The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Efforts to address the complex and diverse range of challenges facing peace operations require a complementary, coherent and integrated approach across the UN system and among international stakeholders. This is critical to ensuring that peace operations are prepared and able to support sustainable peace. The Annual Forum Report 2015 examines these challenges departing from an analysis of the recommendations and outcomes of several major reviews and developments throughout the year, including the reviews on UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, as well as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Forum agreed that partnerships among all stakeholders are essential to progress on the recommendations across these reviews and to improve the approach of peace operations to institution- and capacity-building.

This report comprises a comprehensive summary of the presentations, discussions and background materials of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 on 'Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN’s Review Panels’ Recommendations for Future Missions'. It also presents a number of targeted recommendations derived from the speakers’ and participants’ views on the current challenges of peace operations.
CHALLENGES FORUM
PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

**Argentina:** Ministry of Defence in cooperation with Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz

**Armenia:** The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence

**Australia:** Australian Civil-Military Centre

**Canada:** Global Affairs Canada

**China:** China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence

**Egypt:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa

**France:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

**Germany:** Center for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office

**India:** United Services Institution of India

**Indonesia:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Japan:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Jordan:** Institute of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Jordan Public Security Directorate and Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre

**Nigeria:** National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Norway:** Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

**Pakistan:** National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

**Russia:** Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies

**South Africa:** Institute for Security Studies

**Sweden:** Folke Bernadotte Academy, Armed Forces, National Police and National Prison and Probation Service

**Switzerland:** Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports

**Turkey:** Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Armed Forces and National Police

**United Kingdom:** Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development

**United States:** Department of State, Department of Defense, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and United States Institute of Peace

**International Secretariat:** Folke Bernadotte Academy
Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN’s Review Panels’ Recommendations for Future Missions

Challenges
Annual Forum
Report 2015
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Preface

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 took place during a particularly challenging time for the international community, with widespread brutal and often fatal violence taking place in a number of conflicts and countries around the world. Terrible hardships have been threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions of people throughout the year, resulting in the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency reporting on record levels of worldwide displacement as war and persecution increase. No country or person in the world stands unaffected by these developments.

But the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 also took place during a historic time for UN peace operations. Only a few days earlier, an unprecedented number of pledges for UN peacekeeping, which exceeded all expectations, had been made at UN headquarters in New York during a Leaders’ Peacekeeping Summit convened by the United States in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General and a number of UN Member States. In addition, the opening of the UN General Assembly had just concluded, which included a high-level two-day debate on the Maintenance of Peace and Security as part of the commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations. Furthermore, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping was preparing for its 2016 annual session.

2015 saw the conclusion of a number of milestone reviews on key elements of UN peace operations. First, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its major Review in early June with over 125 recommendations. Shortly thereafter, the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture of the Advisory Group of Experts was published, also this Report containing a large number of recommendations. Third, in the wake of the UN General Assembly the UN Secretary-General issued his Report on the implementation of a selection of HIPPO recommendations, outlining the future of UN peace operations primarily during his remaining time in office. Fourth, the all-important Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 was finalised by a High-Level Advisory Group in close collaboration with UN Women; offering important new evidence, ideas and good practices on the power of engaging and empowering women in peace and security. Fifth,
the General Assembly formally adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development along with a set of new Global Goals, of which number 16 confirms the interconnectedness of peace, security and development. Together, these critical summits, meetings, reviews, reports and studies have created a momentum for UN peace operations where there is a real possibility of a major influx of new capacities and capabilities, at the same time as there is an opportunity to make great use of insightful analysis and solid recommendations.

Against this background, the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 sought to make a start in the important work that follows in terms of implementation and devising optimal ways for shaping and reforming UN peace operations for the future. And what better place to start these discussions than in Armenia, a country that recently increased its support to UN peacekeeping significantly by deploying troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 2014, as well as to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in 2015, and made important pledges at the 2015 Leaders’ Peacekeeping Summit. Armenia is also investing increasingly in theoretical and methodological developments aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of UN peace operations through its Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia,1 which generously hosted the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

The Challenges Annual Forum focused on a central issue to modern peace operations that is relevant across all the reviews listed above, namely institution- and capacity-building for peace. Whilst institution- and capacity-building have been included in certain peacekeeping operation mandates since the 1990s, they have recently become not only standard, but a core part of multidimensional peace operations. At the same time, the complex operating and security environments that these missions are deployed into make it increasingly challenging for the UN to engage in capacity- and institution-building activities on the ground. This raises some serious questions for UN peacekeeping that the Challenges Forum participants tried to identify and begin to answer in Yerevan, with a particular focus on: the changing and increasing demands on UN Police and Security Sector Reform, the need for better coordinated approaches, planning and leadership, and the key role of strategic communications, as well as of ensuring ownership, inclusivity and participation.

To support the discussions, four background papers had been commissioned

for the Annual Forum to trigger a dynamic and results-oriented dialogue, two of which were written by members of the HIPPO - Hilde F. Johnson and Alexander Ilichev on the ‘Capacity to Protect Civilians’ and ‘Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative’ respectively. Leanne Smith, Chief of the UN Policy and Best Practices Section of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support, authored a paper on ‘Institution- and Capacity-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding’. Dr. Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor at the Ministry of Affairs of Armenia, and Dr. Jibecke Joensson with the Challenges Forum Secretariat wrote a paper on ‘Early Actions to Save Succeeding Generations from the Scourge of War’.2

The aim of the 2015 Forum reflects the steadfast purpose of the Challenges Forum during its 19 years of Partnership namely to improve the analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations. Equally important is the Partnership’s dedication to strengthening and broadening the international network of actors involved in supporting UN peace operations. As such, partners represent a global network of 47 peace operations departments and organizations from 22 countries. The Forum constitute a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policymakers, practitioners, academics and increasingly also non-governmental organizations on key issues and developments in peace operations.

This Report presents the findings of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015. It provides a comprehensive overview of the outcomes of the recent reviews relevant to institution- and capacity-building for peace, and indicates which areas urgently require more attention as well as presents some ideas with regards to the actions that could be taken to those ends. A table of targeted recommendations is included in the beginning of the Report, reflecting not a general consensus but ideas and suggestions that were voiced and discussed by Forum participants throughout the two-days of deliberations and discussions in Yerevan, in both plenary and break-out sessions dedicated to specific case-studies including South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Liberia.

What became clear during the Annual Forum was that despite all the current serious and complex challenges that UN peace operations are facing, peacekeeping has arguably never been more important, nor has it benefited from more support from the UN Member States. There is no doubt that peace operations are currently experiencing a certain momentum that has the potential to go beyond generating unprecedented pledges for peacekeeping,

2 The background papers are available on the Challenges Forum website: www.challengesforum.org (accessed 17 March 2016).
and extend to important reforms that can help adapt practice to future threats and thereby enhance the effectiveness of missions on the ground.

The fact that during these difficult, complex and somewhat confusing times for international peace and security, peace operations are increasing in both numbers and scope, sends a clear message about the UN and its operations still being the best available tool to address violent threats and keep, as well as make, and build peace. It should also reassure us about the international community’s continued commitment to multilateralism and to not only saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, but also to provide them with peace.

We would like to express our appreciation to all involved in making the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 possible and most productive. First, we would like to thank the Armenian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for supporting and co-hosting the 2015 Annual Forum with the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia. Second, we would like to thank all the chairs, speakers and participants for their invaluable contributions to the deliberations. Third, we appreciate the contributions by the authors of the background papers for helping to frame our discussions and outline a number of questions for reflection in preparation for the Forum. Finally, but not least, we would like to recognize in particular our colleagues Dr Benyamin Poghosyan, Deputy Head of Research at the INSS, Mr Levon Ayvazyan, Head of the Armenian Ministry of Defence Policy Department, HE Ambassador Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, Dr Jibecke Joensson, Acting Head of Peace Operations Policy and Best Practices at the Challenges Forum Secretariat, and Lisa Sharland, Analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Centre, and an Adviser with the Challenges Forum, who all played central roles in making the 2015 Annual Forum a true success. We believe that the reflections and recommendations presented in the Report may provide important insights and inputs to the historical ongoing work of reviewing and reforming UN peace operations for future threats. And we look very much forward to reflecting on the progress that has been made on these and other recommendations in 2016.

Maj. Gen. Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian Annika Hilding Norberg
Head Director and Founder
Institute for National Strategic Studies Challenges Forum
Ministry of Defence of Armenia Folke Bernadotte Academy
## Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUCA</td>
<td>UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Community Liaison Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOSG</td>
<td>Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Contributing Country</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Special Political Mission</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council resolution</td>
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Executive Summary

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted on 5-6 October in Yerevan by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More than 100 participants from Challenges Forum Partner Organizations, the United Nations (UN) and civil society took part in the dialogue over two days. Opened by the Armenian Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs, it was the first Challenges Annual Forum hosted by the Armenian Partners. The theme was ‘Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Review Panels’ Recommendations for Future Missions’.

The Annual Forum took place at a historical juncture in efforts to improve, strengthen and reform UN peace operations through a series of reviews. These included reports from the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the Advisory Group on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325. Each of these Reports provided substantive recommendations to improve the approach of peace operations and the UN system more broadly in undertaking institution- and capacity-building activities. Furthermore, the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015 signalled the important relationship between peace, security and development.

Moreover, the Forum discussions were timely, taking place immediately following the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, where more than 50 countries and regional organizations pledged personnel, equipment and enablers to support current and future peace operations. These developments have the potential to greatly improve different dimensions of UN peacekeeping, provided Member States follow through on their commitments.

In order to address the recommendations and findings emerging from these major review and reform processes, the Challenges Annual Forum focused on trends, challenges and opportunities emerging from the three above mentioned Reports, with a focus on commonalities and differences. Each
of the review Reports identified findings and recommendations that are of relevance to institution- and capacity-building, whether in the context of supporting mandated tasks, deploying personnel and capabilities, or planning for exits and transitions. Drawing on the priorities set out in the HIPPO Report, the importance of politics, people and partnerships was a consistent theme throughout the Annual Forum discussions.

Recognising the important role that peacekeepers can play as early peacebuilders, the discussions also focused on the role that institution-building could take in bridging the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding by connecting the security and peace nexus. Discussions were informed by case-studies of peace operations in three different phases: start-up working with a transitional government (Central African Republic); crisis and reconfiguration (South Sudan); and transition and draw-down (Liberia).

While the Reports present a significant opportunity for reform, discussions analysed some of the challenges and impediments to institution-building as well. These included a lack of financial support (important to programmatic funding and activities such as Security Sector Reform), limited or unavailable resources (including military enablers and capabilities, gender advisers and civil affairs support at UN headquarters), and a lack of coordination and coherence (both with international stakeholders, and local authorities and partners). In this context, the reviews offered useful recommendations to address some of these challenges.

The findings and conclusions of the Challenges Forum 2015 provide some insights into the views and perspectives of peacekeeping stakeholders on the changes that are emerging in UN peace operations. This is particularly opportune as the UN prepares to engage in a series of intergovernmental processes to consider the recommendations and identify priorities for implementation, including through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Plenary of the General Assembly. Many of the issues under discussion during the Challenges Forum 2015 may be of interest to these discussions.

The Challenges Annual Forum 20 year Anniversary in 2016 will provide a further opportunity to continue the discussion and identify priorities ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Thematic Debate on ‘UN, Peace and Security’ to be held on 10-11 May 2016.
Summary of Recommendations

Discussions during the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 identified several recommendations to improve institution- and capacity-building in UN peace operations. These are intended to build on the recommendations emerging from the review panels and their Reports on UN peace operations and identify specific areas of practical and targeted reforms, which may support those broader implementation processes. For each of the recommendations, a range of different stakeholders that may be in a position to action or initiate the suggested work have also been identified. However, given the focus of the discussions on institution- and capacity-building, in many instances, a greater range of stakeholders—including host authorities, civil society and field personnel—will need to be actively engaged and involved in efforts in order to take forward these recommendations.

The recommendations attempt to address gaps in policy, planning, training and coordination, and may be of interest to Member States ahead of inter-governmental discussions on the next steps throughout 2016.

Session 1: Implement Reforms to Improve UN Peace Operations

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<th>NO</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATION</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Engage troop and police contributing countries from the planning and formulation phase of mission mandating in order to ensure they are clear on the mission expectations and objectives.</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Develop guidance to support the UN Security Council with sequenced mandating for UN peace operations, drawing on lessons learned and best practices from field missions.</td>
<td>EOSG</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Foster a sound narrative and engaging story of the objectives, challenges and achievements of UN peace operations to share with international stakeholders to enhance ongoing, as well as generate new commitments and support.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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1 UN Security Council (UNSC), Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), UN Security Council (UNSC).
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Drawing on lessons learned from field missions and troop and police contributing countries, review the rules and systems in place to manage military assets in peace operations in order to identify whether there are circumstances where they should be under military command instead of civilian management.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Identify lessons learned on capacity-building initiatives from the work of gender advisers in UN peace operations, including efforts to support the development of national action plans to implement UNSCR 1325.</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Through further analysis and discussion among stakeholders, explore the value of including the protection of civilians as a principal of peacekeeping.</td>
<td>Challenges Forum Partnership</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Identify recommendations from the HIPPO Report that have not been included in the SG's Report in order to prioritise issues that should be contemplated for further Member State consideration and support over the next 12-18 months.</td>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>In addition to identifying troop and police commitments to UN peace operations, the UN with the active support of Member States should seek to identify other areas of support to sustaining peace (eg diplomatic engagement, support to regional organizations).</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Undertake a mapping exercise on the pledges and commitments made by countries at the Peacekeeping Leaders’ summits in 2014 and 2015, in order to identify commitments that have been fulfilled and to develop a clear picture on demand versus supply against present gap lists.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Utilise the UN Police Chiefs conference in 2016 and the outcome of the independent review of the UN Police Division to enhance the understanding of, and the awareness about, the different roles and functions of UNPOL in peace operations, in order to generate a diverse range of commitments, training programs and financial support among Member States.</td>
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### Session 2: Improve Support to the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

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<td>11</td>
<td>Analyse how UN regional offices can support and contribute to the work of UN peace operations, particularly in relation to transnational threats.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Engage with Member States and regional organizations (such as the African Union) on the operationalisation of the strategic policing framework in order to share lessons learned and support the development of regional and other policing initiatives.</td>
<td>DPKO</td>
</tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Identify lessons learned on capacity-building and peacebuilding from the deployment of special political missions, including an examination of broader lessons learned on the role of police components in peace operations.</td>
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### Session 3: Undertake Effective Institution-building

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<td>14</td>
<td>Analyse lessons on Police and Security Sector Reform SSR to identify comparative advantages that different actors involved in UN peace operations provide, as well as mechanisms to improve coordination and sustainability of Police and SSReform programs throughout the life-cycle of a mission. This should include a review of the standing police capacity so as to enhance rapid deployment.</td>
<td>DPKO</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Engage Member States, regional organizations and host countries in dialogue on lessons learned from SSR support and capacity-building programs (including police sector reform), in order to identify gaps in coordination, assessment and planning, mandating, as well as financial support.</td>
<td>Challenges Forum Partnership</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Develop guidance and request streamlined reporting to ensure missions routinely involve local actors in institution-building efforts without necessarily increasing missions’ reporting burden. (See also recommendation 22)</td>
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Session 4: Opportunities and Challenges to Connect the Security and Peace Nexus

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<td>19</td>
<td>Increase the resourcing and support available to the Civil Affairs Unit in UN headquarters in New York.</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Drawing on lessons learned from political engagement by the UNSC, Member States and regional organizations, develop guidance around compacts focusing on the need to find political solutions and ensure there is greater trust between the host government and the peace operation in terms of meeting the Security Council objectives.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Direct missions to create comprehensive strategic communications plans to engage with local populations, host authorities and the international community.</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Rationalise reporting lines for peace operations through an integrated reporting framework and ensure there is focus on tracking qualitative progress (ie impact) over quantitative exercises (ie activities).</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Promote and operationalise the existing integrative assessment tool in the field so as to improve the benchmarking of progress and ensure more results-based transition plans.</td>
<td>DPKO/DFS</td>
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1. Introduction

Opening Remarks and Welcome: Major General Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council; Dr Seyran Ohanyan, Minister of Defence, Armenia; Dr Edward Nalbandian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Mr Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia; Professor Alexander Nikitin, Director, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University, Russia, Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted on 5-6 October in Yerevan by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More than 100 participants from Challenges Forum Partner Organizations took part in the dialogue over two days, including policymakers, practitioners and various experts from the United Nations (UN), Member States, academia and civil society. The theme for the Annual Forum was ‘Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Review Panels’ Recommendations for Future Missions’. Background papers (available online)\(^4\), presentations and discussions examined the findings of several international reviews of issues related to UN peace operations, including:


\(^4\) The background papers prepared for the forum are available online via the Challenges Forum website: www.challengesforum.org (accessed 16 December 2015).


• ‘Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325’8; and

• ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Peace’.9

The discussions provided a timely opportunity to discuss points of convergence and difference among each of these reviews. All of them had a common purpose of analysing developments that had taken place within the last 10 or 15 years, in order to identify key challenges and opportunities for reform. Furthermore, each of the reviews identified findings and recommendations that were of relevance to UN peace operations, whether in the context of supporting mandated tasks (that support early peacebuilding), deploying personnel and capabilities (such as gender advisers, women protection advisers and police, justice or corrections officers), or planning for exits and transitions (that require coordination with the UN Country Team, donors and other stakeholders).

While each review had separate aims and objectives, participants agreed that there needs to be a comprehensive approach to address their findings and recommendations. This requires new thinking and different approaches in order to overcome institutional silos—an aspect that is particularly important if the United Nations, regional organizations and international stakeholders are going to improve the effectiveness of UN peace operations when it comes to institution- and capacity-building. As one panellist noted, understanding the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is an essential part of those efforts.

The reviews provide strategic and reflective analysis for the international community at a critical juncture for UN peace operations, with one panellist noting that the reviews present a ‘historical opportunity’. The international system has struggled to maintain its effectiveness and uphold peace and security during a period of staggering growth in the number of deployed peacekeepers in the last decade. More than 125,000 personnel

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8 Referred to hereafter as ‘Global Study on UNSCR 1325’.

are deployed to 16 UN peacekeeping missions, with a budget of just over USD 9 billion. Of those personnel, more than 95 per cent are deployed into contexts that have a protection of civilians (POC) mandate. The number of armed conflicts has tripled since 2008, with more than 60 million civilians displaced as a consequence of ongoing conflicts. This continues to place an unprecedented amount of pressure on the UN system, both for UN peacekeepers (which are required to protect an increasing number of displaced civilians in their areas of operation) and the wider operation of humanitarian and development activities.

At the same time, UN peace operations continue to face a growing range of complex and challenging threats. Armed groups and spoilers present a threat in contexts such as South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali and the Middle East. The UN is increasingly a target and can no longer rely on its unique international legitimacy as a means of protection. Furthermore, many efforts to address international conflict are often taking place outside the confines of UN operations—such as the international efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—but would likely have longer-term implications for future UN engagement. These challenges require partnership and a global approach.

Efforts to address these threats have also been compounded by a lack of political consensus on the future direction of UN peacekeeping, limited resources and capabilities, as well as financial constraints. The Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping—which took place on 28 September 2015 in New York, the week prior to the Annual Forum—resulted in pledges and commitments from more than 50 countries and regional organizations to UN peacekeeping. Many participants were of the view that the Summit presented the UN with an unprecedented opportunity to draw on a wider range of personnel and capabilities for peace operations, which stands in contrast to efforts over the last decade to generate the necessary military, police and other enablers to new and existing missions. Countries taking part in the Summit agreed on a joint declaration, signalling mutual commitment and support in addressing some of the ongoing challenges to UN peacekeeping.10

10 Declaration of Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, the Governments of Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Turkey, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, United States, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Vietnam, 28 September 2015, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/declaration-leaders-summit-peacekeeping (accessed 1 April 2016).
The UN is in the process of analysing and reflecting on the reviews, in order to develop what one panellist referred to as the ‘2030 agenda’ when it comes to peace operations. The HIPPO Report and in the subsequent Secretary-General’s Report on the peace operations review set out an ambitious agenda of reforms, aimed at making peace operations more modern, more accountable and more responsive to the needs of those deployed in the field and the civilians they protect. In order for the reviews to comprehensively address some of these challenges, panellists noted the need to focus efforts on some of the key themes identified in the reviews-politics, people and partnerships. Furthermore, if the reviews are going to be complementary, mutually reinforcing and improve the approach of UN peace operations to institution- and capacity-building, then the UN system and the international community need to take a coherent and integrated approach to these efforts.

Armenia’s Engagement in UN Peace Operations

Armenia has been actively engaged in developing peacekeeping capabilities since 2001, deploying military personnel to multinational operations in Iraq (January 2005 – October 2008), as well as to the NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. More recently, Armenia has committed personnel to the UN and its peacekeeping operations in Lebanon (since November 2014) and Mali (since July 2015). As of November 2015, Armenia had 34 personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping operations.

Armenia continues to identify opportunities to increase its contribution and involvement in peacekeeping operations. The President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, joined more than 50 World Leaders in making pledges to current and future UN peace operations at the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping held on 28 September 2015 in New York. Armenia committed to deploying an Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices company, as well as a Level II hospital to UN peacekeeping operations. Armenia took part in a meeting of Foreign Ministers on the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping missions on 1 October in New York. Attendance and pledges made at these events, along with the hosting of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015, demonstrate Armenia’s substantive commitment to peacekeeping. It is supported in these efforts through international cooperation and bilateral partnerships with a range of countries, including that of the United States, Greece, Italy and Germany. The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 also marked the informal launch of Armenia’s first National Defence Research University.
In addition to preparing and deploying personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, Armenia is supporting the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to peacekeeping operations. In 2014, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) organised an International Strategic Policy Forum on ‘Integration of National and Regional Peacekeeping Capacities into the Global System of Peace Operations’. The forum was attended by senior officials from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretariat and Joint Staff, CSTO Member States, as well as representatives from China, Israel, South Africa, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the OSCE and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Armenia assumed the chairmanship of the CSTO in September 2015 and is continuing to use that role to support the development of peacekeeping capabilities, including through the memorandum that was signed between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the CSTO in 2012.

As a peacekeeping contributor, Armenia has expressed support for many of the reforms underway to support improvements to UN peacekeeping, including recommendations emerging from the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Recommendations of particular priority for Armenia include the importance of political solutions to achieving lasting peace, the need for mediation and prevention of conflicts and the importance of mission mandates being situation-specific, rather than based on general approaches or templates.

Politics, People and Partnerships

Political solutions are central to lasting peace. This was one of the four essential shifts identified in the HIPPO Report, which noted that ‘politics must drive the design of and implementation of peace operations’\(^\text{[11]}\). If that momentum falters, then the international community must assist in getting political efforts on track. The situations in South Sudan and the Central African Republic have illustrated the need for inclusive political processes in order to overcome ethnic and sectarian tensions that have contributed to the ongoing cycle of conflict. The importance of fostering inclusive national ownership — which entails a wide spectrum of national actors including women and young people — was identified as one of the critical determinants of success for sustainable peace in the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.

One of the key challenges for peace operations is identifying a political end state in a country that a mission is deployed into. Peace operations are by

\(^\text{[11]}\) HIPPO Report, p.10.
their nature only intended to be transitory to support a country in its efforts to establish peace. But it is often unclear under what conditions a peace operation should leave. In some instances, the mission has little choice but to depart when requested by the host government. However, in most cases, it is a negotiated process among the host government, the UN Security Council and in some cases, the broader international community and regional organizations. Key questions include: What are the conditions that should be in place before peace operations leave? And how do we know when those conditions are met and we can move beyond the presence of a peace operation?

As one panellist noted, the answers to these questions are both technical and political in nature (as noted in the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture). Technical in that there are decades of lessons to draw on when it comes to institution- and capacity-building in the context of UN peace operations. These have resulted in guidance, training and best practices in areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and establishing the rule of law and governance institutions. Nonetheless, these lessons have also demonstrated that each situation is different, requiring a context-specific approach that is responsive to the political environment that a mission is deployed into and guided by national processes and ownership. Technical expertise is therefore needed to support reforms that are of inherently political nature.

Another consistent theme across the reviews was the need for peace operations to take a more people-centered approach. For example, the HIPPO Report stated that peace operations need to be more field-focused and people-centred. This means that the UN needs to adopt an approach that is responsive to the needs of those deployed in the field, and that missions themselves need to focus on serving and protecting those that they have been mandated to assist. Putting people at the centre of peace operations means engaging with local communities to monitor and understand the impact of peace operations. This will ensure greater support for more inclusive peace processes as well as more calibrated approaches to addressing the protection needs of civilians. Women’s participation is a key component of these processes, both in terms of participation in peace operations and in understanding the needs and concerns of women in situations of conflict.

Adopting a people-centered approach is essential to developing institutional capacities. Peace operations need to have an understanding of the informal mechanisms that are often in place to manage conflict and societal disputes. International actors frequently overlook these mechanisms in their rush to
provide assistance, ignoring critical domestic actors. In order to overcome these challenges, peace operations need to support the development of institutions that respond to the specific needs and concerns of the population. Improved analysis and planning could support the ability of peace operations to understand conflict at the local level.

Discussions focused on the importance of partnerships as an integral component of peace operations. Different partnerships contribute to and support the implementation of mandates for UN peace operations. The triangular partnership between the UN Security Council, troop and police contributing countries and the UN Secretariat is integral to successful peace operations. But establishing longer-term sustainable peace also requires ongoing partnerships between peacekeeping missions, host authorities, international donors and in many instances, regional and sub-regional organizations. Partnerships are particularly critical in efforts to undertake institution- and capacity-building, as these activities rely heavily on funding and technical expertise that is usually not available in peace operations. This requires a coherent and integrated approach among all stakeholders involved in supporting these activities.

**Partnerships with Regional Organizations: The CSTO and the UN**

The HIPPO Report notes the importance of regional partnerships in efforts to improve peacekeeping reform. The UN continues to engage with regional organizations to develop partnerships in an effort to support the development of regional peacekeeping capabilities.

The relationship with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is under development. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DKO) signed a memorandum of understanding with the CSTO Secretariat on 28 September 2012. Part of this cooperation includes sharing materials on peacekeeping policies and standards, providing briefings and supporting the development of the CSTO’s standby force (4,000 personnel). Member countries of the CSTO are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

The CSTO regularly conducts peacekeeping exercises among member countries. In September 2015, Armenia hosted Nerushimoe Bratsvo (Unbreakable Brotherhood)—a joint exercise of CSTO peacekeeping forces. The exercise included 600 military personnel, with representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as UN DPKO. Belarus is scheduled to hold the next CSTO peacekeeping exercise in 2016.
Coherence and Integration

Participants agreed that efforts to establish sustainable peace are often impeded by fragmentation in the UN system, therefore a collective effort is required to overcome these institutional obstacles and develop a coherent approach. This is particularly important in the context of UN peace operations, given the substantive role they have in facilitating political dialogue among the national and local authorities and armed groups, protecting civilians in the absence of host state capacity or willingness, and supporting early peacebuilding tasks, including developing rule of law and governance institutions and reforming the security sector. However, these efforts are often complicated due to the myriad of international, regional and national actors involved, with each stakeholder having different aims and objectives on the ground. This means that building synergies and aligning national priorities is not always as straightforward as it first appears, particularly in contexts where a national political process is failing, broken or absent.

Consequently, UN peace operations have an important role in facilitating a coherent and integrated approach to institution- and capacity-building across the UN system and broader international community. Yet silos and historical divisions within the UN system often add to the difficulty of developing a comprehensive and coherent approach to these efforts. For example, analysis and planning is often conducted within different departments and agencies within the system. In order to address this fragmentation and ensure the UN system undertakes a more comprehensive approach to strategic analysis and planning, the HIPPO Report recommended the Secretary-General to establish a small strategic analysis and planning capacity.12

Another factor compounding coherence across the system is the resourcing within the UN Secretariat. As one panellist noted, the UN Secretariat often lacks the necessary personnel and resources to support the work of peace operations in the field. It was argued that the UN Secretariat itself needs to be strengthened if it is to support peace operations in carrying out their mandated tasks. Member States could consider providing further support to these efforts, in order to support the ongoing development of comprehensive guidance, training standards, analysis and planning or operational support. This is particularly important in the context of supporting civilian capacities

12 HIPPO Report, pp.57-59.
such as civil affairs, as well as the gender divisions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (as recommended in the Global Study on Security Council Resolution 1325).

In addition to coherence across the UN system, there is also a need for greater cooperation and coherence with regional organizations. At times, regional and sub-regional organizations have several comparative advantages over the UN. This includes drawing on local and regional expertise on a conflict situation (e.g. the Intergovernmental Authority for Development in South Sudan), which is likely to provide more political leverage and legitimacy among some actors and spoilers to the conflict. In some instances, regional organizations are more willing to deploy into environments where the UN is reluctant or unwilling (e.g. the African Union (AU) in Somalia), or to enhance the capabilities of a UN mission (e.g. the European Union (EU) Training Mission in the Central African Republic). However, there are also significant limitations, including access to sustainable funding and logistics support. As a consequence, the UN is often working in parallel with regional organizations. The HIPPO Report noted the importance of strengthening global and regional partnerships, in order to improve burden-sharing between the UN and regional organizations. This is particularly important for the UN’s relationship with the AU, given the number of peacekeeping missions deployed on the continent. But it also signalled a growing awareness of the need to have a more comprehensive approach to engaging with other regional and multilateral organizations such as the EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the OSCE and CSTO. With a more coherent and integrated approach to peace operations, regional organizations could be better placed to assist with burden-sharing when it comes to mobilising forces to deploy to peace operations, supporting political engagement and facilitating training and capacity-building activities alongside UN peace operations.

Participants agreed that the Challenges Forum Partnership is an important vehicle in supporting ongoing efforts to develop a more coherent and integrated approach among these different entities—regional, subregional and bilateral stakeholders—when it comes to institution- and capacity-building.
Challenges Forum’s Engagement on Strategic Communication in Peace Operations

On 23 June 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) co-hosted a Challenges Forum Workshop on ‘Strategic Communications for a New Era of Peace Operations’ in Washington DC in close consultation with the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and UN DPKO and DFS. The workshop gathered representatives from governments, international organizations, academia and the private sector to discuss ways to improve strategic communications in UN peace operations.

The workshop was timely, taking place following the release of the Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN peacekeeping and only days after the launch of the HIPPO Report. The HIPPO Report included the following specific recommendation on strategic communications: ‘The Secretariat and missions should put in place at every stage of the mission lifecycle strategies for planning, recruitment, resourcing of mission communications teams aimed at ensuring interactive two-way communications with local people and ensuring UN peace operations use modern and appropriate communications, approaches and technologies’.

Discussions during the workshop identified the importance of developing a sound narrative and engaging story about the work of UN peace operations. In particular mission contexts, strategic communications was identified as an essential prerequisite for success with a three-fold purpose to inform, influence and protect. The key role of digital media in these efforts was underlined.

The Challenges Forum Partnership took forward recommendations that emerged from the workshop presented in a Policy Brief.

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2. High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: Current Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

**Background Paper:** Hilde E. Johnson, ‘Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?’; **Chair:** Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Russia; **Panellists:** Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Norway; Lt. Gen. Abhijit Guha, Member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, India; Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Dr Alan Ryan, Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre.

Over the last year the international community has engaged in a process to extensively review UN peace operations. The review presents a historical opportunity for the United Nations. It is the most significant attempt at reforming UN peace operations in over 15 years and it comes at a time when the international community is attempting to address a range of global, transnational and complex threats.

Discussions in this session focused on suggested reforms in the HIPPO Report where there could be tangible impact in the next few years. These included the protection of civilians (in terms of managing expectations and the need for capabilities to carry out mandates); the role of the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and other stakeholders in mandate development; force generation and rapid deployment; as well as the role of UN peace operations in implementing the women, peace and security agenda (drawing also on the findings of the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325). All participants were in agreement that the HIPPO Report offered important recommendations to improve the effectiveness of UN peace operations, but that the success of the reforms would ultimately be dependent on implementation and that the support of Member States would be critical to these efforts.

15 See, for example, Alexander Ilitchev, ‘Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative’, Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).
High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was appointed in October 2014 by the UN Secretary-General with the aim of comprehensively reviewing the direction of UN peace operations. The panel subsequently issued its Report ‘Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People’ in June 2015.

The Report identified four fundamental shifts that were essential to improving peace operations:

- ‘Politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations’
- ‘The full spectrum of United Nations peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground’
- ‘A stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership is needed for the future’
- ‘The United Nations Secretariat must become more field-focused and United Nations peace operations must be more people-centred’

The Secretary-General reported back on the findings in the HIPPO Report in September 2015, identifying several recommendations as priorities to take forward over the next 12 months.

Recommendations are expected to be considered through various intergovernmental mechanisms, including the Security Council and General Assembly (including the Fourth Committee, Fifth Committee and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) throughout 2016.

The UN General Assembly held a debate on the findings of both Reports on 12 October 2015 and subsequently adopted a procedural resolution (A/RES/70/6) taking note of the HIPPO and Secretary-General’s Reports and deciding that the respective bodies of the General Assembly would give consideration to the recommendations during its seventieth session.

The Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement in November 2015 (S/PRST/2015/22) following its consideration of some aspects of the HIPPO Report, although this made no commitment to any of the recommendations, only expressing its intention to continue giving them consideration.
**Principles and Protection of Civilians**

Protection of civilians (POC) is at the core of the work of the United Nations, including the work of peace operations. As the HIPPO Report acknowledged, there has been substantive progress in developing norms and frameworks in this area. The UN was ahead of Member States when it came to developing peacekeeping guidance to support military components. Over the last few years, the UN Secretariat has developed: an operational concept, a policy on the POC; implementing guidelines for military components on UN peacekeeping missions; and a policy on POC in peacekeeping. Missions are now expected to develop their own POC strategies and mechanisms to implement this guidance and ensure all mission components understand their roles and responsibilities when it comes to POC. These are positive developments. However, despite this progress and as the HIPPO Report noted, results on the ground remain inconsistent and mixed.

One of the challenges raised by the panellists related to engaging with the host government on efforts to protect the civilian population. Peace operations are planned and deployed on the assumption that the host government has primary responsibility for the protection of civilians. However, as one panellist noted, this is often a slogan rather than a reality. This is one of the biggest challenges for peace operations. For example, in South Sudan, the mission effectively had responsibility to protect hundreds of thousands of civilians on POC sites, due to a lack of willingness and capacity by the host government to do so in the context of ongoing ethnic violence. These type of situations are placing enormous pressure on peace operations and require new thinking on how to engage in political dialogue and capacity-building initiatives with the host government in these settings.

In the context of peace operations, efforts to establish a protective environment rely heavily on capacity-building activities undertaken by peacekeepers and bilateral partners, particularly when it comes to developing institutions such as national police services. Unfortunately, projects to engage in capacity-building initiatives with police are often supply- rather than demand-driven. They focus on individual police officers instead of aligning with the broader needs of the country. So approaches tend to have limited impact in building resilient institutions capable of delivering protection to civilians. This is compounded by an absence of long-term investment in such projects. The six-month rotations within missions are not conducive

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to longer-term capacity-building. Those that are being recruited into police peacekeeping roles usually do not have the training or knowledge to transfer skills or build policing institutions.

The role of peace operations in supporting SSR remains an ongoing challenge to broader protection of civilian efforts. As one of the background papers noted: ‘To consolidate and sustain peace in a country, reforms of the security sector may be the most critical intervention’. It was argued that the UN has the ability to perform a more substantive role in coordinating and supporting SSR efforts. Those activities are usually undertaken bilaterally and with minimal transparency. As a consequence, they are often ill-planned, supply-driven and fail to respond to the needs of the country. Improved SSR coordination could assist in building security institutions that are prepared, trained and equipped to better protect civilians. If those efforts were to succeed however, then UN peace operations would need to have the capacity to draw on more programmatic funding to support these activities (which was one of the recommendations made in the HIPPO Report).

Nonetheless, even if peace operations were resourced and prepared to undertake SSR activities, there is an inherent challenge in this work if the host government is complicit in civil war or committing human rights abuses. For example, in South Sudan, the UN Security Council removed most peacebuilding elements in the mandate following the outbreak of civil war. This has complicated ongoing efforts to protect civilians and highlighted the centrality of political solutions in any efforts to protect civilians and build sustainable peace.

The ability of peace operations to project force and provide physical protection to civilians also remains an ongoing challenge. As one panellist noted, size matters when it comes to peace operations. Those deployed to countries with a small geographical territory are more likely to succeed, as they have a greater capability to extend their reach and have a much better ratio between peacekeepers and square kilometres. However, most peacekeeping operations are operating with significant resource constraints. For example, in South Sudan, at least 60 per cent of the country is inaccessible during the rainy season. Even if there were no concerns about access restrictions, limited numbers of enablers such as helicopters made it difficult to maintain a presence in different parts of the country and project

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17 Hilde E. Johnson, ‘Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?’, Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).
18 HIPPO Report, p.98.
19 Johnson, 2015.
force to protect civilians. This was often further compounded by the lacking of willingness of troops to deploy to certain areas, undertake risk and use force when necessary.\textsuperscript{20}

Mismatches between resources and capabilities, along with mediocre performance by some peacekeepers, remain an ongoing challenge to providing physical protection to civilians. In order to address some of the different views among stakeholders and emphasise the centrality of POC to the work of peace operations, one panellist suggested that the peacekeeping principles (consent of the host authorities, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate) should be revised to include protection of civilians as a core obligation. This would remove disputes and potential loopholes that are used by troop and police contributing countries when it comes to obligations to protect civilians. There were differing views on this point, as some participants argued that the Security Council authorisation to use force to protect civilians was very clear. The presence of the mission does not absolve the host government, nor does it absolve the mission from taking on anyone who may pose a threat to civilians.

Despite many of these challenges, there are positive developments taking place to protect civilians. However, information about these successful efforts to protect civilians are often not being communicated effectively to the local population, or host authorities, nor to the international community. This is one of the reasons why the HIPPO Report identified the need for better strategic communications in UN peace operations. This would go beyond the role of traditional public information roles and take a more strategic approach to identifying audiences and messages that would communicate the work that the peace operations are undertaking to protect civilians, as well as broader mandate implementation. Initiatives that engage a wide cross-section of the population and utilise modern technology would form an important part of these efforts. Furthermore, strategic communications could also assist in managing expectations about the activities that a peace operation can undertake to protect civilians, addressing some of the concerns about limited resources and capabilities to deliver protection across wide-geographic areas.

There were some differing views among the panellists regarding the central role of governments in protecting civilians, particularly in the context of non-recognised states. As one panellist noted, in disputed territories, there is still

\textsuperscript{20} Johnson, 2015.
an obligation for institutions and individuals to uphold human rights and protect civilians. These obligations is embedded in international instruments. Efforts to support institution- and capacity-building in these contexts—particularly when it comes to raising awareness and developing capacities to protect civilians—need to be actively considered. It was suggested that peace operations could draw lessons from these situations in terms of working within complex political environments, but also noted that at the same time, the international community has to invest more in resolving these situations.

UN Policy on Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping

The DPKO/DFS Policy on ‘The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping’ was issued on 1 April 2015. Its purpose is to provide the conceptual framework, guiding principles, and key considerations for the implementation of protection of civilians (POC) mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The policy builds on years of work to develop a conceptual framework on POC in peacekeeping, responding to requests of the Security Council (through resolution 1894) and the C-34 (through yearly reports). These documents include the Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians, the DPKO/DFS Protection of Civilians Resources and Capabilities Matrix, a DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies, and a DPKO/DFS Comparative Study on Protection of Civilians Coordination Mechanisms.

The policy provides background to the evolution of POC in peacekeeping and further articulates the different responses expected of peacekeeping missions in situations where civilians are under threat of physical violence, drawing on the three tiers established in the operational concept (protection through political process, dialogue and engagement; provision of physical protection; and establishment of a protective environment).

Mandate Development and Implementation

Mandates for peace operations set the strategic direction of a mission. However one of the key challenges for the Security Council in designing mandates is minimising the gap between the aspirations of the international community and the realities on the ground.

First and foremost, the Security Council requires information and analysis on the country situation where it may be considering deploying a peace operation. In many instances, peace operations are deployed into contexts
rapidly and with limited time to draw on information about the needs of the country, particularly when it comes to institution-building. Failure to address these gaps from the outset can have long-term implications on the overall success of the mission. This is one of the reasons why the HIPPO Report identified the need to develop a core capacity to provide strategic analysis within the Secretary-General’s office. Such a system-wide capacity could assist in overcoming stovepipes within the system. It could enable the delivery of more timely information for decision-making in the UN system, which provides recommendations to the Security Council ahead of mandate formulation.

Phasing and sequencing aspects of mission mandates would also provide more time for the Security Council to draw on this analysis and match it to the reality of the resources and capabilities available to deploy to a mission (another recommendation in the HIPPO Report). In order to optimise this process, however, the Security Council would need to engage with other major stakeholders that will have responsibility for delivering on the mandate. This should include current and potential troop and police contributing countries as early on in the mandate development process as possible.

Although there are already routine mechanisms in place to facilitate engagement between troop and police contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat in the form of triangular cooperation, these meetings often do not result in a practical and frank exchange among stakeholders. As one panellist noted, if you select troop contributors early enough in the mandating process, then you will have personnel that are aligned with a particular mandate, rather than responding to it. These systems need to be improved in order to establish trust among the stakeholders and ensure that there is not a mismatch between mandates and their implementation.

**Force Generation and Rapid Deployment**

The rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers is essential to consolidating early security gains and setting the conditions for institution-building activities to take place. Yet this is an area where the UN system has historically struggled. New and reconfigured missions in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic have still not generated personnel to meet their authorised

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21 HIPPO Report, pp.60-61.
ceilings of military and police personnel, despite authorisation taking place at least 12 months earlier. These delays are a symptom of problems within the UN system, as well as the political commitment and willingness of troop and police contributing countries to commit in a timely manner to peacekeeping operations. Ad hoc solutions are often the standard approach, despite mechanisms being in place to identify Member State commitments. Planning commonly starts from what is available rather than what is needed. This has to change.

Several recommendations have been proposed in the HIPPO Report to address these challenges, included the development of a UN ‘vanguard’ capability, rapid deployment headquarters, financial and political incentives, specialist support packages, inter-mission cooperation and the use of national and regional standby arrangements. While there are technical aspects to force generation, it is also an inherently political exercise and needs to be approached in that manner. Member States also need to remain engaged in improving the system.

In 2015 there have been several positive developments to improve force generation and rapid deployment. The UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System replaced the UN Standby Arrangements System in July, supported by a Strategic Force Generation Cell in DPKO. Combined with the pledges made at the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, these reforms have the potential to improve force generation to UN peace operations. But it also requires more strategic engagement and commitments from potential troop and police contributors. Pledges at the Summit need to be followed up on and Member States need to be held accountable for their commitments (it was suggested a mapping exercise may assist). Systems that enable Member States to provide short or medium term specialist capabilities during the start-up phase of a mission could act as key enablers, at a time when missions would benefit from early security gains. These could include specialist engineering capabilities, as well as medical and mobility enablers. Triangular partnerships—between the UN Secretariat, a troop contributing country and third country—could support capacity-building in this regard.

Ultimately, if peace operations are going to be most effective in the field in delivering on their mandates and capitalising on early gains from rapid deployment, then these initiatives also need to be supported by reforms to address issues that have an impact on operations in the field. Some of the concerns that were identified included the existing accommodation standards
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(as the use of hardware structures often impede mobility), command and control of military assets (which remain subject to civilian control and standards, limiting their use and effectiveness) and reform of logistics systems (that would allow for better mobility and responsiveness). Improving these processes would enable better delivery on mandated tasks, including protection of civilians (particularly in remote areas), as well as engagement with local communities, which are an essential component of longer-term institution-building.

Leaders’ Peacekeeping Summit – September 2015

A Leaders’ Summit on UN Peacekeeping was held in New York on 28 September 2015. The event was co-hosted by US President Obama and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in cooperation with the Heads of States of Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda and Uruguay. More than 50 world leaders took part in the Summit. The Summit was a follow-up to a similar event in September 2014, which was initiated by US Vice President Biden. It also drew on a series of regional meetings that had been held throughout 2015 in Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Uruguay and Indonesia.

According to the United States, pledges for the event exceeded expectations. These included more than 40,000 military and police personnel, 40 helicopters, 30 infantry units, 15 engineering companies as well as several other high end enablers. The US government utilised the forum to announce that it had developed a new Presidential Directive on peace operations – the first one in over 20 years.

More than 40 countries associated themselves with a political declaration at the Summit in support of UN peacekeeping. In that declaration, countries recommitted themselves to the reform of peace operations; acknowledged that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations was a mutual responsibility among Member States; expressed support for ongoing peacekeeping reform efforts; affirmed support for conduct and discipline and called for an end to sexual exploitation and abuse; underlined that protection of civilians was a shared and solemn responsibility (taking note of the best practices set out in the Kigali Principles); expressed commitment to the safety and security of peacekeepers and acknowledged the critical role of regional and sub-regional organizations in these efforts.

The United Kingdom is expected to host the next annual summit in 2016. Work is also underway within the newly established Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to identify ways to integrate and absorb the pledges and match them against current and future needs in peace operations.
Opportunities for Women, Peace and Security

Participants agreed that the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in peace operations has been mixed over the last 15 years. While there have been significant improvements to the gender responsiveness and capabilities in peace operations, it has not always been a priority.

For example, the HIPPO Report noted that it was often referred to as a ‘women’s issue’ rather than being viewed as a peace and security issue; there was a lack of mission funding to support gender-related activities (which had an operational impact on the ability of missions to engage with the local population); and there was an inconsistent approach among mission leadership to the issue (which could affect prioritisation). Similarly, the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 noted that much of the progress that had been achieved in implementing the UNSCR 1325 agenda had been measured in a series of ‘firsts’ rather than ‘standard practice’. In the context of peace operations, the study recommended that the gender divisions of DPKO and DPA be strengthened, and that there should be a D1 level gender adviser in the office of every Special Representative of the Secretary-General in a mission, complementing some of the recommendations in the HIPPO Report.

Member States have a particularly important role in supporting the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Several countries have developed national action plans and strategies for the domestic context. Some argued that these national commitments are a signal that a country is willing to lead on the issue internationally. This was particularly important in the context of peace operations, where the UN relies on Member States to offer female military and police personnel to peace operations. This requires countries to have national strategies increasing the recruitment and retention of women into these security fields. Increasing the number of uniformed female peacekeepers remains an ongoing challenge and one entirely dependent on the support of Member States to operationalise.

Several participants noted that the UN has the ability to be a leader on the issue of women, peace and security. The Security Council has articulated a substantive normative framework to guide these processes. But it requires leadership and political commitment to implement these recommendations, something which is often lacking, at least at senior levels in peace operations.

23 Global Study on UNSCR 1325, p.17
One of the recommendations emerging from the HIPPO Report was that leadership compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of mission consequently specify performance indicators in relation to gender.²⁴

Nevertheless, regardless of any political commitment to implement the women, peace and security agenda, the real determinant is often in the provision of funding and resources for missions. Gender units in the UN Secretariat need to be adequately resourced to provide support to gender advisers in the field, as well as to develop policy, guidance and training materials to support peace operations in carrying out these tasks. Peace operations also need advice integrated across different components in the field to ensure that approaches to cross-cutting issues such as SSR, DDR, rule of law and governance, and POC, are inclusive and gender-sensitive. Similarly, missions need more female personnel in their military, police and civilian components to facilitate engagement with women across a range of fields and within local communities. Rather than being viewed as a peripheral issue, such approaches need to be integrated more comprehensively into mission planning, analysis and force generation as a core capability requirement.

If these reforms were embraced by Member States, then they have a real opportunity to ensure that peace operations are more responsive to gender needs and more inclusive of women. This in turn would support the ability of UN peace operations to develop sustainable and inclusive institutions, which are critical to preventing relapse into conflict.

Engaging Member States on Peace Operations Reform

Member State support is critical to any effort or initiative to reform peace operations. The recommendations emerging from the HIPPO Report and other reviews have been directed at a range of stakeholders, both within and external to the UN system and external to it. Different aspects of each of the reviews will be considered separately within different UN executive, legislative, financial and policy bodies. In the case of the HIPPO Report, the Security Council, Fifth Committee, Fourth Committee and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) are all expected to engage in debate and discussion around the recommendations that should be implemented.

Some reforms will be easier than others to implement, which was in part reflected in the recommendations that the Secretary-General chose to take

²⁴ HIPPO Report, pp.80-81.
forward in his Report in response to the HIPPO Report. As one panellist noted, those reforms that were not picked up in the Secretary-General’s Report need to be noted and considered as well. Some issues identified in this regard include addressing recruitment processes among civilian staff, command and control issues related to military assets, the recruitment of leaders (which is not an entirely independent nor impartial process), procurement process reform and a more robust approach to enforcing accountability in addressing sexual exploitation and abuse. These initiatives need to be pushed by Member States. It also requires the UN Secretariat to be forthright in identifying reforms that are urgently needed.

For most troop and police contributing countries, the C-34 session in 2016 presents an opportunity to identify areas of consensus on the HIPPO Report for potential implementation. It was agreed that the process would not be easy and that there would be resistance to many of the proposed reforms. But it is an important process in ensuring that peacekeeping continues to have the political consensus and support that is needed to be most effective as a partnership.

Global Study on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)

The adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1325 was a landmark development in the year 2000, recognising that the participation of women and inclusion of gender perspectives were critical to the maintenance international of peace and security. At the time of the Forum, the Security Council had adopted six further resolutions on women and peace and security (resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106 and 2122).

Resolution 2122 (adopted in 2013) invited the UN Secretary-General to conduct a review on the implementation of resolution 1325 in the 15 years since its adoption. Led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the High-level Advisory Group for the study commissioned research papers and conducted a series of consultations and surveys to support the review.

The Report was released in September 2015. It noted that significant developments have taken place globally in the time since resolution 1325 was adopted. However, while significant normative progress has taken place to advance the agenda, implementation is still yet to become standard practice.

As requested in resolution 2122, the Secretary-General reported back on the findings of the Global Study as part the annual report on report on women, peace and security to the Security Council.
Role of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)

The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) has a central role in facilitating discussions among Member States on peacekeeping, particularly troop and police contributing countries. It was established in 1964 by the UN General Assembly and as of 2015, had 147 members, as well as observers such as the African Union and NATO.

Members of the C-34 negotiate an annual report each year on a range of peacekeeping issues, providing a series of requests and recommendations to the UN Secretariat and wider membership on peacekeeping policy. The Secretary-General reports back to the C-34 every year, with an update on how requests have progressed. Meetings of the C-34 are often convened throughout the year to facilitate briefings and discussions with officials on peacekeeping developments in the field or to present reports or policies.

The remit and objectives of the C-34 have not always been clear. It is generally tasked—on an annual basis—to make a comprehensive review of all aspects of peacekeeping operations. However differences on approach in terms of negotiating the annual report brought the committee to complete gridlock in 2013. In many ways, this development was reflective of broader disagreements and challenges that were plaguing UN peacekeeping operations more broadly.

It is unclear how the C-34 may decide to take up the issues raised in the HIPPO Report during its deliberations over the annual report in 2016. Some have suggested that the C-34 should seek to consider the HIPPO Report as a whole and avoid approaches that will select some recommendations over others. Yet this is likely to create a challenge, as some of the issues discussed in the Report are not directly relevant to the deliberations of the committee (e.g. Special Political Missions). Regardless of the approach by Member States, early ongoing engagement and communication between the UN Secretariat, the Chair of the Working Group (Canada’s Deputy Permanent Representative) and members of the committee will be critical to maintaining momentum and ensuring the C-34 has a constructive role in supporting the implementation of recommendations in the HIPPO Report. Member States will also need to be cognisant of the recommendations in the other reviews—namely of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the Global Study on SCR 1325 – which present some issues for consideration in terms of UN peacekeeping policy.
3. Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Current Trends, Opportunities and Challenges

Background Paper: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, ‘Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative’; Chair: Mr Amr Aljowaily, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for United Nations Affairs, Egypt; Panellists: H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; Mr Stefan Feller, Police Adviser, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; Ms Sarah Hearn, Associate Director, Senior Fellow, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom; Dr Alexander Tsinker, President of the International Expert Center for Electoral Systems, Director for East European States and Commonwealth of Independent States Institute, Israel.

The concept of peacebuilding within the UN system was addressed in each of the three reviews taking place in 2015. In addition to the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding Architecture—which focused exclusively on challenges and opportunities to reform the UN’s peacebuilding architecture 10 years after its founding—the HIPPO and UNSCR 1325 Reports both addressed the concept of peacebuilding within their respective mandates. The report card on the UN’s efforts to address peacebuilding needs was not entirely positive. While there had been some success in the last decade to improve the UN’s investment in peacebuilding, there were also gaping holes in the UN’s organizational approach to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding was often considered as an ‘afterthought’. This resulted not only from systemic institutional challenges, but more importantly, from a misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding.

Discussions in this session focused on a range of areas where the UN should concentrate its efforts to support peacebuilding, particularly in the context of peace operations. This included a need to work more specifically on conflict prevention (a finding shared by the peacebuilding review and HIPPO Report); invest adequately in capacities that support institution-building such as policing; and foster national ownership and engagement with local communities and civil societies to support peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots.
UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2015

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review is in progress following a request by the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council. The review marks 10 years since the establishment of some of the key institutional bodies on peacebuilding, namely the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

The review process is intended to involve two stages. In the first stage, the Secretary-General appointed an Advisory Group of Experts to prepare a review report. That Report was released in June 2015 and was considered as part of the comprehensive discussions during the Challenges Annual Forum. The second stage underway involves an inter-governmental process, co-facilitated by the Permanent Representatives of Australia and Angola to the United Nations.

The Review that was finalised in June 2015 reminds the UN and its Member States that sustaining peace is amongst the core tasks outlined in the UN Charter and therefore, must be the principle that flows through all of the organization’s engagement rather than being marginalised. The urgency for the UN to systematically address the fragmentation between the actors who hold the many pieces of the peacebuilding puzzles is emphasised. The Review introduces a wider, broader and deeper comprehensive concept of ‘sustaining peace’ as absolutely fundamental for the UN to address the changing global and increasingly complex and volatile context for conflict and peacebuilding. It also assesses the UN’s achievements in this area thus far, and presents concrete proposal for how to:

- Promote coherence at the intergovernmental level;
- improve the peacebuilding capability of the United Nations system;
- partner for sustaining peace;
- secure more predictable peacebuilding financing; and
- improve leadership and broaden inclusion.

Peacebuilding Concepts and Tools

Peacebuilding is a complex concept with different interpretations among the various actors involved. There is the notion of peacebuilding as a broad concept—a part of the ‘arc’ that stretches from conflict prevention, to peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Then there is the peacebuilding architecture, which includes institutional
entities established as part of the outcomes of the World Summit in 2005, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). However, as the Report on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture noted, the architecture is much broader than just these entities. Then there are some of the tools which assist in mobilising efforts in support of peacebuilding, including peacekeeping operations, special political missions, envoys of the Secretary-General, as well as the funds, programs and agencies that make up the UN Country Teams. Many of those institutional tools are supported by Member States through the contribution of personnel (military, police and civilians), financial support to UN entities, as well as donor support through bilateral relationships with the host country and the engagement of regional and sub-regional organizations.

Peacekeeping is one of the most utilised tools at the disposal of the Security Council to support early peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. The Council has significant influence over the timing and prioritisation of tasks that may support early peacebuilding activities, such as the authorised levels of police personnel and the engagement of peace operations in tasks that support early peacebuilding such as the rule of law, SSR, DDR, as well as the deployment of gender and women protection advisors. Yet peacebuilding efforts can be supported at a much earlier stage by the Security Council and the Secretary-General if there was a more concerted effort to draw on early warning and preventive tools.

**Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy**

Conflict prevention is at the core of the UN’s work. Preventive diplomacy today is conducted by a broad array of actors and tools. As several participants noted, the UN Charter provides authority to draw on, with Chapter VI referring to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Furthermore, some of that authority is entrusted to the Secretary-General through articles 98 and 99 of the UN Charter, which provide authority to bring matters which may threaten international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. In practice, there are several different mechanisms in the UN system that can be drawn on to support conflict prevention offices. These include the appointment of envoys through the Secretary-General’s good offices, and field presences such as UN regional offices and special political missions (which is a term also used to broadly capture all of the aforementioned
conflict prevention tools). Each of these mechanisms can act independently in preventive diplomacy efforts working with Member States and regional organizations, or in many cases, work alongside and in support of the work of UN peacekeeping missions.

Regional offices perform an important role in preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts. The UN currently has three regional offices: the United Nations for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia. These regional offices are usually led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and are often established at the initiative of the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Security Council. For example, the Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia was established in 2007 in parallel with the closure of the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding and became operational in 2008. It supports the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in building conflict prevention capacities. The centre works to build trust among Member States to enhance international partnerships to counter terrorism and violent extremism, drug-trafficking and other forms of transnational organised crime.

The mandates for regional offices can vary but they often broadly support a range of initiatives intended to support preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. They can facilitate discrete consultations with Member States and regional organizations in situations of emerging conflict. For example, the United Nations for the Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia played an important role during the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The HIPPO Report recommended the establishment of further regional offices, in consultation with Member States, noting the value these offices can provide to conflict prevention and mediation. The Secretary-General has expressed his interest in establishing further offices in North Africa, West Asia and Southern Africa. Like the offices already established in West and Central Africa, if utilised effectively, further offices have the potential to assist regional coordination in support of the work of UN peace operations, particularly when it comes to addressing transnational and cross-border threats.

25 HIPPO Report, p.36.
26 United Nations, Overall Policy Matters Pertaining to Special Political Missions, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/400, 30 September 2015.
Regional organizations can also complement the work of UN mechanisms when it comes to preventive diplomacy. One example that was noted was the work that the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is undertaking in Nagorno Karabakh. The OSCE supports the activities of the Minsk Group, which is intended to find a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. As one panellist noted, it is important that there is an understanding of which organizations are leading these negotiations and how they are facilitating these processes. While efforts to find a political solution to the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh remain ongoing, it demonstrates that regional organizations can complement the work of the UN when it comes to conflict prevention efforts, with such organizations often having a better understanding of the regional dynamics and political concerns involved.

In addition to the work on regional approaches, the UN also has the ability to deploy other special political missions (SPMs) that can support peacebuilding activities. As the HIPPO Report noted, these tools fall within the full spectrum of UN peace operations, providing for a broader continuum of responses, particularly when it comes to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. In many cases, some SPMs have military and police components deployed, albeit in much smaller numbers and usually in advisory capacities, but they can undertake many of the same tasks when it comes to political engagement, capacity-building and conflict prevention. Furthermore, SPMs often perform a critical role either following the conclusion of a peace agreement, or as the follow-on operation after the draw-down of a peacekeeping operation. They may also be deployed alongside a regional peace or multilateral operation to provide political support. In this regard, and as the Secretary-General has noted, they often have core peacebuilding mandates. In drawing lessons on the engagement of UN peace operations, SPMs provide a lot of lessons. Efforts should be made to draw more extensively on these lessons, beyond discussions over technical and financial support—which although important—distract from the broader value of a more streamlined approach when it comes to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

27 UN, Overall Policy Matters Pertaining to Special Political Missions, A/70/400, 2015.
Police and Capacity-building

Police play a central role in peacebuilding in the context of UN peace operations. They manage public safety, protect the civilian population, build the capacity of national police, and in extreme situations may undertake executive policing functions. Even more importantly in today’s evolving global environment, they contribute to efforts to address transnational threats, terrorism and violent extremism. Yet despite their consistent engagement in UN peace operations for more than 50 years, there are still challenges in setting consistent standards and recruiting appropriately qualified personnel—both formed police units (FPUs) and individual police officers (UNPOL). These impediments have an impact on the ability of peace operations to support longer-term peacebuilding efforts, particularly when it comes to protecting civilians, capacity-building and coordination to build nationally resilient police services.

Efforts are underway within the Secretariat to better guide the work of UN policing. The first layer of work involves the development of a Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) on policing. One of the aims of the framework
is to support the work of police components in multilateral operations to enhance sustainable peacebuilding efforts. The value of this framework was recognised by the UN Security Council, with the adoption of the first policing resolution in 2014 (resolution 2185). The first component of this framework was completed in 2014 with the issuance of the Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. The DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Guidelines on Policy and Capacity Building provide further instruction to support police components in their efforts to undertake capacity-building. Several participants noted that the framework links to longer-term efforts to build sustainable peace, particularly the aims of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. However, one of the key challenges for the operationalisation of the framework will be funding to support its implementation. For this reason, the HIPPO Report stressed not only the importance of finalising the framework to provide policy and guidance on core policing functions, but also to ensure that there are proposals for resources to address its implementation.

Police perform a fundamental role in building trust and confidence among the local community and with national authorities. As one panellist subsequently noted, windows of opportunity for building trust open and close, therefore they need to be acted upon when they arise. Strength and accountability of institutions can often be the most significant factor in the onset of further violence. One way UN police build trust among the local community is through providing protection (in cases where the national police authorities are unwilling or unable to do so). For example, in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UNPOL is tasked with providing security to the more than 180,000 civilians currently residing in POC sites across the country. However, their primary role is usually to work with the national authorities to build the capacity of the local police and law enforcement services and ensure they meet the highest standards possible.

Building the capacity of national police and law enforcement institutions is a highly political process as it touches upon many aspects of national sovereignty. Efforts may be undermined by a difficult relationship with the host government, as demonstrated by the events in South Sudan, where UNMISS withdrew most of its capacity-building engagement due to the outbreak of civil war. Furthermore, UN police are often confronted with corruption, serious and organized crime, collapsed rule of law institutions and terrorism or other forms of globalised crime. This requires not only the right expertise and ability to transfer knowledge, but also listening
to national counterparts about their needs in order to support national ownership of the process. It takes at least two generations to change rule of law institutions, therefore the work of UN police needs to be built on thorough foundations, with the support of the peace operations as well as other stakeholders such as bilateral donors. Coordination, particularly in terms of prioritised and sustainable funding support, is critical to ensuring police reform remains sustainable after a mission has transitioned or exited from the country. The external review of the UN Police Division—requested by the Secretary General to inform his 2016 Report on UN policing—is likely to formulate further recommendations to support the activities of headquarters in guiding the work of UNPOL components in the field. 

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**UN Guidelines on Police and Capacity-building**

The DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Police and Capacity-building were issued on 1 April 2015. The guidelines are intended to ‘spell out the fundamental principles and approaches to police capacity-building and development in post-conflict countries and other crisis situations. The Guidelines form the first set of subsidiary guidance below the DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.

The guidelines identify a series of fundamental principles for police components, namely:

- ‘Win multi-party, cross societal consensus on police reform’
- ‘Put the host state government and police in the lead’
- ‘Address behaviours, build a culture of accountability’
- ‘Broaden reform beyond police: justice and corrections’
- ‘Insist on standards and benchmarks’
- ‘Comprehensive integration of women’s rights and gender equality commitments’
- ‘Praise and encourage but do not shy away from critical feedback’

Building on these fundamental principles, the guidelines outline a series of processes to undertake police capacity-building and development.

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29 A Challenges Forum Workshop hosted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the UN DPKO Police Division on UN Policing and Capacity-building and Development in March 2014 resulted in these first thematic guidelines of the Strategic Guidance Framework.
The planned 2016 conference of Member State Police Chiefs may provide a further opportunity to generate awareness, commitments and financial support for the work of UN police in peace operations.

**Broad and Inclusive National Ownership**

Any effort to undertake peacebuilding in a country emerging from conflict needs to be nationally owned and inclusive across society. The Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding Architecture noted that ‘inclusive national ownership’ was a ‘critical determinant of success’ in peacebuilding. But the Report also noted that there can be risks to acceding to processes which encourage national ownership which is led by the government, to the exclusion of other groups. National ownership therefore incorporates not only the views or priorities of the host government, but those of the wider community. This is why the Report argued for ‘inclusive national ownership’, which entails ‘participation by community groups, women’s platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and civil society, including under-represented groups’. For the UN system, this means supporting efforts to ‘broaden ownership’, with efforts to engage civil society, youth and women, and to utilise tools to enhance communication, including social media.

One of the capacities available to UN peace operations to facilitate national ownership is the deployment of civil affairs officers and community liaison assistants. The UN Secretariat is currently undertaking a series of projects in conjunction with peace operations to draw on lessons and identify ways that civil affairs can support local and national consultations in support of peacebuilding. This includes a project examining how to engage civil society, as well as another looking at what role peace operations should be undertaking when it comes to extending state authority (if any). Further analysis is also underway on the value of community liaisons assistants (CLAs). CLAs are nationals that are usually recruited from the communities where a peacekeeping mission is engaging. Preliminary findings from that review suggest that CLAs are an incredibly useful resource to peace operations, particularly in terms of improving understanding and awareness about local community needs. Such activities act as a useful bridge to inform how peace operations might enhance inclusive national ownership in support of peacebuilding activities.

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30 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture Report, p.8
Beyond the granular discussion of resources that support national ownership, participants also examined the relationship between the newly adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and how these can support peacebuilding efforts by UN peace operations. The SDGs build on the Millennium Development Goals and identify a series of targets to be achieved by 2030. One of the strengths of the process that led to the adoption of the SDGs is that it was led by developing countries. This ownership is particularly important given that it is those countries that will have responsibility for taking forward the goals, with the support of the international community.

**Sustainable Development Goals**

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in September 2015 by UN Member States after several years of preparations and negotiations. The ‘2030 Agenda’ is intended to address a range of challenges that threaten sustainable development. It includes 17 SDGs and 169 targets as part of the ambitious agenda for implementation over the next 15 years.

The ‘2030 agenda’ sets out a series of mechanisms for implementation, with targets identified under each of the 17 goals. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (financing for sustainable development) is intended to form an integral part of the implementation process. In terms of follow-up and monitoring, this is expected to be a nationally-led and owned process, guided by a set of global indicators under development, with reporting from the Secretary-General and the UN system, and with regular high-level political engagement through the General Assembly (every four years).

The SDGs build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and address those aspects that remain unfinished. The MDGs were adopted in the year 2000 and were intended to provide a framework for development, with a series of targets to be met by 2015. However, progress was uneven in some places (e.g. Africa and other developing countries) and many targets were not on track to be met. The SDGs are aimed to address some aspects that the MDGs failed to achieve.

Of the 17 SDGs adopted, goal 16 is of most direct relevance to the work of UN peace operations, stating: ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.’
Importantly, the SDGs recognise the interrelated nature of peace, security and development. SDG 16 calls for peace, justice and strong institutions. There were some fears that the inclusion of this goal represented a militarisation of development. However, while there is no expectation that the peace and security system (including UN peace operations) will lead on it, SDG16 provides an opportunity to ensure that peace agreements align national priorities with these goals. It was noted that 1.5 billion people currently live in fragile states, and if progress was made on SDG 16, then that number could be brought down to only 300 million by 2030.
4. Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus

Institution-building forms a central part of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Developing effective, trusted and legitimate state institutions can enable the host government to uphold its responsibility to protect the civilian population and support the maintenance of peace and security in a country. But the concept of institution-building is complex and there are many different understandings of how it may be undertaken in the context of UN peace operations.

There has been some analysis of the role of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders. In 2011, the DPKO and the DFS developed a strategy on the contribution of UN peacekeeping to early peacebuilding, noting that peacekeepers brought several comparative advantages to early peacebuilding efforts. The strategy identified that peacekeepers supporting early peacebuilding had three key roles – ‘to articulate, enable and implement peacebuilding goals’. What this means in practice is that peacekeepers (1) advance the political objectives of the peace process; (2) provide security for other actors undertaking peacebuilding tasks to operate; and (3) lay the foundations for longer-term institution-building.31 It is this third role where

peacekeepers have the most direct engagement in support of institution-building.

Throughout the discussions in this session, participants identified a range of issues emerging from the three high-level reviews of 2015 that required further consideration in the context of institution-building. These included taking a more ‘people-centered’ approach to peacekeeping, developing state-society relations (as a means to support extending state authority), balancing short-term security demands with longer-term peacebuilding needs (in the context of mission start-up, transition and draw-down), identifying and mobilising the right skills and capabilities, and developing a range of partnerships to support institution-building efforts.

**Institution-building: Interpretations Across the Three Reviews**

The high-level reviews that have taken place in 2015 have provided an opportunity to re-examine the role of UN peacekeeping in institution-building. Each of the reviews identified a series of lessons learned and good practice that can be drawn on in improving the efforts of UN missions to undertake institution-building.

The HIPPO Report acknowledged that efforts to build sustainable state institutions are a long-term generational effort. It identified seven deficits when it comes to sustaining peace: the wrong mind-set (i.e., not responding to the needs of the country); failure to respect nationally owned priorities; supply-driven templates with technical approaches to reform efforts; failure to plan for the fiscal dimension; a focus on the capital and elites instead of those groups core to the peace process (e.g., ex-militias, ex-rebels and displaced persons); and failure to adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach which supports nationally-led reconciliation efforts and trust-building. These ‘deficits’ provide important lessons for the work of UN peace operations in supporting institution-building. In this context, the HIPPO Report offered a ‘cautionary note’ on what can be expected of UN peace operations when it comes to institution-building.

The importance of long-term and sustainable investment in institution-building efforts is also emphasised in the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding Architecture. The Report stated that damage

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32 Smith, 2015.
33 Smith, 2015.
to institutions often results from protracted violent conflict that ‘deepens social cleavages’. This is why institution-building is not only central to peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, but to long-term international efforts to promote development and sustainability as well. It is also why the Report noted the importance of institution-building in the 2015 Development Agenda, with Sustainable Development Goal 16 calling upon the international community to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, inclusive and accountable institutions at all levels’.

Similar themes are identified in the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The Study recognised the need for women to participate and engage in early peacebuilding efforts, as well as institutions such as the security sector. Failure to include women or consider gender perspectives in institution-building activities would result in institutions that fail to be representative and inclusive of the wider population, ultimately undermining their effectiveness in support of peace. The Study subsequently identified a range of targets to improve the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, including in the context of UN peace operations, with many recommendations also being picked up in those respective reviews.

One consistent aspect across all the reviews was the important role that the Security Council has in articulating the strategic direction of peace operations, particularly when it comes to institution- and capacity-building. As the background paper noted, the earliest reference to these tasks in a peacekeeping mandate can be traced back to resolution 1244 for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Some mandates, such as those in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, have included executive mandates which enabled the missions to carry out executive functions of the local authorities. Of the currently 16 deployed peacekeeping missions, it was found that there were at least 64 mandated tasks that related to capacity- or institution-building. These include functions that provide some form of support to national border control, rule of law, justice and corrections, SSR and DDR, elections, national human rights institutions, extension of state authority and local governance, administration of natural resources, national dialogue and reconciliation and resettlement and internally-displaced persons (see Table 1).

34 Report on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, p.27.
35 Smith, 2015.
36 Smith, 2015.
The UN system has developed a range of policy, guidance and training materials to support a number of these activities in peace operations. Nonetheless, the UN system still faces a number of fundamental challenges when it comes to supporting efforts to build sustainable, inclusive and resilient institutions in conflict-affected countries where it has a peace operation deployed. Some of these challenges relate to issues such as maintaining the consent of the host state while simultaneously trying to work with the host authorities to undertake institution-building activities. In some instances, missions are deployed into an environment where the conflict has not yet been resolved and efforts to undertake reconciliation are in their infancy. These contexts demonstrate that any effort to undertake institution-building is inherently political and needs to be approached in this manner.

Table 1. Extracted from Leanne Smith, ‘Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Peace and Security Nexus’, Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION-BUILDING MANDATE</th>
<th>MANDATED PEACEKEEPING MISSION</th>
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<td>Mandated Peacekeeping Mission</td>
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<td>National Border Control/Customs/Coastguard</td>
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<td>Rule of Law: Police, Corrections, Judiciary</td>
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<td>SSR and DDR</td>
<td>UNMIL, ONUCI, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSTAH</td>
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<td>Electoral Institutions</td>
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<td>National Human Rights Institutions</td>
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<td>Extension of State Authority/Local Administration/Governance</td>
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<td>National Dialogue and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>Resettlement and Internally Displaced People</td>
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Taking a ‘People-centered’ Approach

There needs to be a paradigm shift in the way that peace operations engage with people if they are to have a more effective approach to institution-building. The HIPPO Report recommended four major shifts to improve the effectiveness of peace operations: the centrality of politics, the need for a flexible approach, a stronger and more inclusive partnership and the need for a more field-focused and people-centered approach. Many participants agreed with the need for the UN to shift its focus to the field and the needs of the local populations, particularly if peace operations were going to be more effective in supporting institution-building efforts.

One challenge is that the needs of the local population are often overlooked when it comes to planning and implementing institution-building programs. There is commonly a mismatch between what the local needs are and the programs that are put in place to support them. This may be due to a lack of communication and understanding. But more often, it is because peacekeepers and the mission deploy into a country with pre-conceived ideas and templates for what is needed. This can result in waste and generate ineffectual results. For example, when equipping local government offices, there is no point attempting to install computers if the locals do not have a reliable source of electricity. If the locals request type-writers, then there is a probably a very good reason for it.

Despite commitments within the UN system to develop national and local ownership, there is often a fundamental failure when it comes to operationalising it. Part of the challenge is identifying who speaks for the people. The obvious assumption will often be the government. But in instances where there is an outbreak of civil war (eg South Sudan) or a transitional government in a society still in conflict (eg Central African Republic), these views are not necessarily representative of the entire population. This requires a much more concerted effort from peace operations to engage the widest range of people at all levels of society in discussions about institution-building. This needs to take place at strategic, operational and tactical levels. One way to address this challenge might be the establishment of advisory boards between different stakeholders to engage with the mission. These should involve locals rather than just consulting them and should facilitate processes that enable local communities to identify their own solutions.
There is a need to ensure that missions are focused on how to support those who they are mandated to support and assist, ensuring that any progress is assessed against how it affects the lives of those affected by the conflict. This is also particularly important in efforts to develop strategies to protect civilians. In many instances, communities may already have a strong resilience for protecting themselves, so missions should ensure they do not come with pre-conceived ideas about the needs of the local population. But it also requires the mission to be engaged and ask the communities whether they feel safe. It is an ongoing process of monitoring and assessment. The needs of the local population must be at the centre of the process. It also requires engagement at all levels in support of decision-making. National professional staff— which may include civil affairs officers and community liaison assistants—can perform an important role in these efforts.

Structural and systemic challenges also need to be addressed if peace operations are going to be more people-centered in approach. As one panellist noted, donor and institution goals often take higher priority than local needs. These present challenges in situations where elections are set to external timetables (rather than against progress of reconciliation or political dialogue), programs are delivered on external donor timeframes (rather than at a pace that may be required by the local community) and training programs are quite often developed based on the capability of the supplier (rather than the needs and requirements on the ground). As the panellist went on to note, efforts need to be made to address these ‘covert’ challenges, within mission leadership which can provide some flexibility to implementation of programs. Member States can adopt practices which focus on local needs and provide some flexibility when providing donor support and training programs. In instances where systemic challenges cannot be addressed, then communication and expectation management among the local community can assist with mitigating some concerns.

Participants agreed with the importance of placing people at the centre of peace operations. As one panellist noted, if this approach were institutionalised it could fundamentally change how we do peace operations. But this requires a shift from a box-ticking attitude of consulting to involving local communities in efforts to plan, prepare and implement institution-building programs. It needs to draw on the strengths that already exist among national organizations, civil society and local communities. In addition, it requires a re-orientation at the systemic level, as well as among the attitudes of peacekeepers deployed on the ground.
Extending State-Society Relations

Peacekeeping operations are only deployed with the consent of the host authorities. But the relationship with the host government in many peace operation contexts is challenging and difficult. For example, in theory missions are meant to have freedom of movement to undertake their operations as part of the Status of Forces Agreement in a country. But some host governments will interfere with this operational freedom, imposing a series of access restrictions (e.g., South Sudan). In other cases, the host authority may be transitional and be viewed by some parties to the conflict as an illegitimate representative for the mission to be engaging with (e.g., Central African Republic). In these situations the host government is often not representative of many of the different groups which may act as spoilers.

Peace operations are often mandated to support the extension of state authority through tasks such as assisting the state with its responsibility to protect civilians or building the capacity of its security sector. However, this focus often ignores efforts to develop a healthy relationship within the country among the state and other actors of society. It also means investment is focused on building the capacity of state institutions, particularly at the national level, often at the expense of local mechanisms which may have a more significant role in facilitating conflict resolution and resolving disputes that fuel ongoing conflict. This led to a discussion among participants on the value of shifting focus from extending state authority to extending state-society relations.

Converging on extending state-society relations could have several benefits. Institution-building often takes many generations, beyond the life-cycle of the presence of a peace operations or other UN field presences. Facilitating the development of a strong relationship between the state, civil society and local communities may strengthen the resilience of institutions if there is relapse into conflict or a crisis in the country or another form of setback. It may also ensure that institutions are more representative of the local community, including different ethnic groups, ex-combatants, civil society and women. By supporting more consultation between the state and different parts of the society, the peace operation will be facilitating the building of trust in the institutions which are intended to protect and represent the people. This is particularly important in ensuring that institution-building efforts are sustainable and likely to extend beyond the life-cycle of a mission.

In addition to strengthening the resilience of institutions, focusing on state-
society relations may also help shift the mind-set of peace operations to prioritise engagement efforts at the sub-national and local level. While there have been efforts to de-centralise the activities of peace operations to sub-national levels (eg during the establishment of UNMISS), the international community, regional organizations and donors have tended to focus their efforts on reform of the national institutions.

By shifting the focus down to the sub-national and local level, actors could assist in addressing some of the root causes of the conflicts, which are often more localised and based on local grievances. In order for this to be most effective, peace operations will need to be resourced adequately with capacities such as civil affairs officers to support this engagement and activities and to develop plans on how to work with local communities in developing institutions that provide security, justice, governance and services. In the long-term, such shifts in focus may provide peace operations with greater latitude to continue undertaking some institution-building activities if the national authorities become difficult to engage or unfavourable partners to work with. This is particularly important if the mission presence is required to continue providing critical support to protect the civilian population (as it did in South Sudan). Such activities may also contribute to efforts to resolve conflict at the national level.

Identifying and Mobilising Needed Skills and Capabilities

Effective institution-building in the context of peace operations requires personnel that have the right skills and capabilities. However, the personnel that are often deployed to peace operations do not have the necessary capabilities to transfer skills, deliver training or provide support through project services and management. Assuming technical proficiency equates to being able to deliver capacity-building programs remains a problem in peace operations when it comes to institution-building. There is often a tendency to hire people for the skills they have, rather than their ability to transfer them.

In the context of policing, it is often assumed that experience in community policing means personnel are qualified to build policing institutions from scratch, when in reality this requires expertise in governance, administration and regulatory functions. This was a lesson learned by UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Towards the end of the mission, the police component there recruited many non-uniformed staff into the
police component to work on legislative reform, donor coordination, gender-responsiveness and monitoring and evaluation. This enabled a more consistent and sustainable approach to institutional-building. Another lesson was when someone who had been recruited to run the local power station in order to transfer knowledge to the local Timorese, decided they were not going to help the locals as in their view the locals did not have the skills needed.

Part of the problem is that needs are not being clearly identified or they are being driven by supply rather than demand. Missions need to analyse the requirements of the host country (in consultation with local actors) and identify the resources and capabilities required. The focus in the start-up phase of peace operations tends to be on security needs (ie military and police capabilities) instead of peacebuilding activities. This is partly due to the focus of the UN Security Council, which has a tendency to ensure that security factors are addressed as a matter of priority, particularly in contexts where civilians are under threat from physical violence. This results in more focus on generating resources such as military contingents or formed police units, rather than specialised civilian capacities.

If institution-building is going to be effective from the outset of a peace operation, there needs to be adequate attention on civilian staffing needs during planning and start-up phases. This is particularly important as civilian capabilities are often in short supply (particularly from Member States) or recruitment processes can take several months to identify and hire the best qualified person. Identifying qualified national staff, particularly at the sub-national level, may also take considerable time and even then, it may be difficult to identify individuals that meet the recruitment profile. For example, MINUSCA has had difficulty recruiting community liaison assistants at the sub-national level, as there are few (if any) people from the immediate region who meet the education profile for the positions. In order to address some of these challenges, missions need to have more flexibility to generate the personnel required to undertake institution-building from the earliest phase of the mission. It is also important for missions to ensure they are hiring people who are prepared and willing to transfer their skills and knowledge to the local population, acknowledging that it is a long-term investment.
Balancing Short-term and Long-term Approaches

Many recent peace operations have been authorised or reconfigured in a very short period of time to protect the civilian population. The immediate priority is on providing security to civilians to protect them from threats of physical violence. But the UN Security Council has often recognised the need to address some capacity-building aspects in the early phases of the mission, including mainly a range of templated tasks such as SSR and DDR. Nonetheless, the routine mandate cycle has previously meant that mandate were not reviewed for close to a year, unless there was a period of crisis. Given that many missions are planned quickly, this has meant mission mandates have been developed with minimal local consultations (aside from a brief technical assessment mission) meaning they are often not well configured to support longer-term capacity-building efforts.

This is one of the reasons that the HIPPO Report recommended the Security Council consider the use of phased and sequenced mandates in its approach to peace operations. A phased mandate would give the Council time (eg six months) to re-visit the initial mandate after further analysis of the requirements on the ground, ensuring it is adjusted to address the needs of the local population and support institution-building efforts. Similarly, sequencing tasks in the mandate would provide broader strategic direction from the Council on the priorities of the mission when it comes to providing security and supporting capacity-building activities. Several participants noted that this model was worth further consideration and noted that it was an approach that was likely to be adopted in the upcoming revision of UNMISS’ mandate. But it was also noted that the nature of mandating peace operations presents challenges when it comes to institution-building.

Institution-building by its nature requires long-term investment. Yet this often conflicts with the short-term cycle of peace operation mandates. Most mandates are re-authorised annually, with requests for the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on progress against mandate implementation ranging from four months to annually. This typically means that mandate cycles place a premium on activities, rather than on long-term goals or objectives (which may take years). For example, in Liberia, this approach meant that there was repeated focus on delivering the same activities to deliver short-term results, rather than on addressing some of the complex institution-building issues, including a more cohesive legislative

38 HIPPO Report, p. 48.
and regulatory framework. As one panellist noted, short-term demands often took priority over long-term viability, meaning projects would often be unsustainable for the national police service. It was argued that if the long-term challenges had been addressed in Liberia—such as developing legal and regulatory frameworks, establishing civilian oversight of the police service and building sustainable corporate services—then the lifespan of UNMIL may have been shortened. Shifting focus from activities to impact, with a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, could improve the institution-building approach of peacekeeping missions and their efforts to focus on long-term goals.

**Value of Different Partnerships**

Partnerships are critical to institution-building, given the long-term support and investment required from various stakeholders. Peace operations are one of many actors involved in institution-building activities—and often only in the early phase of the process. In order for peace operations to be effective in providing support, they need to ensure their activities are coordinated with the UN Country Team, which is often better positioned to develop long-term programs in the country. Furthermore, there is a need to coordinate efforts among Member States and donors to ensure that there is a coherent and comprehensive approach to programs that deliver sustainable results. This is particularly important as peace operations begin to enter a transition and draw-down phase, as demonstrated by recent developments in Liberia. Failure to develop strong partnerships among the stakeholders risks undermining early gains and successes in establishing the foundations of institution-building.

Institution-building efforts also require engagement and support beyond the peace operations. Regional organizations—such as the African Union, European Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian States, for example—have an important role to perform in supporting these efforts, whether through coordinating and generating resources, or leading the deployment of a mission. As previously noted, in some cases, regional or sub-regional organizations may be better placed than the UN to deploy personnel and expertise to a country for peacekeeping or peacebuilding support, drawing on local resources and knowledge.

Recent UN peace operations in Mali and the Central African Republic have
taken over AU-led operations, demonstrating the importance of ensuring there is cooperation and continuity between both organizations when it comes to analysis, planning and deployment. Some participants suggested that the UN did not take over in Mali and the Central African Republic because it brought comparative advantages, but simply because those missions required UN funding to continue. While this argument may be disputed, it demonstrates the difficulty in securing regional funding for peace operations. These same fiscal limitations have an impact on the ability of the region to support institution-building efforts after a peace operation has departed, making partnerships all the more critical to these efforts.
5. Effectively Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus in the Field: Challenges and Opportunities

Institution-building needs to begin at the outset of a peace operation’s deployment. However, the approach of each mission needs to be context specific and responsive to the political and security situation on the ground. Peace operations in different phases of the mission life cycle present a diverse range of lessons to draw on when it comes to institution-building. In order to examine some of the challenges and opportunities emerging from the field, participants were divided into working groups to examine UN peace operations deployed to the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Liberia. Each of the missions selected for the working groups were at different stages in the mission-cycle: start-up working with a transitional government (Central African Republic); crisis and reconfiguration (South Sudan); and transition and draw-down (Liberia).

Several themes were identified to frame the discussions across the working groups. Prevention was noted as a key task, drawing its foundations from the UN Charter. Missions need to develop a culture of prevention in the manner that they are planned and carry out their work. But in order for conflict prevention to be most effective, it needs to be linked to early action. This requires early warning mechanisms to be deployed from the earliest moment of a mission’s deployment, often drawing on regional organizations when and where they exist to provide support. Reconciliation was also noted

39 For further background information, see Gagik Hovhannisyan and Jibecke Joensson, ‘Call for Change and Early Actions to “Save Succeeding Generations From the Scourge of War”, Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).
as a cornerstone and key to sustainable peace.

Efforts to support institution-building also require the right types of personnel, capabilities and partnerships within a peace operation. Police, justice and corrections personnel are paramount to early success and have an important role in supporting capacity-building and instilling legitimacy and trust in state institutions. Strategic communications and technology can enhance efforts to engage in dialogue with a range of stakeholders, but more work is required to examine how tools such as social media might be utilised to foster peace and increase situational awareness. Partnerships are broad ranging and can support a range of different tasks. However, further analysis is needed on the comparative advantages that the UN could bring to institution-building over other organizations and what types of partnerships could support different activities.

South Sudan

Facilitator: Dr Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway; Rapporteur: Mr Ashraf Swelam, Director, Cairo Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Egypt.

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

On 8 July 2011, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1996 authorising the deployment of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This preceded the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, following the results of a national referendum where the population voted for South Sudanese independence. In practice, UNMISS took over from the previous UN presence in Sudan (UNMIS) with a significantly reconfigured mandate.

There were high expectations within the UN system when UNMISS was authorised. The mission was deployed at the same time as the findings and outcomes of a series of different policy reviews were underway on peacekeeping, including the ‘New Horizons’ agenda. Resolution 1996 mandated UNMISS to—among other tasks—work closely with the government to support peace consolidation, state-building and economic development, develop capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law, strengthen the security and justice sectors and protect civilians.

40 United Nations, A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.
The security crisis that broke out in South Sudan on 15 December 2015 significantly changed the context in which UNMISS was operating. Security concerns and the immediate need to provide protection to tens of thousands of civilians on UN bases (in addition to those fleeing the civil war across the country) resulted in an increase in the number of troops and police deployed to the mission shortly thereafter (through resolution 2132). As the civil war continued, the Security Council decided to drastically reconfigure the mission mandate, recognising that UNMISS could no longer work alongside a government that was complicit in committing human rights abuses. Resolution 2155 was adopted on 27 May 2014 and shifted the mission focus from peacebuilding to activities primarily focused on the protection of civilians, including facilitating humanitarian access and monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses.

International and regional efforts continued in parallel to find a resolution to the conflict in the months that followed, resulting in the adoption of a peace agreement between the government (led by President Salva Kirr) and the opposition (led by Riek Machaar) in August 2015. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2241 in October 2015, outlining a series of steps and reviews needed before the Security Council adopted a more comprehensive, revised mandate to ensure UNMISS could support the implementation of the peace agreement.

At the time of writing, the Security Council was expected to adopt a new and revised mandate for UNMISS by 15 December. It is anticipated the revised mandate will focus on re-engaging in many of the institution- and capacity-building tasks which ceased as a consequence of the civil war. Yet again, UNMISS will be expected to draw on some of the best practices and findings emerging from the UN reviews supporting reform of peace operations.

The signing of the peace agreement in South Sudan in August 2015 presented challenges and opportunities for UNMISS’ engagement in the country. The UN Security Council was expected to meet in October to adopt a new mandate for the mission, which would provide further direction on the future role of UNMISS. But these developments also presented some risks for longer term peace in the country. Previous efforts to implement a ceasefire had failed. The UN had no substantive role in the peace agreement—that engagement was undertaken by regional organizations such as the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). This raised questions as to whether the
UN mission was the best placed instrument to support peace efforts going forward, or whether regional organizations such as IGAD or the African Union may be better positioned to take forward certain engagements. Notwithstanding the recent political developments, UNMISS continued to fulfil a critical role protecting the civilian population. More than 180,000 civilians continued to seek shelter on UN bases across the country. Even greater numbers of civilians required the protection beyond those bases, although the resources and capabilities of UNMISS to meet those expectations remained limited and impeded by a series of access restrictions as a consequence of a difficult relationship with the host government and opposition forces.

It was in this context that the working group examined some of the lessons for institution-building in South Sudan at the Challenges Annual Forum. This included examining the implications of the narrower mandate adopted by the mission in May 2014, which looked at the challenges of operating in an environment where the mission was required to protect civilians but had limitations on providing any form of capacity-building. It was a timely discussion given the opportunities presented by the peace agreement in terms of identifying potential areas of institution-building across the country going forward.

The working group identified several recommendations emerging out of recent developments in South Sudan. First, there is a need to clarify the role of UN peace operations when it comes to supporting and extending state authority. The original mandate for UNMISS adopted in July 2011 was focused on early peacebuilding tasks, in an effort to build the capacity of the host government institutions, including the security, police and justice sectors. However, with many of the host government institutions complicit in the events that took place in December 2013 and responsible for human rights violations against the civilian population, the mandate for the mission was significantly revised, removing nearly all of these capacity-building aspects. This undoubtedly contributed to a more hostile relationship with the host authorities and restricted options to support longer-term solutions to protect civilians. Although the HIPPO Report recommended that a peace operation should not be present where there is no political agreement to support, this was not possible for UNMISS given its role in the protection of civilians. More analysis is required on the types of support that peace operations can provide to support institution-building that may not include lending direct support to the host authorities (eg civil society and local
organizations).

Second, with a fragile peace agreement in place, UNMISS should be focusing its efforts on building trust and confidence among the parties. This is important both at headquarters in Juba and at the sub-national level. Civil affairs officers perform an important role in efforts to engage and build trust with the local communities by sharing information on the work of the mission, facilitating dialogues and discussions among local actors, often thereby supporting local reconciliation efforts. This can also provide the mission with a better understanding of some of the local drivers of conflict, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the security situation and the threats to civilians. Ensuring there is an adequate focus and investment in engaging at the sub-national levels in a peace operation can support the overall objectives of a mission in support of institution-building and facilitating better state-society relations.

Third, if the mandate for UNMISS is re-authorised, it needs to be realistic and focused on incremental steps in terms of supporting the peace agreement. Focus should be on re-engaging in building the capacity of the South Sudanese National Police Service and building institutions in civil society. This should also be coordinated with national and international efforts to support DDR and SSR activities.

Fourth and finally, UNMISS needs to prioritise efforts that support creating an environment where the civilian population ultimately feels safe and in the case of the POC sites, enable safe and voluntary returns. This requires institutions that are fulfilling their functions in society, including upholding the rule of law (justice institutions) and providing physical protection (police services). Underlying tensions which were fuelling the ethnic conflict need to be addressed through reconciliation and local conflict resolution initiatives. And those that had committed atrocities during the civil war also need to be held to account, ensuring there is no further impunity. Peace will ultimately result only when the civilian population has faith and trust in the government institutions that are intended to ensure their protection. The international community also needs to be willing to consider a range of options if there is a failure to implement the peace agreement, including the application of sanctions.

In conclusion, the working group noted the importance of ensuring the political agreement in South Sudan was upheld and implemented by the
parties. This will require ongoing engagement by regional organizations, including IGAD and the African Union, as well as the international community. It will also require appropriate analysis and planning by the UN Secretariat to ensure that the new mission mandate addresses the needs of the world’s newest country when it comes to building institutions – many of which still need to be developed from scratch.

Liberia

Facilitator and Rapporteur: Mr Bart Laan, Chief of Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia.

United Nations Mission in Liberia

On 19 September 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1509 establishing the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Authorisation to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission to Liberia followed the signing of a peace agreement in August 2003. The peace agreement came about after years of ongoing conflict, as well as the engagement and presence of a multitude of regional and UN actors in the country intended to support peacebuilding and capacity-building activities. UNMIL thus had significant challenges to overcome in order to prevent another relapse into conflict and support efforts to build sustainable peace in Liberia.

Resolution 1509 authorised the deployment of a peace operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with a POC mandate. UNMIL was mandated to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and peace process, support humanitarian and human rights activities and support security sector reform.

The outbreak of Ebola in Liberia in 2014 presented a significant challenge for the mission and highlighted the importance of peace operations in building resilient and responsive national institutions. The crisis delayed the expected drawdown of mission personnel at the time. UNMIL has also worked closely with the neighbouring UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire in terms of providing inter-mission cooperation and support during times of crisis.

Liberia is expected to transition and hand-over security responsibilities to the Liberian National Government by 30 June 2016 (according to the current resolution 2239).
Discussions on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) focused on the different aspects of institution-building that require attention as a mission is in the process of transition and drawdown. UNMIL started to draw down in 2012, but was affected by the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa during 2014. This presented challenges to the operation of the mission and highlighted the importance of ensuring that the country has effective security, governance and health institutions to manage crises, which challenge not only the maintenance of peace in the country, but also regional and international security.

The mandate re-authorising UNMIL in December 2014 noted that the mission’s transition needed to be completed by the end of 2016. This meant the mission had just over a year to finalise handover to the host authorities. Efforts were underway to implement the transition plan that had been in place since March 2015, however it had an overly optimistic timeline and many initiatives were already well behind schedule. In order to support preparations for an eventual transition, the mission continued to focus primarily on how to track change and progress, financial and resource allocation, and the allocation of security tasks.

Within this context, the working group focused its discussions on whether there were lessons that could be learned from the preparations to transition and drawdown in Liberia. This included identifying what was and was not working effectively, and whether there is a way to hold the mission accountable to the capacity-building mandate it has been given.

Building on those broader themes, the working group identified six key recommendations from its discussions. First, there needs to be an emphasis on integrated planning and to focus on the results that can be achieved through the application of existing tools, such as the Integrated Strategic Framework. Even though there are several policies, guidance documents and other tools in place to assist with a comprehensive planning approach to peace operations, they are largely under-utilised particularly at the mission leadership level.

Second, the UN needs to improve and rationalise the reporting lines within peace operations. There are already too many reporting demands placing pressure on missions which often involve significant duplication of efforts. Rather than requesting new reports as a means of measuring progress, the UN Secretariat and the Security Council should consider approaches to
rationalise reporting lines. One approach that was suggested was the creation of an integrated reporting framework, which could ensure that all entities were reporting through the same line so as to avoid duplication. Improved reporting would also assist the mission with its efforts to track progress across the mission. This was viewed as particularly important in the context of a mission, such as Liberia, entering a transition phase.

Third, in the context of mission drawdowns and transitions, the UN Country Team needs access to reliable and sustainable funding. Proper funding channels are essential to ensuring that the country team is able to continue supporting certain institution-building activities within the country once the peace operation leaves. This also requires coordination and engagement with bilateral partners, which are similarly undertaking activities in the country to support capacity-building activities.

Fourth, the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) needs to be enhanced to ensure it is well placed to provide assistance to capacity-building. While views in the working group differed on what the intended role and function of the SPC should be, there was broad consensus that the SPC was falling short of expectations and that these need to be clarified. Participants noted that one of the challenges for the SPC was that it relied on mission budgets to carry out capacity-building activities. It was noted that the SPC might be better placed to undertake capacity-building activities if it had other budget lines to draw on. Further improvements to the SPC would also include an improved roster system and additional mechanisms and arrangements in place with Member States to assist with deployments of police capacities.

Fifth, there is a need for timelines in the context of mission transitions and drawdowns, such as Liberia. Timelines for drawdown can guide the inclusion of certain capacity-building tasks in the mission mandate. It can also assist with analysis and planning to support the role of the UN Country Team, which will often have the lead in supporting the work of the host authorities when the mission exits.

Finally, missions require personnel with the right skill-sets to support capacity- and institution-building. For example, when deploying personnel to support building the capacity of the security or justice sectors, these individuals need to be prepared to transfer skills and knowledge and train other personnel. That often requires a very specific type of training and background. Missions also need to ensure that the personnel being deployed
to support capacity-building are meeting the needs on the ground, rather than the availability of personnel to deploy to a particular mission context.

In conclusion, the working group noted the importance of ensuring there is a sufficient relationship between the start-up and closing phase of a mission. Transitions and exits need to be considered from the very outset of deploying a peace operation, in order to ensure that the mandated objectives align with overall efforts to build sustainable and lasting institutions in the country. Some of the lessons emerging from the experience in Liberia could be applied to other mission’s in the process of transition and drawdown, such as the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Mission in Côte D’Ivoire (UNOCI).

Central African Republic

Facilitator: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; Rapporteur: Ms Lisa Sharland, Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Centre, and Research Adviser, Challenges Forum, Australia.

United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

On 10 April 2014, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2149 authorising the deployment of a UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). That same resolution requested a seamless transition from the previous UN presence, UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Furthermore, the mission would take over from the existing African Union deployment (MISCA) as of 15 September 2014. MINUSCA is operating in cooperation with the parallel force of French military personnel (Sangaris) as well as the European Union Training Mission (EUTM).

MINUSCA was authorised following months of sectarian violence across the country. The priority tasks of the mission under resolution 2149 included protection of civilians; support for the implementation of the transition process; facilitating humanitarian access; promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; as well as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation. The mandate took the approach of sequencing some of the tasks, identifying a second tier of tasks if the conditions permitted. These included support for security sector reform and coordinating other aspects of international
As the UN’s newest peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA has benefited from many of the best practices when it came to preparing and planning for a peace operation. The Security Council authorised the establishment of the mission in April 2014 but provided the UN six months to prepare and take over from the African Union. The mandate also drew on some early thinking regarding mandate prioritisation and sequencing. Yet MINUSCA has been plagued by several problems. The mission has still not generated the necessary military and police personnel to meet the ceilings authorised in the mandate. The political process has been struggling, with the eruption of violence in Bangui in late September 2015 challenging the capabilities of the mission and resulting in a further delay to the elections which had originally been scheduled for mid-October 2015. Many of these problems existed prior to the deployment of MINUSCA, due to the failure of dialogue and previous efforts to advance SSR and DDR.41

Within this context, the working group set out to examine what has been learnt from the establishment of the mission in the Central African Republic, as well as what lessons emerged from the crisis in late September. It examined four different issues: the role of the Bangui Forum, the mission mandate, efforts to address the conflict and support institution-building, as well as exploring the value of a political compact between various stakeholders. The Bangui Forum was held in May 2015 as an exercise for developing a peacebuilding agenda. The forum brought together more than 700 leaders, including political and military representatives, armed groups and civil society. Topics discussed at the forum included the new disarmament agreement, timelines for elections and the extension of the transitional assistance (including the work of the panel of experts). The resolution also included urgent temporary measures on an exceptional basis to maintain law and order.

The most recent mandate authorisation for MINUSCA (resolution 2217) builds on the previously mandated tasks and re-prioritises some of the existing tasks within the mission mandate (e.g supporting justice and the rule of law).

Efforts to implement the MINUSCA mandate have been hampered by ongoing sectarian violence and instability across the country. At the time of writing, planning and the conduct of elections were underway before the end of 2015.

government mandate, justice and reconciliation and social and economic priorities. It was part of an ongoing process of dialogue and an important part of that was an effort to build trust with and between the participants. For many members of the working group, this showed that CAR was more in a ‘trust building’ phase than in an ‘institution-building’ phase.

Nonetheless, there were some concerns that the Bangui Forum made an effort to be too inclusive. It was unclear who owned it or the outcomes that emerged, and that made it very difficult for the expectations of all participants to be met. This subsequently resulted in a narrative that had some overtones of rejecting the international community, which was problematic given the role of MINUSCA and various international stakeholders in supporting the electoral process. While the Bangui Forum was viewed as an important mechanism and process for political dialogue, it raised broader questions within the working group about how you get the balance right between inclusivity and representation, and ensuring such forums identify outcomes which will enable a political solution to the ongoing conflict.

Planning and development of the mission mandate in MINUSCA attempted to draw on best practices at the time. As one participant noted, MINUSCA had one of the best planning processes, since it was inclusive and drew together different parts of the UN system. Key elements in the mandate include protection of civilians, support to the transition and extension of state authority and technical support for elections, support for national and international justice and the rule of law, support to justice and corrections, DDR, as well as urgent temporary measures. Reflecting an effort to better prioritise and sequence the mandate, some tasks such as SSR were identified as non-core priorities, to be undertaken at a later stage. Yet despite this comprehensive approach, the mission has struggled to implement the mandate and address some of the drivers of conflict. One gap throughout the mission planning process has been a lack of understanding and local knowledge about the conflict in CAR. This has been affecting the mission’s overall efforts, including its ability to engage in any institution-building efforts with the transitional government.

The crisis in Bangui in September in 2015 demonstrated that there are still many aspect of unresolved conflict in the country. It showed that considerable ethnic tensions remain between the Muslim and Christian communities, with the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka able to mobilise quickly,
inflict violence on the civilian population and continue to destabilise the political process. There remains a vacuum of leadership. While the elections were intended to replace the transitional government, there is no guarantee that those winning the elections will be perceived as legitimate and representative among the local actors, including those that continue to generate conflict. Furthermore, there is no coordinated approach to institution-building or to manage expectations among the stakeholders when it comes to MINUSCA’s approach to justice reform, DDR or SSR. This has led to misunderstanding and distrust among many of the national stakeholders.

One idea of how to address some of the political challenges was the development of a compact between the UN and the host government in the Central African Republic. This was a recommendation that emerged from the HIPPO Report in the context of articulating the responsibilities of the host government when it comes to issues such as the protection of civilians.42 It was noted during the discussion that the idea of compacts have grown out of the development dialogue, including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. They have the potential to help manage expectations, which is particularly important during the ‘honeymoon phase’ (early period) of a peace operation. If you had a compact that captured the maximum boundary of what you wish for a mission to achieve, this could be helpful. But if you add another document that needs to be negotiated from the outset, then that could be too much of a distraction. Discussions in the working group focused on the scope, inclusivity and timing of a political compact in the context of CAR, with differing views on whether it would assist in building trust and supporting the political process.

The working group identified five key recommendations from its discussions. First, the situation in CAR has demonstrated the importance of strategic communications. The Bangui Forum was an example of engaging and communicating between different local actors, the host authorities, armed groups and international actors among the international community. While the Forum was not perfect, it was a critical mechanism in an effort to build trust and communicate among actors that could shape the political and security environment.

Second, the UN needs to have a better understanding of the contexts it is deploying into. Many participants found it astonishing that despite several

previous UN presences in CAR, there was still a lack of understanding about the drivers of the conflict. Part of this requires talking to the right people, including those that have had a long standing presence in the country such as NGOs and representatives of civil society.

Third, the developments in CAR demonstrated the importance of local level work through civil affairs and human rights components at the sub-national levels. Civil affairs officers in particular facilitate understanding reconciliation and trust-building initiatives. Yet civil affairs officers in particular do not have the support required at UN Headquarters, with two staff supporting the work of approximately 1,000 civil affairs officers in the field. Some participants noted the need to revise the level of support being provided to the work of civil affairs officers at UN headquarters.

Fourth, it is critical that there is an international and coordinated approach among partners on security issues. One example where this has been particularly important in CAR is around the issue of DDR, where MINUSCA has been the coordinator, but not the leader. There are different visions and expectations among the stakeholders. It is unclear who is undertaking the vetting and there has been difficulties getting the armed groups engaged in the process. Managing expectations is critical. For example, expectations will need to be managed with the establishment of the special court, particularly in terms of supply and demand on funding and resources.

Finally, compacts may provide a means of articulating commitments between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the host government, thereby facilitating an improved partnership and the building of trust. But further examination and analysis is needed on what value-added a compact might provide. For example, what would it cover? Who would be a party to it? How broad would it be in application? Would it add value to the UN Security Council resolution? Would it differ conceptually to a development compact? It was agreed that these concepts need to be explored further.

The working group concluded that in order for there to be a more effective approach to institution-building in the Central African Republic, it will be important that MINUSCA manages expectations through strategic communications, engages a wider range of stakeholders and ensures it facilitates a sense of national ownership.
Key Findings and Conclusions

Effective, trusted and sustainable institutions are critical to maintaining peace and security in conflict-affected countries. While peace operations often play an important role in extending state authority, they also need to explore ways to foster and develop state-society relations. By examining the field contexts in South Sudan, Liberia and the Central African Republic, several lessons were identified to improve the institution-building activities of peace operations.

Peace operations need to deploy with the right capabilities and personnel from the outset of a mission to engage with local communities and support capacity-building. Further resources are needed at headquarters to support the work of civil affairs officers, who are vital to facilitate engagement with local communities, civil society actors and to support sub-national engagement. Missions also need to assess the capacity-building needs on the ground and identify the profiles of personnel that can address those gaps (eg those that can transfer skills, policing, administrative functions), focusing on demand rather than supply. Funding and support to the SPC and the use of the roster systems should be reviewed to ensure they are meeting the needs of peace operations, particularly in the early phase of mission deployment.

Missions also need to manage the expectations of the international and local community through more strategic communications. This includes both traditional and non-traditional media, such as social media. Closing this gap would help ensure that there is less hostility towards peace operations in situations where expectations are not being met and foster trust and confidence among the local community in terms of the activities being undertaken by the peace operation to support institution-building initiatives.

Strategic analysis and planning are critical to increasing understanding and awareness of how a peace operation can shape and influence the conflict environment it may be deploying into. Failure to understand the drivers of conflict will make a peace operation ineffective in its efforts to engage politically with the parties and identify the priorities that need to be addressed to improve the immediate security situation, including threats to the civilian population. Missions need to prepare and plan for eventual exits from the outset of their deployment. Sequencing of mandates may assist in ensuring the right priorities are addressed at different phases of the peace operation and that there is a timeline to measure progress against.

Ultimately, any efforts to support institution-building require a coordinated
and comprehensive approach among all of the stakeholders involved. This might include the development of a compact between the UN and the host authorities, which could assist in articulating the responsibilities and expectations among the parties. But the use and application of compacts needs to be analysed further to ensure they can provide support to the implementation of the mandate. Further coordination is also needed to ensure there is sustainable funding to support institution-building activities, particularly when a mission is entering the drawdown and transition phase and preparing to hand over to the UN country team or other international actors. Efforts to track the success of a mission could also be measured better with a more coordinated approach to reporting, with a more integrated reporting framework. This would require focus on developments in the field, rather than internal processes—a key recommendation emerging from the HIPPO Report.
6. Conclusions and Looking to the Future

Chair: Major General Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic Expert-Council; Panellists: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member of the UN Secretary-General’s Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, Russia; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden; Mr Davit Tonoyan, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Armenia.

The Challenges Forum 2015 took place at a critical juncture in the reform of UN peace operations. Discussions over the two days drew on experience from a range of disciplines and highlighted the importance of a coherent, cooperative and comprehensive approach to addressing the recommendations in the reviews in order to support institution- and capacity-building in UN peace operations. Discussions demonstrated a diverse range of views and perspectives on the challenges that need to be addressed going forward. In part this was reflective of the different backgrounds and experiences of the participants. This added significant value and a different dimension to the discussions, which assisted in developing a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach to some of the challenges presented.

Participants agreed that the reviews presented a historical and unprecedented opportunity to improve the approach of the UN system and the wider international community to institution- and capacity-building. But in order for these efforts to be successful, the various stakeholders involved—the Security Council, the UN Secretariat, Member States, troop and police contributing countries, regional organizations and donors—would need to work in partnership at all levels and with one another to implement the reforms.

Peace operations provide an important vehicle for undertaking institution- and capacity-building activities in countries emerging from conflict. But they are increasingly being deployed into contexts where there are still active hostilities and no peace to keep. In these situations, peacekeepers can have a
comparative advantage over other peacebuilding actors with the ability to use force and act as a deterrent against threats to civilians. Such efforts can result in early security gains that build the space for a more substantive political dialogue. However, as demonstrated by the context in South Sudan, peace operations may be operating in environments where the host authorities, armed groups and spoilers challenge the implementation of the mission mandate, complicating efforts at undertaking early institution- and capacity-building tasks. These contexts highlight the centrality and importance of political solutions to efforts to bring about sustainable peace, something noted in both the HIPPO Report and the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.

Efforts by peace operations to provide physical protection and establish a protective environment for civilians contribute to institution-building activities within peace operations. But concerns were expressed about the resources, capabilities and willingness of countries to engage in activities to protect civilians. The ability to establish early gains in a volatile security context is often limited as the UN Secretariat struggles to rapidly generate personnel and resources to deploy to a peacekeeping mission context. It was hoped that commitments made at the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, along with the establishment of improved force generation processes, will provide the UN Secretariat with more options when it comes to rapid deployment and managing the performance of troops and police in the field. If these initiatives were successful, they could assist peace operations in establishing security from the outset of a mission deployment or soon after a crisis breaks out, creating the time and space for ongoing capacity-building activities.

Security sector reform is an important component in peacekeeping mandates and a critical means for establishing security in a country (and building longer-term institutional capacity to protect civilians). However, concerns were expressed that these activities are often vastly under-resourced and lack programmatic funding. Even where donor funding is available to draw on, it is often short-term, resulting in programs that are unsustainable. Reforming the security sector, rule of law and governance institutions can take several generations and requires ongoing investment, well beyond the life-cycle of a peace operations. In many instances, missions also do not have the right expertise or capabilities to draw on. Several participants noted there are many initiatives underway to improve police training and guidance on some of these aspects, including through the policing Strategic Guidance Framework.
However, ongoing support will be required to take these reforms forward and further analysis is needed on the role that the UN system and peace operations undertake in supporting reform of the defence sector as well.

Sustainable financing and resourcing are also critical in supporting capacities at headquarters and in the field to implement activities in support of institution-building. This includes capacities such as civil affairs officers, who perform a vital role in engaging with local communities on their needs and concerns, as well as communicating mission activities. Similarly, gender advisers ensure that missions are taking a gender-sensitive approach when planning operations and activities. However, despite the important and enabling role of these capacities, they are not being prioritised nor receiving the support often required from the UN Secretariat due to a lack of dedicated funding. In order for peace operations to understand the needs of the local community, they need resources, capabilities and training to listen and engage.

The case studies of South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Liberia identified commonalities in technical approaches, but also cautioned against taking a templated approach to peace operations when it came to institution-building. Each situation requires a context-specific response, recognising that institution-building is an inherently political process. National ownership is important, but peace operations also need to focus on fostering state-society relations in order to ensure that institutions are more resilient and political sustainable in the event of crises.

In taking forward the recommendations of the reviews, Member States need to ensure that UN peace operations have the strategies and tools to support institution- and capacity-building. For example, recommendations to adopt political compacts and develop and implement strategic communications could benefit from further analysis and Member State support.

Participants agreed that the implementation of the various recommendations of the reviews will be a complex undertaking in the year ahead. Each review has different processes and constituencies to support their implementation. The Secretariat has to tell Member States what it needs and Member States have to identify their priorities. In the case of peacekeeping, the C-34 will play a pivotal role in that process, as will other bodies in the General Assembly. As one participant noted, Member States need to ‘move to where the puck is’. In other words, Member States need to be proactive in
discussing and identifying reforms across all the reviews that would make UN peace operations a more effective tool in supporting institution- and capacity-building.

The Armenian hosts, concluded by underlining the importance of lessons learned and best practices, combined with sophisticated situational awareness of the host country’s specific historical, cultural and political context, for the ongoing efforts to enhance the effective implementation of peace operations. The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the First Deputy Minister of Defence noted that the discussions during the two-day Forum served as a useful starting point in identifying key recommendations and prospects for reform.

The Challenges Forum 20 year Anniversary in May 2016 will provide a further opportunity to continue these discussions and identify priorities ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security on 10-11 May 2016.
Appendix 1. Programme

Monday, 5 October 2015

Opening Remarks and Welcome

Chair: Maj. Gen. Dr. Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Insitute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council

Speaker: Dr Seyran Ohanyan, Minister of Defence, Armenia; Dr Edward Nalbandian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University, Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council, Russia; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Session 1 | Outcomes of the UNSG’s Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations: Current Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Focus: During the past year, the UN in cooperation with the international community has engaged in a comprehensive effort to review the current state of UN peace operations, the environment in which they are operating as well as the results that they are (and are not) achieving. What lessons can we learn from the UNSG’s Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations and the Global Study on the implementation of SCR 1325 not only about the main challenges, but also the opportunities of peace operations? What can traditional peacekeeping achieve that robust peacekeeping cannot and vice versa, and what impact does the implementation of SCR 1325 have on the outcomes? What can (and what cannot) the UN do to fulfill its relatively newly acquired responsibility to protect civilians? Is better and clearer mandate formation a means for making UN peace operations more effective? What are the implications of the findings of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Global Study on the Implementation of SCR 1325 on institution- and capacity-building?

Chair: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Russia Background Paper: Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom

Background Paper: Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Member, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Norway
Speakers: Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Member, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Norway; Lt. Gen. Abhijit Guha, Member, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, India; Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Dr Alan Ryan, Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre

Lunch Key Note | Update and Results from the 2015 Peacekeeping Summit

Chair: Maj. Gen. (Retd) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum, United Kingdom

Speakers: Ms Anne A. Witkowsky, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Department of Defence, United States

Session 2 | Outcomes of the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Current Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Focus: The peacebuilding architecture has also benefited from a large review effort over the last months. What does the Panel Report reveal about the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s achievements during its ten years of existence? What lessons are there to be learnt from ongoing peacebuilding initiatives, in particular about ensuring national ownership and the implementation of SCR 1325? How can the lessons learnt best be used in connection to the implementation of SDG 16? How can the UN and the international community better engage in strengthening and extending state authority in the face of the fragility of states? What means and methods does it have at its disposal to enhance institution- and capacity-building in divided societies? How can the international community’s need for a common strategy for peacebuilding be reconciled with specific societies’ need for a localized solution, and what role can regional organizations play therein?

Chair: Mr Amr Aljowaily, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for United Nations Affairs, Egypt

Background Paper: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Russia

Speakers: H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; Mr Stefan Feller, Police Adviser, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; Ms Sarah Hearn, Associate Director, Senior Fellow, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom; Dr Alexander Tsinker, President of the International Expert Center for Electoral Systems, Director of East European States and Commonwealth of Independent States Institute, Israel
Dinner Keynote: H.E. Mr Michael Grant, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada

Tuesday, 6 October 2015

Session 3 | Institution-building as a Bridge between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus

Focus: The Security Council frequently references institution-building in its mandates despite the lack of a common understanding. What falls under institution-building, and what does not? How distinct is institution-building from, and how does it overlap with peacebuilding and the extension and restoration of state authority? What doctrines, policies and guidelines on institution-building for peace are there and what are the gaps? How can stabilization and the extension and restoration of state authority better be integrated into the formation of peacekeeping mandates as well as mission planning processes? What is the desired early peacebuilding “end state” in terms of safety and security? What are the lessons learned and best practices of institution-building as a connecting link in the security and peace nexus? And what role can specialized international organizations play therein?

Chair: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

Background Paper: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

Speakers: Dr Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway; Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Director Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University; Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Scientific-Expert Council, Russia; Mr Bart Laan, Chief, Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia

Introduction to Working Groups Session | Effectively Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus in the Field – Challenges and Opportunities

Focus: Exploring and making recommendations on institution- and capacity-building as a way to bridge peacekeeping and peacebuilding, looking at three specific case studies - South Sudan, Central African Republic and Liberia - in three separate working groups.

Chair: Dr Jibecke Joensson, Head (Acting) of Policy and Best Practices, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, and Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia
**Background Paper:** Dr. Jibecke Joensson, Head (Acting) of Policy and Best Practices, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, and Dr. Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia

**Working Group Facilitators**

**South Sudan:** Dr. Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway

**Central African Republic:** Ms. Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

**Liberia:** Mr. Bart Laan, Chief of Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia

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**Concluding Session | Looking to the Future**

**Chair:** Maj. Gen. Dr. Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic-Experts Council

**Speakers:** Mr. Davit Tonoyan, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Armenia; Mr. Alexander Ilitchev, Member, UN Secretary-General's Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, Russia; Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
Appendix 2. Participants List

A

Mr Jonas Alberoth, Deputy Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Lt. Khaled Alhmoud, Head, Archive Section, Peacekeeping Operations Training Center, Jordanian Public Security Directorate, Jordan

Mr Amr Aljowaily, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for United Nations Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Col. Ahmed Alsayydeh, Director, Police Peacekeeping Operation Training Center, Jordanian Public Security Directorate, Jordan

Maj. Aiham Alshahwan, Head of International Cooperation Division, Police Peacekeeping Operation Training Center, Jordanian Public Security Directorate, Jordan

Ms Zara Amatuni, Head of Communication and Prevention Programs, Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to Armenia, ICRC

Mr Saad Ansari, Defense Fellow, Department of Defense, United States

Mr Swelam Ashraf, Director, Cairo Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Egypt

Mr Levon Ayvazyan, Head, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense, Armenia

B

H. E. Mr Suresh Babu Thadipaneni, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Embassy of India to Armenia, India

Mr Nick Birnback, Director, Public Affairs, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

Maj. Dan Brice, Acting U.S. Defense Attaché, Embassy of the United States to Armenia, United States

Ms Maureen Brown, Senior Police Adviser, Challenges Forum, United Kingdom

Mr Christoph Buehler, Diplomatic Officer, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

Maj. Gen. Evgeny Bulavintsev, Military and Air Attaché, Embassy of the Russian Federation to Armenia, Russia

Mr Bradley Busetto, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative for the Republic of Armenia, United Nations

Lt. Col. Jonny Borjesson, Gender and Military Adviser, Challenges Forum, Swedish Armed Forces, Sweden

C

H. E. Mr Lukas Casser, Embassy of Switzerland to Armenia, Switzerland

Brig. Gen. Lars-Olof Corneliusson, Military Adviser, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Dr Cedric de Coning, Director of Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway

Col. Andre Demers, Director Peacekeeping Policy, Canadian Armed Forces, Canada

Ms Caroline Doulliez, Head, Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to Armenia, ICRC

H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, United Nations

Dr Dirk Lorenz, Counsellor, Head of Political, Economic, Press and Information Section, Delegation of the European Union to Armenia, European Union

Ms Patricia Enhorning, Desk Officer, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Mr Marten Ehnberg, Charge d’Affaires, Embassy of Sweden to Armenia, Sweden

Ms Judith Farnworth, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Embassy of the United Kingdom to Armenia, United Kingdom

Mr Stefan Feller, United Nations Police Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Prof. William Flavin, Assistant Director, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States

Mr Johan Fredborn Larsson, Desk Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Maj. John Friel, Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, United States Embassy, Armenia

H.E. Mr Lukas Gasser, Ambassador of Switzerland in Armenia

Ms Alison Giffen, Senior Adviser for Peacekeeping, Department of State, United States

Ms Dina Gilmudtinova, Second Secretary, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia

Mr Andrew Goldston, Strategic Police Advisor to the Stabilisation Unit, National Police Chiefs’ Council, United Kingdom

Mr Bonian Golmohammadi, Secretary-General, World Federation of United Nations Associations, United Nations

Maj. Gen. (retd) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum, United Kingdom

H.E. Mr Michael Grant, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada

Col. Li Guangya, Military Attaché, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to Armenia, China

Lt. Gen. Abhijit Guha, Member, United Service Institution of India and former Member of UNSG’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, India
Lt. Gen. Movses Hakobyan, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Armenian Armed Forces, Armenia

Ms Sarah Hearn, Associate Director, Senior Fellow, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Founder and Director, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

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INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policy-makers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The Forum contributes to shaping the debate by identifying critical challenges facing military, police and civilian peace operations, by promoting awareness of emerging issues, and by generating recommendations and solutions for the consideration of the broader international peace operations community. The Challenges Forum is a global endeavor, with its Partnership encompassing Partners from the Global South and North, major Troop and Police Contributing Countries as well as the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.
The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Efforts to address the complex and diverse range of challenges facing peace operations require a complementary, coherent and integrated approach across the UN system and among international stakeholders. This is critical to ensuring that peace operations are prepared and able to support sustainable peace. The Annual Forum Report 2015 examines these challenges departing from an analysis of the recommendations and outcomes of several major reviews and developments throughout the year, including the reviews on UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, as well as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Forum agreed that partnerships among all stakeholders are essential to progress on the recommendations across these reviews and to improve the approach of peace operations to institution- and capacity-building.

This report comprises a comprehensive summary of the presentations, discussions and background materials of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 on 'Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Review Panels’ Recommendations for Future Missions'. It also presents a number of targeted recommendations derived from the speakers’ and participants’ views on the current challenges of peace operations.