as UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI. In some missions, the roles and responsibilities of different actors are clear but in others, the complexity of the situation or of the mandate has led to some confusion, requiring enhanced cooperation and coordination.

Recent missions have been mandated by the Security Council, to a certain extent, to support humanitarian activities, provide protection, and in some cases, support reconstruction and development activities. This has led to an internal debate and discussion within the system as to how these mandates can be properly discharged and what should be the nature of the relationships between the different players involved.

The challenges vary by type of mission. A very difficult humanitarian dynamic is created when there is increasing confusion about what constitutes humanitarian assistance and what constitutes humanitarian action. This is particularly so when some Member States promote intervention on humanitarian grounds or justify their own interventions as being humanitarian. A broadened definition of who and what is humanitarian is not only a potential cause of confusion but creates problems of coordination in its own right.

Addressing this begins with a recognition of the respective roles and responsibilities of the different actors. It is impossible to coordinate effectively without a clear understanding from the outset of who should be doing what. The UN has adopted an approach to cooperation and coordination in crisis situations. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), headed by the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, has a mandate for humanitarian coordination, advocacy and policy development both at headquarters and in the field. Individual peacekeeping missions are led by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, who has authority over all UN entities in the field. In complex emergencies with ongoing humanitarian needs, the
coordination of the activities of the broader humanitarian community UN agencies and non governmental agencies alike is carried out by the Humanitarian Coordinator, who is normally supported by an OCHA office.

Within a mission, decisions as to who should do what should ideally be based on the competencies of the different actors involved whether they be political, military, humanitarian or development. Thus, under the overall guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the different elements of a mission mandate should be implemented by the UN entity mandated and most competent for performing a given task. For example, the primary role of a peacekeeping operation as it relates to humanitarian action is not to actually conduct humanitarian work but to create an environment in which humanitarian work can be successfully undertaken by those with the skills to do so. The Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by OCHA, would coordinate that effort within the broader humanitarian community. This clearly becomes more complex in integrated or hybrid missions (i.e. situations where the UN mission does not include a blue helmet peacekeeping force but where other international forces, such as NATO or a coalition of the willing, are operating in the same theatre, e.g. Afghanistan).

There are three particular challenges to cooperation and coordination in peace operations that are worth highlighting: the role of peacekeepers in providing protection; the role of peacekeepers in a peacebuilding or transitional environment; and coordination in a regional context.

The role of peacekeepers in providing protection

The protection element raises additional challenges and opportunities. Protection is now being more explicitly included in mandates given by the Security Council. For example, recent Security Council mandates such as for MONUC, UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSTAH and ONUB, include language that requires the missions “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”, within their capabilities and areas of deployment.

Such mandates confer on peacekeepers a specific and important protection role. However, determining the extent of this role is not always a straightforward matter. Importantly, these mandates usually recognise that it remains the primary responsibility of the Government to provide such protection to civilians—e.g. “...without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of the police authorities”, in the case of MINUSTAH. However, peacekeeping operations are frequently confronted with practical challenges. What constitutes “imminent threat” and what should be the appropriate response is not always clear. This has implications both for the rules of engagement and for humanitarian coordination. The early stages of the operation in Sierra Leone demonstrated the real problems that this poses for Force Commanders and others in determining how to respond to an “imminent threat.” For example, sexual violence is often not seen as constituting an “imminent threat” that should be acted upon. Greater clarity and a further conceptual shift are needed if this kind of protection mandate is to embrace the physical protection of civilians more completely. Beyond the physical protection of civilians, peacekeepers also have a role in creating an environment that enables the government and humanitarian agencies to fulfill their own protection responsibilities and tasks.
The role of peacekeepers in a peacebuilding or transitional environment

Each troop contributing country has a different doctrine and approach to the actions and activities they undertake in support of peace building. This will be a growing challenge as mandates broaden and more peacekeeping efforts focus on post-conflict stabilization. For example, in Afghanistan a hybrid mission where a system of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) has been established, each PRT has a different approach and doctrine. The role of stabilization is vital for creating a secure environment for recovery and reconstruction. But, we need to be aware that if the military move into other areas under a broad heading of “stabilization” they can potentially undermine sustainable processes of reconstruction either through failing to coordinate their efforts with the overall reconstruction priorities or through not having adequate resources to ensure sustainability and thereby creating expectations that will have to be picked up by the humanitarian and development communities. The challenge is to define the limits of the peacekeeping role in transitional circumstances. Proper integration will result in a better understanding of who is qualified to take on what responsibilities.

Coordination in a regional context

The third challenge is how to address regional issues in a peacekeeping context. As one example, in West Africa, there are three missions established in three separate countries with no regional structure or systems for coordination between them. Such structures are critical for issues of common concern, such as demobilization. A crisis of youth violence is now affecting the region as a whole as young demobilized soldiers move from one country to another. Although there are separate conflicts in each of these countries, the problems are interrelated. Failure in one will affect the success in another. This is a key challenge to cooperation and coordination and one for which we do not have any answers. One solution might be better integration with regional organizations to look more carefully at the role of regional organizations in a given context and determine how a peace operation might effectively integrate with or relate to it, e.g. as with the African Union in the Sudan. It is clear that when we are dealing with regional humanitarian crises, we also need to have structures to address them regionally at the political and military level.

General considerations

In general terms, confusion over the respective roles and responsibilities of humanitarians and the military can arise for a number of different reasons. It has partly been confused by mandates, for which some responsibility lies with the Security Council. However, within the system, we also need to engage more fully in joint planning from the outset. To achieve coherence, the UN system should, before the adoption of the Security Council mandate, develop a common strategic approach based on a shared understanding of the given context, its problems, needs and coordination requirements. Attempts are being made to better address the issue of coherence which could involve working more closely with Member States to discuss how we would see our respective roles in meeting a given objective so that in setting the goals of the mission, Member States can provide clear and appropriate mandates. In a similar vein, OCHA has been working with the Security Council to ensure that mandates reflect best practice in addressing protection concerns.
In integrated missions and in civil-military situations in general, confusion can also arise because of fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures between, on the one hand, the distinct chain of command and clear organizational structures of the military and, on the other hand, the loosely organized humanitarian community. The two groups have different mandates, objectives, and working methods. For example, humanitarian assistance and protection is provided through a complex network which is comprised not only of international organizations and NGOs but is also largely dependent on collaboration with national staff and local partners. Most of the actors engaged in humanitarian work are present on the ground long before the arrival of international personnel and will continue these functions after their departure.

This needs to be born in mind when establishing a peace mission. The mission should take full advantage of the specific expertise, relations, and humanitarian and development advocacy approaches developed over time by the humanitarian and development communities, particularly with national partners. But it should do so in a manner that does not unduly disrupt these relationships as they also have a bearing on future handover and exit strategy.

Where we accept that we are working together towards a common goal in peacekeeping operations, we need to approach the task from the perspective of what needs to be done to allow each of us to fulfill our respective roles efficiently. A common concern for humanity should underline all our activities. In light of the role of the humanitarian community to provide protection and assistance on the basis of humanitarian need, it is important for missions to support the impartial distribution of assistance and to recognize the significance to the humanitarian community of maintaining neutrality so as to be able effectively to discharge its particular responsibilities. Humanitarian actors need to retain the lead role in and direction of the humanitarian efforts and have to ensure that their operational independence is not restricted. For example, humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain and sustain access to all vulnerable populations in all parts of the country or region of the complex emergency, and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict.

In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian operations should cooperate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential impact of the perception of too close an affiliation with a military campaign. Bearing in mind that humanitarian and development actors have often been in place before the mission arrives and will remain after it leaves, their concerns are practical ones as to how the mission will affect their capacity to operate and ability to gain access. The principled delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection to all populations in need has a bearing on the perception of the seriousness and independence of humanitarian efforts in general. Humanitarians must continue to build trust with local communities by demonstrating through word and deed that humanitarianism is separate from political or military agendas. This trust is also essential to the security of humanitarian workers.

That said, the key objective of humanity of providing protection and assistance to vulnerable populations wherever they are can frequently require that the humanitarians and military work together. Efforts have been made to clarify the humanitarian community’s position on civil-military relations. See the IASC Reference Paper on Civil-military Relationship in Complex Emergencies of
28 June 2004. Some practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination include:

- Establishment of clear liaison arrangements and lines of communication: it is essential to establish these from the outset, particularly in circumstances where humanitarian actors cannot be co-located with the military because of the impact on the perceptions of the local community;

- Information sharing: As a matter of principle, humanitarian organizations should not engage in gathering or disseminating information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature. But in carrying out humanitarian assistance and ensuring the security of humanitarian workers, information sharing with the military forces can be important, particularly with respect to information regarding the security situation; the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside the military operating theatre; planned or intended humanitarian activities; population movements; and mine action.

- Use of military assets for humanitarian operations in peace enforcement missions: In situations of ongoing conflict, such assets should only be used on an exceptional basis, as a ‘last resort,’ when humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs. When used, they should remain under civilian control and be deployed for a limited time only.

- Use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys: Again, armed escorts should be used only in exceptional circumstances and in response to a request made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria.

In winning the trust of the community, conduct is also an important issue for the humanitarian community. Troop behaviour can markedly affect the interface with the local population and with the humanitarian community just as the behaviour of humanitarian workers affects their relationship with the local population. It is desirable that the actions of peacekeepers and humanitarians are mutually reinforcing even more so where the relationship with the local community is hostile or threatening. Good conduct is not really a matter of doctrine but is more a question of training all soldiers as to the appropriate way to approach a peacekeeping operation and what behaviour is expected of them. Much of the work done by the humanitarian community in training armed forces only focuses on working with command issues. It would be important perhaps the fourth challenge to start addressing humanitarian issues for the front line troops involved in peacekeeping operations.

In summary, coordination and cooperation in peace operations is about ensuring that actions are mutually supporting across all levels. This requires a clear understanding of individual roles and functions and objectives. In the context of integrated missions, it is about achieving coherence between the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian and development actors in order to realize the full range of objectives of the United Nations.

Deployment of military and civil defence assets in these circumstances, including military aircraft, should be in accordance with the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines”) of March 2003. (See http://www.reliefweb.int/medias/medm/mcdm.html.)
Such action should be guided by the IASC Discussion Paper and Non Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001, approved by the IASC and reviewed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs. (See http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/MCmilesescort.doc.)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CONTRACTORS ON
PEACE OPERATIONS:
SUGGESTIONS FOR BETTER GOVERNANCE

Mr. Bruce Oswald

Introduction

Our hosts, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CISS), have requested us to examine, amongst other things, the “challenges for UN member states in the new era and the implications for cooperation and coordination of different models of governance.” In that context, one challenge facing the international community is the accountability of individuals, organisations and States involved in the training and planning for, and the management and conduct of, peace operations.  

In the background paper for this seminar we were reminded that one of the obstacles to effective cooperation and coordination identified in Phase I of the Challenges Project was the difference in levels of accountability. During Phase II accountability was again raised as a key aspect which concerns the international community. Thus, issues such as who peacekeepers are accountable to; what standards of accountability should be set; who should set those standards; and what mechanisms exist to hold peacekeepers accountable have exercised the minds of Partner Organisations during both phases of the Challenges Project. Various means and methods for enhancing accountability through cooperation and coordination have been, and will continue to be, discussed.

* Bruce Oswald is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Melbourne, Law Faculty. He is also an Associate Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law. The author would like to thank the participants of the Beijing Seminar and members of the subsequent Challenges working groups for their comments concerning accountability on peace operations. Their comments have assisted the author to refine the paper. The author would also like to thank Ms Sarah Finnin for her assistance and Ms Liz Saltmies for her ongoing encouragement and support.

In recent years there has been a growing emphasis on holding peacekeepers accountable on peace operations. Accountability has been considered fundamentally important to the maintenance of legitimacy, credibility and good working relationships during peace operations. Accountability is also essential for ensuring that parties involved in the peace operation do not break the law, and where violations are committed they are held liable. The recent emphasis on accountability has led, for example, to the UN Secretariat developing and adopting a number of measures to enhance the accountability of UN military and civilian peacekeepers. These measures range from a generic code of conduct for peacekeepers \(^7\) to more detailed rules and principles concerning sexual exploitation\(^6\) and adherence to international law.\(^5\) Such measures are appropriate and welcome. However, more work needs to be done to hold other international actors accountable. For example, there has been relatively very little development of accountability rules, principles, standards and norms for contractors who are employed to provide services on peace operations. Consequently, this presentation will focus on outlining some measures that should be considered in relation to holding contractors more accountable.

As the terms ‘accountability’ and ‘contractors’ are used in a variety of ways, it is important to define how they are used in the context of this paper. Accountability refers to holding individuals, organisations and States answerable for their actions and, on some occasions, even their omissions. In this sense, ‘accountability’ is a generic term that encompasses the rules, principles, standards and norms against which individuals, organisations and States explain their actions and omissions. These rules, principles, standards and norms are intended to create and maintain, amongst other things, good governance; good faith; constitutional and institutional balance; supervision and control; accessibility of reasons for decisions or a particular course of action; procedural regularity; objectivity and impartiality; due diligence; and promotion of justice.\(^3\) Accountability in the context of this paper therefore includes legal, political, administrative and financial rules, principles, standards and norms.

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\(^1\) This code of conduct is referred to as ‘We are United Nations Peacekeepers’.


\(^3\) For example, the Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law’, 6 August 1999, ST/SGB/1999/13.

The term ‘contractors’ is used in this paper to refer to private actors who, as commercial entities, are profit driven in their participation in peace operations. Contractors participating in peace operations provide services such as logistics, engineering support, technical support (i.e. for computer and communication systems), and transport to peace operations. These contractors are generally employed to provide such services and support by corporate organizations such as Kellogg Brown and Root. In some circumstances, contractors may also be employed directly by international or national organisations, or Member States.

II. Measures to Enhance Accountability of International Contractors

The current framework to hold contractors accountable on peace operations is inadequate because it relies almost solely on the application of the host nation’s domestic laws or the contractor fulfilling their contractual obligations.

This limited framework is compounded by the fact that, generally, there is very little monitoring undertaken of contractors and consequently, there is limited information available on the exact number of contractors providing services on peace operations; the amount of money involved in contracting for their services; and the terms of their employment. While it is true that the terms of employment for contractors are based on contractual obligations, there is international regulation of such terms. Furthermore, the involvement of corporate companies in employing contractors further complicates the accountability of individual contractors because there is very little oversight of the types of people employed, or the terms of their employment. The accountability of contractors providing services on peace operations is also complicated by the tensions that exist between achieving internationally recognized standards of human rights, and corporate profitability. As argued by Singer, ‘there are certain situations in which human rights may be transgressed for corporate interests.’

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1 Singer uses the term ‘privatised military firm’ to describe three types of contractors that are found in military operational environments today. He defines such companies as ‘profit driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare’. He divides the industry into three categories: (1) military provider firms which focus on the tactical environment often engaging in combat; (2) military advisory firms which engage in providing services such as training and advice to military forces; and (3) military support firms which provide rear echelon and supplementary services. The definition of contractors used above fits most closely to this third category. Contractors in this sense do not ‘participate in the planning and execution of direct hostilities.’ Peter W Singer, ‘Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatised Military Industry’ in 26(3) International Security 2001/2002. Contractors on peace operations would fall into the category of military support firms, 18.

2 Law and order authorities may be unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction for reasons including limited resources, collapse of the criminal justice system, corruption, and/or simply disinterest in dealing with international actors.

3 As most contracts are based on confidentiality, there is little transparency as to the accountability standards contractors are expected to maintain.

4 Above n7 p 33.
Accepting that the current framework for holding contractors accountable for their behaviour on peace operations is inadequate, there are at least four measures that may be used to enhance their accountability and, therefore, improve the governance of contractors. These include developing: (1) general principles and guidelines for employing and managing contractors (hereafter referred to as ‘General Principles for Contractors’); (2) a generic or model contract that may be used as a basis for employing and managing contractors (hereafter referred to as the ‘Model Contract’); (3) a mission specific code of conduct for employing and managing contractors; and (4) mechanisms to review the accountability of contractors. These measures will assist in better governance of contractors by ensuring that rules, principles, standards and norms that are developed to hold them accountable are transparent; and that affected individuals and organisations are provided with effective mechanisms to make complaints and report their concerns regarding the behaviour of contractors, and where appropriate receive redress. Developing and implementing these measures requires effective and efficient cooperation and coordination between international organisations, Member States, professional associations; \(^{1}\) and contracting firms.

A. General Principles for Contractors

General principles and guidelines that set basic accountability standards for contractors are necessary for at least four reasons. First, such principles and guidelines will assist in developing a general consensus as to the essential elements of accountability standards required of contractors. Secondly, they will provide a basis upon which to develop detailed rules and principles that would form the foundation for a model contract and mission specific codes of conduct for contractors. Thirdly, they will provide a reference point to stimulate greater debate as to further development of accountability standards for contractors. Fourthly, they will assist in ensuring that there is greater transparency as to what is expected of contractors when providing services on peace operations.

These general principles and guidelines must be based on international and national legal rules, principles, standards and norms; incorporate accepted standards relating to administration and financial probity; and take into account commercial realities. Furthermore, they must also be pragmatic and flexible so that they can be applied to a variety of situations in the field. The principles and guidelines developed must find the appropriate balance between pragmatic realities that contractors face on peace operations so as to ensure that unrealistic expectations or inappropriate requirements are not imposed upon them; and the need to ensure that the acts and omissions of contractors do not impact adversely on stakeholders in the area of operations. Thus the General Principles for Contractors should describe in general terms a model system of principles and guidelines that are universally accepted. In addition, they should also describe how the principles and guidelines should be implemented and enforced. The General Principles for Contractors should therefore establish the benchmark against which the behaviour of contractors can be measured.

\(^{1}\)One example of a professional service organisation that oversees contracting firms is the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) that ‘was founded to institute industry wide standards and a code of conduct, maintain sound professional and military practices, educate the public and policy makers on the industry’s activities and potential, and ensure the humanitarian use of private peacekeeping services for the benefit of international
peace and human security.’ See http://www.ipoaonline.org/ for further details regarding IPOA.

The development of General Principles for Contractors will require considerable coordination and cooperation from States, international organisations, field partners, professional associations and individual contracting firms so as to ensure that the general principles and guidelines are accepted and seen as having wide application to peace operations. In the context of the UN, the Peacekeeping Committee may consider it appropriate to recommend to the General Assembly that it should provide support and devote resources to developing a resolution that encapsulates general principles and guidelines for contractors. Such an approach will ensure that the principles and guidelines developed are seen as establishing universal standards in the same way that resolutions such as ‘Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners’ are now viewed.

B. Model Contract

Recognising that contractors are usually employed on peace operations through contractual arrangements, a key mechanism by which to stipulate measures to enhance their accountability exists in the contract that the contractor enter into. Therefore, it would assist States and international organisations if a Model Contract was developed that could be used as a template or precedent for the application of accountability rules, principles, standards and norms for contractors on peace operations. A Model Contract would also have the benefit of providing a narrower commercial focus than the General Principles for Contractors as to what is expected of parties when entering into commercial arrangements to provide services on peace operations. A Model Contract would also provide a useful precedent that may be used by States, international organisations (including regional organisations), and contractors when the affected parties are considering the terms concerning the employment of contractors.

The Model Contract should be based on the General Principles for Contractors but with a much greater emphasis on articulating binding rules and principles that take into account the commercial realities that are faced during the conduct of peace operations. Thus, all stakeholders should be able to use the Model Contract as a basis for adjusting the employment of contractors using a precedent that has the capacity for utilizing a number of pre-drafted clauses that may be amended to suit particular commercial realities in the field.

The development of a Model Contract will require the input from States, international organisations, field partners, professional associations and contracting firms. The UN should, however, coordinate this input so as to create a basis for a General Assembly resolution. The General Assembly could request that the Secretary General prepare a Model Contract for contractors in the same way that it requested that the Secretary General prepare a model status of forces agreement between the UN and host countries. Such an approach would ensure that the Model Contract is widely disseminated and that its provisions are transparent.

C. Mission Specific Codes of Conduct

Mission specific codes of conduct would ensure that the General Principles for Contractors and the Model Contract are further developed so as to reflect the standards expected of contractors by the relevant authorities and managers responsible for the conduct of a specific peace operation. Often a
contractor will be employed in a manner that gives managers in the field (for example the Special Representative of the Secretary General) very little say regarding the specific terms of the contract. Thus, the mission specific code of conduct would inform contractors and local stakeholders of the specific rules, principles, standards and norms that will apply to contractors in the mission or area of operations.

Mission specific codes of conduct, while based on the General Principles for Contractors and the Model Contract, should also be tied into mission specific issues, such as the standards expected of other peacekeepers in the area of operations, mission rules regarding sexual exploitation, and the application of human rights to specific situations that are likely to arise during the operation. Therefore, the development of mission specific codes must be coordinated between the various managers of the peace operation, local stakeholders and the relevant contracting firms working in the mission area. Such coordination is essential if the codes are to reflect the realities of that particular peace operation, and are to be considered by all affected stakeholders as being a reasonable, effective and efficient measure to hold contractors accountable.

D. Mechanisms to Review and Enforce the Accountability of Contractors

The mechanisms available to review and enforce the accountability of contractors are usually limited for a number of reasons, including the fact that often States and organisations lack legal jurisdiction over contractors, or are not functioning effectively in the area of operations. Therefore, there is a need to consider the development of more effective and efficient means to review the accountability of contractors.

Options available for greater review and enforcement include: (1) encouraging States in which contractor firms are incorporated to develop more effective jurisdiction over individuals and firms so as to ensure that local courts in that State can review their actions and omissions; (2) developing an international and/or national licensing body that can vet contracting firms that intend to, or are operating, in peace operations; (3) enhancing and standardising the existing ombudsman and complaints authorities on peace operations to accept complaints regarding the behaviour of contractors; and (4) creating a permanent international body and a subsidiary independent complaints system in the mission area to monitor, investigate, make recommendations, and provide feedback to the affected parties regarding the complaints made against contractors.

Due to the fact that review and enforcement mechanisms must be capable of holding contractors accountable in a range of ways and forums such as within the municipal law of the State in which the contractor is incorporated in; by way of the contractors employment contract and through the effectiveness of local review and enforcement measures it is essential that States, international organisations, field partners, professional associations and individual contracting firms cooperate

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1. See A/RES/44/49, 8 December 1989, para 11.
2. Jon Cina, Rapporteur Report ‘Accountability’ in Jessica Howard and Bruce Oswald (eds), The Rule of Law on
and coordinate with each other to ensure that the appropriate review and enforcement mechanisms are developed and resourced.

**Conclusion**

It is of fundamental importance that contractors are left in no doubt as to their responsibilities to protect victims and potential victims, and their accountability for damages caused to the host nation and its inhabitants. In conclusion therefore, developing effective and efficient measures to hold contractors that provide services on peace operations more accountable will add to the better governance of peace operations by ensuring that the appropriate balance is achieved between commercial realities and the requirement to adhere to legal, political, administrative and financial rules, principles, standards and norms. Holding contractors serving on peace operations accountable can only add to the legitimacy and credibility of peace operations.
PUBLIC SECURITY

Ambassador Murat Bilhan,
Chairman of the Center for Strategic Research (SAM)

Excellencies, Distinguished Members of Academia, Distinguished Colleagues, Participants, Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen,

As the world is changing, we are facing new risks and challenges. The escalation of regional conflicts threatens global peace and security. In cooperation with the UN, Turkey takes part in various activities that aim to prevent conflict and provide security and peace. A significant feature of modern peacekeeping is better planning, training, coordination and the maintenance of capabilities for the rapid deployment of both the military and police.

I would like to present to you details of Turkish participation in the police component of international peace operations. First of all, I have to emphasise that the police component, as a civilian contribution to peace operations, is a very recent phenomenon. In fact the Dayton Agreement, upon which UN Security Council Resolution No. 1035 on 15 December 1995 was adopted, to establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF), was signed only back in 1995. The IPTF in its role of promoting local law and order was essential in establishing a lasting peace. The IPTF also ensures that at local level, internationally accepted standards are followed in police and criminal justice activities. They also assist in ensuring that elections are carried out fairly, in an atmosphere free from violence or intimidation, and with respect to freedom of movement.

In international peacekeeping operations ever since, the involvement of police forces has been continuously growing. They are sometimes armed missions, especially in riots, or in counter crime or terrorism operations but in most cases, these are unarmed operations in support of national local police units. The requirement of whether or not the task force would be armed is determined by the UN authority requesting the assignment of a police contingent from the member states. Again in each case, the scope and the limits of duties expected from police forces to be assigned are clearly defined in the letters of intent circulated to the members by the United Nations.

In such a recent letter, for instance, concerning the establishment of a police task force in support of a UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), a reference was made to the UNSC Resolution No. 1528, which stated that the situation in Cote d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region. According to this resolution, the civilian police component of the UN operation was expected to be in charge of advising, assisting and training the Ivorian National Police. It was underlined that UNOCI was an assistance mission, and as such, UN civilian police
personnel would not carry arms.

Having contributed to the international Peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Turkey participated in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which was set up as the successor to the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to which she had also contributed.

Since then, the efforts of Turkey that has considerably contributed to UN police task force in the framework of operations for providing peace and prosperity in the international arena and for supporting the objectives of the United Nations (UN), have been increasingly continuing. In UN Peacekeeping Operations, Turkish police have been deployed in places such as: Kosovo (UNMIK), Liberia (UNMIL), Congo D.R. (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Cote d Ivoire (UNOCI), East Timor (UNMISET), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Burundi (ONUB) and the UN New York HQ. Turkey has been one of the major contributors in this field, as of October 2004. After Jordan and the USA, Turkey ranks third as the country presently providing the most police officers for peace operations. While Turkey was in fifth place among Police Force Contributing States according to data of March 2004, she has been raised to the third place according to data of October 2004, with a total of 334 police officers effectively participating in different missions. Turkey has assigned 643 officers since 1995, mainly in the Balkans. Turkey is also a participating country in the EU Police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia.

This indicates that Turkey attaches a growing importance to the civilian components of international peacekeeping operations. Indeed this is important, because the nature of international peacekeeping operations is changing now, these operations include more civilian aspects, in comparison with operations of the past which were essentially built upon military peace efforts. The task and role of the police should be strengthened, in view of the fact that new concepts of threats and risks create the necessity for new approaches, and a broader look at international efforts to find solutions to those threats and risks.

In Turkey, police officers are recruited for permanent duties. Their training is undertaken by the Police College, High Schools and Academy. Following the completion of the educational period, police officers are classified into specialised branches, and assigned to work in different parts of the country.

Turkey has a wide range of programmes to train both Turkish and foreign police personnel and has further developed new training programmes. In this case, it is worthwhile to note that a recent seminar on Peacekeeping Operations was held in Istanbul on 9–16 June 2004 under the title of UNTAT.

Furthermore, on the eve of each peacekeeping operation, pre-deployment seminars are organised in order to present to the assigned personnel the content of the operational mission, the conditions of the host country and all other information with regard to their tasks.

In order to contribute to regional and global peace, to improve their cooperation with other countries police agencies, and to have a mutual exchange of information, the Turkish Police
Academy also gives training opportunities aimed at improving the skills and professional standards of future foreign policemen, in the context of a framework of bilateral agreements with their countries. For the period between 1991 and 2005, 706 foreign students from 14 countries have been registered in the Turkish Police Academy and to date, 408 students have graduated and 209 students are still continuing their education.

The skills acquired by foreign police officers in the Turkish Police Academy provide them with valuable professional qualifications and a common professional understanding which might be used fruitfully during different types of peace operations if their respective countries participate.

Furthermore in the Turkish International Academy for Fighting against Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking, established by the contributions of the UN, a variety of seminars are organised for both Turkish and foreign police functionaries.

I would like also to share with you our experience with the Turkish gendarmerie. The Turkish gendarmerie is a very specific security force which resembles both the military in its basic structure, conscription, training and operational capability as well as the Turkish National Police Force in its attributions, its field of activities and further specialised training conceived for its public order functions. Despite its military character, it is unique because it is administered by the Ministry of the Interior. The gendarmerie is in charge of rural areas, and the police in urban, suburban and metropolitan areas. Gendarmerie officials are in fact military officers and the conscripts are serving in the same way as those who undergo compulsory military service.

In summary, the internal security of the country is coordinated at the level of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and both these security institutions (police and gendarmerie) are attached to this Ministry, which is a civilian body. We are ready to share this experience with you.

During peace operations, the need for police units with military structures has become increasingly more apparent. On the one hand, the Turkish gendarmerie units have the advantage that they can be deployed rapidly due to their military structure and they can perform specialised missions involving disciplined group actions because of their military capability and equipment. On the other hand, those same gendarmerie units are essentially capable of carrying out law enforcement agency functions, such as intelligence gathering, investigating cases, providing links between incidents and individuals, preparing cases for court hearings and assisting in immobilisation of terrorist organisations. The Turkish gendarmerie has contributed so far to the missions established in Hebron in Israel (UNTIPH), in Kosovo (NATO’s KFOR), in Bosnia Herzegovina (SFOR) and in Afghanistan (ISAF).

Lastly I wish to present to you the main ideas arising from the lessons learned from the exercises carried out by the Turkish authorities during many peace operations.

1. In order to encourage participation of countries in peace operations, it is necessary to establish structures which provide transparency and participatory policy, encompassing recruitment, planning and management of operations. In this field there is a different system between the
leading organisations such as UN, OSCE, and the EU. The UN system is the most transparent and easiest one to work with, cooperation starts from the very earliest stage of planning and it gives power and responsibility to national organisations to nominate and select candidates with the help of UNDPKO.

- In this field, there is a need for harmonising work between the different systems of the leading international organizations. One of the most appropriate solutions to this end may be to consider the establishment of an ad hoc committee, formed by the contributing countries, which can cooperate equally with the structures of leading organisations for all aspects of peace operations from the beginning to the end of the mission.
- The appointment of candidates to senior positions in the field and at headquarters should reflect the respective level of contributions of the countries involved.
- Human Resources Management sections should work closely with national institutions for the nomination and selection of personnel.
- There should be a time limit given for the length of service in international posts, especially seconded posts, which are not career building posts.

2. It is important to have doctrinal and procedural convergence, interoperability and a set of minimum standards required by a common operation, both among the countries that provide stability police and among the international organisations that use them. To this end, there is a need for cooperation among the countries doctrine centres, training facilities and headquarters and among the leading organisations.

3. There is a crucial need for cooperation between military and Civpol components during peace operation missions. Military and police forces having complimentary skills have had to cooperate more closely in their home countries to meet the needs of peace operations which are of a multi dimensional nature, requiring the capabilities and functions of both military and Civpol units.

Thank you.
SESSION II

WHAT ARE THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?

WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FOR PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES?
It is a pleasure for me to represent the United Kingdom at this important seminar. Some of you may be surprised that the UK is represented by a French national. Please, take this as a sign that EU cooperation on defence and security is in the making.

I will only be able to set out a couple of headlines in this short presentation. I hope we can go further into some issues during the expert meeting over the weekend and at the UK seminar to which I extend a warm invitation to all.

Challenges to cooperation and coordination in peace operations arise at three different levels:
- between the UN, Regional Organisations and Member States
- between the UN Security Council, troop contributing countries (TCCs) and the UN Secretariat
- between the myriad of actors involved in complex peace operations today.

1. Cooperation and coordination between the UN, Regional Organisations, and Member States and amongst Member States

The reference to cooperation and coordination amongst Member States is not anodyne: indeed, developing “variable geometry” partnerships for peace operations among Member States of the UN will be part of the solution to the problems we are encountering.

Let me highlight three domains:

a. Rapid Deployment

The UN does not, by itself, have high readiness capacity and we all know that it would be difficult to set this up. Therefore, we need to develop options to compensate for this gap:

- Member States should be encouraged to provide formation that can be immediately operational upon deployment, such as formed units and headquarters. A good example of this is SHIRBRIG;
- We should also encourage the development of regional rapid deployment capacity in support
of the UN; the UK is at the forefront of EU efforts to set up Battle groups that could be engaged for rapid reaction short term enforcement missions, either to provide a bridging force in a new mission area before UN troops arrive, or to assist a UN mission in difficulty.

b. Logistics

There is a need to develop logistic support arrangements to fill the gaps in the UN Strategic Deployment Stocks holdings and the lack of capacity of some Member States. The same applies to the African Union.

The UK is fully committed to the G8 engagement to develop logistic support arrangements to assist the African Union and African regional organisations. Several models can be considered, but we need to be realistic: strategic capabilities are scarce, even in the richest Western countries. For both the UN and Africa, the way ahead may be to develop better processes to rely on the private sector, with financing from richest UN members. The pattern would therefore take the form of quadrilateral arrangements between the UN (or AU), donors, troop contributors, and private providers.

c. Training

- The quality of peacekeepers is essential to the success of a peace operation. For this reason, the UK has assisted the development of the UN Standard Training Modules. It is important that all countries adopt those standards and incorporate them into their training;
- Some countries have more training capacity than others. They should increase their efforts to train third country nationals, working as much as possible in cooperation with DPKO’s Training and Evaluation Service (TES). The UK is about to enter a cooperative scheme with TES;
- The UK has extensive troop training programmes in Africa and elsewhere. In Africa we are also supporting the development of regional peacekeeping training centres. Coordination with key partners in this, especially France and the United States, is increasing, both bilaterally and in the G8 context (G8 “Clearing House”);
- At the UN level, one thing the UK would like to see is a better integration of military and civilian training at DPKO; it is important that TES, the Civilian Training Service and the Civilian Police Division work closely together to develop coherent training plans.

2. Cooperation and coordination between the UN Security Council, TCCs and the UN Secretariat

The rationale for improving cooperation and coordination at this level is that we need to strengthen the relationship between those who mandate, those who plan, and those who manage peace operations. I shall raise again three points:

a. Early identification of leadership
This is a shared responsibility: it is essential that in a mission the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the Force Commander (FCdr), and ideally the Chief of Staff, be identified early. It is simply not acceptable that they meet for the first time once they have been deployed in the field. It is also essential that the FCdr and the SRSG can participate in the planning of the mission that they will have the responsibility to conduct. This in turn points to the importance of pre-deployment training.

b. Security Council TCC consultations

• These consultations should occur at the earliest possible time, i.e. during the definition of the mandate;
• In the context of today’s peace operations, there is a particular need for clarity on the use of force:
  - the mandate should make it clear when force will be needed;
  - in return, the Security Council should obtain clear commitment from TCCs that they will use force when necessary. The UN cannot succeed if it must count with repeated national caveats in the field.
• DPKO should look at innovative options. The UK is interested in the suggestion made by USG Guéhenno before the 4th Committee last week and mentioned by David Harland yesterday that the UN should consider developing a Strategic Reserve: this would give DPKO a degree of certainty that they can rely on a force at high readiness to reinforce a mission in difficulty.

c. Consultations TCC-UN Secretariat

The Secretariat must be able to rely on better information from Member States for two reasons:
  - to plan missions appropriately
  - for the security of UN personnel.

Some information exchange will of necessity remain informal because of the sensitivities involved, but it must nevertheless take place. I hope we can discuss this later in this seminar.

3. Cooperation and coordination across the range of actors involved in the spectrum conflict prevention peacekeeping peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction work

a. Within the UN

• The UK supports the concept of integrated missions and the generalisation of the mechanism of Integrated Mission Task Forces, but recognises that this raises problems, e.g. how to preserve the integrity of the humanitarian space. More work is needed across the UN system to define best practice;
• The UK is currently supporting the development of the Integrated Mission Planning Process, as we believe that the use of this tool will bring a step change in the way the UN approaches the planning of complex missions;
One issue of particular importance is the need to properly plan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) schemes as part of complex peace operations. The UK supports current joint efforts by DPKO and UNDP to develop policy and guidance in this field. However, there may be a need to go a step further and prolong this by Security Sector Reform work. The UK would be willing to bring its SSR expertise to bear in UN missions.

b. Between the UN and its partners in peace operations

As highlighted by many already during this conference, we are moving towards a system in which the UN more and more shares responsibility with others in responding to crises. This is a welcome development, but much work is ahead of us to define appropriate relationships.

We need to develop various forms of liaison arrangements between the UN and other actors, both at headquarter level and in the field. But it is unlikely that we will find a “one size fits all” model: the UN will have to develop distinct relationships with each regional organisation, and those may even differ from mission to mission (this is why I referred to “variable geometry” above). I hope the expert meeting at the weekend will help progress this agenda.

c. High Level Panel recommendations

The UK is interested in the proposals expected to come out of the High Level Panel on threats to international security convened by the UN Secretary General, which are aimed to better coordinate UN and international action across the spectrum of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict rebuilding:

- Deputy Secretary General for Peace and Security
- Peacebuilding Commission
- Peacebuilding Centre and trust Fund.

However, we will need to examine each of those proposals at face value once we have the detail of the report.

Thank you very much for your attention. I will be pleased to answer your questions.
HUMANITARIAN/RECONSTRUCTION COORDINATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Mr. Arthur Gene Dewey
Assistant Secretary of State for
The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration

I would like to thank the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, and China Institute for International Strategic Studies, for hosting this important Seminar. I also salute the Challenges Project for its continued leadership in the field of peace support operations. I am pleased and honored to continue to be a participant in this landmark effort.

We all recognize that effective peace support and post-conflict stability operations require an incredible amount of cooperation and coordination. Yet in practice, both cooperation and coordination too often break down. Why does this occur? I believe there are two principal reasons: First, there is a significant mismatch between the disciplined integration of the military forces on the one hand, and the less disciplined, less integrated civilian political/humanitarian/reconstruction component on the other hand. Second, the linkages and communication between these highly asymmetrical military and civilian components too often are hostage to personalities and ad hoc coordination arrangements.

Drawing on the experience of a wide range of peace support, and transition support, operations world wide, I believe there are five major elements of successful collaboration.

First, we have to do better comprehensive campaign planning. The military is skilled at campaign planning, but neither the military professionals, nor civilian professionals, is very good at comprehensive campaign planning. Each can do planning within their own narrow lane; but exceedingly few in either camp can work across the lanes to do comprehensive civil-military planning.

Such planning means developing a common civil-military picture of:

1. The Situation, both from the standpoint of a clear understanding of the threat, and familiarity with the total civilian and military assets needed to meet that threat;

2. The overall civil-military mission; (developing the outlines of what is achievable is vital here. Top level civilian and military planners need to get together early to work through what would be a
realistic mission, and what it would cost.)

3. The Concept of Operations needed to reach the desired civil-military end state;

4. What the military component could be expected to do support the main civilian effort in helping that effort achieve its political, humanitarian and reconstruction objectives. This needs to be spelled out in a range of specified and implied tasks that military forces might be called upon to provide;

5. Description of how Cooperation and Coordination will be accomplished.

Getting two very different planning cultures together to draft a timely workable comprehensive campaign plan is the most difficult but also the most important element of a peace support operation. Getting this to happen in a multinational, multilateral UN peace support operation is a monumental undertaking, but one that must be attempted.

In the U.S. we have yet to succeed of producing such a functional plan in a timely manner. Getting the interagency team together at the top to do this has proved too difficult. I have some ideas on how both national, and United Nations, planners could work around this huge obstacle. I hope this Seminar will give us an opportunity to explore these ideas.

(For example, I ask the staff of our Bureau in Washington to draft such a comprehensive campaign plan for major emergencies, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Even if this does not lead to an official doctrine or statement of purpose for the U.S. government as a whole, it is a valuable exercise in prioritizing our resources and exerting our strategic role with other policy making organizations. The results of this process for Afghanistan permitted an early role for the United Nations and effective transition from military operations to the establishment of local political authority.)

The Second principle is the need to assess in advance the humanitarian impact; the unintended humanitarian consequences, of actions political leaders take, or fail to take, in complex contingencies such as peace support operations. In the Balkans during the 1990s, a series of acute humanitarian emergencies, including ethnic cleansing, arguably could have been avoided or mitigated, had such an assessment of humanitarian consequences been undertaken. The two classic tragedies where humanitarian impact was overlooked were the slowness to respond to genocide in Rwanda, and the very late response to the million person march of Hutus from Rwanda to Eastern Zaire in mid 1994. With consideration of, and planning for, the humanitarian impact in each of these cases, tens of thousands of lives could have been saved.

The Third principle is the need for the civilian and military planners to huddle together well before the launch of a civil-military operation. The purpose of this “huddling”, or getting together in an interactive, participatory workshop, or conducting a “rock drill” as military planners like to call it, is to accomplish several absolutely essential tasks. These include identification of critical gaps in the plan; to point to those gaps that could be “show stoppers” if not fixed; to answer any lingering doubts and questions in the minds of the key participants; and to reduce to the extent possible,
surprises and unintended consequences in the plan of operations.

The best, but unfortunately the only really good example of such a huddle, was the two week long participatory workshop that United Nations Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari conducted for the U.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia in 1989. Ahtisaari attended every session of this pre-deployment workshop. He used it to establish communication, to generate teamwork and loyalty, and to instill an esprit de corps that afforded the best possible opportunity for this peace support operation to succeed. To this day, the UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia is considered one of the finest hours of the United Nations. Ask Martti Ahtisaari how this happened, and he would point to this pre-deployment get together as one of the major ingredients of success.

A sub-principle to the conduct of a pre-deployment “huddle” of the key operational players is to find a way to determine the key tasks where the civilian humanitarian and reconstruction players need the help of the military. Then these requirements need to be coordinated with the military planners. The UN agency best placed to do this is the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. What is needed is a list from the key UN agencies and other international organizations involved in an operation, plus the NGOs, the range of specified and implied tasks that military forces might be called upon to provide in support of the main civilian humanitarian and reconstruction effort. Then OCHA should go over this list in detail with the military planners, both at DPKO, and with planners already deployed forward in the field. The purpose of this exercise is to determine which ones the military can, and will do; which ones the military hasn’t planned for but can and will, and which ones the military acknowledges need to be done, but the military will not do them for a variety of reasons. (As an example, the most troubling gaps usually identified in such an exercise is the absence of any clearly identified responsibility for administration of justice, for civil policing, and for assuring the secure space in which the civilian humanitarian and reconstruction players can work).

Finally, the Fourth principle of effective civil-military coordination and cooperation is to conduct a brutally honest after action review. It is too arrogant to call this a lessons learned exercise, since the record of learning these lessons is not very impressive. But it is vitally important to identify what went right and wrong and why, how to fix what went wrong, and how to build on what went right.

Moving now from the theoretical to the practical, let me touch on how some of these ideas concerning cooperation played out in Afghanistan.

Good cooperation at many levels has been essential to success in post-conflict Afghanistan. The Program Secretariat and follow-on Consultative Groups really embody the large-scale cooperation we achieved between U.N. organizations, the U.S. and other donors, and the new Afghan government. This mechanism allowed for a smooth transfer of planning, programming, and budgeting of public services from international organizations to Afghan ministries.

The development of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs, provided much needed field coordination among foreign and Afghan civilian and military officials, diplomats, and humanitarian workers. A well planned system of checks and balances ensures that the interests and roles of all
these various groups are respected. For example, PRTs approve reconstruction projects only with the approval of provincial authorities. PRTs also assist in coordination between local authorities and the central government in Kabul, raising the profile of the central government throughout the country and ensuring that national and local officials are on the same page. At a higher organizational level, the PRTs represent international coordination, with the U.S., Germany, the UK and others sponsoring teams in key locations out in the countryside.

I believe that in Afghanistan the international community can point to a success story in terms of coordination and cooperation. Several key ingredients made this cooperation and coordination work. These included:

1. Posting of liaison persons from the key United Nations agencies involved in humanitarian and reconstruction work at the major military headquarters. (This kind of coordination was vital to instructing the military planners on the skills and competencies of these agencies. It also showed these planners and senior staff the ways the military could help these agencies while staying out of their way and letting them do their work.

2. Putting UN agencies out front to provide for public services and perform many of the functions of governance while new and very weak national ministries were trying to get on their feet and do this job for themselves.

3. Insure coordination and cooperation between the UN agencies and their corresponding Afghan ministries through the ingenious Program Secretariat twinning model.

4. Establish sectoral task forces that include Civil Affairs military personnel. These task forces formed around the sectors of Water, Food, Medical, Security, and Winterization. The military brought a useful discipline and organizational skills to these task forces. And the coordination and cooperation made possible by these task forces kept the civilian and military components of the operation informed of each other’s work, and help minimize (though not eliminate completely) the blurring of lines between military and civilian humanitarian actors.

In many ways the Afghan example demonstrated the future of a peace and transition support operation, and shows that it can work. It also showed the things that did not work. For example, it revealed the serious consequences of inadequate planning for public safety out in the countryside. It revealed the weaknesses of assigning responsibility for oversight of such key sectors as Justice, Police Training, and Poppy eradication to individual donor countries rather than equipping and funding international organizations to do these tasks. And finally, the weakest link was the lack of a Human Rights program to provide a Neighborhood Watch over the abuses of warlords, militia commanders, and the oppression of majorities over their minority neighbours throughout the country.

The lesson identified in Afghanistan and every other civil-military operation is that coordination and cooperation work best when the civilian component is tightly integrated as was possible through the twinning of UN agencies with Afghan ministries. The military component need not,
and normally should not, be integrated with the civilian component, but must provide the harmonious and interoperable support needed to make the civilian effort succeed. It is this interoperability that permits the substitution of the military’s version of Command and Control with the civilian friendly term of Cooperation and Coordination.
Introduction: Changing Role of UN Military Peacekeepers in Complex Peace Operations

UN Peacekeeping (used as a generic term) has gone through a substantial changing process which has had a strong impact within the UN itself, and on the different international, regional or national levels of decision taking and conduct. Consequently, there is a need to scrutinize the state of affairs from a political, humanitarian, military, and law and order perspective in order to identify areas where coordination and cooperation is needed the most.

UN peacekeeping forces have served an important role from the very beginning. Pre-Cold War Peacekeeping Operations were described as ‘largely military in composition’. The military were tasked to maintain calm on the front lines. Their presence was enough to prevent the expansion of many conflicts, while peacemakers negotiated a settlement of the dispute. But the changing nature of conflicts following the end of the cold war made it imperative for the UN to launch a new era of humanitarian activities. Peace operations, generally carried out within a stat, can be described as multidisciplinary, multinational, complex in nature and influenced by the volatility of the situation in the ground and the danger of a conflict spillover regional wise.

Therefore, the UN military force gradually learnt to “coexist” in the mission area with other partners whose roles are of the utmost relevance, and are ready to carry out new tasks, as for example Human Rights monitoring. We may emphasize the fact that Modern / Complex Peace Operations are essentially ‘civilian defined’ and ‘civilian led’. The military can provide security, put a cessation to conflict, separate warring factions; disarm and demobilize among other tasks that can create a safe and secure environment for the other components UN Civilian Police and Specialized Civilians. This demands not only “coexistence”, but putting greater emphasis on coordination, cooperation, communication and some degree of consensus among all the actors in the field (what is commonly referred to as the four Cs, in the STM3 UN led Project).

In giving the military perspective, it is important to stress the fact that, in the face of a conflict, the solution is political, legal, social, humanitarian, economic and developmental, and not only military. Peace Operations are no longer about keeping the peace in a kind of status quo way, but equally important about peacebuilding in its widest spectrum. It is important that actors in the
field—starting with the military, who up to recently had been the central actors in traditional peacekeeping—have a common understanding of each others roles, as well as highly professional competences regarding their own specific task. Previous training approaches, for example, put the focus on Force Commander’s preparation, while the current holistic approach is training or mentoring, the senior management team of multidimensional operations as a whole (Integrated Mission Planning Program).

We must state that the tendency indicates a change of paradigm, i.e. from traditional peacekeeping to more complex operations. It has been recognized that sometimes deployment under Chapter VI meant using the wrong tool, in the wrong place at the wrong time. By June 2004, only 25% of the missions have a Buffer Zone (UNFICYP, UNMEE, UNOCI and UNOMIG). UN military peacekeepers and associate personnel are operating in a more threatening environment which has called for more complex, robust and multidimensional Chapter VII mandates. In the last five years, from nine missions deployed, eight were Chapter VII mandated. This issue in itself has proved to be a challenge that has to be met mainly in two ways: by strengthening UN’s own faculty, and by building up cooperation with other organizations.

**How can Member States best support the UN in Peace Operations?**

Triggered by the “Brahimi Report”, the UN has undergone a deep organizational transformation in rather a short time, but it relies on the Member States, especially on Troop contributing Countries, to implement the whole range of recommendations in the most effective manner. The Security Council has called upon ‘...all States to intensify efforts to secure the world free of the scourge of war...’ The challenge at national level is to accompany UN in this change, but UN itself has to be more explicit as regards conceptual issues. First, when moving from Chapter VI to VII mandates, some Member States may have experienced some impediments as regards domestic procedures which imply slow bureaucracy and lengthy debate, or may have economic or logistic restrictions to be able to support a UN Peace Operation. This clashes against the UN definition of ‘rapid and effective deployment capabilities” within 90 days of receiving the mandate to launching a complex operation, commonly consisting of 5 to 10 thousand troops with corresponding numbers of CIVPOL and multidisciplinary civilian personnel.

**How do political decisions impact on the military?**

**Impact on training:** When the political decision of participating in a UN mandated mission, troops, who may not be mandated in their country to carry out law and order tasks, find themselves, for example, carrying out policing duties, when there has not yet been a CIVPOL deployment to carry out that specific role. Some troops are currently carrying out tasks for which they have not been prepared during their military education (riot control, urban searches, arrest and detention, etc.) Moreover, troops are certainly trained in International Humanitarian Law, but there must be awareness that Human Rights are the axis of current mandates. Training Military Peacekeepers in Human Rights is a must, if we come to think of the implications for the military force duties in this new context (protection of civilian population, monitoring and observation on Human Rights, support to Human Rights partners). Misunderstanding of rules of engagements can also pose a great
difficulty, when interpreting them at the national level.

Impact on logistics: this is a difficult issue when we recall “Brahimi Report”, in that 77% of UN troops come from developing countries or countries with weak economies. There may be a great impediment in complying with the MOU and in respecting the standards of COE. This also brings about collateral problems, such as lack of the necessary own equipment, or lack of equipment interoperability even within the same contingent, ranging from standardized weaponry to a common radio communication system and means of transport. A better distribution of resources within the Armed Forces at the national level, especially when those resources are scarce, is of the utmost importance. For instance, if we come to the worse case scenario, and troops are engaged in law and order tasks, there is often a need to provide troops with non-lethal weapons. This ultimately causes an impact not only on logistics, but on how training should be carried out.

Impact on national standards: as for example the concept of Human Rights, of Civil-military Coordination and of Use of Force in Self-defence. Different cultures may have a different approach towards Human Rights, but in carrying out UN mandated functions, Armed Forces should abide by UN standards and work towards a basic doctrinal commonality. On the other hand, CIMIC still connotes an instrument of the commander to fulfill a military mission for some Troop contributing Countries. The military is not the only solution to the problem: CMCoord officers must be trained to understand humanitarian principles and guidelines so that they can facilitate the coordination of the security and development interface and ensure that any military support offered is complimentary to the humanitarian and development agenda. Adapting national standards to UN standards again has an impact on training.

Recommendation: on how MS can best support UN in Peace Operations.

- With a clearer policy transmitted by the UN itself, deeper understanding and flexibility at the national decision making level, in the light of UN Chapter VII mandated Peace Operations. They should be seen as a way of achieving the mandate while protecting UN Forces, rather than as intrusive, warlike operations. This understanding will help achieve rapid deployment, or improve the Troop contributing Countries rapid deployment level in the UNSAS, as defined by UN itself.
- Revision of tactical doctrine and educational curricula (including a greater emphasis on Human Rights and a greater awareness of CMCoord and Cultural Awareness, to meet the needs of effective performance in the mission area). More emphasis should be given to the common interpretation of ROE’s. Rather than training, when talking about the nature of change in conflicts, and therefore in Peace Operations, and the established new paradigms, there is a need for education to promote radical changes.
- Member States should have an active role in the development, validation and implementation of UN DPKO TES Standardized Training Modules (STM 1, 2 and 3) in order to foster interoperability and standardized procedures.
- Closer dialogue and negotiation at national level between decision makers and Armed Forces who can play a more active advisory role in what can or cannot be achieved from a military perspective; and between Troop contributing Countries and DPKO as regards material and logistic needs / resources and advanced planning.
Promote awareness that active participation will enable each Troop contributing Country not only to make a contribution to international peace and stability, but also to strengthen its own national security.

How can the UN best support Member States when becoming Troop contributing Countries?

The bottom line for organizing an effective and rapid response to a crisis is political will. But too often delays or insufficient planning have slowed effective UN ‘action’ or complicated on-going operations. The UN relies completely on the equipment, personnel and services volunteered by its member states. Many troops are without logistical support and weaponry, making them less effective in emergency situations. Lack of pre-deployment planning, mobility limitations, the sparse availability of military intelligence from Member States, and a lack of funding, deficiencies in critical areas such as communications, multi-role logistics, health services, and engineering have all pierced the capability of forces to carry out their mandates.

If the Standby Arrangement System is fully built up, the Secretariat would be in a better position to meet current challenges. But again, the system’s success is totally dependant on the support and participation of Member States, since even under the standby arrangements Member States will retain the right to deploy the agreed units in a particular operation. I do not recall if there are statistics as regards how many times Member States have backed off. The difficulty of securing resources has led to unacceptable delays in deployment of peace keeping forces in emergency situations that cannot afford delay. The lack of stocks plays a critical role in enhancing the rapid deployment capabilities of Peace Operations.

Both military and civilian planning capacity of DPKO and other UN agencies, funds or departments need to be strengthened. To deploy into a mission area without an exit strategy shows something went wrong during planning stage. UN planning tasks require not only cooperation within a department but also cohesion with various departments, offices, divisions and units involved in all aspects of UN peacekeeping. Certain basic doctrinal commonality is also needed. Enhanced intelligence capacity (collecting and analyzing field information) is necessary for a coherent planning and in order to protect mission personnel, but above all to be able to carry out mandates which implicitly or explicitly entail protection of civilian population.

Recommendations: on how the UN can best support Member States when becoming Troop contributing Countries.

- UN Brindisi Log Base provides logistics in a timely way. Stocks are replenished on a regular basis to meet the demands of future Peace Operations, to cover the needs of UN Staff and UNMO’. UN can pre-tock general supplies at regional depots in order to avoid lack of equipment interoperability, arrange faster airlifts, improve early warning capabilities and secure better military intelligence from member states.

- UN, mindful of the equality among its members, plays the role of bringing together all Member States, in order to plan and carry out a PO, around the same table. Member States from the developing world with weak economies should be encouraged, when having to comply with the UN standards, to enter into bilateral arrangements, either with private...
donors or relying on the support of developed countries to count with the necessary Contingent Equipment. Collaboration by a major power is desirable, as long as it does not imply a kind of neo colonialism.

- Even when dealing with PO training per se, collaboration among Member States should not be seen as the old schema of communication, where there is a transmitter of knowledge and a passive receptor, but rather a two way interaction. It may take time to break the apparent taboo of some regions, countries or individuals being a “tabula rasa” as regards PO expertise and knowledge, simply ignoring “…those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves.”

- The UN must adopt clearly defined, credible, achievable and appropriate mandates, including in those mandates effective measures for the security and safety of UN personnel. It should strengthen consultations with Troop contributing Countries when deciding on Peace Operations.

- Improvements in planning for a response can help build a better operation and may provide greater confidence to countries weighing their political support.

- Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade size forces with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment.

**How can the UN and Regional Organizations best support each other in Peace Operations?**

It is of the utmost importance to stress the fact that the UN has the global and inalienable responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. But given the financial, logistical, and political constraints, the UN has also turned to a policy of delegation to coalition of willing member states and regional organizations that are more effectively equipped to deal with the actual activities that are inherent of a Peace Operation. The Security Council itself called for the strengthening and communication between the UN and regional or sub regional organizations and arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. There are many instances where the UN has resorted to Multinational/Regional Forces formed by willing states and authorized by the Security Council, with a view to rapid deployment, previous to the deployment of a UN force.

The new challenges in PO underline the importance of smooth cooperation between the various organizations, and with ad hoc coalitions. We must bear in mind that all UN mandated operations serve the same purpose, whether they are led by the UN or by other entities, namely to contribute to peace and security. The tendency to count with regional standby forces ready to respond to the UN in face of a crisis situation impacts on the need for regional training. Every Troop contributing Country is primarily responsible for training its own troops. But training would be enhanced by a second regional phase of combined or joint training and exercises. The deployment of standby forces may have an impact on logistics, too. The lack of capacity for sustaining regional Peace Operations can have negative results in accomplishing the mission.

The establishment of regional stand by forces, supported by a corresponding Regional Organization, is a living reality in some regions, a well founded project in others, and an aspiration in some cases,
such as in Latin America, where we do not count with a regional organization, which deals with Peacekeeping active participation. MINUSTAH clearly shows that South America is deploying mainly following the structure of MERCOSUR, but a Peacekeeping Chapter is still a pending issue, an option that can be explored, given the UN tendency to delegate on regional or sub regional organizations.

Thus, we can clearly distinguish a disparity of regional maturity, so to speak. Different regions evolved in different ways, developing distinctive competencies when tackling peace operation issues. As Captain Dunbar stated during the 14th Challenges Seminar in Abuja, ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum have established a proactive and effective way to deal with security challenges in their region, a ‘can do’ approach to solving problems, rather than waiting for problems to drift to the agenda of the Security Council. Some regional organizations—maybe the most powerful—have chosen to follow their own policies, even though this may imply a degree of detachment from the UN. But, as Mr. Seraydarian (DSRSG, UNMIL) pointed out at the 14th Challenges seminar, there is a danger of regional organizations not providing the UN with the necessary means to implement the UN mandated missions. Indeed, there is a marked reduction in troop contribution from developed countries to UN Peace Operations. Other regional organizations recognize UN primacy and sustain that any military intervention in a Peace Operation should always count with the authorization of the UN Security Council. As Dr. Chambas expressed during the Abuja Seminar, ECOWAS keeps faith with the spirit of the key aspects of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter, holding consultation with the UN.

However, it is our belief that—taking into consideration the different capabilities and idiosyncrasies—all Member States must have a say in this issue and must work in cooperation and coordination in the name of peace, while creating friendly bonds among themselves: this gives value added to Regional Peace Operation participation. Paraphrasing Major General Tony Stigsson—when addressing the issue of multidisciplinary training during the 9th Challenges Seminar in Buenos Aires—we may say that Troop contributing Countries must train together since we work together. Regional approach to Peacekeeping leads to a continuous synergy in terms of cooperation. Cooperation requires transparency. Transparency generates confidence. And confidence contributes to regional stability. Finally, stability significantly fosters regional peace and security and an environment in which development can take place, giving regional Peace Operation training and deployment a two fold purpose.

As previously stated, the need for regional participation is imperative because troops of the same region may have similar standards of training and equipment, and share cultural attitudes and motivations. The decision making processes at a regional level is faster. The contribution with troops of Military Alliances or Regional Organizations to Peace Operations authorized by the UN are undoubtedly the best response to vigorous military activities, but in many other circumstances of complex Peace Operations it is only the UN that can support the wider spectrum of capabilities needed in humanitarian and development activities, through its own agencies or associated NGO’s.

Recommendations: on how UN and Regional Organizations can best support each other in Peace Operations
UN should encourage the emerging regional approaches towards Peacekeeping, providing not only standardized training, but supporting the partnerships with technical, political and legal advises.

There should be greater dialogue and institutionalized coordination between UN and regional organizations, and among regional organizations themselves, so as to exchange views, support each other not only through training but logistically, and avoid duplication of efforts.

Regional Organizations must not limit the role of the UN, but rather support UN and recognize that, with its global membership, where the whole International Community comes together, the UN keeps on as the only world body whose legitimacy is indisputable.

What are the expectations of the International Community?

I have just mentioned the International Community, which brings me to the question posed in this second session, that is to say: What are the expectations of the International Community? A straight forward question to which there is no straight forward answer. As an individual, as part of an organization or as a representative of a Member State, I truly believe I do not have the authority to speak on behalf of the International Community, or try to summarize what its expectations are. So, leaving aside the military perspective, will reformulate the question: What, in my personal opinion, should be the expectations of the International Community?

The answer is there, in black and white for all us to reflect upon. The greatest expectation, we all, as the International Community, should have is to live up to the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter, reaffirming our commitment to the principles stated in the Preamble.

- To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...
- To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
- To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
- To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

And to these ends,

- To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
- To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
- To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
- To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.
- To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, (...)
- To achieve international cooperation (...), promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as the race, sex, language or religion.
In John Locke’s philosophy, tabula rasa was the theory that the human mind is at birth a “blank slate” without rules for processing data.

Joseph Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness”.

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1. In John Locke’s philosophy, tabula rasa was the theory that the human mind is at birth a “blank slate” without rules for processing data.
2. Joseph Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness”.
My speech has three parts. In Part I, recent changes in the international environment in which peacekeeping operations are evolving. Part II, a series of challenges the changed international environment has posed to troop contributing countries. Part III, some suggestions.

I. A Changed International Peacekeeping Environment

Since the end of the cold war, significant changes have taken place in the international environment in which peacekeeping operations are evolving. The changes have the following characteristics:

1. Reduced tension between major powers

Since the balance of power was broken with the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed improved relations among major powers. There have been more dialogues and closer cooperation between them. As a result, tension between major powers has been greatly reduced.

2. Change in the nature of conflicts

A large proportion of post cold war conflicts have been internal in contrast with the mainly inter-state wars during the cold war. In 1998 for example, out of the 27 armed conflicts in that year, only 2 were international (Ethiopia—Eritrea and India—Pakistan). Although there has been a slight increase in the number of inter-state conflicts since the 1990s, peacekeeping operations have been operating largely within the national boundaries.

3. Growing influence by regional organizations

During the cold war, the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in international affairs was limited. Having slipped the leash of the cold war, these organizations have been eager to exert their influence. Some of them have expanded their sphere of intervention beyond the regions they find themselves in. Examples are NATO and OSCE.

4. Power vacuum or lack of government authority in mission areas
The majority of current peacekeeping operations are deployed in areas of intra-state conflicts. A power vacuum or a lack of government authority often exits in such areas due to the withdrawal of the former ruler, the collapse of a legal government, the incompetence of the government, ill governance or a power struggle. Peacekeepers, therefore, are often compelled to discharge their functions in anarchy.

5. **Humanitarian crisis as a result of complicated causes of conflict**

Intra-state conflicts have often been the result of a combination of complex causes: the collapse of state institutions, a breakdown of law and order, ethnic and racial hatred, religious incompatibility, political persecution, economic disparity and desperation, natural disasters and shortage of resources. These phenomena and conflicts themselves become cause and effect of each other, often culminating in large-scale humanitarian crisis.

6. **More actors, hybrid missions**

Conflict resolution is no longer the exclusive purview of the UN. Regional, civil and NGO organizations also play key roles. UN member states have also formed multinational forces or coalitions of the willing to conduct peacekeeping operations under non-UN command. Different models of cooperation between the UN and other actors have evolved since the 1990s. Some are integrated operations, where different regional organizations and the UN operate within a single, or joint, chain of command; some are coordinated operations, where the UN and other organizations operate side by side under separate command structures, but in a coordinated fashion; some are parallel operations, where the UN deploys alongside another organization’s force, without formal coordination; and some are sequential operations, where the UN either proceeds or follows a multinational, regional or bilateral force. Hence, hybrid missions.

**II. Challenges to Troop contributing Countries**

The changed international peacekeeping environment has posed a series of challenges to the UN and, in turn, to troop contributing countries.

1. **Lack of consensus on traditional peacekeeping principles may divide the international community.**

Consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force are fundamental principles guiding UN peacekeeping operations. These principles have been adhered to in traditional peacekeeping operations, which deal with inter-state conflicts. However, as peacekeeping operations evolved into the second generation, different opinions among member states have emerged as to whether these principles must be maintained in peacekeeping operations that deal with intra-state conflicts. Lack of consensus on these principles may have serious consequences. One, the international community may split into opposing blocs where decision is required and if lack of consensus spreads into the Security Council, the UN credibility will be damaged. Two, such disagreement may have a negative
effect on member states willingness to contribute troops.

2. Peacekeeping operations must be deployed in a rapid and timely manner.

Rapid and timely deployment is key to the success of any military operation. Peacekeeping operations are no exception. However, the need for action is not always satisfied. Firstly, the nature of peacekeeping is to “keep” peace, which means there must be some sort of peace to keep in the conflicting area. Some form of agreement must be reached prior to the deployment of a UN operation. Peacekeeping is born to be a delayed action. Secondly, decisions to take action must be made by the Security Council, which is not always monolithic. Lack of consensus in the Security Council may not only result in delay of deployment, it may even lead to inaction by the UN. Thirdly, the UN doesn’t have a standing force, as envisaged in the Charter and although scores of countries have joined the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), prior permission from member countries remains an indispensable condition for the deployment of the pledged troops.

3. A severe shortage of resources occurs with the rapid expansion in both the number and size of peacekeeping operations.

The expansion of peacekeeping operations means a greater demand for resources, but because of a commitment gap, supply falls far short of demand. With regard to personnel, in recent years, we have seen a decline in the troop contributions of developed states to the UN commanded peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa. Conversely, there has been a rapid growth in the contribution of troops by developed states to multinational forces or coalitions of the willing. The expansion has also resulted in a heavier financial burden to the UN, or, to be more exact, to member states. This has been aggravated by some states delayed payment of their dues to the UN.

4. UN peacekeepers have to face greater security threats.

The blast that killed 21 UN staff members in Baghdad in August 2003 reminds us of a fact that the UN has become a target of terrorism. Political motivations such as terrorism are the most important underlying causes. Factions in an internal conflict don’t always keep their commitment. They often blame the UN for the political losses they have suffered or regard UN peacekeepers as the stumbling block. The UN, therefore, becomes the target against which they retaliate or let out their steam. The hostage taking incident in May 2000 in Sierra Leone and the killing of a UN military observer in May 2004 in D.R. Congo, are only two of the many such examples.

Security is the precondition for the UN to carry out its activities and security threats affect a member state’s willingness to contribute troops. After the Baghdad explosion, the UN had to evacuate its entire staff from Iraq. And subsequent to the hostage taking incident in Sierra Leone, some troop contributing countries withdrew their troops and the UN faced serious problems trying to find countries prepared to send extra soldiers to bolster the UN peacekeeping force in that country.
5. The UN must improve its management of peacekeeping operations to make them more effective and efficient.

Improper management or low efficiency not only impedes the accomplishment of the mandate, they also dampen member states confidence and consequently their enthusiasm to contribute troops.

Modern complex peacekeeping operations must be planned carefully and consultation and coordination are important ingredients to careful planning. The accomplishment of complex tasks calls for the collective and coordinated effort of different contingents: infantry, engineering, transportation and medical units. Consultation and coordination with troop contributing countries as to the timing of deployment, the equipment to be carried and the training level of each unit must take place well in advance, or the smooth functioning of each unit will not be achieved. An inadequately equipped or poorly trained infantry unit may make the other contingents feel insecure; lack of interoperability of the communications equipment may make it impossible for different units to communicate with each other.

Lack of cooperation or coordination may also disrupt the day to day functioning of an operation. As far as I know, in 2001 some military observers assigned to UNTSO missed the reporting date of the month, only because their travel authorizations had not been issued in time. This situation could have been avoided if DPKO had been contacted and oral authorization sought.

6. Poor personnel qualities also hinder the functioning of a peacekeeping operation.

Because of the different educational and training background, there is great disparity in the qualities of personnel contributed by different countries. Troop contributing countries should take a more responsible attitude and attach due importance to the qualities of personnel they contribute. They must strictly follow the selection standards of the UN and take serious steps to improve the education and training of their personnel.

III. Suggestions

To improve the cooperation and coordination between the UN and its member countries, the following suggestions are put forward:

1. To bridge the capacity gap, the UN should improve the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). Significant progress has been made in the system since 1993 with more than 90 participating countries. Improvements must still be made in the following aspects: political support from troop contributing countries, response time after a crisis breaks out, interoperability of equipment, command and control and the standardization of training.

2. To raise the effectiveness and efficiency, education and training should be improved. The UN should provide more guidance in peacekeeping training to troop contributing countries and carry out pre-deployment inspections or tests. The UN should continue to provide training assistance to countries that lack training experience. More importantly, the UN should maintain
good cooperation and coordination with troop contributing countries in the aspect of training. Troop contributing countries must cooperate more closely in training their personnel.

3. Two-way cooperation and coordination between the UN and member states should be enhanced. To promote wider cooperation from member states, the UN should have more consultation with its member states and allow them to get more involved in the decision-making and planning process. Member states, in turn, should render the UN more political, financial and personnel support.

4. Developed member states should provide more support to the underdeveloped in terms of finance, equipment or training. Many countries, small and underdeveloped in particular, have the willingness to contribute more to UN peacekeeping operations, but have been unable to do so because of the constraints in finance, equipment or training. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for developed member countries to provide them with more support in these aspects.
NO MORE FAILED STATES?

Mr. Hans Hækkerup
Former UN Under-Secretary-General

In the post 9/11 world the UN is facing a tough choice: Either to concentrate on traditional peacekeeping missions or to restructure the organisation enabling it to play a significant role in the new type of missions like Afghanistan and Iraq.

Since the end of the Cold War the concept of peacekeeping has changed dramatically. Gone is the nice lightly armed blue helmet soldier sitting in his white painted watchtower overlooking the ceasefire line. He only shoots in self-defence. Instead we have a combat soldier in camouflage fatigues and flak jacket in his armoured car. He shoots when it is necessary to fulfill his mandate.

And he does not need the consent of the parties.

But peacekeeping missions have also changed in another way. The role of the military component has been reduced both in time and scope. It has become one element among others even if an important one.

In the first phase, when a crisis develops into conflict, it has to be dealt with through diplomatic and economic means. In the second phase, if fighting nevertheless breaks out, military force has to be used to stop it through pre-emptive deployment, enforcement or peacekeeping. Then, in the third phase, the civilians take the lead in post-conflict state-building.

This will be the subject of my speech here today.

Very often the state structure has been destroyed during the conflict. Therefore state-building has become a crucial part of the whole concept of peacekeeping. Unfortunately the political interest in this tiresome process often trickles away when the conflict disappears from the front pages and donor money dry up. The result will be a failed state, where warlords or ethnic or religious leaders are in de facto control and the state structures have ceased to function.

In the state-building phase a mission typically will include Civil Administration, Law Enforcement (Police, Justice, Prison guards), Relief, Reconstruction, Returns, preparations for Elections, Demining, economy etc. and the military providing overall security.

A lot of different organisations might well be involved: The UN, NATO, the EU, the African Union, OSCE. And other UN Agencies, donor countries and NGO’s in Kosovo we had over 600 NGO’s
involved when it peaked. The coordination between all these actors is quite demanding.

Typically a UN mission will be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

If we look at the different roles of the SRSG, it falls into three categories:
- an administrative role
- a political role and
- a military role (if the SRSG is in charge of the military component)

The administrative role is in principle nothing new, there has been a civilian component in most traditional peacekeeping missions, but the scale of the civilian component is totally different in the missions of today like in Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, and a lot of the SRSG’s energy goes into law enforcement, administration, dealing with economic questions etc.

This does not leave too much time for the SRSG’s political role: To bring the parties to sit down at the same table, negotiate a political settlement, prepare for elections, write a new constitution etc.

There have been voices suggesting to split the two functions, for instance in Kosovo. I would strongly warn against this: If the SRSG does not have the administrative powers, the leverage with the parties might well be gone.

Who are the SRSG’s negotiating partners? Who is really the SRSG’s “constituency”?

First of course, the parties to the conflict. But a lot of other actors also have to be taken into account: The UN Security Council members, the neighbours in the region, the troop contributing countries, other organisations involved in the mission, the UN Secretariat in New York with all its different actors, DPKO, DPA etc, and last but not least your boss, the UN Secretary General.

With the central actors, the major powers of the world, interaction is very often on various levels: With ambassadors in the mission area, ambassadors in the region, ambassadors in New York, often also ambassadors to NATO and the EU or the AU and of course the foreign ministries in their respective capitals.

Very often the ambassadors even if from the same country have a different view of the problem, depending on where they work, but at the end of the day it’s capitals that have the final word.

Running a UN mission is also a challenge in another way. You bring together a lot of people from different countries, with different languages, different cultures, different traditions. This is not easy. But the two most challenging differences are the different culture between military personnel and civilians and the different administrative cultures. And it is a must to have people in the mission who know the very subtle UN administrative culture.

Typically a mission also changes over time, going through different phases, as responsibilities are gradually handed over to the new institutions created in the political process.
If we look back at the last 15 years, the compositions of the missions have changed tremendously. The profiles of the major organizations like the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE have been defined not by theoretical considerations, reports or panels, but rather by the role they played in actual missions, and most of them have experienced their ups and downs not least the UN. No missions are alike, and the span of control of the SRSGs has been very different.

In the UNPROFOR mission in Croatia and Bosnia the military was under the command of the SRSG. There was a special arrangement for the use of air-strikes called the double key: The military commander and the SRSG should both agree before action, a procedure that was highly problematic.

In the following missions in Bosnia and Kosovo this was changed, and the line of military command went directly to NATO.

In Bosnia the EU took the leading role on the civilian side, and the mission was headed by a High Representative, appointed by the EU. The UN and OSCE had their own missions in Bosnia. The UN was among other things responsible for international police. The High Representative was responsible for coordinating the efforts of all the agencies in Bosnia, but there was no command line, and the overall picture was blurred.

It also characterised the mission in Bosnia, that all three ethnic entities had their own administration, police etc., and the willingness to hand over responsibility to common institutions covering all of Bosnia.

When drawing up the UNMIK mission in Kosovo they tried not to repeat the mistakes from Bosnia. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 defined the mandates for both the military and the civilian part of the mission. KFOR was under NATO command and control. Nevertheless coordination had to be very close.

This was the only part of the mission that was outside the SRSG’s span of control. The four UNMIK pillars (UNHCR, UN civilian administration which includes police and justice, OSCE and EU) had all to answer to the SRSG. This made a big difference. Even if OSCE and EU also had to report to their own Headquarters in Vienna and Bruxelles and needed political visibility, it was clearly preferable to have them inside the tent rather than outside.

One of the big problems in Kosovo was that the outcome of the political process, the “final status” of Kosovo was open.

In East Timor they did not have that problem. It was clear from the outset that the goal was to prepare for Independence and build the necessary government institutions.

In Afghanistan the military component is now under NATO command and control, while the UN is running the civilian part of the mission and is responsible for elections. The main problem being
that the central authorities and NATO are only in partial control of the country, while different warlords have actual control in their fiefdoms.

Iraq is an even more difficult case. The war was waged without an explicit UN mandate and against the fierce opposition from several of the Security Council members. Nevertheless agreement was reached to give the UN a limited role in the preparation of elections.

In the initial phase the US military had control with both the military and the civilian administration, gradually handing over responsibilities to an interim government.

Many in the UN were afraid that the organisation would be seen as being part of the occupation force.

The answer came in August last year, when the UN HQs in Baghdad was blown up by a car bomb. The head of the UN mission, Sergio de Mello, and many others died.

Now, more than a year later, the UN is still wrestling with the problem and has not yet decided to send a mission back to Baghdad. The UN wants to have their own blue helmet protection force, not to be protected by Coalition Forces. But it has not been possible to get the necessary contributions from member countries.

This problem has to be solved, but the real dilemma goes deeper than that. Should the UN play a role in countering non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction? Or should there be a limit to how far the UN could go not to become a target itself?

These are some of the questions Kofi Annan has asked a panel of 16 highly respected and experienced people from all parts of the world to address.

The panel shall also address the question on how to strengthen the UN’s capacity on civilian crisis management.

In my view, “state building” should be made a central goal of conflict management and peacekeeping.

Sufficient continuity in the international presence and financing should be ensured until local governing authorities are ready to take over.

It is important to develop a stand-by arrangement from where we can draw civilian experts and police officers, judges and prison guards for our missions with short notice.

In many missions the first couple of days have been decisive for the future of the whole mission. If there is even a short power vacuum the lootings and killings committed in these first days can have a bigger negative impact than the preceding war itself, like in Kosovo and Iraq.
It is also crucial to get the international financial institutions the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks involved from the very start in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. Political and economic development strategies should be integrated.

And the operational focus should be shifted from “doing” to “enabling”.

Dramatic change is needed, if the UN shall remain relevant in countering the problems of state building. If we don’t succeed we will leave behind even more failed states.
CHALLENGES FOR UN MEMBER STATES IN THE NEW ERA

Dr. Siret Hürsoy
Assistant Professor, Ege University, Turkey

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

In order to tackle the new security challenges in the 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations have involved in a remarkably wide variety of new forms of activities, some of which have either been totally new for the UN or on a much more larger scale than before. The UN, having the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as enshrined in its Charter, has begun to redefine peacekeeping with the Secretary General’s “An Agenda for Peace” report since 1992. “Classical” peacekeeping was often defined as a “Chapter-6-and-a-half” activity, meaning that it fell uncertainly somewhere between Chapter VI (on the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”) and Chapter VII (on “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Act of Aggression”). Within the limits of these two Chapters, UN peacekeeping operations were generally carried out on the basis of three key principles: the consent of the parties, the impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the non-use of force in most circumstances.

There is a strong tendency in UN circles that “modern” peacekeeping nowadays follow a series of techniques constituted a full set of UN tools for addressing virtually any new challenges: If conflict prevention efforts failed then diplomatic peacemaking channels and, if required, peace-enforcement should be utilised; once there is an agreement to pursue a peaceful solution then traditional methods of peacekeeping could be applied; and, finally, once peace is reached, peacebuilding could begin with the desire of nation-building.

It can be easily observed from the above analysis that not only the distinction between “classical” peacekeeping and its various other “modern” activities has become blurred, but also there is a tendency of moving towards the intervention in the internal affairs of a state by peace and nation building techniques and the use of force for achieving these techniques. The revival of nationalism and conflicts within, rather than between, states has the reason of this trend. Therefore, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of UN began to play key roles in building national capacities and supporting the role of civil society with the help of specialised UN Agencies since the task of administering a territory during the transitional stage is endowed to the UN with the Charter. UN peacekeeping forces have become increasingly involved in assisting, or even exercising, certain governmental functions in states, for example, in support of institution building.
(including judicial and legal systems, armed and police forces), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), as well as de-mining.

The debate on SSR and its relevance for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building began a few years ago and gained high level attention with the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 2002. In many failed or failing states, or after civil wars, countries that aim to turn into “modern” nations and “modern” states (two overlapping, but different institutions), the process of nation building and the construction of statehood are strongly influenced by the armed forces. The dilemma in the nation building process is about the choice either investing in military or civilian sector. However, at the core of SSR is the concept of civilian security, democracy, good governance, and human rights that are closely related with the national political, economic and social development. The term “security” in the SSR is referring to the democratic civilian control of state’s armed forces, which is putting civilian-centred security (civilian supremacy in law enforcement) above military-centred security (military supremacy in law enforcement). The UNDP is increasingly engaged in such development programmes related to justice and SSR as a prerequisite for sustainable peace and development. The SSR debate on the relationship between the armed forces, the state, and the rest of society has relatively recently begun to be conceived in UN circles.

There is no doubt that security contributes to enhancing stability and promoting law and order, thereby strengthening the rule of law. Financing the development of good governance for civilian security is one of core elements of security sector reform as well as a precondition for successful development. However, in situations like excessive military spending, inefficient allocation of resources, poor democratic performance, and politicisation of the security sector remain as serious obstacles to democratisation, good governance and economic progress. Therefore, wealthy countries are unwilling to donate financial aid to countries that have problems with their security sector because as a result of directing this aid to military centred security by local authorities there will likely be the rise of conflict and insecurity. In order not to waste the money intended to be donated for development, in words of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the financial assistance must be a “reward of sound governance”. These words are the manifestation of the importance of security sector reform, which have been rapidly gaining a wider recognition, particularly in such debates about individual freedom, social participation in political life, and increasing the efficiency of economic assistance to the developing nations where the reform task in security sector have deliberately been assigned in “modern” UN peacekeeping mandates.

In light of these arguments, one should also keep in mind that while this kind of liberal civil-military relations in the SSR process is based on co-operation and coordination between the two sectors, which could facilitate other functional activities of peacekeeping operations, it might also exacerbate insecurity in many transitional societies. Assisting democracy through the liberalisation of political and economic sectors, like other aspects of the UN peacekeeping, depends upon local co-operation and co-ordination. The lack of local co-operation and coordination and appropriate timing during reform processes could increase crime rates sharply and urges immediate reforms in the criminal justice system in order to enhance the capacities of police, prosecutors and courts. In fact, the nature of post-conflict transition in societies can make democracy a distant goal,
because in many of these societies, police lack a service ethic, are unaccountable, and are implicated in crime, corruption, and abuses of the human rights of citizens. Therefore, SSR is a core component of successful post-conflict transition, of consolidation of democracy, of prevention of renewed armed conflict, of possible rehabilitation of damages in the social fabric, and of promotion of sustainable development. In the past few years, such reforms have been concluded by UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor and Bosnia, as well as on-going efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo, are good examples to comprehensive peace-building tasks that have been assigned to UN peacekeeping mandates.

The UN as an active organisation in multidimensional peacekeeping operations has currently important responsibilities in the SSR. The SSR is an important measure to the UN peacekeeping mandates in the following areas:

1. **Democratisation of a state**, which seems impossible without a transformation of institutions, check and balances that serve to ensure that armed forces are constitutionally regulated, under civilian control, and its members are depoliticised. The post-conflict transitional administration should begin to function in cooperation and coordination with the UN Peacekeeping forces and should pay attention to the SSR, recovery and rehabilitation of the society in order to remove the deep feeling of insecurity between civilian and military sectors.

2. **Post-conflict rehabilitation** would be made possible by disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of armed forces. Reintegration of combatants into the civilian centred security institutions could be facilitated by unification of various armed formations into a national security structures. UNDP is a platform for the establishment and the enforcement of programmes in the DDR sphere. Institutionalisation is also important in the rehabilitation process for managing and channeling conflicts into these structures, because individuals have a voice in such a secure legal environment.

3. **Establishment of good governance practices**, which is associated with the reform of the UN system, means maintaining a rule of elected representatives over all military and security institutions, representatives accountable to the society and functioning in a transparent manner. The idea of good governance is also associated with the coordination of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitoring, supervising and conducting elections. Elected representatives should be able to maintain balance between various interests of social and political groups, free from corruption, organised crime and human rights abuses, as well as providing the security of all citizens.

4. **Every individual is a part of security sector**, and security sector involves every single sector in society, including individuals within civil society organisations, within the media, religion, ethnic groups, and individuals within parliament, the military, intelligence community, police, customs officials, and those involved in the penal system. This collective understanding would facilitate removing insecurity between different sectors in the society.
(5) **Professionalisation of armed and security forces** are providing a clearly defined roles and functions to each of these institutions, which are functioning on the basis of rule of law. While armed forces are responsible for protecting the state, security forces are responsible for protecting individual citizens. Not only the armed forces need to be professionalised, reintegrated, and put under civilian control, but also similar processes have to take place within police and paramilitary formations, in secret security services, and border guards. The prominent activities of UN peacekeeping forces are involved in the SSR by advising, training, and assisting in the reconstruction of governmental and police functions.

(6) **Internal and regional conflict prevention** brings to the security sector a liability to implement complex peace agreements by effectively coordinating in between a range of political and civil actors for managing internal and regional conflicts. Justice, transparency and arms procurement are important for confidence building both for intra-state group relations as well as for inter-state relations. However, any effective SSR initiatives for internal and regional conflict prevention could be launched before or after a military conflict, not during a full war.

(7) **Economic development**, needs a financially stable, socially predictable, and politically favourable environment, with security sector calculating the real internal and external needs of the state, operating on a transparent budget under parliamentary scrutiny which is accountable for its spending.

The international system needs to be based on a set of basic principles for better co-operation and operational co-ordination, which would facilitate international organisations to react swiftly during the initial phases of any given conflict for maintaining international peace and security. The role of the UN and its agencies are central in that regard and should be supported by other international and regional organisations, among which NATO, EU, and the OSCE are of particular importance. Although there is no single definition to civil-military relations in the SSR, it would not be difficult to observe that while the meaning of SSR in NATO leans heavily towards the military aspects of civil-military relations, in the UN, OSCE and the EU context the civilian aspects of civil-military relations are emphasized with a wider application. The UN and NATO cooperation and operational coordination in Afghanistan is a very good case in point to the SSR.

According to the international agreements, which were reached at the Bonn Conference, a trilateral partnership was established between the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The mandate of ISAF, which is established on December 20, 2001 (UNSCR 1386), crossed the threshold of the UN ‘Chapter 6 and a half’ peacekeeping activities and came under Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement) in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, and 1510. ISAF supports the ATA in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, in providing safe and secure environment conductive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and reconstruction of the country. In such a wide range of tasks, ISAF should be considered as UN’s
security assistance mission rather than a modest peacekeeping mission. Due to the complexity and difficulty of the security assistance mission for the UN, ISAF was brought under NATO command on August 11, 2003.

NATO-led ISAF developed the “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (PRT) concept, which is practical tool for civil-military relations. As an interim mechanism, its primary purposes are to facilitate the development of a secure environment through establishing relationships with local authorities; to support SSR activities within its means and capabilities; to facilitate reconstruction efforts; and to focus on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed forces. SSR process is comprised of the so called “five-pillars” in Afghanistan:

1. The creation of ANA is supported by the US as the lead nation;
2. The Afghan National Police is sketched out and sponsored by Germany with assistance in some instances from other nations;
3. The judicial sector reforms are carried out under the supervision of Italy;
4. The disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) project is under the responsibility of Japan;
5. The counter narcotics strategy is sponsored by the UK in support of the efforts employed by the Afghan government.

The OSCE, as the largest regional security organisation in the Eurasian-Atlantic zone, has been particularly working on the establishment of a democratic system of governance in the security sector domain. The OSCE instruments in preventive diplomacy efforts are early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and where these fail, post-conflict rehabilitation. The post-conflict rehabilitation efforts of the OSCE include the improvement of democratic norms of relationships not only at the civil-military level, but also at the civil-civil level. The EU has also begun to pay considerable attention to similar post conflict rehabilitation efforts, which has been proven twice with the application of the EU-led project Stability Pact for the Balkans in 1999 as well as emphasised in the EU Security Strategy Document in 2003. It has been stated in both official papers that post conflict rehabilitation and stabilisation requires democratisation of all elements of states security apparatus and their relations with the society. An emphasis with regard to the SSR was not only put on the DDR, civilian oversight, professionalisation and reduction of armed forces, but also on police, paramilitary formations, secret security services, and border guards. A written agreement about coordination between the UN and the EU in these fields concluded and similar agreements might be concluded with other regional organisations.

In the absence of any shared understanding about the fundamental similarities and differences between different security sector models, considerable confusion in the real world in terms of exactly what policies, ideas and values should apply during the reform process in the civil-military relations is still a serious challenge. However, there are at least 5 main actions that can be taken by the UN peacekeepers in order to improve civilian-military relations between the national armed forces and civilian authorities during and after post-conflict rehabilitation in “modern” peacekeeping operations:
(1) Successful implementation of the SSR and particularly the DDR requires dynamic, cooperative and well coordinated peacekeeping activities.

An understanding of the conflict and the particular needs and ability of various indigenous entities in a post-conflict transitional society, peacekeeping operations require cooperation and coordination with these entities for comprehending the political, cultural, ethnic, and social circumstances that are in flux. Each peacekeeping activity must generate a political will in society which is necessary for the execution of SSR and DDR and must be able to adjust itself at both strategic and operational levels to different, *sui generis*, national circumstances in which the national security sector has to function.

(2) SSR in any national circumstances is a very complex task and could only be addressed through a wide civilian-military expertise and ample financial resources.

This will require a concerted peacekeeping effort by and for civilian and indigenous military units. Civil-military relations shall be improved by training and education of native people and peacekeepers in international institutions that would provide them the chance of putting theory into practice. Joint training for peacekeepers, civilian and military personnel is essential to create a common basis of knowledge, practices and standards as well as building an esprit de corps. However, SSR require expertise, expertise need training and education, training and education requires funding, and funding requires substantial involvement of the international financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank and the IMF). The Post-Conflict Peace-building Unit was established in 1998 as a central agency mechanism to lead the World Bank’s financial assistance. Given the lead role that the UNDP often plays in the economic, political, and social spheres in nation building, providing more internal coherence during state building would certainly help to a more concerted strategy from the World Bank in relation to SSR. Nevertheless, these activities and extra units put a significant burden on UN’s financial and human expertise that its organisational system apparently became overstretched.

(3) SSR should not be imported from outside to impose a set of pre-determined principles.

There could be outside assistance for strategic and operational cooperation and coordination to improve civil-military and civil-civil relations. Any SSR efforts that are launched and implemented from outside would have negative consequences if states do not initiate, develop, and implement their own national projects. Instead of drawing the post-conflict society in a sea of foreign reform projects, the process must be locally initiated and the role of outside actors shall be one of support and facilitation of home-grown demands. In order to be effective and successful, trained and educated internal political forces, according to real indigenous needs, must conceive and participate in the preparation process of these reforms.

(4) SSR is a gradual and challenging process with cumbersome and controversial consequences at the beginning.

The reform of a security sector is a never-ending process. To begin military reforms, establishing
democratic and civilian control of armed forces, and adjusting the relationship of the military institution to broader democratic society requires appropriate timing since SSR is a long-term and difficult process. The time-scale must be measured not in months or years, but in generations, for a successful move towards national unity. One of the main reasons for the need of generational change is that it takes much longer to change people’s mentalities. Therefore, there should be a mechanism to check regularly the development, implementation and monitoring of these reform steps for a certain period of time.

(5) An effective cooperation and coordination between principal international organisations, UN and major NGOs is needed in the reform of security sector.

Many international organizations are still hesitant to be involved in the propagation of, and assistance in, the democratic transformation of national security sectors. They are arguing that the well known UN norm of non-intervention into the internal matters of states is an obstacle. Therefore, the DPKO of UN is responsible and well placed to undertake such an important initiative alone or together with other international organisations for facilitating the effective co-operation and co-ordination between donor countries and NGOs. The civilian-military training centres in the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and other international organisations must co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts. A robust support from national and international peacekeeping training centres and institutes to UN-led joint training activities is essential for a successful SSR. Turkey, for ex., established a Partnership for Training Centre (PfP) in Ankara in 1998 for training and education of civilian-military expertise. The PfP Training Centre is providing qualitative education and training support to Partner Countries in accordance with NATO and PfP principles.11 The Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of the DPKO is another important training and education centre under the UN umbrella.

To conclude, we are all part of the security sector. This is absolutely fundamental to the whole concept of human security. Understanding and appreciating that each of us has a role, not only in the reform of the security sector, in maintaining the security sector and control of the security sector, but also in conflict prevention, is one of the biggest developments in the whole debate on security sector reform and are essential requirements for the UN to maintain international peace and security.

Endnotes:


6 Andrzej Karkoszka, ‘The Concept of Security Sector Reform’, pp.9 15


8 For the UN Security Council Resolutions, go to web page: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html


10 See the OSCE ‘Code of Conduct on Politico Military Aspects of Security’ at www.osce.org

11 Go to Partnership for Peace web page in Ankara: www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr
SESSION III

DIVERSIFIED TASKS AND THE CHALLENGES
FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING
CHALLENGES OF TRAINING

FOR

THE UN MULTIDISCIPLINARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

IN THE 21st CENTURY

Professor Liu Zhao
Research fellow of CISS

The challenges for UN member states in the new era, a complex issue of cooperation and coordination on peace operations, are becoming more and more acute and drawing world wide attention. Among the listed topics for discussion on this seminar, the diversification of tasks of peacekeepers and UN personnel for their education and training is one of the top concerns. The aim of this paper is therefore to present a survey of the challenges of training facing the UN multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations in the 21st century, with suggestions to meet these challenges.

I. The Challenges of Training for UN Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping Operations In the 21st Century

The world has undergone fundamental transformation in the post-Cold War period. Although the likelihood for large-scale warfare has been greatly minimized, the world's pursuit for peace persists as many regions of the world continue to suffer from tensions and conflicts, with a sharp increase of the conflicts and casualties of the civilians. As a result, the need for effective functioning of the United Nations from the majority of the Member States is more pronounced than ever, the need for more UN peacekeeping operations in particular. In fact, the participation in the UN peacekeeping operations is a concrete display of the international commitment to the United Nations by all the Member States. The joint efforts in strengthening cooperation and meeting challenges have become the main theme of the UN PKOs.

Peacekeeping is an invention of the UN that has played an active role in easing the tense regional situations, and thus brought stability to many areas of tension around the globe. The new threats and challenges that we face in the 21st century require a renewed commitment not only to the maintenance of world peace and security, but also to the enforcement efforts on the cooperation and coordination of peacekeeping operations on the part of the Member States. In my view, the UN
peacekeeping operations are confronting four major challenges which should be addressed:

**Firstly**, United Nations peacekeeping operations are facing an extraordinary challenge. The number of operations is reaching a record level, troop deployment is on an upward spiral and the need for more civilian specialists is becoming acute. Early in 2004, the United Nations Security Council was facing the prospect of creating or expanding peacekeeping operations on an unprecedented scale. According to the latest data provided by the UN HQ NY (dated 1 October 2004), the United Nations has deployed missions in Liberia, Cote d Ivoire, Haiti and Burundi respectively since late of last year. Now it is planning to expand the mission scales in Cote d Ivoire and DR Congo and considering sending troops to Sudan and Iraq. Currently there are a total of 16 ongoing peacekeeping missions around the globe with 62,289 military personnel and civilian police serving in peacekeeping operations (not including civilians serving in these missions).

**Secondly**, the request for more member states to contribute peacekeeping troops becomes ever more intense with a sharp increase of the mission types and the number of the peacekeepers. As Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed out in his report to the General Assembly on September 7, the mandates of current UN peacekeeping missions have become more and more complicated. In addition to the peacekeeping missions in its traditional sense, the UN peacekeeper are involved in such other jobs as the political transition, economic reconstruction, the repatriation of refugees, humanitarian relieves, monitoring and even elections. The Member States of UN are requested to contribute more and more various kinds of peacekeeping troops, which are confronted with more and more difficulties and challenges on the course of implementing these missions, even terrorist attacks sometimes. The plan of the above mentioned expansion and set up of new mission areas will result in an increase of 30,000 more UN peacekeepers, likely to the record level of a total of 90,000 next year, which is the highest number since October of 1995. With the implementation of the above plan, the ability of UN PKO will undoubtedly be challenged.

**Thirdly**, the expansion of peacekeeping requirement and the severe shortage of peacekeeping sources have become a protruding contradiction. As Secretary General Kofi Annan put it, the rapid increase of the requirement on the UN PKOs is a welcome signal which indicate that the international society are facing new chances of helping the peaceful settlement of various conflicts. This, however, will surely put the UN peacekeeping budget from the present $ 2.96 billion to $ 3.82 billion. The increase on the peacekeeping requirement obviously surpasses the present capability of UN and constitutes a major challenge for UN since 90s of last century. To meet these requirements, the international society should make necessary commitment in the political, financial and human resource arenas, so as to guarantee the necessary manpower and materials required by the peacekeeping missions, as well as to raise the ability of quick response and air projection of the peacekeeping troops.

**Fourthly**, the growing tense relationship between the military and civilian personnel is affecting and even endangering the image and efficiency of the UN peacekeeping operations. In the peculiar working environment of the mission areas, there exists a common relation of cooperation and coordination among the civilian and military. The deviations on professional, cultural and religious awareness will easily make some peacekeeping personnel unintentionally impose their mindset on
others. The resulting tense civil-military relations prevailing currently in the peacekeeping missions has already impaired their images and undoubtedly affected the smooth and effective running of the internal daily routines in the mission areas. Therefore due attention should be stressed and a range of skills aimed at fostering cooperation and coordination among the military, police and civilian peacekeeper need to be trained urgently so as to raise the image and efficiency of the peacekeeping missions.

Early in 2004, the United Nations Security Council was facing the prospect of creating or expanding peace operations on an unprecedented scale. The consequent demand for more competent peacekeepers poses increasing challenges to training courses. In fact, the fundamental one puts forward the specific requirement on training methodologies, financing training budget, a common standard and greater coherence. This is because the increase of UN peacekeeping mission’s numbers means the need of more experienced and competent peacekeepers. Of all the various challenges, the major ones include:

1. the exigent need for greater coherence and common basic training contents in the whole peacekeeping operations training system, as well as the insurance of the peacekeeper’s profile which can meet the basic requirement of UN standard;

2. the establishment and expanding of the basic peacekeeper’s profile in order to determine new and effective training guidelines and methodologies;

3. the insurance of the financing of training and education budget in order to guarantee the improvement of overall quality and efficiency of training;

4. the development of an evaluation system, which is fair, transparent, clearly understood, accepted, and applicable to all.

II. Meeting the Challenges of Training for UN Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century

Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg was quite foresighted in his address at Stockholm Seminar of 1997, i.e., “The key remedy for the challenges facing peace support operations as we enter the 21st century is the improvement of training and education in the area of peace support”. At this very first stage of the new century, conflicts and threats to international security are becoming increasingly complex and demand ever more elaborate peace operations from the United Nations. Rather than simply keeping the warring parties apart, peacekeeping operations increasingly need pre-conflict preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding elements. The new demands being made on peacekeeping operations call for greater attention to be paid to the training and preparation of peacekeepers (both civilian and military) and to the widening range of ancillary support functions essential for the success of a peace mission.

In view of the above mentioned factors, a holistic approach to the training of peacekeepers is deemed highly necessary, i.e., all personnel, regardless of rank and function on a peacekeeping operation, must receive specific training prior to their deployment in the mission area. In tackling the above discussed challenges, it is proposed that actions be taken on the following matters.

**Firstly,** while perfecting and enhancing the existing training and education system of UN, criteria for training of peacekeepers, whether military or civilian, should be developed in a unified way according to the UN standard and accepted by peacekeeper contributing countries to the minimum. In other words, regardless of the cultural and other differences in approaches to training and education, there is a need to develop a peace operations training and education template and provide training materials which are produced in all official languages of the UN system, an outline plan for all levels of training—strategic, operational and tactical—that can be adapted by all Member States to meet their own specific requirements while maintaining a minimum international standard. Besides, the UN should choose dedicated expertise as well as “generalists” from military, police and civilian components as training and education specialists to an appropriate scale.

**Secondly,** it is strongly recommended that, on the basis of thorough investigation, an agreed evaluation system that would be applicable to all should be developed and Member States of the United Nations enhance their cooperation and coordination on the training of peacekeepers. One ideal step would be that contacts be enhanced for international peacekeeping training, with different countries exchanging visits, sharing experience and learning from each other on training methodologies. This should be observed as a rule and standardized. As the training of peacekeepers currently varies from country to country, common standards and cooperation of preparation would enhance the cohesion and effectiveness of all peacekeeping operations. A centralization of the preparation of peacekeepers for a particular mission is also important to avoid problems of poor coordination at the moment of deployment.

**Thirdly,** necessary and sufficient assistance should be rendered to the training of peacekeepers of those developing counties by the United Nations and those developed countries. In the meantime, sufficient human and financial resources should be allocated to implement the planned training for the diversifying needs of the peace missions, providing sufficient budget for training and swapping on the basis per person so as to assure the smooth fulfillment of the mandates of peacekeeping missions. As proved by various instances, it is a very good way for developed countries to provide pre-deployment training to those less experienced developing countries. One effective way to guarantee the quality of peacekeeping troops and raise the efficiency of relevant UN peacekeeping missions might be that the UN will provide financial support to troop contributing countries for training and swapping. Besides, the United Nations should not only strengthen the communication between the peacekeeping mission and troops, but also enhance the smooth contacts and coordination between the civilian and military, aiming at a high level of efficiency and improved self-image.

**Conclusion**

The task of keeping the peace is becoming more complex and demanding. Therefore, those
employed in peacekeeping operations require very thorough training and preparation prior to their
deployment to the theatre. This training, due to the complexity of crises, must be more extensive
than normal general purpose military training. It goes without saying that the UN peacekeeping
operations are more diversified and unpredictable than conventional military operations and exert a
far greater impact to international peace and security. Since the training and education of the UN
peacekeeping operations affects and determines the fate of the mission and the prestige of UN, all
the countries concerned need to strengthen cooperation and meet the challenges together, seeking
innovative thinking and solutions for the challenges confronted in the area of peacekeeping training.
DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS

FOR

COMPUTER ASSISTED EXERCISES

Major General Tony Stigsson
Joint Forces Command, Swedish Armed Forces

Background

Introduction

One of the major exercises that the Swedish Armed Forces is conducting during 2005 is VIKING 05, a multinational simulated and distributed computer assisted staff exercise that will be carried out in December 2005. VIKING 05 will involve both military and civilian personnel.

However, the purpose of this presentation is not to describe the VIKING exercise as such. Rather, my objective is to discuss the concept, role, efficiency and effectiveness of computer assisted exercises in principle, and I welcome the opportunity to exchange views with you or answer any questions you may have on the concept.

The concept used for the VIKING exercise could easily be adapted and used for similar exercises anywhere in the world. The concept could also be used for pre-mission training.

I will also mention the link that we are developing between the findings of the Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report and forthcoming VIKING 05 exercise.

Sweden in Peace Support Operations

Sweden has, for many decades, been involved in peace support operations around the world. We have a long tradition of supporting the multinational society in crisis response operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As early as in 1814, Swedish peacekeepers were sent to monitor peace in Denmark, and in 1935 we took part in a UN mandated operation in the Saar land between Germany and the Netherlands in order to ensure peaceful elections in a tense area.

Most of the officers and reservists in the Swedish Armed Forces have served in a multinational environment. So far almost 100000 men and women have served as soldiers, observers and monitors in approximately 30 missions around the world.
Today we have approximately 700 troops, officers and civilians deployed in 13 crisis response or peace operations.

The security situation in the world is changing constantly. Both the UN and UN mandated regional security organisations play a very important role in meeting the challenges placed before us. Flexible standby readiness, in order to ensure quick response when and where crises appear, is of utmost importance.

But flexible readiness is of no use if the personnel are not well trained. I find it vital that the personnel are well prepared, well equipped and well trained before they are deployed into a mission area.

In order to improve training, the Swedish Armed Forces established a peacekeeping centre for training and competence in 1961. The Swedish International Training Centre is now also a Partnership for Peace training centre. The centre trains both civilian and military personnel from Sweden and other nations. Each year, 2000 students from 20 countries participate in courses and exercises conducted by the centre.

Another initiative to make training more efficient is the Nordic cooperation in peace support activities, NORDCAPS, which has a long and unique tradition. The burden of training is divided between the nations, and instructors are exchanged.

The Nordic countries also have a long history of working together in combined operational units. This has been the case for instance in the Balkans.

**Concepts for Computer Assisted Exercises**

**The PfP Simulation Network**

Sweden has and will play an important role in connection with the three Partnership for Peace driving initiatives. These initiatives were presented at the NATO Washington Summit in 1999, and they aim to build an enhanced education and training framework among nations.

The PfP Simulation Network has involved Sweden as one of the main contributors, mainly through our Defence Wargaming Centre, but also through the Swedish International Training Centre, the Swedish National Defence College and the Swedish Joint Forces Command.

The PfP Simulation Network offers new possibilities that can enhance PIP exercises, education, training and operations. Instead of traveling thousands of miles to an exercise or to mission training, the participants can remain in their countries and take part in a distributed staff exercise.

The concept has been developed through several computer assisted exercises, where training audiences have been given access to up to date methods and tools, both prior to and during the
execution of the exercises.

**Live Exercises VS Computer Assisted Exercises**

It is important to realise that the level of an exercise is not always suitable for everyone. A live exercise, with every level involved from the lowest to the highest, with all equipment, would of course be the best possible. However, at the same time, it would be the most costly and resource consuming. Also, when conducting mission training, time is of the essence, and a computer assisted exercise is less time consuming.

Today we need to choose an alternative. When training staff methods, we can replace most entities in the field with simulated entities, and keep the focus on the management level. This does not catch all the flavours or elements of a live exercise, but it is much more cost effective, and it is effective for the personnel that are being targeted for the exercise. Having said this, we need live exercises as well they can never be replaced altogether by everything else.

**Developing Distributed Simulated Computer Assisted Exercises**

The concept of the distributed computer assisted exercise VIKING was established with the first exercise in 1999. VIKING 99 was then followed by VIKING 01 and VIKING 03. These exercises were used as experiments, aiming to find the best methods and tools. The basic principle is to use modern available developed tools and methods in a multinational environment in order to enhance aims and objectives, mainly related to staff procedures and civil-military cooperation.

VIKING 05 will not be an experiment, but the first actual exercise in the VIKING series in which we will train staffs military and civilian together within the NATO combined joint task force concept.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, fictitious scenarios are recommended in multinational exercises.

Developing the scenario of an exercise is very time and resource consuming. However, once a scenario has been developed, it can be used for several exercises, and depending on the aims and objectives, different events can be played. We would be pleased to offer to you the Bogaland scenario, that is used in the VIKING exercises, as the scene for a peace support operation exercise.

The Swedish joint wargaming simulation system CATS TYR has been in use since 1996 at the Swedish Defence Wargaming Centre. It supports exercises at the joint command level within the Swedish Armed Forces.

With the VIKING concept established, the system is well suited for exercises that focus on crisis response operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, training all services as well as police and civilian organisations.
Both military and civilian expertise was involved in the system development that took place prior to the first VIKING exercise in 1999. The system provides data for situation awareness, evaluation, planning and studies. It allows the participants to be distributed across the Internet, at sites far from the game engine, for instance in the participants own headquarters.

In a VIKING concept exercise, the simulation is creating and feeding all movements and activities in the field, from the political level and all the way down through the lower levels. However, the guiding principle for constructive simulation is that the training audience is not aware of the feed from the simulator. This is why the trainees do not work directly against the simulator. Instead they communicate with a number of response cells, acting as subordinate headquarters and units. These communications are handled via the usual military and civilian communication networks.

The Swedish CATS TYR simulation system manages the situation assessments of the lower control, and allows orders and instructions to be given to the simulated units.

The lower control responds, based on the activities in the simulation system and the main events that are prepared in advance. Incident cells work directly towards the CATS TYR system. The lower control gives orders to simulated units and receives reports from them. Essential information and reports are then sent to the superior training audience.

We have also developed tools that will suite all participants in a multinational exercise, including civilians, police and military, all from different branches and with different backgrounds and skills.

An “off-the-shelf” command and control system is used to provide the common situation awareness picture to the training audience. The picture presents locations and activities of all entities as well as units and groups assigned to the operation: civilians, police and military.

Another tool is the web based map tool. This gives every participant access to geographical information both real information and scenario based information.

The MEL/MIL planning tool has also been developed in Sweden. It shows the main event list and the main incident list, and it is used to plan, run and evaluate the trainees reactions to events and incidents. The tool is linked to the other systems that are used. This ensures that essential information is kept to be presented during hot wash ups and after action reviews.

Advanced distributed learning, ADL, is a feature that has been developed in order to enhance education and preparations prior to exercises and training. In Sweden we have chosen to focus our ADL on peace keeping techniques and staff procedures. A civilian ADL course for peace operations has also been developed. Prior to an exercise, some courses are considered mandatory and some optional. The use of ADL in connection with the VIKING exercises has been very successful.

The PfP ADL portal offers about 25 different courses, all available on the web. Any PfP nation is welcome to contribute to the PfP ADL portal.
Computer Assisted Exercises in the Future

We are constantly developing the VIKING concept. In the future, we would like to among other things:

- pursue higher level exercises, within the NATO Combined Joint Task Force concept, where we have the main training audience at component level
- to a greater extent use distributed computer assisted methods for pre-mission training
- pursue concept development, for instance by improving civil-military cooperation and understanding
- pursue training of standing forces, in order to improve our understanding of doctrinal concepts, and because it is cost effective

Why, then, do we see the need to develop the VIKING concept further? Well, there are several reasons.

Most importantly, there is a need to prepare staffs prior to a mission. The staff member must learn the UN system and the command and control systems and doctrine of the particular regional organisation.

There is also a need to enhance the civil-military cooperation. In any peace operation that involves military personnel, civilian personnel is also present, working for different governmental and non-governmental organisations. If we improve our cooperation, we will decrease friction, and we will then be better able to focus on the operational tasks than the friction itself. In order to improve cooperation, we have to train together in realistic exercises. In this context, we are planning to integrate the findings and recommendations of the Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report into the exercise scenario for VIKING 05. We look forward to working with you and to follow the developments of the report with a view to feed the Partners findings and recommendations into the exercise as part of the VIKING planning process.

The transformation of crisis response training will create a networked collection of interoperable training sites that bring together personnel, both military and civilian, that use developed doctrine and technology to meet the requirements of a crisis response operation. The founding pillars of this capability are realistic training, common ground truth and high quality feedback.

In order to move forward towards interoperability, our concept and the tools we use constantly have to be updated and developed. This is not necessarily very expensive, as long as we avoid making everything in special military versions. Most solutions are available on the civilian market and less costly.

In the close future, we will most likely be able to deploy computer assisted exercises. Then we will be able to train our staffs in real mission environment. We have the tools to do this; we just need the time and resources to create the scenario.
In fact, we have already established a concept for deployed computer assisted exercises for our KFOR headquarters in Kosovo. This enables the execution of mission rehearsals.

**Summary**

In the future, the UN will remain the coordinator of multinational operations wherever in the world they are necessary. The UN mandated operations may be lead by regional organisations, involving resources from several parts of the international community.

Nothing can replace live exercises when it comes to training the lower levels. However, when it comes to training staffs at joint, combined and tactical level, distributed computer assisted exercises are a cost and resource effective alternative to the type of staff exercises we have been used to in the past. In order to make the most of this type of exercise, pre-training with the aid of advanced distributed learning is recommended.

Distributed computer assisted exercises can be used not only for exercises, but for mission training as well. This gives a multinational staff the opportunity to learn and develop staff methods and to get to know each other prior to a mission.

I like to think that training together in a multinational environment is a peace supporting activity in itself you don’t fight a war with people you know.
When I was at DPKO working on the set up of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, one of the most difficult questions was how to find qualified civilians. We were looking for all kinds of personnel: from East Timor specialists to generator engineers, human rights lawyers to health care specialists, district administrators to prison guards. It was an all but impossible task, and it was only thanks to the efforts of the late Sergio Vieira de Mello and his staff that the UN managed to move the operation forward.

East Timor and Kosovo are exceptional cases, in the sense that the UN was asked to administer a territory. However, it is not exceptional for a peace operation of today to be given a mandate that includes peacebuilding tasks. In such a case, the operation requires a wide range of civilian expertise. In addressing the issue of training and education of civilians, therefore, we have to deal with persons having a variety of qualifications falling under the single title of “civilian expert”.

The UN hires civilians who have the stipulated qualifications. These civilians are supposed to possess the professional skills and abilities required for the posts for which they have applied. Therefore, the UN’s main interest is to make sure that these civilians live up to UN expectations in field missions. Here, the central issue is to train the personnel to become full-fledged UN members, doing things in UN way. They have to know: the technologies and methodologies used in the UN, its rules and regulations, how to work as a team with others possessing different backgrounds, the roles and functions of missions as well as the peacekeeping environment. The UN has been developing training manuals, codes of conduct and other useful texts, and providing various types of training including induction training. I have learned that the UN is conducting a review on how best to update their training programs, which is welcome.

From the viewpoint of a state, however, the question goes beyond the training issues. We would be lucky if we had a comprehensive list of civilian experts qualified and ready for dispatch: like a big store owner with a full inventory. What then are we to do?

In 2002, the Japanese government established a high level advisory group to conduct a comprehensive review in order to determine how best to promote its international cooperation for peace. After intensive discussions, the group made a number of recommendations including
several pertaining to human resource development for peace cooperation. It recommended that the government develop systems for fostering, training and dispatching specialists. The government, with the help of experts in the area, has been following up on this question and has adopted an action plan.

Based on the Japanese experience and with a view to exchanging opinions with you, let me raise four questions which are considered common issues among countries providing civilian experts.

1. How to find qualified candidates?

As I mentioned, current peace operations require expertise in a vast range of areas: refugees and IDP assistance, medical and educational support, mine victim support, DDR support, development assistance, socioeconomic support, election assistance, human rights protection, gender equality support and rule of law and democratization assistance. To facilitate the search for civilians with such expertise, we must expand our recruitment base and increase our manpower pool. Those organizations concerned (governmental and semi governmental) should coordinate closely, connecting their personnel databases or creating a common one for this purpose. We have to reach out to private companies, academic institutions and NGOs. There are often restrictions imposed by employer organizations with regard to those who wish to take part. We need to establish a system that facilitates field assignments within our overall employment structures.

2. How to conduct training?

If we do manage to find the needed experts, they will have to go through training prior to deployment. In the case of Japan, we must utilize existing training facilities, as there is no special training center for civilians. We do not want to see our candidates who are supposed to have the requisite skills and abilities repatriated as “unfit for missions”. Training should therefore promote adaptability to difficult environments and enhance the candidates understanding of peace operations. Advice from those who have practical experience in the area would be valuable. At the same time, as peace operations are conducted in high risk areas and security is now a serious concern for all of us, pre dispatch training should include security as well as stress management training.

In our society, there are quite a few people who have the potential to serve in field missions. For young people who aspire to work in the field of international peace, government agencies, universities and the private sector should work together to devise training and education programs to develop their skills and broaden their knowledge. This is one of the areas where we wish to forge international partnerships with overseas bodies having expertise in the training of young recruits. In an aging society like ours, we should consider making use of the abilities of older people as well. We could perhaps develop training programs for retired people, with a view to refreshing their skills and providing the up-to-date knowledge needed to function in the international environment.

3. How to develop career plans for individuals who devote themselves to peace cooperation activities?
I am afraid that we are often more concerned about how to recruit and dispatch experts to a mission than about what will happen to those individuals when the mission completes its mandate. These experts then have to search for their next job assignment. Some of them hope to find opportunities in other field missions or international organizations, while others may wish to return to their country of origin. We should seriously consider the carrier paths of such individuals. If they wish to move on in the international arena, we should help them to find appropriate posts. For those who wish to come back home, it is necessary to develop an environment in which those individuals, having gained valuable experience through their service abroad, can return to their original positions without difficulty and without delay or can utilize their experience and knowledge at universities or other institutions.

4. How to stimulate public interest and expand the base for human resources?

We should conduct public relations activities, generating publicity through lectures, seminars and meetings and through media including newspapers, magazines, radio and television, so as to educate a broad spectrum of the population.

The questions I posed above are not exhaustive and my answers are tentative. I will welcome your views and suggestions. The Government of Japan is planning to hold a seminar in Tokyo in December to discuss how to develop human resources required for peace operations, which have been carrying out diverse functions in a new international environment. Your views and suggestions will be conveyed to the seminar for a further discussion.
CONCLUDING SESSION
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Major General (rtd.) Luo Yudong
Vice Chairman, CISS

Respected Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

After two days of heated discussion, the 15th seminar of the Challenges Project is now coming to a successful close.

Since the start of the second phase of the Project from the second half of the year 2002, the parties concerned have held four seminars on the rule of law, peace operations and counter-terrorism, challenges of change and the regional dimension. And this Beijing seminar has focused on “cooperation and coordination in and on UN peace operations”, which is at the same time the important component of the second phase Concluding Report of the Challenges Project.

Cooperation and coordination in UN peace operations in the new century is a very important theme and a key factor for the smooth implementation and realization of the goals of the peacekeeping operations. It involves many aspects which include the cooperation and coordination between different UN organizations, between UN and regional organizations, member states, troop contributing countries, non-governmental organizations, between UN operations and the operations of regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions, between UN member states and troop contributing countries, between military and military, civilian and military, military and humanitarian assistance, and between the peacekeeping personnel and the opposing parties of the countries where peace missions are carried out. The cooperation and coordination between so many different organizations and different roles are simultaneously a severe challenge and a good opportunity for the parties concerned. According to the requirements of the second phase Concluding Report and in light of the discussions of the previous seminars, this seminar, with its themes on the “Cooperation and Coordination in and on UN Peace Operations”, mainly discussed the challenges of the peacekeeping operations to the UN member states and the troop contributing countries in the new century as well as the challenges of diversification of peacekeeping missions to the peacekeeping education and training, etc. Concerning these issues, many valuable viewpoints and suggestions have been raised and animated discussions have been held at the seminar. Although there still exist different opinions regarding some issues, personally I am convinced that it is quite normal as we have different cultural backgrounds and different perspectives. Moreover, those differences are very beneficial to broaden our thinking and enhance mutual understanding. I believe that you will agree with me on this point, and what’s more, the results of this seminar will enrich the second phase Concluding Report, help improve and strengthen the UN peacekeeping operations, and play an
active role in promoting regional and world peace and security.

The development of the world situation in recent years has demonstrated that the unique role of the UN in addressing international security affairs must be strengthened. Under the new circumstances, the importance of peacekeeping operations, which are an important UN lever to safeguard peace and security in the world, is increased rather than decreased. In confront of many complex and severe challenges, only through consolidated cooperation and combined efforts of all the UN member states, could the UN peacekeeping operations be improved and promoted and people’s aspiration for peace in the conflicting countries and regions be realized. At this seminar, officials, experts and scholars from the UN and different countries of the world have had in-depth study and discussions on the challenges of UN peacekeeping operations, on how to enhance cooperation and coordination between UN and other participating actors, and how to effectively deal with all kinds of challenges from political, military, civil, legal, management, personnel training, academic and other perspectives. The important viewpoints in the presentations and discussions at this seminar which merit our attention are summed up as follows:

- The leading role of the UN in peacekeeping operations must be respected and reflected.

- A stable coordinating mechanism between the UN and regional organizations needs to be established.

- The major aim of peacekeeping operations is to promote peaceful solution of conflicts, so that the means of the operations should be primarily peaceful.

- The basic principles of “consent, neutrality and non-use of force except for self-defense” in peacekeeping operations should be adhered to.

- The Member States should ensure the UN with adequate peacekeeping resources, and enhance its rapid deployment capability of peacekeeping operations.

- The UN planning, organizing, training, guiding and coordinating mechanism for peacekeeping operations should be improved and perfected.

- Peacekeeping education and training must be improved and standardized, the political and military qualification of peacekeeping personnel and their practical competence of mission execution enhanced.

- Efforts should be made to push for the cooperation between the UN and its member states and the cooperation among its member states in the respect of peacekeeping training. The developed countries should provide financial, equipment, and training support to the troop contributing countries that are economically weak.

- Cooperation and coordination among military, police, civilian and humanitarian sectors in the field should be strengthened, and relations between the military and the non-military
personnel improved.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is the unshirkable responsibility of the international community to bring the positive role of peacekeeping operations to a full play in pushing for the peaceful solution of conflicts, promoting regional stability and world peace, and effectively improving the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping operations. In this sense, the Challenges Project and this Beijing seminar have made useful contributions to the international peace cause, and all of us present have made active efforts to safeguarding world peace. The success of this seminar is owed to the great support and joint efforts of the parties concerned. Here, on behalf of the cosponsors of this seminar, the PKO office of the Ministry of National Defense of China and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, I would like to express our thanks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and other departments which have rendered support and help to our organizing work of the seminar, to the UN and the participating officials, experts and scholars from other countries, who have come all the way here and made excellent presentations or offered good comments and suggestions during the discussions. And especially our thanks go to the coordinator of our Challenges Project the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, and Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg in particular. They have undertaken huge amount of coordinating work for the planning and organization of this seminar.

The final ending of the Challenges Project still relies on the completion of the second phase Concluding Report. After the seminar ends, some experts and scholars still need to devote long time and tremendous efforts to completing the Concluding Report. Hence, on behalf of all the Project partners, please allow me to express our sincere compliments and thanks to the writers of the Report!

Thank you.
ANNEX A

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
## FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Harland</td>
<td>Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Derek G. Boothby</td>
<td>Project Adviser, UNDPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Lisa Jones</td>
<td>Official, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Vasant Mande</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Training and Evaluation Service, UNDPKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. P. Souverijn Eisenberg</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Campos Dugone</td>
<td>CAECOPAZ, Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bruce Oswald</td>
<td>Acting Director, Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, The University of Melbourne, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. (rtd.) T. Ford</td>
<td>Fmr. MILAD UN DPKO, Project Adviser, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Timothy Simkin</td>
<td>Defense Attaché, Permanent Mission to the UN, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Sandra Dunsmore</td>
<td>President, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. David Lightburn</td>
<td>Director, Special Projects, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hans H kkerup</td>
<td>Fmr. SRSG UNMIK and Defense Minister, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Franoise Ribier</td>
<td>Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs, EMA, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Takahisa Kawakami</td>
<td>Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amb. Chief A. Mbanefo</td>
<td>Fmr. Chairman, the UN Special Committee for PKO, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Istifanus Zabadi</td>
<td>Director of Studies, The War College of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nnamdi Obasi</td>
<td>Research Fellow, The War College of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Maria Kiani</td>
<td>Research Fellow, The Institute of Strategic Studies, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Alexeijs Salmin</td>
<td>President, Public Policy Center, Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. B. Tuzmuukhamedov</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Diplomatic Academy, Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Gen. Tony Stigsson</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Forces Command, Swedish Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jonas AlberothActing</td>
<td>Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Annika. H. Norberg</td>
<td>Challenges Project Leader, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Charlotte Svensson</td>
<td>Challenges Project Staff, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Lars Forste</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, National Criminal Investigation Directorate, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Jessica Olausson</td>
<td>Point of Contact, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amb. Murat Bilhan</td>
<td>Chairman, Center for Strategic Research, MFA, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Siret Hürsoy</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Ege University, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wg. Cdr. Steve Cooke</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division, JDCC, MOD, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Catherine Guicherd</td>
<td>Officer, UN G8 Team, MOD, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Arthur Gene Dewey</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. John Agoglia</td>
<td>Director, Army Peacekeeping &amp; Stability Operations Institute, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Michael Dziedzic</td>
<td>Program Officer, Balkans Initiative, Institute of Peace, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Dai Shaoan</td>
<td>Deputy Director, PKO, MND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Zhang Li</td>
<td>Assistant Director, PKO, MND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Yang Ningyu</td>
<td>PKO, MND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Lu Jianxin</td>
<td>PKO, MND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. (rtd.) Luo Yudong</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, CIISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Yan Jiangfeng</td>
<td>Secretary General, CIISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Song Weicheng</td>
<td>Senior Research fellow, CIISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Zhuang Maocheng</td>
<td>Research fellow, CIISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Du Nongyi</td>
<td>Research fellow, CIISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Liu Zhao</td>
<td>Research fellow, CIISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Tan Jun</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of Public Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Xu Nanshan</td>
<td>Department of Government Administration, Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Zhu Yinghuai</td>
<td>Department of International Organizations, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bian Ge</td>
<td>Department of International Organizations, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Wang Xiaochen</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of Public Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Song Dan</td>
<td>Legal Affairs Bureau, CMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Meng Danming</td>
<td>Secretariat of General Office, General Staff HQ of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Wang Dianhua</td>
<td>Military Training &amp; Arms Department, GSHQ of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Ji Haiquan</td>
<td>Logistic Planning Bureau, Headquarters of GLD, PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Lu Haiying</td>
<td>Assistant, Financial Department, GLD of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Li Rui</td>
<td>Medical Service Department, GLD of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Wang Zijing</td>
<td>Military Transportation Department, GLD of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Zhang Ning</td>
<td>Shenyang Military Command of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Yang Guoping</td>
<td>Joint Logistic Department of Shenyang MC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Wang Dayong</td>
<td>Medical Service Department, Joint Logistic Department,</td>
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<td>Nanjing MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sen. Col. Qu Zhiwen</td>
<td>The Peacekeeping Civil Police Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Pan Borong</td>
<td>Secretariat of General Office, GSHQ of PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Li Ying</td>
<td>The Logistic Command College of PLA</td>
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ANNEX B

PROGRAMME
Nov 2 (Tuesday)
1700-1900     Project Partners Round Table Meeting

Nov 3 (Wednesday)

Opening Session
0945   Chair: Senior Colonel Dai Shaoan, Deputy Director Peacekeeping Affairs Office, MND, China
0950   Opening Speech: Major General Shi Zhengbai, Senior Official in charge of Peacekeeping Affairs, MND, China
1015   MFA Key Note Mr. Shen Guofang, Assistant Minister, MFA, China
1030   MND Key Note General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief, General Staff, PLA & Chairman, CIISS
1100   UN Statement Mr. David Harland on behalf of H.E. Mr. Jean Marie Guéhenno Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
1130   UN Statement Mr. Derek Boothby on behalf of Sir. Kieran Prendergast Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, United Nations
1140   Challenges Project Framework: Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Acting Director General Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
1155   Challenges Project Framework: Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, Project Leader, Challenges Project Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Session 1: Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations: Challenges for UN Member States in the New Era
Overview of today’s major peace operations—implications for cooperation and coordination of different models of governance, degree of security and the forms of international assistance for humanitarian crises
1330   Chair: Ambassador Chief Arthur Mbanefo, Nigeria Former Chairman, UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations
1340   Humanitarian: Ms. Lisa Jones, Policy Development and Studies Branch UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
1400   Legal: Mr. Bruce Oswald, Acting Director Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, Australia
1420   Public Security: Ambassador Murat Bilhan Chairman, Centre for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey
1440   Discussion
Session II: What are the Expectations of the International Community? What are the Challenges for Personnel Contributing Countries?

0830 Chair: Professor Alexej Salmin President, Public Policy Centre, Russian Federation
0840 Military: Ms. Catherine Guicherd UN—G8 Team, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom
0850 Humanitarian: Mr. Arthur Gene Dewey Assistant Secretary of State for Refugees, Populations and Migration, State Department, United States
0910 Military: Ms. Alaciel Campos Dugone Training and Doctrine Officer, CAECOPAZ, Argentina
0940 Discussion
1030 Military: Colonel Lu Jianxin Peacekeeping Affairs Office, MND, China
1050 Governance: Mr. Hans Hkkerup Former SRSG UNMIK and former Minister of Defense, Denmark
1110 Military: Major Franoise Ribier Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs, EMA, France

Session III: Diversified Tasks and the Challenges for Education and Training
Discussion and Development of Opinions and Recommendations

1330 Chair: Ms. Sandra Dunsmore, President Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada
1340 Doctrines and Guidance: Mr. David Harland, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
1400 Standardized Training Modules: Lieutenant Colonel Vasant Mande Deputy Director, Training and Evaluation Service Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
1420 Academic: Professor Liu Zhao, Research Fellow, CISS
1440 Emerging Trends: Colonel John Agoglia, Director U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
1550 Computer Assisted Exercises: Major General Tony Stigsson, Commander Joint Forces Command, Swedish Armed Forces
1610 Civilian Training: Mr. Takahisa Kawakami, Counsellor Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations
1630 Discussion

Concluding Session

Chair: Major General Yan Jiangfeng, Secretary General, CISS
1725  Concluding Remarks  Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Acting Director General Folk Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
1735  Concluding Remarks  Major General (rtd.) Luo Yudong Vice Chairman, CISS

Nov 5 (Friday)
Sightseeing Tour & Culture Show

Nov 6 (Saturday-Tuesday)