



# Realizing Effective and Dynamic Cooperation for Peace Operations

New York, 14–15 February 2013

## Challenges Forum Seminar Report

The Challenges Forum, in cooperation with the Permanent Missions of Argentina, Sweden and Switzerland to the United Nations, hosted a seminar on *Realizing Effective and Dynamic Cooperation for Peace Operations* on 14–15 February 2013 in New York. The seminar gathered a broad group of permanent mission representatives, senior UN officials, and the think-tank community to discuss the dynamic global context of peacekeeping.

### *Keynote address*

In his keynote remarks, **Mr Jean Marie Guéhenno**, Patron of the Challenges Forum, reflected on the role and contribution of the Challenges Forum as an apolitical network of people and organizations who care about peacekeeping; a network whose relevance was highlighted by the need for peacekeeping to continue to adapt to the shifting challenges posed by international conflict. Fresh from chairing a Presidential panel on France’s future defence requirements, he stated that in this emerging environment force matters. While the UN hitherto had a doctrine that called for a military capability merely to raise the threshold of force sufficient to prevent disruption of fragile peace processes by random spoilers, the spoilers themselves were now strengthening and adapting. Often state-sponsored and well-equipped, they now posed an asymmetric but serious and growing threat to peace operations. Confronting this threat is an emerging challenge.

The use of force on its own was an inadequate tool; it had to support a strong and coherent political process. The Security Council needed to be clear that mandates designed to just “whack” spoilers were insufficient. New capacities were also needed. Experience had shown that blue-helmeted troops in large numbers were not the best answer; large, static and cumbersome forces created heavy ‘footprints’ and over time, negative reactions within the host nations. Equally, smaller forces with high capability needed good mobility and good intelligence to deal with asymmetric threats. The UN struggled to produce forces with the needed tactical and strategic mobility as well as the intelligence and precision weaponry needed to minimize collateral damage amongst civilians (whom the UN was mandated to

protect). At the same time, strong police and civilian capacities were essential to develop an overarching political framework. He believed the UN remained fragmented about this but he was clear that the political stabilization agenda should take precedence over the developmental one. Meanwhile, it was insufficient to develop the UN's military capability without paying close attention to the other civilian-led pillars.

Turning to command and control issues within this threat environment, Mr Guéhenno wondered whether it was practical to have all high capability military enablers under UN command and control. Civilian and military command and control cultures are very different. 'Political supremos are not necessarily the answer': what was needed were confident and competent civilian and military leaders who knew when and where to take the lead and when to support. However, if there was no strategic direction and no political unity the inherent fragilities in UN command and control would "kill any peace process. Finally, he believed that the institutional ambiguities in the Security Council's mandating process, given the P5's very different views on how to handle intra-state conflict, meant that successful peacekeeping needed clear-sighted and competent leaders, both civilian and military, who were prepared to take risks in the interpretation and implementation of their mandates.

In questions, he amplified his belief that UN peacekeeping was designed for stabilization and not war, and that in the context of emerging complex and sophisticated asymmetric threats, UN peacekeeping needed to develop "entry points" and liaison mechanisms for high capability enablers to be harnessed in support of peace operations. He used Mali as an example to summarize his arguments. He believed that any Malian solution needed a strong and unified political process, combined with a stabilizing international peacekeeping force able to signal the international community's intent and engagement, supported by a non-UN high capability quick reaction force, able to deal with more complex threats. The command and control of such an enterprise needed further discussion and development.

### *Opening remarks*

The seminar was jointly opened by **Ambassador Joy Ogwu**, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN, and **Ambassador Mårten Grunditz**, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN. The Director-General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, **Mr Sven-Eric Söder**, then introduced the UN Deputy Secretary-General, **Mr Jan Eliasson**, and invited him to reflect on the future of peace operations.

**Mr Eliasson** outlined the emerging complex environment for peace operations, characterized by ethnic, sectarian and religious tensions and regional dynamics in which asymmetric threats were prevalent and the victims were the civilians caught up in warfare and egregious human rights abuses. The international response to this environment entailed a focus on peace (security), human rights and rule of law, and development and these intertwined pillars had to be kept in balance.

Turning to the challenges of this, he believed that each situation needed a separate and deep analysis, deploying political and cultural sensitivity. There was no place for template solutions. At the same time multidimensional peace operations required a better dialogue and closer cooperation with the relevant regional organizations. The UN Charter's Chapter VIII anticipated the need for this engagement but the right balance between the responsibilities of the Security Council and the ambitions of the regional organizations, such as the AU's, had not yet been found. Additionally, any peace operation now needed to include a strong and early focus on human rights and rule of law issues. But there were risks in this process, as traditional principles of impartiality/neutrality and non use of force except in self-defence, gave way to strong political engagement and more 'muscular' interventionist approaches, such as the concept of 'intervention brigades' in the eastern parts of the DRC and the French action in Mali, are akin to peace enforcement. He pondered how the UN would manage to balance this approach with its need to continue humanitarian operations and uphold humanitarian principles. In conclusion, he quoted former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in saying that the future was not just the vision on the horizon but also the steps that needed to be taken tomorrow. Peace operations had to be pragmatic, and in so being, needed to establish mechanisms to coordinate and integrate the needed security, human rights and developmental pillars delivering a comprehensive approach on the ground to match the situation. This required early warning systems, thorough analysis and integrated planning, combined with the political will to take preventative action.

The Director of the Challenges Forum Secretariat, **Ms Annika Hilding Norberg** then welcomed the delegates, outlined the purpose and nature of the Challenges Partnership and Forum, introduced the seminar program, invited all to contribute to and attend future Forums, and briefed on the five thematic work strands currently being undertaken by the Partners: Future Concepts and Models for Peace Operations; Comparative Policies, Principles and Guidelines within Peace Operations; Authority, Command and Control; Impact Evaluation and Assessment; and Support for the Strategic Guidance Framework for UN Police.

The first session was concluded by a briefing from **Mr Thomas Gürber**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN, and **Dr Thierry Tardy**, Head of Research, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, on the key points generated at the Challenges Annual Forum in Geneva in May 2012. **Mr Gürber's** points were that: the absence of the rule of law was both a root cause and a consequence of crisis; peacekeeping operations should have a holistic role in combating transnational organized crime; and attention needed to be paid to building and supporting local capacities in the (re-)establishment of the rule of law. Concerning the nexus between peace operations, humanitarian space and the protection of civilians, he reported that it needed a broad strategic framework with conceptual clarity to integrate the comprehensive efforts of all stakeholders. **Dr Tardy** spoke on institutional cooperation and the triangular relationship between the Security Council, the TCCs and the Secretariat. While there was some evidence of a degree of inter-institutional cooperation it tended to be through operational necessity rather than any strategic design; while flexibility in relations was desirable they

still needed to work within a structure rather than being ad hoc; and there were numerous differences and difficulties between international and regional organizations which needed to be understood and managed if institutional cooperation was to improve. Some solutions offered were in the area of joint assessment mechanisms, joint lessons learned exercises and joint tasking and planning mechanisms. Turning to the triangular relationship, he identified that solutions lay in looking beyond the three entities to the necessary strategic outcomes; while there were some basic dichotomies between financial contributing countries and troop-contributing countries (TCCs), a global, balanced and fair division of tasks was needed; some progress had been made in improving the trilateral dialogue but more needed to be done; there was a view amongst some that TCCs should have a stronger role in mandate formulation and implementation; and the Secretariat needed a better and closer dialogue with TCCs and the host country.

#### *Evolving UN and Regional Partnerships in Africa: Issues from Somalia and Mali*

The session was introduced and chaired by **Mr Masud Husain**, Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the UN to the UN. The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, **Ms Ameerah Haq**, began by calling attention to the Security Council’s Resolution 2086 of 26 January 2013, which firmly rooted early peacebuilding in integrated multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Moreover it underlined the importance of partnership with regional and sub-regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Having said that she spoke about the challenges of bifurcated command and control in UNAMID and stressed the need for a unity of strategic vision for successful partnership. In Somalia, the UN was providing the logistic support to AMISOM but also needed to be alert to its responsibilities for UN human rights and “due diligence”. This principle was equally true to any future arrangement in Mali. The theoretical transfer of AFISMA troops to the UN could not just be automatic; there must be a certification process, with a focus on human rights. This would take time. Peace operations were moving into new untested fields requiring flexibility and close dialogue.

**Dr Walid Abdelkarim** from the UN DPKO with special responsibility for Somalia and the UN support to the AU, began by saying that the recommendations outlined in the Prodi Report of 2008, regarding the strategic relationship between the UN and the AU, were still valid, if not fully implemented. Speaking on Somalia, he believed that DFS’s support to AMISOM had increased its efficiency “several fold”. However while the AU was capable of deploying enforcement operations (and were in the process accepting casualties at a rate that would be unsustainable within the UN) the AU’s command and control arrangements were still immature and very different from the UN’s. AU operations were still run mainly from the capitals of the troop-contributing countries and not from AU headquarters. Moreover, the AU was keen to develop its multidimensional civilian capacities but was challenged by capacity gaps in policy, funding and strategic planning in an area which the UN believed lay more logically within its own remit and established expertise. At core any partnership strategy which saw the UN providing the political framework, and the AU providing the military component, depended upon

there being no gap in overall strategic vision. There still remained a debate about building (and funding) a comprehensive AU peacekeeping capacity when much of this capacity already existed within the UN. DPKO's view of UNAMID was different from the AU. DPKO did not see Darfur as a model for cooperation between the AU and the UN. More generally, there existed challenges such as the role of neighbours in peace operations, and the absence of AU police and rule of law capabilities, which were problematic for the UN. Further complications were the engagement of sub-regional entities such as IGAD (taking a lead in Somalia) and ECOWAS (in Mali) whose policies needed closer harmonization with the AU's. Improved future cooperation depended upon a shared strategic framework and closer integration of planning.

Finally speaking via video link from Bamako, Mali, was **Major General Shehu Abdulkadir**, Force Commander of AFISMA. He believed that AFISMA was a major test for the AU's sub-regional organizations and its peace and security architecture. Currently they faced challenges. The deployed 5400 troops were unable to meet the mission requirements and he doubted that even the newly pledged 8000 (or a possible 10000) would be sufficient. Better conflict analysis and pre-planning assessment was needed in the future, with the UN being involved earlier. Current challenges were: a lack of logistic and medical support (there was only one Level 2 Hospital); problems with refugees and little coordination by OCHA of NGOs; delayed deployments; and insufficient knowledge and equipment within most TCCs to manage desert and anti-terrorist operations. The timely French deployment helped AFISMA, but they were still very dependent upon French intelligence for their operations. He believed there should be more involvement by neighbours to help fill these gaps. More generally, he believed that the UN should examine further ways of empowering and supporting sub-regional operations, especially by establishing joint planning mechanisms.

#### *Enhancing peace operations through the use of modern technology?*

The afternoon session was chaired by **Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al Hussein**, Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, **Mr Hervé Ladsous**, noted that the UN had too much reliance on "old generation tools". This drove a dependence on more technically capable organizations to meet some of the international community's operational requirements. Modern technology enhanced mission personnel safety and mandate delivery, especially in an era which calls for a better protection of civilians. He listed the many technological gaps currently within UN peace operations including air reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), night vision capabilities, radar scanning and location, and real time command and information systems and blue-force trackers. He noted that the M23 was successful in the operations around Goma in December 2012 at the expense of the UN and the FARDC, because they were able to see and move at night. The new UN Infantry Battalion Manual developed by DPKO identified many modern capabilities required by forces able and equipped to operate in the context of robust peacekeeping. All this required a change in the modus operandi of UN peacekeeping. To start this process and in response to a Security Council request

for more high technology equipment in MONUSCO, DPKO/DFS are letting a procurement contract for three UAVs to operate out of Goma to undertake monitoring and surveillance tasks in support of the protection of civilians mandate and with the full agreement of the Government of the DRC.

**Dr Walter Dorn** from the Royal Military College of Canada premised that technology was in the service of humanity and provided an ever-vigilant eye that kept watch on behalf of peace. The UN now needed more than the eyeball and the binocular. The dilemma was that where conflict was most dangerous lay the greatest requirement for good monitoring and surveillance; so protection had become as important as monitoring. He illustrated the many technologies available now to assist peacekeepers in their monitoring duties, which balanced a reduced intrusiveness with improved safety and observation. In discussion the issue was raised of technology (or its absence) providing an excuse for non-engagement by Northern states in UN peace operations. In contrast Mr Ladsous saw the drive for better technology as an opportunity to get more engagement by the technologically capable member states. However expectations needed to be managed and better technology was only a tool and not a substitute for good leadership and decision-making and eyes on the ground.

#### *Concluding session*

**Ambassador Maria Perceval**, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN, discussed the role and contribution of Argentina to peacekeeping and formally invited all Partners and delegates to the next Challenges Annual Forum to be held in September 2013 in Buenos Aires. Reflecting upon the 'Way Ahead' **Under-Secretary-General Ladsous**, identified the high likelihood both of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia within two years and a close partnership of some nature in Mali. At the same time DPKO was tracking Syria closely with a view to some future role and adapting its position in DRC to accommodate "intervention brigades". The climate was therefore one of volatility and adaptability. SCR 2086 of 26 January 2013 was a significant and holistic text for the future of peacekeeping operations, and if the intervention brigades were approved UN peace operations would be in a new era of stabilization efforts coterminous and concurrent with combat operations. This was indeed a challenge for peacekeeping.

In his closing remarks to the Seminar, **Mr Henrik Stiernblad**, Deputy Director of the Challenges Forum Secretariat, reviewed the significant outcomes of the various sessions and added that in addition to those discussed there were possibly other capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats. There could be advantages in the use of specialized police units to counter spoilers engaged in transnational organized crime and in terrorism. Many police organizations in the world, including in South America, have developed significant skills in fighting serious security threats from armed elements during recent years. He concluded by thanking the hosts, chairs and speakers of the various sessions, the Challenges Forum Patron, the Senior Adviser, the support of all the Challenges' Partners, and finally the staff of the Challenges Forum Secretariat.

Realizing Effective and Dynamic Cooperation for Peace Operations  
Challenges Forum Seminar in New York

The Union League Club  
38 East 37th Street  
New York, 14-15 February 2013

Co-hosted by the Permanent Representatives of  
Argentina, Sweden and Switzerland to the United Nations

**Thursday, 14 February 2013 (The Union League Club Library 6-8 pm)**  
*Opening Reception*

**The Dynamic Global Context: Risks and Opportunities for Peace Operations**

*Keynote Speech*

Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations,  
former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

**Friday, 15 February 2013 (The Union League Club Lincoln Hall)**

**0930-1015 Registration and Coffee**

**1015–1115 Opening and Introduction**

*Co-Chairs*

H.E. Mr Mårten Grunditz, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations  
H.E. Ms U. Joy Ogwu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, Chair of the  
United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

*Reflections on the Future of Peace Operations*

H.E. Mr Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General, United Nations  
*Introduced by* Mr Sven-Eric Söder, Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

*The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations – Status and Issues*

Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director, Challenges Forum Secretariat

*Key points generated at the Challenges Annual Forum 2012*

Dr Thierry Tardy, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland  
*Introduced by* Mr. Thomas Gürber, Minister, Chargé d'Affairs a.i., Deputy Permanent  
Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

**1115–1215 Evolving UN and Regional Partnerships in Africa: Issues from Somalia  
and Mali**

*Chair*

Mr Masud Husain, Minister Counsellor, Chargé d'Affairs a.i., Permanent Mission of Canada to  
the United Nations

H.E. Ms Ameerah Haq, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, United Nations

Dr. Walid Abdelkarim, Principal Officer and Team Leader for Somalia and Support to the African Union, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Major General Shehu Abdulkadir, Force Commander, AFISMA (via video link)

Discussion

**1215-1300 Luncheon Reception**

**1300-1400 Enhancing Effective Peace Operations: How Do We Make Better Use of Modern Technology?**

*Chair*

H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al Hussein, Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations

H.E. Mr Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Dr. Walter Dorn, Royal Military College of Canada, Chair, Department of Security and International Affairs, Canadian Forces College

Discussion

**1400-1430 Concluding Session**

*Invitation to the Challenges Annual Forum 2013*

H.E. Ms Maria Perceval, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations

*The Way Ahead*

H.E. Mr Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

*Closing Remarks*

Mr Henrik Stiernblad, Deputy Director, Challenges Forum Secretariat; former Police Commissioner, United Nations Mission in Liberia